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Abstract 
Although the conundrums of why states falter, how they are reconstituted, and under what 
conditions war may be constitutive of state-making have received much scholarly attention, 
they are still hotly debated by academics and policy analysts. Advancing a novel conceptual 
framework and analysing diverse Somali state trajectories between 1960 and 2010, this 
thesis adds to those debates both theoretically and empirically. The core issues examined 
are why and how Somaliland managed to establish state-run structures of governance, how far 
its development paralleled or diverged from past Somali state trajectories, and under what 
conditions violent conflict advanced or abridged the polities’ varied state-making projects. 
Drawing on diverse strands of literature on state-building, nationalism and warfare, the 
thesis develops an original analytical frame to better understand processes of state-making 
and state-breaking. It argues not only for the need of ‘bringing the nation back in’, but 
proposes to conceptualize state trajectories in terms of changing levels of institutional and 
socio-cognitive standardization. Scrutinizing received wisdom, the empirical research 
presented finds, amongst others, that Somali state trajectories have been less unique than 
commonly claimed, and proposes that Somaliland’s alleged state-making success between 
1991 and 2010 hinged at least as much on autocratic governance, top-down policies and 
coercive means as on frequently emphasized elements of grassroots peace-making, 
‘traditional’ reconciliation and ‘home-grown’ democracy.  
Conceptually, the project is located at the intersection of political-economy and historical 
and institutional approaches to state-making. Applying qualitative research framed in 
comparative case studies the thesis not only advances the theoretical debate surrounding 
issues of state fragility and state-making, but also offers novel insights into Somalia’s history 
and presents new empirical findings on the frequently romanticised case of Somaliland. Yet, 
the research results are significant beyond Somali boundaries as they provide relevant 
insights for our general understanding of state trajectories and the role of conflict in state-
making and state-breaking. 
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1  
Introduction 
State fragility has been top of the agenda for practitioners and academics since the end of 
the Cold War, not least because “[f]rom a historical perspective, much of the developing 
world today is characterised by states in the process of formation” (CSRC 2005:2; 
Carothers 2002). While the ten years after 1991 saw attention chiefly focused on ‘weak’, 
‘failed’, and ‘collapsed’ states,1 the post-2001 decade saw a shift to the more programmatic 
issue of ‘state-building’.2 Following an extensive period dominated by the Washington 
Consensus paradigm with its overly optimistic emphasis on the market (Milliken/Krause 
2002:753),3 this interest in state-breaking and state-making signalled an incremental 
realization of the need for ‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans et al. 1985). Yet, as the post-
2001 decade drew to a close, concepts of ‘hybrid political orders’ (Böge et al. 2008) and the 
‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/07) heralded a further rethinking of the state, in which 
earlier negative interpretations of non-state orders (Jackson 1990; Zartman 1995; Rotberg 
2003; Bates 2008) came to be praised as autochthonous ways of state-building.4  
At least as long as states remain peaceful. For war, the orthodox dictum goes, constitutes 
“development in reverse” (World Bank 2003; Collier 2004),5 which often can only be 
stopped by outside intervention (Leander 2004:78; Weinstein 2004:11; Collier 2007). Yet, 
 
                                                     
1  E.g. Rothchild/Chazan 1988; Jackson 1990; Bayart 1993; Zartman 1995; Reno 1995; Richards 1996; 
Forrest 1997; Villalon/Huxtable 1998; Schlichte 1998; Cliffe/Luckham 1999; Milliken/Krause 2002. 
2  E.g. Ghani/Lockhart 2008; North et al. 2007; Brinkerhoff 2007; Röder 2007; Hehir/Robinson 2007; 
OECD 2008; Call/Wyeth 2008. This shift is partly rooted in the fact that the 1990s perceived state 
fragility largely as a regional problem, while later approaches frequently framed it as constituting a major 
challenge for international security (Wolff 2011:953ff.).  
3  Berger 2008:1; Robinson 2007:11ff. 
4  On the acceptance of the idea of ‘governance without government’, see Czempiel/Rosenau 1992.  
5  Kaldor 1999; Herbst 2000; Leander 2004. While for the Somali context, this proposition is made by Ford 
et al. (2004), Bakonyi and Stuvøy (2005:359) counter that “war is not equal to the breakdown of societal 
order, but represents an alternative form of social order” (see also Kivimäki 2001:5). 
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given that, historically, war made states and states made war (Tilly 1992:67),6 this liberal 
perspective on violent conflict “may only be sustained by a form of historical amnesia” 
(Cramer 2006:9). The latter feeds into the frequent perception that countries emerging from 
war were ‘blank slates’ particularly suited for “radical policy reform” (Collier/Pradhan 
1994:133), due to their alleged institutional tabula rasa.7 While commonly neglecting 
institutional trajectories, war-to-peace continuities, and, more generally, the “historicity of 
the state in Africa” (Bayart 1993:viii; Elias 1977), the general focus on institutions and 
institutional reform has come at the expense of an equally important component for state-
making: the nation.8 Although nationalism continues to represent “the most universally 
legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 1983:3; Comaroff/Stern 1995:3), 
the need for ‘bringing the nation back in’ has frequently been neglected (Helling 2009; 
Lemay-Hébert 2009).  
In light of these debates, this thesis aims to explore and explain processes of state-building, 
their interrelation with nation-building, and the constitutive role war may play in state-
making in the contemporary world.9 With divergent state-making developments in the 
Somali territories providing the arena of this analysis, the empirical core issue examined is 
why and how certain Somali state-making projects undertaken between 1960 and 2010 
differed, and under what condition war was detrimental or beneficial to these endeavours. As 
well as setting out to develop an original analytical prism that combines insights from the 
too often unconnected literatures on state-building and nation-building to enhance our 
theoretical understanding of processes of state-making and state-breaking, this dissertation 
also sheds new light on the trajectories of the state in Somalia and Somaliland. Although 
both theoretical propositions and empirical findings partly challenge the established 
literature, the thesis generally seeks to advance rather than dismiss past accounts. 
The project’s relevance lies in scrutinizing current conceptualizations of state-making and 
state-breaking, in advancing an alternative analytical approach that combines valuable 
insights from the literature on state-building, nation-building and warfare, and in addressing 
 
                                                     
6  Hintze 1906; Elias 1977; Howard 1978; Weber 1985; Mann 1986.  
7  Cf. Cramer (2006:255), who scrutinizes this idea. 
8  While the concepts of state-building and nation-building have frequently been used interchangeably (Zaum 
2007:1; Hippler 2004; Goldsmith 2007), they are treated as fundamentally different in this thesis. 
9  State-building refers to the establishment of institutions and organizations of government. Nation-building 
addresses issues of identity rather than government and implies the creation of a nation. Finally, I use the 
term state-making as an umbrella term for processes that encompass state-building and nation-building. The 
term state-breaking is applied in juxtaposition, used to replace terms such as ‘state failure’ or ‘collapse’. 
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some of the central gaps in the existing theoretical as well as empirical literature. Its 
originality is grounded in the proposition that processes of institutional and socio-cognitive 
standardization – i.e. the homogenization of particular sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules 
of the mind’ – within a politically delineated and geographically defined society lie at the 
heart of state trajectories, and that it is central administration that provides a key tool for 
advancing such mechanisms of standardization. When war contains dynamics that catalyse 
processes of standardizing an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, it 
is constitutive of state-making. The empirical value of this research project lies in 
contributing to a deeper understanding of why Somalia’s state-making projects collapsed, 
and uncovering some of the underlying processes that informed the seemingly successful 
state-making endeavour of Somaliland – both of which remain under-researched to date.  
To further develop these and other thoughts and frame the evolving theoretical 
propositions and empirical findings in a broader context, this introductory chapter proceeds 
as follows. The first section briefly presents the iterative process behind the research project 
and highlights its central propositions. Section two situates the thesis in the broader 
literature and depicts some of the chief theoretical and empirical gaps it aims to fill. After 
describing the methodology applied in carrying through this project in section three, a 
roadmap of the thesis is outlined in section four.  
 
1.1 Presenting the Research Project 
The Iterative Process 
I set out on this PhD project in October 2007, intending to explore and explain the 
apparent success of Somaliland’s state-making project, which was supposedly not only 
unique (Hoyle 2000:85; Kaplan 2008b:148; Jhazbhay 2009:50), but had, in the absence of 
large-scale international development assistance, undertaken remarkable self-directed 
‘autonomous recovery’ (Weinstein 2004; Bradbury 2008:4; Eubank 2010). My curiosity was 
heightened by the fact that I had just finished consulting with the World Bank on a project 
in Timor-Leste, a state that remained highly fragile despite – or, possibly, because of – the 
significant support and involvement of the international community (see e.g. Engel and 
Vieira 2011). What interested me in particular was why Somaliland’s state trajectory 
supposedly diverged so much from other (Somali) state-making endeavours and how the 
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general lack of international involvement had contributed to this alleged ‘success story’ 
(Jhazbhay 2007; Henwood 2007:168).10  
Embarking on my research, I was increasingly less convinced that Somaliland constituted 
such a triumph of modern state-making. Moreover, I started questioning its alleged 
uniqueness, not only because this claim turned out to have a long tradition in Somali 
studies,11 but also because I started seeing a number of parallels to other state-making 
endeavours within and outside Somali boundaries. Combined with a thorough re-reading of 
the literature on state-building, nation-building and the role war had historically played in 
these processes, I decided to shift the analytical focus of my research towards identifying 
the mechanisms that underlie processes of state-making and state-breaking, while still 
addressing the questions of why and how Somaliland might be different. I was eager to 
accord special attention to the role violent conflict played in these processes, aiming to 
disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war to uncover under what condition wars could unleash 
“dynamics that have the potential to help bring about progressive long-run change” 
(Cramer 2006:10).  
A central motivation to study the Somali case lay in my endeavour to better understand the 
trajectory that has beset the Somali people who have endured so many decades of war and 
poverty. Thereby, my research was driven by the goal of finding out how to substitute which 
bellicose components that were constitutive of state-making, so as to achieve similar 
outcomes by non-violent means. In this sense, I was interested in following Gerschenkron’s 
(1962) idea of ‘catching-up’ and ‘burning stages of development’ for the context of state-
making. After having undertaken a feasibility study in Somaliland in July and August 2008, 
the overarching theme of the research project developed into an exploration of common 
patterns and divergent processes of state trajectories in the past Republic of Somalia (1960-
1991) and the self-styled Republic of Somaliland (1991-2010). I articulated a number of 
propositions, whose validity I aimed to establish by empirical research and data analysis in 
subsequent years. Of these propositions, the most central three are presented in the 
 
                                                     
10  Shinn 2002; Renders 2006; Eggers 2007; Othieno 2008; Bradbury 2008; Kaplan 2008b; Walls 2009a; 
Kibble/Walls 2010a; Harris/Foresti 2011. 
11  E.g. Contini (1964:3) who presents the newly independent Somalia of the 1960s as ‘unique’ due to its 
“distinctive democratic process”, Sheikh-Abdi (1977:657), who depicts the Somali nation as “one of the 
most uniformly homogeneous populations of the continent”, Rotberg (2002), who singles Somalia out as 
the only state that did not stop at ‘failure’ but ‘collapsed’ to the fullest extent, and the Senlis Council 
(2008:9), according to which “Somalia is a state in name only.”  
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subsequent part, while a number of further ones are touched upon in section 1.2, which 
situates the thesis in the wider literature.  
Three Central Propositions 
The central purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the cogency of three main propositions 
that emerge through theoretical consideration and the examination of three case studies, 
one of them in extensive empirical detail.12 The project’s main proposition – and most 
original theoretical contribution – lies in conceptualizing state-making as a process of 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Institutional standardization underlies state-building 
and is understood as a process whereby a single set of ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990; 
North et al. 2006) gains dominance within a given society – i.e. a condition in which all 
major role relationships are regularized by a preponderant organization. Likewise, socio-
cognitive standardization underlies nation-building and is defined as a process whereby one 
common set of ‘rules of the mind’ – i.e. socio-cognitive elements such as language or 
mental maps – becomes dominant within a politically defined population. In order to refer 
to both of these processes I will apply the term of regime standardization.13 
The analytical understanding of state trajectories in terms of changing levels of institutional 
and socio-cognitive standardization is based on a reinterpretation of well-established arguments 
in the literature on state-building and nation-building respectively, and aims at 
reconstructing the common bonds between these sets of literature that were weakened in 
the 1980s (Eriksen 2006:1). Whereas classical accounts of state-building emphasize the 
creation and enforcement of a common institutional framework,14 also the literature on 
nation-building prominently features the element of standardization. Whether generated by 
industrialization (Gellner 2006), language or education (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 
1977:135), or warfare (Simmel 1964; Howard 1978; Tilly 1992), it is socio-cognitive 
standardization that constitutes the basic red line running through all of these explanations of 
 
                                                     
12  See section 1.3 for the research methodology. 
13  By ‘regime’, I refer to a historically rooted set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems shared by two or 
more individuals, which regulates the allocation and application of power. See Chapter 2 for definitions of 
‘institutions’, ‘socio-cognitive systems’, and further key terms.  
14  E.g. Hobbes 1651; Locke 1694; Rousseau 1763; Machiavelli 1513; Weber 1919; Tilly 1985; Mann 1986. 
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nationalism. While the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’ does not establish causal 
explanations, this lense is to improve our understanding of state trajectories.15 
As its second key proposition, the thesis advances the ‘central administration thesis’. 
Following the established argument that administration, understood as the “management of 
public affairs” (OED 1989), is central to state-building,16 and combining it with the 
modernist perspective on nation-building that argues that “administrative organizations 
create meaning” (Anderson 1983:53),17 I advocate not only that state- and nation-building 
are inextricably interlinked, but also that significant changes in a society’s collective 
institutional and identity parameters are to be ascribed to modifications in their form of 
organization. Alterations in a society’s institutional structure generally go in tandem with 
modifications in its socio-cognitive configuration. Consequently, I suggest that it is central 
state administration that is key in driving processes of institutional and socio-cognitive 
standardization. The fundamental hypothesis advanced here is that state trajectories are 
largely determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or exploit central and 
political administrative institutions and organizations.  
The third main proposition I put forth is that war can foster and catalyse processes of state-
making, under the condition that it promotes institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. 
This proposition leans on the bellicist tradition – with its emphasis on the importance of 
war for state-building and nationalism18 – but is distinct in that it treats large-scale organized 
violence ‘merely’ as an antecedent condition, rather than an all-defining independent 
variable. While challenging those who advocate that war was a daemon of decay that 
constituted nothing but “tragic vicious circles” (World Bank 2008; Collier 2004; Leander 
2004) that amounted to “nothing less than doom” (Mohamoud 2006:15), the project 
similarly distances itself from those propagating war as an angel of order (Luttwack 1999). 
Rather, this thesis sets out to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war, arguing that particular 
aspects of violent conflict may be constitutive of state-making.19 
 
                                                     
15  A further caveat of the regime thesis presented in this dissertation lies in the fact that the (causal) 
economic dimensions of state trajectories remain insufficiently explored, not least due to space 
constraints. 
16  E.g. Tilly 1992; Reinhard 1996; Herbst 2000; Röder 2007. 
17  Bendix 1964:18; Smith 1983:38; Giddens 1985:116; Mann 1986:44; Gellner 2006:8; Breuilly 2006:xxv. 
18  E.g. Elias 1977; Howard 1978; McNeill 1983; Mann 1986; van Creveld 1991, 1999; Tilly 1992; Colley 
1992.  
19  Cf. Rasler/Thompson 1989; Kestnbaum/Skocpol 1993:667; Deflem 1999; Bates et al. 2002; Kalyvas 2005; 
Taylor/Botea 2008. While my discussion of the role of war is similar to most other studies of war in that it 
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These propositions inherently challenge the frequently made argument that state-making 
projects are no longer on the agenda of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa (Kaplan 1994),20 
which is plagued by violent disorder and state-breaking (Bayart et al. 1999; Chabal/Daloz 
1999), and where “chances of success for state-building in the early 21st century are […] 
constrained, if not completely obsolete (Berger/Weber 2008:198).21 Subjecting this 
common view to critical scrutiny I suggest that despite superficial symptoms of decline, 
processes of state-making have not vanished from the African continent – if only because 
“[state] collapse is likely to inaugurate fresh or renewed processes of state formation” 
(Doornbos 2002b:798; Eisenstadt 1988). How the three main propositions and a number of 
minor ones develop throughout this thesis relate to the literature on state-building, nation-
building and to Somalia and Somaliland is discussed subsequently.  
 
1.2 Putting the Thesis into Context 
The Literature on State-Building… 
Being at the bottom of the global order, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ and ‘failing’ states have become a 
key concern for the international community (Torres/Anderson 2004:5; DfID 2009; World 
Bank 2011a).22 When this research project started in late 2007, one tenth of the world’s 
states were considered to be ‘failing’ (Foreign Policy 2007; Böge et al. 2008:3), turning state-
building into a central endeavour of the world community, because “weak or failed states 
are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems” (Fukuyama 2004:1). In a 
volte-face to earlier opinion which had seen the state as an obstacle to development in 
general and state-making more particularly in the 1980s and 1990s (Ferguson 1998:52),23 
 
                                                                                                                                     
tends to posit war as something abstract, I concur with Reid (2007:41) that “this most psychologically 
traumatic and physically violent of human experiences can rarely be accurately represented by 
intellectualizing about it.” 
20  For the counter-argument, see e.g. Renders 2007:439; Spears 2007:22. 
21  See also World Bank (2002), which argues that “[c]ountries abandoned by the international development 
community show few signs of autonomous recovery” (cf. Weinstein 2004:2), and Fukuyama (2006:2) who 
suggests that “the underlying problems caused by failed states […] can only be solved through long-term 
efforts by outside powers” (cf. Meierhenrich 2004:162).  
22  However, it should be noted that state fragility is not a new phenomenon (Yoffee/Cowgill 1988). 
23  The widespread belief was that civil society could bring about democracy and development if only the 
state got out of the way (Diamond et al. 1988; Hyden/Bratton 1992; Harbeson et al. 1994; cf. Eriksen 
2006:1). For the Somali case, see Leeson (2006:1), who suggests that “Somalis are better off under anarchy 
than they were under government” and that “anarchy has improved overall development” (ibid.:26).   
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scholars and policymakers alike realized the need for ‘Bringing the State Back In’ (Evans et 
al. 1985), not least because the state played an “extensive role in strengthening and 
safeguarding human capabilities” (Sen 1999:5). Ever since, largely liberal interpretations of 
state-building, democratization and governance have guided the international community’s 
handbooks on how to supposedly ‘fix’ fragile states (Ghani/Lockhart 2008).24 
Past conceptualizations of state-breaking can largely be classified into two groups, whereby 
both depart from neoclassical theory, according to which the state is an “organization 
which has the comparative advantage in violence” and is therefore “in the position to 
specify and enforce property rights” (North 1981:21). The first school of thought conceives 
of state failure in functional terms as the polities’ inability to provide certain services (e.g. 
Rotberg 2002, 2004; Zartman 1995). The second understands state failure in institutional 
terms as states’ incapacity to uphold their monopoly of violence (e.g. Jackson 1990; Krasner 
1999; Ignatieff 2002). As both approaches take the Weberian ideal-type state as a 
benchmark,25 these approaches are not only normative and Eurocentric, but perceive state 
fragility in terms of a ‘lack’. Such an understanding of fragile states as a “flawed imitation of 
a mature Western form” (Hansen/Stepputat 2001:6)26 lies in the tradition of modernization 
theory, but does not contribute to an improved analytical insight into how and why states fail. 
I argue that one of the reasons why our knowledge regarding processes of state-making 
remains not only fragmented and incomplete (Cramer 2006:276),27 but also “under-
theorised” (Chandler 2006:189) is that the strands of literature on state-breaking on the one 
side, and state-making on the other, have largely lost sight of each other. Explanations of 
state-breaking have frequently resorted to variables such as poor economic performance 
(World Bank 2003), environmental scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1999; Fairhead 2000), resource 
curse (Collier/Höffler 1998;28 Ross 2004), ethnic strife (Ignatieff 1998; Fearon/Laitin 2003) 
and greed and grievance (Berdal/Keen 1997).29 Yet, approaches to state-making appear 
generally disconnected from these debates, focusing by and large on ‘institution building’ 
(Eade 1997), good governance (Kauffmann et al. 1999), taxation (Moore 2004; Bräutigam et 
 
                                                     
24  See also Baker 2007; Kaplan 2008a; Chesterman et al. 2005. 
25  Even though Weber (1988:190) himself makes it perfectly clear that no state can do all that an ideal-type 
state is imagined to do. 
26  Mamdani 1996:9; Hill 2005. 
27  Jessop 2006:111; Milliken/Krause 2003:12. 
28  Collier/Höffler 2001, 2002a, 2004. 
29  Berdal/Malone 2000; Collier/Höffler 2001. 
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al. 2008), security sector reform (Pouligny 2004), and elite bargains (CSRC 2005; 
Lindemann 2008).30 However, as state-breaking is an “unavoidable accompaniment of the 
state-making process” (Ayoob 2007:95)31 and because “[n]o state’s degree of fragility or 
failure is static” (Brinkerhoff 2007:3; Kulessa/Heinrich 2004:1), conceptualizing state 
trajectories as a continuum rather than in rigid dichotomies is analytically meaningful and 
promises to grasp the state-breaking-to-state-making continuities (CSRC 2005:1).  
Consequently, the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) (2005) advanced the concept of 
‘institutional multiplicity.’ Itself being based on a “framework that lies at the intersection 
between a Weberian understanding of the state and the political economy of state building” 
(ibid.:4), ‘institutional multiplicity’ valuably points out that a state’s degree of fragility or 
resilience largely hinges on the co-existence and frequently contradictory interrelationship 
of different sets of ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990) within a given territory. That 
institutional multiplicity poses a challenge to state-making is obvious in that it provides 
actors with the possibility to “[switch] strategically from one institutional universe to 
another” (CSRC 2005:8), thus defying the larger purpose of institutions, which is to “reduce 
uncertainty by providing a [clear] structure to everyday life” (North 1990:3). Despite this 
crucial insight and the conceptual value of this approach, its invariable reliance on 
‘institutions’ reduces the process of state-making to state-building, thereby glossing over the 
equally crucial aspect of nation-building – a point to which we shall return later.   
As the Weberian (1919) state concept has trouble dealing with cases where the lines 
between state and society, or formal and informal are blurred – a condition that applies to 
most cases of state-making – it fails to “anticipate new and diverse forms of state 
institutionalization” (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3; Khan 2002:14). Aiming to overcome this 
limitation and the shortcoming that the Weberian state concept inherently supposes that 
the state constituted a rather homogenous entity with a monopoly on violence,32 Böge et al. 
(2008) introduce the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPOs). Whereas international 
state-building approaches suggest that locally derived political solutions are problematic (cf. 
Chandler 2007:71), the concept of HPOs counters that external efforts at state 
reconstruction suffer from a ‘nirvana fallacy’ (Coyne 2006:344) and that local solutions are 
 
                                                     
30  OECD 2008; Di John/Putzel 2009. 
31  See also Tokpa (2000), who argues that state-making and state-breaking are two sides of the same coin. 
32  See critique of North et al. 2007. 
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the only viable ones.33 Drawing on the concept of ‘institutional multiplicity’, and sharing 
significant similarities with the concepts of ‘twilight’ institutions (Lund 2006) and the 
‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/07), Böge et al. (2008) suggest that a hybridity of 
‘political orders’ is desirable for the advancement of developing states.34  
Not only does this conceptualization of state trajectories neglect the crucial component of 
nation-building for processes of state-making, it also suffers from further fallacies. For one, 
the theoretical framework of HPOs remains inconclusive regarding the question under what 
conditions or what kinds of HPOs are constitutive of rather than inimical to state-making – 
where runs the line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘too little’ and ‘too much’ hybridity? For 
another, in taking the monolithic view of the state as its contentious starting point, the 
concept aims to “overcome the notion of the state as being the superior and ultimate form 
of political order per se”, in order to “[free] the debate from its current state-centric bias” 
(Böge et al. 2009a:88). Although some questioned whether the ‘state’ constituted an 
appropriate analytical tool for analysis (Foucault 2000:123),35 a proposition particularly 
made for sub-Saharan Africa,36 the state is far from being political ‘scrap-iron’. While it 
might not be as ‘autonomous’ as suggested by Weber (1947) and his followers,37 the state 
remains the foremost political actor in today’s world (Howard 2002:103).38 Because “[s]tate-
making was essentially an internal undertaking” (Holsti 1996:44), the focus on the state is in 
order, as even in ‘stateless’ Somalia, “the coup of 1991 was more of an attack on a regime’s 
inequitable policies than a repudiation of the modern state” (Little 2003a:168).  
Accordingly, I dispute the more general proposition that the state is obsolete in 
contemporary Africa. Ultimately, there is widespread understanding that the European 
experience of state- and nation-building was diffused to non-European societies through 
 
                                                     
33  Cf. Lockwood (2005:68) who argues with reference to Poldiano (2001) and Götz (2005) that “most 
externally-led governance reforms have failed.” 
34  This proposition is in line with Huntington (1968:20), who suggests that “[c]omplexity [of political 
systems] produces stability” and North (2005:42) who proposes that “[institutional] conformity can be 
costly in a world of uncertainty.” 
35  See also world-system approaches put forth by Wallerstein (1974); Meyer/Hannan (1979), Modelski 
(1987), and Dunn (1995) who argue that the “territorial state was not at all the appropriate unit of analysis 
to understand social formations and change” (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:8).  
36  E.g. Linklater 1995:178ff.; Heyer 1997a:11; Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3. 
37  E.g. Skocpol 1979; Collins 1986; Mann 1988; Tilly 1992. 
38  See also Tilly (1992) Jackson (2001), Krasner (1999), and Picket (1996:15), who postulates that “[t]he only 
stable entity in the dynamic and changing constellations of existence is the state.” 
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colonialism.39 Despite superficial symptoms of decline, I suggest that processes of state 
formation have not vanished from the African continent and that “[state] collapse is likely 
to inaugurate fresh or renewed processes of state formation” (Doornbos 2002b:798; 
Eisenstadt 1988). While acknowledging that different politico-economic environments 
“affect, in a multitude of ways, the evolution of all these patterns across the economic and 
political terrains” (CSRC 2005:7),40 and additionally increase “political and economic 
expectations” (Khan 2002:4; Debiel 2002:5) towards states, the project explores the 
assertion that even the most vulnerable political entities do not merely float in the currents 
of globalization, but still have ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Clay/Schaffer 1984; Duffield 2001). 
… Nation-Building… 
A central problem with many approaches to state-making lies in their equation of the ‘state’ 
with ‘central government’. Almost invariably, this leads to an understanding of state-making 
as a process of strengthening institutional capacity (Khan 2004:165), and wrongly suggests 
that state-making is a purely scientific, technical and administrative process. Thus, it is not 
surprising that most approaches to state-making gloss over its inherent political nature 
(Chandler 2006:5f.; Ferguson 1994), reducing state-making to state-building, thus turning it 
into a form of ‘antipolitics’ (Jayasuriya/Hewison 2004). Yet, as “[g]overnance is about the 
relationship between the state and society” (Brinkerhoff 2007:18), and as “it is in the realm 
of ideas and sentiments that the fate of states is primarily determined” (Holsti 1996:84), I 
argue in a manner analogous to the dictum of Evans et al. (1985) on the state, for the need 
of ‘bringing the nation back in’. Consequently, I propose that state-making was not merely 
about ‘getting institutions right’, but also about the establishment of political identities, 
common mental models, and, more generally, socio-cognitive systems. 
While the connection between the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ was realized in the nineteenth 
century and encompassed by the term ‘nation-state’ (Giddens 1985:83-121; Navari 1981), 
this crucial link is absent from much of the current literature.41 One of the very few scholars 
to call for a re-unification of these concepts to better understand state trajectories is Lemay-
Hébert (2009:22), who argues that “[t]o be effective, statebuilding has to take into account 
 
                                                     
39  E.g. Bereketeab 2000:40; Tilly 1975; Smith 1983; Mazuri 1983; Diamond et al. 1988; First 1983; Young 
1994. Yet, this idea of an imported African state is contested by Bayart (2000).  
40  Krause 1998:130; CSRC 2001; Moore 2004:309; Migdal/Schlichte 2005:10, 33. 
41  This partly shows in the fact that the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ have frequently been used 
interchangeably (von Hippel 2000:96), thus defying analytical precision. See also fn. 8. 
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not just the rebuilding of state institutions, but also the complex nature of socio-political 
cohesion, or what some refer to as nation-building.” As “the creation of institutions has 
concrete repercussions on the nature of the socio-political cohesion” (ibid.:32) and as 
nation-ness still represents “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our 
time” (Anderson 1983:3), I propose that concepts of state-making and state-breaking have 
to incorporate the socio-cognitive issue of political identity into their analytical frameworks, 
in order to enhance our understanding of state trajectories. I, thus, challenge those scholars 
who assert that “the goal of nation-building should not be to impose common identities on 
deeply divided peoples but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow 
people to live together despite differences” (Ottaway 2002a:17), as this implies the 
questionable assumption that it is possible to ‘organize states’ while leaving the ‘identity’ of 
their populations untouched. 
…Warfare… 
This research project also speaks to the proposition that “war makes states, and vice versa” 
(Tilly 1992:67), which is hotly debated in academia. Although it is generally acknowledged 
that “the experience of warfare has played a central and indeed essential role in the process 
of state and nation formation in Europe” (Clapham 2001:1; Huntington 1968)42 and that 
“violence […] is an integral part of the processes of accumulation of power by the national 
state” (Cohen et al. 1981:901),43 the validity of this assertion is frequently called into 
question in the context of the contemporary world of developing states (Leander 2004; 
Herbst 2000).44 Although some accounts suggest that the ‘war makes states’ hypothesis 
holds not only for Europe, but also for Africa, and that the constitutive role of warfare can 
not only be observed for past, but also present state-making endeavours (Deflem 1999; 
Cramer 2006; Niemann 2007), the view of the ‘war makes states’-critics prevails. In the 
shadow of the ‘new wars’ literature (Kaldor 1999)45 and the proposition that “the European 
experience does not provide a template for state-making in other regions of the world” 
(Herbst 2000:22), scholars such as Leander (2004) cast doubt on Tilly’s dictum and propose 
 
                                                     
42  Cf. Pereira 2003:387.  
43  Tilly 1992; Colley 1992; McNeill 1983; Mann 1986; van Creveld 1991, 1999. 
44  See also Ogot (1972:3), who proposes that in African studies the impression has been created that “the 
Chaka wars were senseless and inhumane while the Thirty Years’ War was fought for a noble cause.” 
45  Kaldor 2007; Duffield 2001; Jung 2003. 
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that war is a “political retrovirus […] about nothing at all” (Enzensberger 1994, as in 
Cramer 2006:77).46  
Apart from the classical accounts on war and state-making in historic Europe, war has more 
recently been conceptualized as a rational economic strategy (Keen 1994, 1998; Reno 1995; 
Duffield 2001). These approaches suggest that “war may be a continuation of economics by 
other means” (Keen 2000:7), and, building on Foucault (2000), highlight the fact that wars 
might serve important (rational, economic) functions for some members of a society in 
conflict. Yet, by focusing on particular (groups of) individuals, they tell us little about the 
forms of social transformation that may occur during conflict (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 2005:363), 
even though it is acknowledged that “[i]nstitutions are altered by conflict” (Aron 2003:481; 
Schlichte 2003:33). Furthermore, concepts such as the rebel-centred models of Collier and 
Höffler (1998, 2004) as well as Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not consider the question of 
why and how particular states come to be vulnerable to violent conflict in the first place.  
Based on the insight that “[not] all types of violent conflict are equivalent in their historical 
significance” (Cramer 2006:48), the debate has come to an impasse at which the 
inconclusive argument is made that “[t]he effects of contemporary wars on statehood are 
ambivalent” and that there is “no single unambiguous causal relation between states and 
wars” (Schlichte 2003:38).47 Although it is argued that one needs to differentiate between 
different kinds of war in order to assess its implication for state-making (Rasler/Thompson 
1989; Kestnbaum/ Skocpol 1993:667), a central feature of the debate’s deadlock remains – 
namely that the considerable span in time and space that renders a sound comparison of 
the role war has played in state trajectories then and now, here and there, impossible.48 Indeed, 
Tilly’s ‘war makes states’ thesis is only partly applicable to the Somali case, for example, 
largely because the wars that can be considered constitutive of state-making have involved 
recurrent events that unfolded over centuries, rather than more isolated instances of war. 
Yet, rather than outright abandoning war as an explanatory variable, I propose that its 
context-specificity calls for the necessity to disaggregate its ‘black box’, in order to identify 
particular components that might be constitutive of state-making. The analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 2 aims at precisely this.  
 
                                                     
46  Kaplan 1994a; Holsti 1996; Desch 1996. Tilly (1992:195) himself expects state-making in the 
contemporary Third World to be distinctly different from the European experience.  
47  Clapham 2001:8; Cohen et al. 1981:902. 
48  van de Walle (2004:94) aptly remarks that “[e]very age constructs its […] own types of war.”  
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… and the Scholarship on Somalia and Somaliland 
The state trajectories of Somalia and Somaliland lend themselves to an investigation of the 
theoretical issues at stake for several reasons. Not only have the Somali territories seen 
numerous processes of state-making and state-breaking in their post-colonial era, but they 
are also particularly well-suited to study the relationship between war and state trajectories, 
because in the Horn of Africa this relationship has been “far more intensive, and of much 
longer duration, than elsewhere [in Africa]” (Clapham 2001:2).49 There already exists an 
extensive literature on Somalia,50 and scholarly work on Somaliland’s state-making project 
has also been growing,51 but despite this significant scholarship, notable gaps and 
inconsistencies remain. 
One of the frequently made propositions this thesis subjects to critical scrutiny concerns 
the allegation that the state of Somalia was ‘unique’.52 Shortly after the British Protectorate 
of Somaliland and the Italian colony of Somalia gained independence in 1960 and decided 
to unify in the Somali Republic, the newly born country came to be celebrated as one of the 
rare authentic nations in Africa (Fitzgibbon 1982a:2).53 Based on their “burning sense of 
nationalism” (Legum/Lee 1977:31; Laitin 1977b:14) and “genuine democracy” (HRW 
1990:14; Contini 1964:3; Pegg 1998:11), Somalis and their state-making endeavour were 
considered inimitable on the African continent. Although it is undeniable that the Somali 
state trajectory of the 1960s and thereafter constitutes a case of its own,54 I question the 
supposition that the Somali Republic in general and the processes that characterized its 
state trajectory were a “striking anomaly” (Lewis 1972:384; see also fn. 11). In highlighting 
the more general underlying patterns of state-making and state-breaking in Somalia, this 
 
                                                     
49  See Section 1.3 for the research methodology. 
50  Spanning from anthropological accounts of Lewis (1961) and Luling (1977) to works on state-making and 
state-breaking in Somalia (e.g. Laitin/Samatar 1987; S. S. Samatar 1991; A. Samatar 1992; Drysdale 2001; 
Menkhaus 2004; see also Gilkes 1994a; Bakonyi 2001; Little 2003a; Marchal 2004; Abdullahi 2007a; Adam 
2008). For an abundant literature on the aspect of international intervention in Somalia see e.g. Marchal 
1993b; Keen 1994; Lyons/Samatar 1995; Compagnon 1995; Prunier 1997a; Clarke/Herbst 1997. 
51  E.g. Adam 1994; Prunier 1994; APD 1999; Ahmed/Green 1999; Brons 2001; Zierau 2002; Bryden 2004b; 
Jhazbhay 2007; Kaplan 2008b; Terlinden/Ibrahim 2008b; Walls 2008; Bradbury 2008; Höhne 2009; 
Renders/Terlinden 2010; Spears 2010. 
52  E.g. Lewis 1972:384, 1967:104. 
53  See also Sheikh-Abdi (1977:657), Laitin/Samatar (1987:xiv), Adam (1999), Lewis (2002:138), Lata (2004) 
as well as those scholars who went as far as claiming that Somalis were a ‘primordial nation’ (Abdi 
1979:20; Porter 1984:186; Issa-Salwe 1994:vi; Hassan 1989; S. Mohamed 1992:4).  
54  Not least because Somalia was one of the few states in sub-Saharan Africa that was formed out of 
formerly distinct colonial entities.  
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thesis counters those arguing that “Somalis are so unique that systematic comparison can 
be of no benefit” (cf. Kapteijns 2001:15).55  
A second inconsistency addressed by this thesis regards the supposition that “the 
dismemberment of Somalia began right after the hasty and legally unconsummated union of 
Somaliland and Somalia in 1960” (Adan 1994), that the Somali state collapse started with 
the military coup of General Siyad Barre in 1969 (Abdullahi 2007a:43), and that “Somalia’s 
experience as an independent state was negative to say the least” (Battera 2004:6). While 
such accounts rightly emphasise that the disintegration of the Somali Republic did not 
occur overnight, but was marked by long-term undercurrents, they gloss over the notable 
processes of state-making that were pursued in the decades after independence – and also, 
and as I suggest, particularly so, under Barre’s dictatorial rule in the early to mid-1970s. In 
analysing the mechanisms underlying processes of state-making and state-breaking, this 
thesis challenges such oversimplifications, and suggests that divergent state trajectories 
hinged less on different types of government (e.g. democratic vs. autocratic), than on 
progression and regression regarding institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.  
Apart from these issues, further gaps remain concerning the explanation of the Somali state 
trajectories. One largely unanswered question is why Somalia’s project of state-making in 
general and nation-building in particular started crumbling in the late 1970s, despite an 
inter-state war with Ethiopia, which enhanced national sentiments in a society that was 
already euphoric about irredentist ideas.56 While some scholars suggest that it was the misfit 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of governance that caused the demise of the state 
(Mansur 1995:115; Lewis 1980, 1994),57 others point to its dire economic performance, 
which ultimately brought it to its knees (Markakis 1987:90f.; Laitin 1993:125). Again other 
analysts locate the breaking of the Somali state and nation in international politics, blaming 
either the “black colonialists of Ethiopia” (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141) or “Soviet complicity” 
(Payton 1980). While all these accounts have a point, their underlying theoretical 
conceptualizations are, amongst other flaws, analytically unable to grasp the (dis-) 
 
                                                     
55  As is shown in Chapter 5, this ‘uniqueness-argument’ reappears in much of the literature on Somaliland. 
56  E.g. Lewis 2002:236; Greenfield 1991:16; Compagnon 1995:428; Cabdi Sheikh-Cabdi 1977:657, cf. Ahmed 
I. Samatar 1988:132. 
57  See also Abdullahi 2007a:43; Mohamoud 2006:20. While the traditionalists argue that it was the continuity 
of clan politics that destroyed the state (Lewis 1993a/b; 1991; Simons 1995:202ff.; Adam/Ford 1998:v), 
transformationists postulate that it was external structural changes and the onset of ‘modernity’ that was 
to blame (A. Samatar 1992; A. I. Samatar 1993).  
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continuities between state-making and state-breaking. This thesis attempts to fill this void 
by pointing to deeper underlying patterns of state trajectories.  
A central puzzle that the more recent Somali scholarship has found a hard nut to crack 
regards the question of how the significantly divergent state trajectories that occurred within 
the (former) Somali Republic in the post-1991 era could be explained. A common 
explanation to account for the difference between the Somaliland ‘wunderkind’ and the 
Somali ‘rapscallion’ suggests that the answer lies in the regions’ dissimilar colonial 
histories.58 While this proposition suffers from a number of empirical flaws,59 it is also 
analytically problematic in that it inherently assumes that socio-political structures were 
static. A related but alternative argument that has gained much currency in the scholarly 
literature – predominantly amongst proponents of the concept of HPOs – points towards 
the revival of ‘traditional institutions’ (Bryden/Farah 1996; Bradbury 1997, 2008)60 and 
argues that it was the ‘elders’ who were “responsible for the success of Somaliland today” 
(Leonard 2009:13; Flint 1994:36). Although the role of ‘traditional authorities’ in 
Somaliland’s state-making endeavour can and should not be dismissed, this thesis 
scrutinizes this proposition on empirical grounds. It furthermore advises that the role 
‘traditional authorities’ played fell more into the realm of peace-building rather than state-
building, which should not be confused analytically.61  
By means of rounding up this brief overview of some of the key literature on, and 
remaining gaps in, Somali scholarship, I touch upon a final proposition that has risen to 
prominence. Building on the ‘benevolent elders thesis’ much of the literature on the self-
styled state of Somaliland is united in its, at times overly benign, portrayal of this state-
making project. Once formally launched with the polity’s unilateral declaration of 
independence after the Somali civil war in 1991, this state-making endeavour has 
recurrently been depicted as ‘unique’ (Hoyle 2000:85; Kaplan 2008b:148; Jhazbhay 
2009:50). Its alleged inimitability is not only rooted in its supposedly genuine process of 
‘bottom-up’ peace-building (Farah/Lewis 1993; Bryden/Farah 1996), ‘traditional 
reconciliation’ (Brons 2001), and ‘grassroots’ democracy (Adam 1995; Terlinden/Debiel 
 
                                                     
58  E.g. Laitin/Samatar 1987:59, 1998:225; Shultz 1995; Lewis 1980, 2002:169; Brons 2001:129; Huliaras 
2002:158; Bradbury 2008:24ff.; Prunier 1998:225; Interview 1. 
59  See chaptes 3 and 4. 
60  Brons 1994; Prunier 1998; APD 1999; Kyed/Buur 2006; Renders 2006; Jhazbhay 2008; Kaplan 2008b; 
Walls 2009a.  
61  Cf. Paris 2004.  
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2003),62 but also in the circumstance that its state-making project was carried through in the 
absence of significant international financial assistance (Weinstein 2004; Bradbury 2008:4; 
Eubank 2010). Consequently, numerous analysts celebrate Somaliland as an impressive 
“African success story” (Henwood 2007:168)63 and represent it as “Africa’s Best Kept 
Secret” (Jhazbhay 2003).  
This rather one-sided portrayal of Somaliland is partly due to the fact that it is frequently 
compared with the “quintessential failed state” of Somalia (Nenova/Harford 2004:1),64 
which has remained caught in the “tragic vicious circle” (World Bank 2008) of a “bloody 
civil war” (Wahlers 2011:4). The strong emphasis on Somaliland’s peaceful state-making 
components however glosses over the fact that this polity was also embroiled in a number 
of civil wars – wars that were in part instigated by its political leadership in order to 
consolidate its power, and which ultimately lay at the heart of Somaliland’s state trajectory. 
Although Somaliland’s ability to ultimately replace violent means of conflict resolution by 
non-violent ones is as laudable as its progress in establishing structures of governance, this 
thesis questions the outright ‘success’ that Somaliland has frequently been accorded. In 
proposing that its state-making was decisively informed by shrewd politicians, top-down 
policies, and bellicose power politics, this work acts as a corrective to a number of 
established and emerging narratives on Somaliland’s state-making project, and shows that 
there has been a learning curve in Somali state-making endeavours since 1960.  
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
Qualitative Case Study Method  
In order to investigate and empirically analyse these theoretical considerations, I undertake 
qualitative research along the lines of a “structured, focused comparison” (George/Bennett 
 
                                                     
62  WB/UNDP 2008:11; ICG 2003:34; Othieno 2008; Forti 2011:5. 
63  Shinn 2002; ICG 2003:10; Battera 2004:2, 17; World Bank 2005:19; Eggers 2007; Renders 2006; Jhazbhay 
2007; Henwood 2007:168; Kaplan 2008a,b; Othieno 2008; Bradbury 2008; Leonard 2009:13; Walls 
2009a:2; Kibble/Walls 2010a:14; Harris/Foresti 2011. 
64  See also Angeloni (2009:755ff.), who argues that Somalia was an “anti-state”, Heyer (1997a:1), who 
suggests that Somalia was but a “temporary state”, Weber (2008:14), who postulates that Somalia as a state 
was neither fragile nor weak, but “simply nonexistent”, and Drysdale (2000:84), who advocates that 
“Somalia is the pioneering example of total state collapse.” See also Courrier International 2008. See also 
fn. 11. 
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2005; Gerring 2007) of a controllable number of case studies. This methodology was 
chosen, because, first, the study focuses on identifying processes and patterns, making such an 
approach appropriate (Ragin 1987; Cramer 2006:136).65 Second, many of the potentially 
decisive mechanisms entailed in state-making and state-breaking are hard to grasp without 
detailed investigation, which rules out statistical methods in favour of a small-N 
comparative analysis (Acemoglu et al. 2003:84). Third, the decision to investigate the role of 
war for state trajectories entails a small-N study, as it has convincingly been argued that 
“[m]ost theories of war are best tested by case-study methods” (van Evera 1997:30). Last, 
but not least, the decision to apply this approach was also based on the fact that while the 
rare process of ‘autonomous recovery’ as allegedly observed in Somaliland is not fit for 
statistical testing, it holds great potential for qualitative analysis and theory development.   
A central advantage of the case study approach is that it does not run the risk of 
‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori 1970, 1984), a problem frequently encountered by statistical 
studies that subject quite dissimilar cases to ‘one-size-fits-all’ analytical frameworks. Small-
N studies allow for high levels of internal (or conceptual) validity in that they provide the 
researcher with the opportunity to identify and assess those indicators that best capture the 
underlying theoretical concepts. They also invite conceptual refinement largely 
characterized by a higher level of validity – however, over a more limited number of 
observations as compared to large-N studies. Moreover, in comparison to statistical studies, 
case studies dispose of the advantage that they are superior in accommodating multifaceted 
causal relations and equifinality (von Bertalanffy 1968). Yet, in order to leverage these 
advantages, a number of issues need to be taken into consideration when choosing cases.  
According to orthodox procedure, the “fundamental problem of inference” (King et al. 
1994:91) should be counteracted by ensuring variation in the independent variable 
(ibid.:140f.). Such a ‘controlled comparison’, however, is largely incompatible with social 
science research, for which case-selection on the dependent variable is a legitimate 
alternative as long as sufficient variation in the values of the dependent variable is ensured 
(Ragin 2004:7).66 Given the vastly diverging state trajectories the Somali territories have 
experienced, this condition is met. Apart from sufficient variation on the dependent 
variable, cases have to fulfil the demands of a ‘most similar research design’ 
 
                                                     
65  See also Bayart (1993) and Chabal (1991) who argue that “political analysis should be concerned with 
understanding processes over time – that is, the opposite of ‘snapshot’ explanations” (ibid.:52).  
66  King et al. 1994:129; van Evera 1997:52; Geddes 2003:116; George/Bennett 2005. 
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(Przeworski/Teune 1970:32f.)67 in order to not only facilitate the identification of the 
particular processes and patterns, but also to allow for their identification in the first place. 
The Somali cases clearly fulfil this precondition. Taking these aspects into consideration 
valuable insights can be gained from research that is rooted in “more pared down but 
detailed sets of comparisons and contrasts” (Cramer 2006:136). 
The research presented in this thesis is comparative in time, comparing past processes of 
state-making in Somalia with the more recent one experienced by Somaliland. Such 
longitudinal studies ensure limited variation of background conditions, as many variables 
can be held constant, thereby facilitating the identification of processes and patterns 
responsible for diverging state-making outcomes. Moreover, the project is also comparative 
on an intra-case basis, as it compares processes of state-making and state-breaking amongst 
different geographical polities within the territorial confines of the former Republic of 
Somalia (a national comparative study). The division of the case into ‘sub-cases’ or 
‘subunits’ along chronological and geographical lines, allows an increase in the number of 
observations, by “making many observations from few” (King et al. 1994:217ff.; Lijphart 
1971), thereby confronting the problem of underdeterminancy of research design.  
Selection of Case Studies 
While the puzzles raised by the case of Somaliland constituted my starting point in the 
selection of case studies, I deployed a comparative approach to shed light on its trajectory. 
The Somali cases lend themselves to a comparative approach, not least because their state 
trajectories are marked by an interesting heterogeneity.68 First, there is the newly-
independent democratic Somali state of the 1960s, which was perceived as constituting one 
of Africa’s rare real nation-states.69 Second, there is the autocratic Somali state of the 1970s 
and 1980s, which can itself be subdivided into two cases – one encompassing the period 
between 1969 and 1977, which largely witnessed processes indicative of state-making, and 
the other comprising the era from 1978 to 1991, which was generally marked by patterns of 
state-breaking. The years of 1977/78, which saw the Ogadeen War between Somalia and 
Ethiopia, “the most ferocious conflict in Africa since World War II” (Woodward 
 
                                                     
67  Berg-Schlosser/Siegler 1990:156; Klugmann et al. 1999:11. 
68  See Lemke (2003:6) who convincingly argues that “we cannot undertake analyses of arguments such as 
Tilly’s while only focusing on successful instances of state-making. […] If we are interested in the process 
of state-making, we have to include the failed as well as the successful cases.” 
69  Lata 2004; Touval 1963; Sheik-Abdi 1977; Adam 1999; Laitin/Samatar 1987:xiv. 
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1977:281), are widely considered to be a watershed in the Somali state trajectory.70 Third, 
there is the Somalia of the 1990s onwards, which came to be known as probably the most 
“full-blown case of state collapse” (Milliken/Krause 2002:754).71 Fourth, and finally, there 
is the allegedly opposed case of Somaliland, which developed into “one of the most stable 
polities in the Horn [of Africa]” (Bradbury 2008:1; ICG 2003:10; World Bank 2005:19).72 
While a comparative study of contemporary state-making processes throughout the 
territory of Somalia would have been intriguing, especially juxtaposing the experience of 
Somaliland since 1991 with that of south-central Somalia during the same period, it was 
beyond the scope of the current study. It would have been impossible to replicate the 
primary research I undertook in Somaliland in south-central Somalia. Instead, I have had to 
confine the comparative dimension of the study to Somali state development between 1960 
and 1991. It follows that what the thesis has to say about the wider dimensions of Somalia’s 
state trajectory in the post-1991 era is by implication rather than through primary research.  
That said, due to their broad similarities in social, cultural, linguistic, and religious terms, the 
comparison between the state trajectory of Somaliland and past state-making endeavours in 
Somalia constitutes – despite important differences such as dissimilar colonial experiences 
and changing geopolitical environments –  a loose approximation of a social scientific 
‘natural experiment’.73 Particularly Somaliland appears to fit this characterization, leading 
other scholars to argue that “Somaliland seems like a perfect laboratory of statehood in 
Africa, providing numerous lessons about how the concept and the idea of statehood can 
be relevant and important in Africa today” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:723). Moreover, the 
Somali cases also lend themselves to test the ‘war makes states’-hypothesis. As argued 
above, the Horn of Africa has experienced a relationship between war and state formation 
that has been of longer duration and far more intensive than elsewhere in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Clapham 2001:2; Ahmed/Green 1999). This argument appears to be particularly 
true for the case of Somaliland, for which other scholars have already hinted at the 
formative role war played with regards to state-making (Jacquin-Berdal 2002; Huliaras 2002; 
Bakonyi 2009). Yet, although it is suggested that “Somaliland challenges the image of war” 
 
                                                     
70  E.g. S. Mohamed 1992:6; Bryden 1999b:3; Tripodi 1999a:1. 
71  Adam/Ford 1997:106; Rotberg 2002:86; Mohamoud 2006:16; Foreign Policy 2007; Schneckener 2007; 
Nenova/Harford 2004:1; Drysdale 2000:84.  
72  Reno 2003a:2; Zierau 2003:58; Doornbos 2002:808; Bradbury 1997:27; Mubarak 1996:150; Jirdeh 2004. 
73  Cf. Mahoney/Rueschemeyer 2003:341f.; George/Bennett 2005:153. 
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(Bradbury 2008:2), and that the polity was “very much a product of war” (Spears 
2004b:185), the Somali literature still lacks an account that fully develops this argument – a 
gap this research project tries to fill.  
Main Research Tools 
In order to conduct the research and gather the data required for this project, I used a 
number of research tools. First, I engaged in an extensive desk study, reviewing the existing 
literature, collecting secondary data, and engaging in archival research. In undertaking this 
exercise, I relied largely on the libraries of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science and the School of Oriental and African Studies, as well as the British Library, all of 
which provided valuable material. Furthermore, I assembled as much grey literature on 
Somalia and Somaliland from international development and non-governmental organiza-
tions as I could in order to enhance my knowledge of the empirical terrain, what is generally 
judged as constituting received wisdom, and identify existing knowledge and analytical gaps.  
Second, I complemented this basic research by three research visits to Somaliland. The first 
took place immediately after my MPhil/PhD upgrade panel in the summer of 2008. 
Between July 15th and August 13th I carried out a feasibility study in this de facto state, 
familiarized myself with the environment and established first contacts that were to 
facilitate future research. I returned from January 27th to May 4th, 2010. While conducting 
my own doctoral research, I was also involved in a research project funded by the British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and carried through by the Stanhope Centre for 
Communications Policy Research. In the capacity of a research team leader I organized and 
conducted research into the information and communication ecology of Somaliland, which 
provided me with valuable insights into aspects of socio-cognitive standardization in 
Somaliland.74 The third and final period extended from June 8th to August 12th, 2011. For 
the greater part of June I consulted on a project with the Small Arms Survey (SAS) and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a ‘youth-at-risk’ project. Being 
based at the Somali Observatory for Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP), this 
exercise allowed me to enhance my insights into Somaliland’s state trajectory and to expand 
my network of informants. The subsequent section entitled ‘Challenges in Collecting and 
Assessing Oral Materials’ provides a fuller and more in-depth discussion of this research 
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tool, which was instrumental and essential in rendering some of the original empirical 
contributions of this research. 
Apart from carrying out interviews, I also collected documentary sources in Somaliland. 
While archival resources are especially useful for case study construction as they are stable, 
broad and exact (Yin 2003:86), such an ideal-type situation of archival resources does not 
exist for either Somalia or Somaliland. Written material and (consistent) statistical data is 
hard to come by – partly because the respective authorities have insufficient resources for 
data collection and partly because the region was poorly administered for many years and 
devastated by repeated conflict; the data I gathered enabled some additional and deeper 
insight into local and national government policy over time. While the collection of 
documentary sources and interviews enabled reconstruction of the recent past, primary 
observation, which constituted a further research tool, allowed for insights into the present.  
Whereas the Somali language has a rich oral tradition, it did not gain an orthography until 
1972. Therefore, and due to the fact that Somalia was colonized by different imperial 
powers, Somali spelling is varied. The country’s capital, for example, is spelled Mogadiscio 
by the Italians, Mogadishu by the English, and Muqdisho by the Somalis. Although having 
originally intended to standardise the spelling by using Somali spellings in every instance, 
this quickly became awkward and confusing. Thus, I compromised, using the Somali 
spelling whenever possible, but using the commonly known spelling for most names and 
locations. Some of the compromises I have chosen may irritate Somali scholars and 
language purists alike, and for that I apologize. When referring to Somali individuals, I will 
frequently refer to them by using their ‘official’ nickname, marked by guillemets. And when 
referring to Somali sub-clans and lineages, I will frequently situate them in the greater clan 
genealogy, so as to facilitate tracking (e.g. Isaaq/Habar Awal/Saad Muse/Jibril Abokor).  
Challenges in Collecting and Assessing Oral Materials 
Over the course of my research sojourns in Somaliland I conducted some 158 interviews, 
and, moreover, engaged in uncounted informal personal converations with informants in 
Somaliland, Nairobi, London, Paris and Geneva. While those informal conversations were 
undertaken with individuals from a great diversity of professional backgrounds and social 
status, I conducted the formal interviews largely with key informants of Somaliland’s 
political, administrative, business and media elite. This approach was justified by the fact 
that key informant interviews allow the researcher to focus directly on the research question 
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(Yin 2003:86). Furthermore, the urban elite have higher educational levels, better 
knowledge of the English language, and generally wider expertise in Somali and Somaliland 
politics than, for example, most informants in the rural areas, making the former an 
obvious target group for the research I aimed to undertake. Hence, and due to the fact that 
Somaliland’s political, economic and intellectual elite are concentrated in the capital the 
majority of interviews took place in Hargeysa.  
The secondary reason for why I focused my interviews on the urban elite in Hargeysa lay in 
the logistical and financial challenges of conducting research outside of the capital. Due to a 
fragile security situation, the carrying through of primary research beyond the confines of 
the capital comes with significant monetary costs, not least because the Somaliland 
government requires all foreigners to hire a minimum of two 4x4 vehicles and an armed 
escort consisting of members of the Special Protection Unit (SPU) when leaving Hargeysa 
for other destinations within the de facto country.75 Despite these constraints, I conducted a 
sizable number of interviews in Boroma, Berbera, Burco, and Erigavo. I had been keen to 
undertake research outside the capital, partly because primary observation on the progress 
of state-making throughout the Somaliland territory was to inform my research. Moreover, 
I wanted to guard myself against a ‘capital bias’ in my assessment of Somaliland’s state-
making trajectory.  
For most of the time, the interviews were ‘semi-structured’ in nature, as this formula not 
only facilitates a “consistent line of inquiry” (Yin 2003:89), but also allows for a free-
flowing stream of questions and information. Consequently, this approach enhanced my 
chances of acquiring information from the informants’ perspective, rather than my own. 
Partly in order to ensure a triangulation of information across different interviews, I 
generally used interview guides that featured central questions pertaining to my key research 
interests. The further I progressed with my research and the more I immersed myself in the 
knowledge I had gathered, I adapted the catalogue of questions for the semi-structured 
interviews in order to cover additional ground and explore new narratives. While these 
interview guides evolved particularly in between my different research sojourns – i.e. during 
those phases of my research when I took stock of my empirical knowledge, analysed the 
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material collected to date, and readjusted and fine-tuned my research focus – these guides 
also evolved over the course of each research trip.  
Whereas I recorded and subsequently transcribed the interviews at first, I soon came to 
realize that this practice restricted not only the number of my possible informants, but also 
significantly confined the range of information I would be able to gather. As numerous 
informants were not comfortable having our conversations recorded on tape due to the 
frequently politically sensitive nature of these discussions, I changed my method to taking 
notes during the course of the interview and producing protocols from memory thereafter. 
Although not all of the individuals I interviewed requested anonymity, and while I was 
reluctant to make all of my interview material anonymous at first, I ultimately opted to keep 
all interviews confidential, given that the implications of research and its publication are 
never foreseeable and could possibly impact on the informants’ careers and their lives more 
generally. Yet, by providing specific information about the profession and/or position of 
my interviewees in the ‘List of Interviews’ on pages 327-333, and by linking the information 
obtained in particular interviews with this list through a numerical system throughout this 
thesis, I hope tohave restored some of the validity and transparency the oral materials have 
forfeited through the process of anonymization.   
Although the research presented in this thesis relies on a variety of sources, primary oral 
materials constitute a central source. This is largely because it is only in interviews that I was 
able to uncover information and narratives that did not yet constitute part of the 
established knowledge and received wisdom on Somaliland’s state-making project. Since 
interview material provides the principle source of information for this thesis, I have had to 
confront a number of methodological challenges. Amongst them are the representativity of 
the interview sample, the reliability of informants’ information, the comparability of 
different interviews, and the degree of manipulation in the presentation and interpretation 
of the oral materials.  
As regards the selection of informants, I aimed at selecting interviewees from different 
political and clan groupings within the different sectors I wanted to research, so as to guard 
against bias and allow for the triangulation of information. Thereby, I undertook special 
efforts to interview representatives of different ‘sides’ of a particular conflict or event 
wherever possible, in order to not only validate particular pieces of information, but also to 
gain a greater spectrum of narratives as well as achieve a greater level of objectivity. In 
practical terms, I started identifying my interviewees through my initical contacts at the 
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Academy for Peace and Development (APD) during the course of my first research sojourn 
in Somaliland. Given that the APD is probably the most respected local think tank in 
Somaliland – which has, moreover, been deeply involved in diverse political processes – 
and due to the circumstance that its researchers come from a wide range of political and 
kinship backgrounds, selection bias in favour of one or another group was limited. Once I 
had explored and engaged with the informants suggested to me by APD staff, I started 
applying a ‘snowball system’ to reach beyond the immediate contacts I had initially been 
provided with.  
During my second and third research sojourns in Somaliland I commenced identifying my 
informants in a similar manner, however, from different institutional bases, amongst them 
the Observatory for Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP). Again, I first approached 
the OCVP staff, subsequently turning towards their own private and professional primary 
contacts, incrementally making ever more distant connections accessible by applying the 
‘snowball system’. Moreover, the longer I stayed in Hargeysa and the more often I returned 
to the Republic of Somaliland, I increasingly got to know a more random variety of 
individuals, ranging from hotel staff to parliamentarians, through whom I sought to gain 
further access to additional informants. The more I learned about Somaliland’s state 
trajectory and the central actors behind it, the easier I found it to identify and target 
informants that I deemed particularly relevant or interesting.  
Apart from ensuring a balanced interview sample, another central challenge that arises 
when relying on key informant interviews as the primary source of research lies in the fact 
that particularly initial interviews run the risk of bias, both on behalf of the interviewee and 
the interviewer (Yin 2003:86). The fact that my own assessment of Somaliland’s state-
making progress changed during the course of my research76 helped me to keep my own 
bias in check. Also, some of the prepossession I encountered on the part of some of my 
informants seemed to diminuish over time – either because I had gained sufficient 
knowledge so as not to readily ‘buy in’ to certain narratives offered by particular 
interviewees, or because I had managed to establish a level of trust with the respective 
informant. While I had frequently been provided with what appeared to fall into the 
‘standard narrative’ of Somaliland’s state-making trajectory during initial interviews – thus, 
rendering some of the early interviews not useful beyond acting as formal introductions – 
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later interviews seemingly brought to the fore more sophisticated answers from my 
informants. Thus, where possible, I attempted to repeat interviews, or at least return to the 
same research question(s) in later sessions with the same informant. 
Nevertheless, during the course of my research I was presented with a cacophony of 
divergent narratives on the question of how Somaliland’s state-making process had evolved. 
Consequently, I faced the challenge of assessing the validity of my informants’ information 
and making judgements as to whom and what to believe. According to Thompson 
(2000:272-274) there are a number of principles that must be followed in order to ensure a 
certain level of validity of oral histories collected. First, each interview must be reviewed for 
internal consistency and with a view to discerning the general thrust of the narrative being 
presented. Second, the researcher must cross-check and triangulate the information 
provided with a variety of sources. And third, the interview must be reviewed in the context 
of the researcher’s own understanding of the wider context in which particular events took 
place. While I tried to adhere to all these requirements, my main strategy in ensuring the 
reliability of my informants’ information lay, as mentioned before, in cross-referencing and 
triangulating information with other sources of information from different types of kinship 
groups, gender, and professional background wherever possible. 
While interview informants recalled particular events with reasonable consistency in terms 
of what happened, explanations for why these events unfolded and who was responsible 
for setting them in motion, for example, tended to differ significantly. Three factors played 
into these inconsistencies. First, the interviewees themselves entertained a subjective 
perspective on certain events and had an interest in according themselves a particular role. 
Second, it seemed to be apparent that particular political or kinship groups had derived a 
shared understanding of a particular historical event. Third, there seemed to be an ‘official’ 
and ‘unofficial’ account of past processes and developments – with the ‘official’ one 
frequently being offered during the early phase of my research in Somaliland, and the 
‘unofficial’ one generally being provided once I had established myself as a researcher. 
Similarly, I found that issues discussed with interviewees and the kind of explanations and 
responses given by them in the morning seemed to sometimes differ from what I was told 
in more informal settings in the afternoon. 
Because of this and the fact that I was presented with different narratives on Somaliland’s 
state-making trajectory, I was confronted with the question of whom and what to ultimately 
believe. This question was particularly pertinent in cases in which the triangulation of 
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information manifested rather than diminuished the cacophony of narratives. In certain 
cases, the question of whom and what to believe presented itself as being relatively straight-
forward, however. This was, for example, the case when an informant presented a highly 
political, contested and ambiguous issue in a simplistic manner, glossing over important 
factors I knew had influenced the aspect under discussion. Similarly, I became suspicious of 
informants’ accounts, if their narratives fell too neatly in line with their clan’s history – 
which is why I always tried to gather a good deal of background information on the 
individual I planned to interview. Consequently, I tended to lend my ear more to those 
informants, who confronted me with accounts that gave proof of higher levels of reflection, 
scrutiny and complexity.  
Apart from conducting interviews in a formal manner during the morning hours, and 
applying a generally slightly less formal setting in the afternoon hours, I also collected parts 
of my research during very informal khat chewing sessions. During the afternoon hours, 
men tend to sit with their colleagues and friends in a room of a public or private building, 
in order to socialize and engulf in the consumption of the light stimulant khat leaves. 
However, while some researchers have found it valuable to attend these chewing sessions in 
order to obtain information, I myself did not find them as valuable, after all. This had 
largely to do with the fact that these afternoon meetings were always held in Somali, leaving 
me either excluded from the conversation or with an uncomfortable feeling of intrusion, 
when trying to switch the discussion to English. Moreover, I found my attendance at these 
sessions to constitute an ineffective use of my time, as it frequently took hours to extract 
some sparse information or clues. Having said that, some of the khat sessions proved to 
provide a useful context for gaining additional information or leads, not least because 
people tended to be more talkative, but also because they often provided an opportunity to 
immediately triangulate information.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
considerations underlying this thesis. Therein, I suggest conceiving of the state as one of 
several socio-political regimes within a society and propose that state-making was ultimately 
about the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ 
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within a geographically defined population. Accordingly, I claim that trends of state-making 
and state-breaking can be understood as processes of changing levels in institutional and 
socio-cognitive standardization. The chapter furthermore contends that the standardization 
and survival of institutions and socio-cognitive systems largely hinges on central 
administration. The fundamental hypothesis I advance is that outcomes of regime 
standardization are greatly determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or 
exploit administrative structures. I also maintain a number of further arguments. First, I 
suggest that periods of regime change, which are characteristic of state-making endeavours, 
are inherently crisis prone, as a modification of the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the 
mind’ that structure a society goes in tandem with shifts in power. Second, I argue that 
processes of regime change are generally driven by elites, as it is largely this social stratum 
that holds the capacity for regime negotiation and standardization. Furthermore, I postulate 
that war can be conducive to state-making under the condition that it contributes to the 
standardization of a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. 
Chapter 3 applies the analytical prism of regime standardization to the Somali state 
trajectories of the 1960s and early- to mid-1970s. The chapter’s first part addresses the 
puzzle of why the previously promising state-making endeavour of the 1960s came to falter. 
After tracing some of the most prominent historical developments in early-independent 
Somalia the section highlights some of the challenges that came with the unification of the 
British and Italian Somali territories. Against this background, the chapter argues that, after 
an initial increase in regime standardization on the part of the state, the 1960s were largely 
characterized by a pluralization of regimes. The chapter’s second part considers the coup 
d’état of 1969, the installation of a military dictatorship, and its implications for state-
making. Thereby, the section speaks to the question of why Somalia was able to experience a 
phase of progressive state-making under Barre’s early rule and how this was undertaken. 
Essentially, the section suggests that with the takeover of the military government trends in 
favour of the standardization of an authoritative set of institutions and socio-cognitive 
systems started to set in.  
A first analysis of the role war played for Somali state trajectories is undertaken in Chapter 
4. The chapter addresses the questions of how the Ogadeen War of 1977/78 and the 
insurgency war led by the Somali National Movement (SNM) in north-west Somalia in the 
1980s impacted the subsequent state trajectories, and why they had such differential effects 
on processes of state (un)making. I propose that the Ogadeen War heralded a situation in 
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which Barre was increasingly bereft of his ability to conduct institutional and socio-
cognitive standardization, thus leading to the unmaking of the Somali state. With regards to 
the civil war, it is, however, less clear as to how much it contributed to an enhancement of 
particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that would lend themselves to 
explaining the alleged state-making success of Somaliland. While it seems as if the war did 
not lead to outright regime standardization, the chapter uncovers certain developments that 
were constitutive of state-making. 
Subsequent to this historical application of the regime standardization prism, the thesis 
delves into analysing Somaliland’s state-making project. Contesting established paradigms, 
Chapter 5 shows that the polity’s state-making process was neither as unique nor as 
peaceful as generally claimed. While showing that Somaliland’s state-making endeavour has 
numerous parallels to earlier state-making projects within and outside of Somali territories, 
the chapter furthermore contests that it was the legendary ‘traditional authorities’ with their 
inclination towards ‘grassroots democracy’ that lay at the heart of the polity’s development. 
Based on empirical findings I claim that Somaliland owes its trajectory largely to the shrewd 
and authoritarian politics of President Egal, who did not even balk at instigating civil war in 
order to consolidate his power and reconstruct a previously deconstructed state. The 
chapter illustrates that whereas the 1991-1993 period was marked by processes of state-
breaking, the subsequent years were largely characterized by a fortification of processes of 
regime standardization, the foundations of which had already partly been laid during the 
course of the civil war of the 1980s.  
Chapter 6 continues to analyse Somaliland’s state-making trajectory, scrutinizing the 
common propositions that democratization and decentralization were not only thoroughly 
beneficial for its development, but also genuine. Drawing upon empirical evidence, I 
propose that the process of democratization was flawed, turning it into little more than a 
continuation of Egal’s authoritarian politics ‘by other means’. Moreover, the effect of 
democratization on state-making appears to have been ambivalent, not least because it 
heralded a process of political decentralization, which impeded the maintenance of regime 
standardization during the 2000s. In light of these developments the chapter argues that, 
from the state-making point of view, both democratization and decentralization took place 
prematurely, putting significant brakes on the broadcasting and implementation of a single 
authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. 
1   INTRODUCTION 
44 
 
The analysis of Somaliland’s state trajectory between the early-1990s and the late-2000s is 
completed by an investigation of the degree of state-making it had achieved by the end of 
its first two decades. Examining developments in its administrative architecture, security 
apparatus, resource mobilization patterns and media landscape, amongst others, Chapter 7 
puts the overly optimistic representation of Somaliland commonly found in the literature 
into question, proposing not only that the republic’s state-making endeavour was far from 
concluded by 2012, but also that the consolidation of this state remained limited. A central 
finding is that regime standardization was – to the extent that it occurred – largely confined 
to the Hargeysa-Berbera-Bruco ‘heartland’ of the Isaaq clan and remained mostly absent 
from the ‘hinterland’. Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, summarizes some of the key 
findings and discusses their implications for theory, policy and future research on Somalia 
and Somaliland.  
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2  
State-Making as Regime Standardization  
International efforts aimed at ‘fixing failed states’ (Ghani/Lockhart 2008)77 in the 21st 
century have been guided by ‘pragmatic neo-liberalism’ (Eyoh/Sandbrook 2001; 
Wolfensohn 1999). Accordingly, the promotion of human rights, civil society and pluralist 
values has taken centre-stage in contexts of fragility (Chandler 2010:33). While Western 
diplomats press political adversaries in (post-)conflict societies to enter into ‘power-sharing 
agreements’ (Sisk 1996; Hartzell/Hoddie 2003)78 and to establish ‘inclusive political systems’ 
(OECD 2011:2), international development experts advise that an adherence to liberal 
pluralism must be observed, if fragility is to be replaced by stability (e.g. OECD 2011:2, cf. 
Levene 2000:20f.). Thus, democratization and decentralization have not merely been seen 
as ends in themselves, but as important means to safeguard political tolerance, ethnic 
diversity, religious freedom, and linguistic non-discrimination. Carrying these liberal notions 
to extremes, neo-pluralist concepts,79 such as ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPOs) (Böge et al. 
2008), suggest that ‘hybridity’ and pluralism constitute not only a goal, but, in fact the very 
nature of modern states.  
Such conceptualizations of, and policy prescriptions for, states ‘in the making’ contrast 
strongly with classical accounts. Social contract theorists such as Hobbes (1651), Locke 
(1694), and Rousseau (1763) suggest that the natural state of violent competition and 
anarchy can only be overcome, if the plurality of players agree to delegate some of their 
powers to a supreme primus inter pares, the Leviathan, who can promote a more peaceful 
coexistence by enforcing particular ‘rules of the game’. Building on these long-standing 
 
                                                     
77  Kaplan 2008a; Chesterman et al. 2005. 
78  For the concept of power-sharing see Daalder 1974; Lehmbruch 1967, 1974; Lijphart 1969, 1977, 1982, 
1984; Lorwin 1974; Nordlinger 1972. Cf. Schneckener 2002. 
79  Neo-pluralist concepts emphasize problems of allocation rather than ones of rule and control, see 
Nordlinger 1981; Lindblom 1977. 
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insights and scrutinizing the fashionable quest for pluralism, Schwartz (1995) reminds us 
that the West’s general understanding of the modern state was built on a ‘diversity myth’.80 
Similarly, Levene (2000:21) argues that states did not exist to promote diversity, but, “on 
the contrary, their role is to streamline, make homogeneous, organize people to be uniform 
in some sense.”81 According to this understanding, the consolidated state is less an object of 
plurality, but more uniformity, and state-making is less about diversification than 
‘standardization’.82  
This train of thought constitutes one key pillar of the analytical prism developed in this 
chapter, which also addresses some other central debates on state-making. Building on 
insights gained from the literature on state-building and nation-building I argue that the 
social construct of the state can meaningfully be understood as one of several socio-political 
regimes within a given society, and that state trajectories can valuably be conceptualized as 
changing levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Understanding a ‘regime’ to be 
a set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems shared by two or more individuals, which 
regulates the allocation and application of power, I propose that state-making is ultimately 
about the negotiation and standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and 
‘rules of the mind’ amongst a territorially defined population.  
In an attempt to analytically not only combine the insights of the state- and nation-building 
literature, but also bridge the gap between existing approaches to state-making and state-
breaking, the theoretical framework presented here furthermore proposes that processes of 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization are largely a function of central 
administration. Building on the realization that both ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the 
mind’ are significantly shaped by the administrative architecture of a socio-political 
organization, the fundamental hypothesis advanced here is that state trajectories are greatly 
determined by the varying ability of ruling elites to build and/or exploit central 
administrative structures. The chapter also contains a number of further arguments.  
 
                                                     
80  Schwartz (1995) shows that the United States of America “was characterized by ethnic dominance, not 
ethnic pluralism” and that “ ‘Americanization’ was a process of coercive conformity according to which 
the United States was a melting pot, not a tapestry.” Thus, he concludes that while Americans preached an 
adherence to liberal pluralism throughout the world, their own state and national unity was not founded 
on pluralism, diversity and tolerance, but homogeneity and conformity.      
81  See also Anderson 1983; Connor 1994:92; Conversi 2007:372. 
82  See also Scott 2007:4. 
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First, I suggest in line with established scholarship that periods of regime change, which are 
inherent to processes of state-(un)making, are inevitably crisis prone (cf. Dogan/Higley 
1998). This is because alterations to existing sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the 
mind’ that regulate role relationships within a given society are political in nature, as they go 
in tandem with shifts in the allocation of power. Second, I propose that such processes of 
regime change are, generally, driven by elites, as it is largely those individuals “who make or 
shape the main political and economic decisions” (Hossain/Moore 2002; Reinhart 1996) 
that hold the capacity for regime innovation, negotiation and standardization. Third, I argue 
in line with other scholars that war can be constitutive of state-making. Whereas scholars 
such as Cramer (2006) highlight rational and political economy aspects or (civil) wars, I 
propose to understand their functionality in even broader terms, suggesting that wars 
positively affect state-making under the condition that they enhance processes of regime 
standardization.  
In order to develop the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’, section one sets the 
theoretical foundation by introducing concepts such as the ‘state’, ‘nation’, ‘institutions’ and 
‘socio-cognitive systems’. This is followed by the presentation of the regime prism in 
section two, and the argument that state trajectories can be understood in terms of ‘regime 
(de-)standardization’ in section three. Section four analyses the role of elites, administration 
and warfare in standardizing a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, 
before turning towards discussing certain indicators of regime standardization in section 
five. An interim conclusion summarizes the main argument.  
 
2.1 States and Institutions, Nations and Socio-Cognitive 
Systems 
The State…  
Although much has been theorized about the state, conceptually it has ultimately been 
declared a “messy concept” (Mann 1988:4).83 Having been called into question as an 
appropriate analytical tool (Foucault 2000:123), particularly for understanding polities and 
 
                                                     
83  Alike, Jessop (2006:111) claims that “no single theory can fully capture and explain its complexities.” 
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their trajectories in non-OECD countries (Linklater 1995:178ff.),84 some scholars have 
celebrated the weakening of the state in favour of either a more global or local vision of 
politics (Held 1995, 1997; Rosenau 1990, 1997). A central critique commonly levelled 
against Weberian conceptualizations of the state is that they perceive it as a largely static, 
autonomous and homogeneous entity.85 In particular, those scholars who have conducted 
empirical analyses of state trajectories in sub-Saharan Africa have criticised such approaches 
as being inadequate to capture the ‘realities on the ground’, as the concepts had trouble 
dealing with cases where the lines between state and society, formal and informal are 
blurred (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:2).86 Marxist and functional understandings alike, which 
interpret the state as the necessary fulfilment of certain ends (Marx 1848; Zartman 1995; 
Rotberg 2004), have frequently been dismissed for failing “to anticipate the new and diverse 
forms of state institutionalization” (Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3; Khan 2002:14). 
This debate has come to a point at which the ‘statist’ school, which argues that states 
remain the “most important institutions of political life” (Röder 2007:4)87 and need to be 
understood in their own right (cf. Krasner 1999; Jackson 2001),88 is seemingly irreconcilable 
with the ‘pluralist’ camp, which counters this claim by voicing the need to “[free] the debate 
from its current state-centric bias” (Böge et al. 2009a:88). However, despite their 
antagonism, the two intellectual strands are not inherently incompatible – at least not when 
understanding their divergences in methodological rather than political terms. Whereas 
statists take the (full-blown) state and its theoretically assigned criteria as their analytical 
point of departure, pluralists make the (partial) state-in-the-making and its empirically 
observable characteristics their point of reference. While statists thus focus on what ought to 
be, or rather on what is not, pluralists emphasize what is – at the cost of suggesting potential 
directions of development out of fear of being normative.89  
 
                                                     
84  Heyer 1997a:11; Migdal/Schlichte 2005:3. 
85  E.g. Skocpol 1979; Evans et al. 1985; Collins 1986; Mann 1984, 1988; Amsden 1989; Petras 1989; Wade 
1990; Tilly 1992. 
86  Renders/Terlinden (2010:726) similarly argue that “[o]ne cannot neatly separate spheres into formal and 
informal, or classify actors as state versus non-state actors.” 
87  Howard 2002:103; Tilly 1992:4. 
88  See also Spears (2007:22), who suggests that “whether for the purpose of ensuring human security or 
advancing economic development, we need to dispense with the idea that we do not need states. The 
problem is not the state per se but states as they are currently constructed in Africa.” 
89  One could also argue that pluralist and non-hierarchical conceptualizations of the state, such as the 
concept of HPOs, are misleading in that they neglect the fact that the state is always a social project, thus 
confusing the ‘state’ with a ‘state-in-the-making’. 
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One solution to bridge this divide is offered by new institutional economics (Coase 1960; 
North 1990), which points to ‘institutions’ as the thread connecting all forms of social 
organization, including all varieties of states. Although its own conceptualization of the 
state, which pictures it as a set of institutions that sanctions the creation, enforcement and 
change in property rights, is problematic in that it ignores the factors that allow the state to 
achieve these goals, valuable insights can be derived from this approach. A key realization is 
to conceive of the state neither in static, autonomous, nor homogeneous terms, but rather 
as a dynamic and complex combination of institutions that are interrelated with a given 
society’s sets of ‘rules of the game’.90 Along these lines it has been suggested that states 
should be understood in terms of their ‘institutional arrangements’ (CSRC 2005:8), and it be 
acknowledged that states are not wholly independent actors, but that “bureaucratic, 
customary, religious and kinship institutions often coexist, each providing particular norms 
and procedures for managing public affairs and organising collectivities” (Hagman/Höhne 
2009:44, referring to Bierschenk/de Sardan 2003).91  
… and the Framework of Institutions 
This institutional understanding of the state builds on the common insight that “institutions 
matter” (Bardhan 2000:245) as they “are critical to all levels of human interaction” (Wunsch 
2000:489; Knight 1992:1). Thereby, institutions are generally understood to comprise 
formal rules and informal constraints as well as the enforcement characteristics of both 
(North 1995:23).92 Because institutions not only enhance information flows but also 
“reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life” (ibid. 1990:3), they can be 
efficient. Yet, “[i]nstitutions are not created to be efficient, but to serve the interest of those 
with bargaining power to create new rules” (North 1994:360). Thus, institutions are not 
static but inherently inert, and given that they are configured by past processes and 
circumstances, they are never in full accord with the requirements of the present (Beall et al. 
2004, referring to Veblen 1902). Building on North’s (1995) understanding, Harriss (2002) 
and Putzel (1999) propose a conceptual modification, arguing that institutions are not 
 
                                                     
90  As Migdal et al. (1994:2) point out, “[s]tates may help mold, but they are also continually molded by, the 
societies within which they are embedded” (cf. Call 2008a:11). 
91  See also Migdal 1988; Böge et al. 2008.  
92  See also Knight (1992:2f.) who similarly understands institutions to be a set of shared rules which 
structure an interaction. Slightly differently, Cook (2000:xii) does not regard rules themselves as 
institutions, but the patterns of behaviour that follow such rules, defining institutions as “patterned 
interaction of at least two human beings following at least one shared, normative rule.” 
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merely “constraints that structure human interaction” (North 1995:23, my italics), but can 
also play an enabling role. Accordingly, I understand institutions to be  
humanly devised, recognized and enforceable ‘rules of the game’ that govern 
the behaviour, rights and obligations of two or more individuals by creating 
regularised role relationships.  
Understanding the state in an institutional framework has the benefit of entailing “a 
dynamic vision of statehood as an entity which is constantly being constructed and 
reconstructed” (Biró 2007:10). While there is broad consensus about the relevance of 
institutions and their central role in shaping state trajectories, the literature disagrees 
regarding the question of what kinds of institutional arrangements lead to state-making and 
state-breaking respectively. Some argue that ‘stable’ states are characterized by institutional 
arrangements dominated by statutory institutions (CSRC 2006:4), thus pointing towards the 
need for a hierarchical organization of different sets of ‘rules of the game’. Others, 
however, suggest that the hybridity of ‘political orders’ lies at the heart of modern African 
states (Böge et al. 2008:10), and that the multiplicity of institutions needs to be embraced 
rather than rejected. Thus, while taking the debate over the most appropriate 
conceptualization of states to the next level, the institutional approach does not solve the 
dilemma of how to best conceive of states – either in terms of how they ought to be, or in 
terms of how they are.  
Reverting to classical accounts of states and state-making can prove valuable in this regard. 
Social contract theory, as developed by Hobbes (1651), Locke (1694), and Rousseau (1763), 
describes a situation in which societies experiences a situation of homo homini lupus.93 The 
philosophers hypothesise that this situation, in which competition among equals causes 
anarchy, can only be overcome if the rivals cooperate rather than oppose each other, and 
delegate parts of their powers to a supreme primus inter pares, the Leviathan. The same logic is 
applied by pragmatist-realist informed approaches to state-making, even though Machiavelli 
(1513) postulates that state-making results more from defection and competition than 
cooperation and social contracts. Though starting from different origins, both accounts 
share the argument that states are characterized by and evolved through a process, in which 
some actors establish a preponderant power position – a proposition mirrored in the works 
of Weber (1919), Huntington (1968), and Mann (1986), amongst others.94  
 
                                                     
93  I.e. a situation in which ‘man is a wolf to [his fellow] man’.  
94  See also Cohen et al. 1981; McNeill 1982; Tilly 1985; Rasler/Thompson 1989; Colley 1992. 
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What emerges is the realization that while states comprise diverse and even conflictive sets 
of institutions, they are characterized neither by the equal status of all institutions, nor by an 
equal power of those organizations that create and enforce particular ‘rules of the game’. 
While I will return to this point shortly, there is another issue that is raised by this 
discussion. The ubiquitous focus on institutions characteristic of recent scholarship on state 
trajectories glosses over another critical aspect of state-making: the nation. In light of social 
contract theories and the more recent scholarship that draws our attention to the inherent 
links between the state and society (Katzenstein 1985; Crone 1988; Migdal 2001), there 
seems to be an urgent need for ‘bringing the nation back in’, as “simply putting in place the 
formal rules is a recipe for disappointment, not to say disaster” (North 2005:161).95 
The Nation… 
While the state is considered a ‘messy concept’, “[t]he concept of the nation is one of the 
most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon” (Tilly 1975:6) and considered 
“one of the [most] difficult areas of social science” (Bereketeab 2000:15). This is reflected 
in the multitude of definitions, which range from those that emphasize the nations’ 
“distinct ethnic identity and history” (Mann 1993:215) to ones that characterize them as 
‘imagined political communities’ (Anderson 1983:6). The reason why the scholarly field 
cannot agree on a universal definition for ‘nation’ as a unit of analysis (Smith 1998:211)96 
lies partly in the concept’s inherent paradoxes.97 Moreover, the numerous and conflicting 
approaches emanate from different schools of thought. While primordialists98 suggest a 
nation-to-state-sequence, modernists99 counter by arguing that the nation is a “construct 
dependent upon the state for its force and meaning” (Tilly 1992, as in Smith 1998:76).100  
 
                                                     
95  The links between the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ were discussed in relation to modernization theories of 
development in the 1950s and 1960s (cf. Scott 2007:4; Hippler 2004; Dinnen 2006), but largely neglected 
ever after. The analytical prism developed here contributes to reviving this link.  
96  Jacquin-Berdal 2002:8; Comaroff/Stern 1995:5. See also Mayall (1999) who argues that a universally 
applicable definition of ‘nation’ does not exist. 
97  While nations claim subjective antiquity they appear to be of objective modernity; the formal universality 
of nationalism as a socio-cultural concept stands in sharp contrast to the irremediable particularity of its 
concrete manifestations; and the ‘political power’ of nationalism does not correspond to its ‘philosophical 
poverty’ (Anderson 1983:6). Moreover, while nationalism defends folk culture and cultural diversity, it 
overrides them with more uniform and homogeneous elements – a crucial point to which I return shortly.  
98  E.g. Geertz 1965; van de Berghe 1981; Kulessa/Heinrich 2004:9. 
99  E.g. Giddens 1985; Mann 1986, 1993; Tilly 1992; Anderson 1983. 
100  Other approaches include perennialism (e.g. Seton-Watson 1965; Connor 1994) and ethno-symbolism 
(e.g. Hutchinson/Smith 1994; Smith 1983). For an overview of the gamut of scholarship on nationalism 
see Smith 1998; Jacquin-Berdal 2002:7-42.  
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The ambiguities inherent in the concept of the nation, and those surrounding the debate 
about it do not, however, justify its neglect in debates on state-making. Even though the 
dawn of a ‘postnational era’ has long been prophesised (Hannerz 1996; Appadurai 1999; 
Bernal 2004:4), nation-ness still represents “the most universally legitimate value in the 
political life of our time” (Anderson 1983:3; Comaroff/Stern 1995:3). Moreover, both 
primordialists and modernists demonstrate, in their own ways, that there is a close 
interrelationship between the state and the nation and that they develop dialectically. 
Moreover, it is acknowledged that aspects of ‘soft power’ need to be considered when 
explaining processes of state-making (Mann 1988:10).101 Similarly, others postulate that 
“[m]odern state formation critically relies […] on the creation not just of effective 
bureaucracies, but of the common identities or ‘imagined communities’” (Clapham 2001:14, 
cf. Anderson 1983), as “within a homogeneous population, ordinary people were more 
likely to identify with their rulers” (Tilly 1992:107).102 
Consequently, I am in good company when challenging those who suggest that nation-
building is only specific to post-colonial situations (Chesterman 2004) and that state-
building and nation-building are ‘opposing forces’ (Ottaway 1999). Rather, I argue that 
state-building and nation-building are dialectic processes, and propose in a manner 
analogous to the dictum of Evans et al. (1985) on the state, the need of ‘bringing the nation 
back in’, if we are to better understand and theoretically grasp state trajectories. In order to 
do so, and in an attempt to find a common denominator that unites the scholarly field on 
nationalism to the question of how patterns of (group) identity are being created, the 
analytical prism I present in this chapter builds on another concept put forth by neo-
institutionalists: the concept of shared mental models. 
… and the Framework of Socio-Cognitive Systems 
Cognitive psychology understands that, interacting with their environment, people form 
internal, mental models of themselves and the things with which they interact. As these 
cognitive constructs help individuals to make sense of their environment, mental models 
provide them with predictive and explanatory abilities to understand these interactions 
 
                                                     
101  See also Holsti (1996), Reinhard (1996) and Putzel’s (1999, 2000) work on state legitimacy and nationalism 
in the Philippines.  
102  See also Khaldun (1967:xi) who proposes that groups are bound together by what he calls ء 
(‘asabîyah) ‘solidarity’, ‘group feeling’, ‘group consciousness’.  
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(Norman 1983:7). While institutions are the “external (to the mind) mechanisms individuals 
create to structure and order the environment”, mental models are understood to be the 
“internal representations that individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environ-
ment” (Denzau/North 1994:4). Thereby, these naturally evolving ‘mental models’ – or 
‘cognitive systems’ (Holland et al. 1986), or ‘belief systems’ (Linz 2000:160) – are not 
necessarily accurate reflections of the environment, but are functional in that they allow 
people to make sense of their surroundings and interact with them accordingly. Logically, 
individuals with common (cultural, religious, etc.) backgrounds and experiences not only 
share reasonably convergent mental models (Denzau/North 1994:3f.), but also find it easier 
to communicate – due to their similarity in interpreting and understanding the world.  
While shared mental models103 form a significant part of individual and group identities, 
cognition does not constitute their only source. As numerous scholars on nationalism have 
distilled, identities are also the result of common (imagined) experiences and shared 
patterns of social interaction. The argument that social tools such as a common language 
provide identity goes back to Herder (1772) and Fichte (1807) and is now well-
established.104 Similarly, social processes entailed in communication (Deutsch/Foltz 
1963),105 industrialization (Hechter 1975),106 and warfare (Tilly 1992)107 have all been credited 
with important roles in building identities. So, when theorizing about nation-building, the 
concept of ‘shared mental models’ with its focus on cognitive elements needs to be expanded 
to incorporate social aspects of identity formation. Thus, I suggest defining these identity-
creating social and cognitive elements as socio-cognitive systems, understanding them to be 
humanly devised ‘rules of the mind’ that are created by individuals to interpret 
the environment and envision potential alternatives, and which give rise to  
socio-cognitive patterns that are shared by two or more individuals.  
Although building on the definition of ‘shared mental models’ (Denzau/North 1994), this 
conceptualization departs from it in two respects. First, it does not share these scholars’ 
endeavour to use this concept to fill the ‘black box of the rationality assumption’ used in 
economics and rational choice models. Second, the concept of ‘socio-cognitive systems’ 
 
                                                     
103  Mental models are developed in relation to issues such as entertaining a shared idea of who is a human or 
member of a particular community, a shared understanding of norms, etc.  
104  Cf. Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983; Gellner 1998; Laitin 2007; Conversi 2007.  
105  Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1977. 
106  Guibernau 1996; Gellner 2006. 
107  Howard 1979; Hilton 1989; Mann 1993; Johnson 1993; Posen 1995. 
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goes beyond the cognitive components – such as mental maps and belief systems – created by 
individuals to interpret the environment, and incorporates socio-cognitive patterns – such as 
language, (political) ideologies and (cultural) norms – that are characteristic of a relationship 
between two or more individuals. A further observation is in order before moving the 
discussion forward: as socio-cognitive systems share with institutions the circumstance that 
they are unstable, dynamic, and can change over time (cf. Norman 1983:8), the question 
emerges what else they have in common? 
 
2.2 The Regime Prism  
‘Socio-Cognitive Institutions’? 
As the previous discussion indicated, institutions and socio-cognitive systems do not merely 
coexist, but interdepend. As Denzau and North (1993:4) state, mental models constitute the 
individuals’ internal perception with which they interpret their environment – an 
environment which is significantly shaped by institutions. Hence, the ‘rules of the game’ 
that structure individuals’ external, social environment constitute the general framework of 
their ‘rules of the mind’. This proposition does not only appear to be sensible theoretically, 
but has also found empirical validation with regards to the formation of ethnic (Barth 1969) 
and national identities (Anderson 1983; Mann 1986; Breuilly 1993). However, the 
interdependence between institutions and socio-cognitive systems is not unidirectional.  
Douglas (1986), for example, sees institutions becoming socially embedded by way of 
iterative cognitive processes. Given that, per definition, socio-cognitive systems do not 
merely ‘interpret the environment’ but also ‘envision potential alternatives’, they are not 
merely a reactionary interpretation of the current setting, but also constitute the cognitive 
basis for its future shaping. This argument appears to be particularly salient if understanding 
institutions as tools with which individuals try to shape the external, social world in such 
ways as to achieve conversion with the particular mental model(s) they entertain 
(Denzau/North 1994:4). Thus, the ‘rules of the mind’ that shape our internal understanding 
of the environment may be the birth certificates of the ‘rules of the game’, with which 
individuals try to structure their external environment.  
From this close interdependence of institutions and socio-cognitive systems it can be 
derived theoretically that, on the one hand, a common set of ‘rules of the game’ shared by 
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(groups of) individuals entails converging ‘rules of the mind’, and that, on the other, shared 
socio-cognitive patterns result in the convergence of sets of institutions, time permitting. 
Similarly, increasing discrepancy in socio-cognitive systems within a society will lead to the 
formation of divergent sets of institutions; and an increasing dissimilarity of sets of ‘rules of 
the game’ culminates, if sustained over time, in different ‘rules of the mind’. Moreover, it 
can be inferred that socio-cognitive systems are unlikely to endure without institutions, and 
the ‘rules of the game’ without the ‘rules of the mind’ that legitimize the structuring of 
individual behaviour and inter-individual relationships. Due to this apparently non-
negligible role of socio-cognitive systems in the formation and functioning of institutions, it 
is sensible to argue that analytical concepts that try to grasp social change in general, and 
state trajectories in particular, need to account for the insight that ‘rules of the game’ and 
‘rules of the mind’ come and go in tandem. 
Understanding Regimes… 
In light of these general observations on institutions, socio-cognitive systems, and their 
inter-relationship every society or social group is defined by a particular set of ‘rules of the 
game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Whether an Aztec nuclear family or an Asian nation, 
Guinean ethnos or German workers’ union, historic church congregation or contemporary 
state – all are characterized by a commonly shared set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of 
the mind’ that create regularised role relationships, meaning and identity. Henceforth, I 
refer to those sets of institutions and their concomitant socio-cognitive systems that 
structure and characterize a particular social organization as ‘regimes’. The notion of 
‘regime’ has found wide and diverse application in scholarlship,108 and even though it has 
generally come to be used derogatively to denote autocratic governments (cf. Linz 2000), 
there have been other usages of the term that make its application expedient for the 
analytical framework developed here.  
Hewison et al. (1993:5) understand a ‘regime’ to be “a particular type of organisation of the 
state apparatus which may take a variety of forms” from liberal democracy to 
totalitarianism, and stress the aspect of continuity inherent to regimes, which may outlive the 
rise and fall of particular governments. Others define the term as the “set of rules, 
 
                                                     
108  International relations theorists (see Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984) have used the term in quite different 
terms compared with urban specialists (see Stone 1989; Lauria 1996). Most generally, a ‘regime’ has been 
defined as “a system of government or administration” (Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics 2009).  
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procedures, and understandings that formulate the relationship between the governors and 
the governed” (Macridis 1986:2), thus emphasizing that regimes are not restricted to the 
‘organization of the state apparatus’, but that they reach beyond its confines, building an 
important bridge between the state and society. Bevir (2007:800) takes this thought a step 
further, suggesting that “[t]he concept of regime evokes a system of social control.”109 
Ultimately, Higley and Burton (1989:78) define regimes as “basic patterns in the 
organization, exercise, and transfer of government decision-making power.” Building on 
these aspects and borrowing from Mann’s (1993:18) definition of a regime as “an alliance of 
dominant ideological, economic, and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the 
state”, I understand a regime to be a historically rooted  
set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems shared by two or more 
individuals, which regulates the allocation and application of power. 
While stripping Mann’s conceptualization of its actor focus, my definition concurs with his 
understanding insofar as it perceives a regime to encompass not only the formal and 
informal institutions, but also the ‘ideological powers’ or, in slightly different terms, the 
‘rules of the mind’. Furthermore, my conceptualization of ‘regime’ deviates from other 
definitions inasmuch as it is not confined to the arena of the state. Rather, in its sociological 
orientation, this definition seeks to lay the basis for the argument that the state is only one 
amongst numerous social organizations that issues rules110 within a given society. And in 
suggesting that the state is structurally comparable with other (pre-state) organizations, this 
conceptualization hopes to contribute to our understanding about the processes that 
underlie the making and unmaking of states.  
Before returning to the ‘state’, however, the important question of how regimes differ 
needs to be addressed. If all social organizations can be conceived of as ‘regimes’, what 
makes the regime of a nuclear family distinct from that of an ethnos or workers’ union? 
Among the many differences – ranging from the (self-)selection of members to the regimes’ 
dissimilarities in relying on a particular balance of ‘rules of the game’ and/or ‘rules of the 
mind’ to maintain themselves – a key distinction lies in their respective complexity. 
Whereas a regime regulating relationships within a family consists of one single shared set 
of institutions and socio-cognitive patterns, the regime of an ethnic group not only contains 
 
                                                     
109  Petras (1989:29) suggests the opposite given his understanding of regime changes as being “almost totally 
divorced from any profound changes in the totality of society.”  
110  Henceforth, I frequently use the term ‘rules’ as shorthand to refer to ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the 
mind’. 
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hundreds and thousands of such family regimes, but also additional sets of rules that 
regulate, amongst others, interactions between these different families. Said differently, 
more complex social organizations (e.g. ethnicities) contain, apart from the authoritative set 
of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that are shared by all members of this 
organization, numerous less complex social groups with similar, yet own defining sets of 
rules (e.g. families).  
Figuratively speaking, complex social organizations resemble a set of Russian dolls and can 
be conceived of as ‘regime ecologies’. Crudely speaking, the regime ecologies of complex 
social organizations are made up of two types of regimes. First, the one authoritative set of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that is shared by all its members and thus 
constitutes the defining characteristic of this particular organization. Second, the numerous 
sets of institutions and socio-cognitive systems, which are shared only by certain members 
of the overall organization and which can thus be referred to as ‘sub-regimes’.111 
Consequently, ‘regime ecologies’ are characterized by hierarchies, not only because 
sociological phenomena generally show a “hierarchy of relationships” (Simmel 1964:25), 
but also because “[t]here are no complex, civilized societies without any centre of binding 
rule-making authority, however limited its scope” (Mann 1984:195). Furthermore, 
hierarchies are nothing but the logical extension of institutions, as both provide a means to 
‘regularize role relationships’ and “structure human interaction” (North 1995:23).  
… and Reconceptualising the State and the Nation 
Thus far, I have established the argument that states can valuably be conceptualized in an 
institutional framework, and that institutions and socio-cognitive systems are concomitant. 
While this led me to demonstrate that states can be understood as one of several regimes 
within a given society, what else can be said about the state? It is generally accepted that 
states are characterized by four main elements. First, a differentiated set of institutions; 
second, centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the centre; third, 
a territorially-demarcated area; and fourth, a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed 
up by a monopoly of the legitimate means of physical violence (cf. Mann 1984:188).112 
 
                                                     
111  While e.g. an ethnic group contains different sub-regimes that regulate family life, warriorship, and 
religious practices, and provide concomitant identities as family members, warriors, or believers, the ethnic 
group is ultimately defined by the one authoritative set of rules that is shared amongst all its members.  
112  Mann himself refers to Eisenstadt 1969; MacIver 1926:22; Tilly 1975:27; Weber 1968a:64. Unfortunately, 
and to the detriment of the other aspects entailed in Weber’s conceptualization of the state, his definition 
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While the first aspect has already been covered by perceiving the state as having a particular 
set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems, and while I will go into the second aspect of 
‘centrality’ in a later section, let us briefly focus on points three and four to take the 
discussion forward.  
A central characteristic of the state is that the purview in which it asserts a particular set of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ is territorially demarcated. Unlike those regimes 
that characterize social organizations such as ethnic groups or epistemic communities, state 
regimes are confined geographically, which implies that the question of who is subjected to 
its authoritarian ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ is decided by territorial rather 
than individual disposition. Thus, already by definition, states cannot tolerate regime 
dissenters; in order to be effective and secure their survival, states have to ensure that the 
vast majority of individuals living within their claimed territory adhere to its set of 
authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ – by coercion if necessary. Partly as 
a consequence of their territorial dependency, states claim to be the highest and ultimate 
instance of rule-making for the populations that reside in their territories. State regimes thus 
champion the task of hierarchically organizing all alternative sets of institutions in such a 
way as to preside over them. In line with these considerations I understand the state to be   
a hierarchically organized and centrally administered regime that claims 
authority over the ‘rules of the game’ to regulate role relationships within a 
territorially defined population.113  
One benefit of perceiving the state in regime terms is that it allows for ‘bringing the nation 
back in’. As sets of institutions go hand in hand with socio-cognitive systems, the nation is, 
in fact, inseparable from the state. Yet, given the bidirectional relationship connecting ‘rules 
of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, the regime framework, unfortunately, does not answer 
the question of which came first, the state or the nation.114 What the regime prism can 
address, however, is the general problem that conceptualizations of ‘nation’ do not take 
agency or action into account (Breuilly 2006:xliii), which renders them “not adequate for 
 
                                                                                                                                     
has frequently been reduced to the argument that a state’s raison d’être is the containment of violence 
within its territory (e.g. Brons 2001:27). 
113  I concur with Hewison, Rodan and Robison (1993:5) in setting the ‘state’ apart from ‘state apparatus’ and 
‘government’, which they define as “the real, existing institutional forms of state power, namely the 
coercive, judicial and bureaucratic arms of the state”, and “the legislative and executive branches of the 
state apparatus and those officials, parties or individuals who control them.” 
114  While primordialists argue that a national identity gives rise to the state (Geertz 1965; van den Berghe 
1981; Greenfeld 1992; Kohn 1994), modernists argue that the nation is a “construct dependent upon the 
state for its force and meaning” (Tilly 1992, cited in Smith 1998:76; see also Anderson 1983; Giddens 
1985; Mann 1986:44; Tilly 1992:116; Chasteen 2003:xx; Breuilly 2006:xxv). 
2   STATE-MAKING AS REGIME STANDARDIZATION 
59 
 
explaining the more particular form of cohesion as a nation” (Marx 2003:16, my italics). 
How do national identities differ from other identities?  
Just as states are not the only rule-making organizations,115 but rather one of numerous 
regimes that issues sets of institutions within a given society, nations are not the sole 
identity-providing socio-cognitive system. As individuals operate within different regimes 
on different social levels they use different identities as members of a particular family, 
religion, or ethnicity. Yet, what makes the national ‘rules of the mind’ distinct from others is 
that “[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle” (Gellner 2006:1), and that it is 
dependent on “the modern state as a new kind of power container” (Breuilly 2006:xxxii). 
Consequently, any explanation of nationalism needs to take political institutions into 
account, as otherwise nationalism “would remain too vague a subject of analysis” (Marx 
2003:7). Hence, I define the nation to be  
an imagined, yet politically organised community that is characterized by a 
shared and state-related socio-cognitive framework.  
This definition shifts the focus from the frequently applied cultural explanation, towards an 
institutional explanation of nationalism, uniting those who argue that the state is 
instrumental in the formation of nations (Anderson 1983; Mann 1986; Breuilly 1993; 
Gellner 2006). I suggest that (political) identities are formed and shaped by way of political 
organization – i.e. that, generally speaking, socio-cognitive systems are contingent upon 
institutional structures. This proposition is in line with the modernists and supported by 
scholars who argue that “[a] state […] propagates an idea or ideology that serves to bind 
population, territory and institutions” (Brons 2001:158), and that subjective collective 
sentiments or identity claims coincide with or refer to existing or emergent institutionalised 
state power (Marx 2003:6).116  
 
 
                                                     
115  It is to be noted that this claim does not contradict the earlier proposition that states claim authority over 
rule-making. 
116  See also Hass 1997:23; Hobsbawm 1990:5ff.; Calhoun 1997:4. It has to be acknowledged, that the 
framework of regime standardization cannot unambiguously account for the formation and existence of 
‘multinational states’ – an analysis that would also surpass the framework of this thesis. What the regime 
standardization prism would, however, suggest in relation to ‘multinational states’ is that such formations 
will always be contested, as can be seen in the cases of Canada and Belgium, for example.  
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2.3 State-Making as Regime Standardization 
On the Approach…  
From the insight that societies consist of multiple, interconnected regimes, it is only a short 
step to conceptualize societal change as an alteration of their ‘regime ecology’. While such 
alteration may come about due to modification of existing ‘rules of the game’ or ‘rules of 
the mind’, it can also stem from the dismissal of old or the introduction of new institutions 
and socio-cognitive systems – a change that might affect only parts of the population or its 
entirety. Accordingly, state-making endeavours can be understood as attempts to change an 
existing regime ecology in order to enforce an authoritative set of rules upon a population 
that resides within a certain territory. State-making is a process during the course of which 
members of a territorially delineated population come to share – voluntarily or by force – a 
common set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that are hierarchically organized 
and centrally administered. The underlying mechanism is one I term ‘institutional and 
socio-cognitive standardization’, cum ‘regime standardization’.  
Along these lines, state-building can be understood as a process in which a set of ‘rules of the 
game’ that claims authority over other institutions comes to be shared and adhered to by a 
population that resides within a given territory. This process can be accomplished by either 
standardizing a set of the rules, which had already been exercised by parts of the 
population, across the entirety of that population; or by introducing a new, authoritative set 
of institutions across the whole populace – as has happened in instances of conquest and 
colonization. Either way, state-building is essentially about achieving institutional 
standardization. Although original, this conceptualization is compatible with and draws on 
former approaches to state-building. Whether classical, Weberian, or libertarian interpreta-
tions of state-building, they all emphasise the need to concentrate rule-making in the hands 
of the few (i.e. ‘hierarchization’) and to enforce the respective rules across the board (i.e. 
‘standardization’). In institutional terms, this translates into a process in which ‘institutional 
multiplicity’ is replaced by institutional hierarchy, domination and standardization.  
This conceptualization sheds new light on the debate between those who argue that 
‘institutional multiplicity’ was generally detrimental to states’ stability (CSRC 2006:4) and 
those who suggest that the ‘hybridity’ of ‘political orders’ was beneficial for state-making 
(Böge et al. 2008:10). Although it is undeniable that processes of state-making are 
commonly characterized by ‘hybrid political orders’, the ultimate goal of any state-making 
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project lies in the attainment of regime domination by way of standardizing an authoritative 
set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. This process of implementing a common 
and overriding set of institutions and mental models is what also lies at the heart of 
historical events such as religious crusades, ethnic cleansings and the introduction of 
particular ideologies. The prosecution and repression of minorities, displacement and 
elimination of opponents, as well as political assimilation and propaganda are, after all, 
geared towards achieving regime standardization.  
Similarly, nation-building can be understood as a process in which a common, state-related 
socio-cognitive system comes to be shared by a territorially defined population. This 
process can be nurtured by spreading and standardizing an existing socio-cognitive 
system,117 or by introducing a new set of ‘rules of the mind’ across the whole population,118 
amongst others. That nation-building is eventually about socio-cognitive standardization, is 
contained in numerous previous accounts of nationalism.119 Hence, Conversi (2007:372) 
and Levene (2000:21) postulate that ‘homogenization’ played a central role in nation-
building, and Connor (1994:92) understands a nation to be a “social group that shares […] a 
sense of homogeneity.” Thus, whether brought about by linguistic unification (Anderson 
1983; Laitin 2007), media and education (Hobsbawm 1977; Anderson 1983), industrializa-
tion (Gellner 2006), urbanization (Szilagyi-Gal 2001) or warfare (Tilly 1992), the common 
denominator of these accounts of nationalism lies in the convergence of a society’s ‘rules of 
the mind’, i.e. socio-cognitive standardization.120 
Despite the fact that, or possibly rather because, there are numerous indications that 
nation-building is fundamentally about socio-cognitive standardization, contemporary 
frameworks of state-making have not only ignored, but virtually shunned this component. 
From a neo-liberal, pluralist, and human rights perspective, Ottaway (1999), for one, claims 
that “[a]ttempts at ‘homogenising’ a state from an ethnic perspective are not appropriate” 
(quoted in Scott 2007:5).121 Yet, by dismissing the importance of ‘homogenising’ or 
 
                                                     
117  E.g. by declaring one vernacular as the official language. 
118  E.g. by announcing a (new) political ideology.  
119  Anderson (1983), for one, shows that while the prevalence of multiple vernaculars reaching from ‘holy’ 
Latin to ‘barbarian’ Bavarian anticipated the emergence of an ‘imagined community’, their sacrifice for a 
standardized language was central in seeing nationalism evolve. And by sharing the same news, celebrating 
the same holidays, and visiting the same memorials and museums, people start having common 
imaginations of their environment and values. 
120  Something that Deutsch (1953) might call ‘assimilation’. 
121  See also Ottaway 2002a:17. 
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‘standardising’ a particular set of ‘rules of the mind’ one not only prevents nation-building, 
but also risks the overall state-making endeavour. In this line of thought, Lemay-Hébert 
(2009:23) recognizes that “statebuilding without nation-building is unlikely to succeed”, as 
states whose societies have “no consensus on the cultural traditions, customs, symbols, 
rituals, and historical experience” suffer from the phenomenon of nation failure (von 
Bogdandy/Wolfrum 2005:585).122  
Thereby, it has to be acknowledged that the process of ‘homogenising’ does, with regards 
to aspects of ethnicity, for example, neither necessitate the cleansing of ethnic minorities, 
nor cleaning the minorities of their ethnicity (Schwartz 1995). In fact, such efforts can 
seriously backfire on state-making endeavours, as they are likely to elicit an affirmation of 
sub-national identities, rather than allowing for the construction of an overarching socio-
cognitive system. While, the elimination of ethnic, religious, etc. minorities has historically 
constituted a common means to arrive at regime standardization, the latter has also 
frequently resulted from adding another, overarching set of ‘rules of the mind’, such as a 
national identity, to a society’s regime ecology. Such a procedure could not only counter a 
society’s potentially perceived need for ethnic standardization – a process likely to be violent 
due to the rather rigid and exclusionary nature of ethnic identities123 – but could also 
provide the basis for a better social integration of ethnic minorities.  
… and Its Benefits 
Conceiving of state-making as a process of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization 
has numerous advantages. First, the framework allows the combination of insights from 
different schools of thought on state-building. While concurring with the statists that the 
state constitutes the most important political organization in the contemporary world,124 it 
accommodates the pluralists’ proposition that states “are [not] the only centres of power 
within society” (Hewison et al. 1993:5), and pays tribute to the fact that states are 
heterogeneous and dynamic entities that are closely interrelated with society.125 
Simultaneously, it takes on board one of the key benefits of the institutional approach, 
 
                                                     
122  Conversely, Bogdandy and Wolfrum (2005:584) articulate that the allied reconstruction efforts in Western 
Germany and Japan following World War II, and the state-making processes in Cambodia and post-
communist Poland were only successful, because “[t]he feature common to them all is their underlying 
and stabilizing sense of national identity which has never been disputed.” 
123  E.g. Moynihan 1993; Huntington 1996:252; Turton 1997:3. 
124  Cf. Röder 2007:4; Howard 2002:103; Tilly 1992:4. 
125  Cf. Migdal/Schlichte 2005; Böge et al. 2008; Hagman/Höhne 2009. 
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namely to think of state trajectories on a continuum rather than in rigid dichotomies. This 
lays the basis for the framework’s second major benefit, namely to bridge the analytical gap 
between approaches of state-making and state-breaking. Rather than rejecting previous 
explanations for state-(un-)making, the regime prism seeks to elaborate on these lines of 
explanation, acknowledging their applicability in some cases, but providing a broader 
framework for analysis.  
Third, the regime prism has the benefit of not being normative, but still providing a lead for 
state development. While it does not suggest which particular components a state needs to 
contain,126 or what functions and services it ought to fulfil,127 it shifts attention to underlying 
processes of state-making and argues that the key is to be found in standardization. In 
focusing on patterns of state-making, it also lays the basis for better understanding the role 
of war and to identify potential means for its replacement. Fourth, in investigating the 
general mechanisms of state-making, the regime standardization framework leaves ample 
room to account for case-to-case diversity, and can accommodate new, yet unknown roots 
of, and routes to, state-making. While one state may have relied on the standardization of a 
specific institution in order to initiate its state-making project, the ‘regime prism’ suggests 
that other states are likely to follow other formulas.  
This leads to the fifth benefit, namely that the framework allows comparing state 
trajectories not only over time, but also over space, as it is largely independent of the 
different states’ cultural contexts.128 While public executions in 17th century Europe vastly 
differ from cricket matches in contemporary India, both have contributed to socio-
cognitive standardization, which, when feeding into the state’s authoritative regime, 
contribute to nation-building. Similarly, the framework allows assessing the extent to which, 
for instance, historic colonialism or economic liberalization were beneficial or detrimental 
to state-making. Sixth, and finally, the regime prism outperforms other approaches to 
analysing processes of state-making and state-breaking in that it allows for ‘bringing the 
nation back in’ and accounts for the role of socio-cognitive elements in determining state 
trajectories. However, a central question that remains unanswered so far is how the regime 
prism conceives of the ‘wicked problem’ (Menkhaus 2010) of state fragility – and resilience.   
 
                                                     
126  See Weberian interpretations of the state. 
127  See Marxist and functional interpretations of the state.  
128  This is, however, not to suggest that cultural context does not matter. On the contrary, the ‘regime prism’ 
argues very strongly in favour of cultural specificities of socio-political processes, including state-making.  
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From Fragility to Resilience 
Following a considerable scholarly debate about what constitutes a ‘weak’ or ‘collapsed’ 
state,129 there have been numerous attempts to measure ‘state fragility’.130 While the 
analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’ does not lend itself to measuring the degree of 
stateness – partly because the ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ largely evade 
quantitative operationalization and recording – the framework is well-suited to identify 
trends of state trajectories. If processes characterized by the standardization of an 
authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ can be understood to be 
indicative of state-making, it follows that state-breaking is an incidence during which such 
tendencies are reversed, i.e. an occurrence that shows signs of regime de-standardization. 
This brings us back to the earlier question of what kinds of institutional arrangements were 
constitutive of state-making – was ‘institutional multiplicity’ a boon or were ‘hybrid political 
orders’ a bane for state development?  
While the chapter has recurrently indicated that processes of state-making were aimed at 
the hierarchization, standardization and, thus, mitigation of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of 
the mind’, this argument deserves additional scrutiny due to its centrality to the analytical 
prism of ‘regime standardization’. Furthermore, it is not only the fashionable framework of 
HPOs that suggest the contrary, but eminent scholars also argue that institutional diversity 
was desirable, as it enhanced resilience by providing alternative institutional frameworks 
(e.g. North 2005:42). Similarly, the CSRC (2005:8), which sees ‘institutional multiplicity’ as a 
central characteristic of state fragility, acknowledges that situations of ‘institutional 
multiplicity’ also offer “the possibility of switching strategically from one institutional 
universe to another.” However, Putzel and Di John (2012) have, in line with the argument 
presented here, come to acknowledge that it was institutional hegemony of the state that 
underpinned state resilience, and that state institutions needed to either marginalize or 
subsume rival institutions. In what follows, I expand on these insights that have emerged 
from different theorizing and argue that the devil is in the detail, as not all situations of 
‘institutional multiplicity’ are alike. 
 
                                                     
129  Cf. Bayart 1993; Zartman 1995; Reno 1995; Richards 1996; Forrest 1997; Villalon/Huxtable 1998; 
Milliken/Krause 2002. 
130  See e.g. the ‘Failed States Index’ (Foreign Policy), the ‘World Governance Indicators’ (World Bank; cf. 
Kaufmann et al. 2006), the ‘Global Report on Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility’ 
(Marshall/Goldstone 2007), and the ‘Index of African Governance’ (Harvard Kennedy School). See also 
Rice/Patrick 2008; Mata/Ziaja 2009; Naudé et al. 2011; Gutiérrez et al. 2011. 
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Conceding that institutional multiplicity per se was not necessarily a problem for state-making, I 
argue that it can even be beneficial to it. Particularly in states-in-the-making, in which the 
state’s set of ‘rules of the game’ is not yet fully developed, weakly enforced and prone to 
renegotiation, institutional complexity is an add-on, as it opens up alternatives. For 
governments in emerging states, for example, it can be vital to rely on and instrumentalize 
alternative institutions, such as traditional ‘rules of the game’, in order to control and 
mobilize resources so long as the respective government does not possess the necessary 
capacity to enforce the state’s own institutions. What also speaks in favour of the fact that 
the plurality of sets of institutions and socio-cognitive systems as such is not antagonistic to 
state-making is that the state itself is, after all, an entity that consists of a complex ‘regime 
ecology’ marked by the coexistence of diverse sets of institutions and socio-cognitive 
systems, rather than a monopoly over rule-making.  
However, I argue that although such plural regime ecologies can be effective and efficient 
means of governance, they are inherently fragile, if their sub-regimes are treated as political 
orders in their own right – as the framework of HPOs propagates (cf. Lambach/Kraushaar 
2009). The regime prism rather proposes that the multiplicity of institutions, the hybridity of 
political orders, or the plurality of regimes – all of which connote a co-existence of equally 
strong and competing ‘rules of the game’ and/or ‘rules of the mind’ – are not to be 
confused with their complexity. While the former are largely inimical to state-making and 
characteristic of state fragility due to the implied lack of an authoritative set of institutions 
and socio-cognitive systems, the latter denotes an attribute of all social organizations. This 
goes in line with the CSRC’s proposition (2005:4), which suggests that fragility occurs in 
situations in which “statutory institutional arrangements are vulnerable to challenges by 
rival institutional systems.”131 In this sense, state fragility can be conceived of as an 
expression of common uncertainties about which set of rules ultimately apply.132  
The uncertainty that prevails in situations of regime plurality can be reduced by structuring 
the different sub-regimes hierarchically, as hierarchies are institutions by other means. 
 
                                                     
131  See also Higley and Burton (1989:20), who argue that regimes can be categorized as stable or unstable, 
depending on the extent to which the state may be subject to “irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or 
widely expected seizures by force” (cf. Case 1995:3). 
132  In this sense, it is to be briefly noted that state-making as understood in the framework of the regime 
prism does not only result from the standardization of a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of 
the mind’, but, by extension, also necessitates the prevention of other actors from standardizing the 
institutions and socio-cognitive systems that they favour.  
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Hierarchies not only contribute to the goal of reducing uncertainty (cf. North 2005:1), but 
also provide interrelation and consistency. This is reflected in Mann’s proposition that the 
resilience of regimes hinges on their cohesion (ibid. 1993:19). With a view to the ‘rules of 
the mind’, North (2005:27) makes a similar argument, suggesting that states need to develop 
and maintain a shared socio-cognitive framework as “a means of reducing the divergent 
mental models that people in a society possess and constitute the means for […] unifying 
perceptions.” Just as “[t]he powerful influence of myths, superstitions, and religions in 
shaping early societies came from their role in establishing order and conformity”, so 
nationalism to this day is “a major force in reducing the costs of maintaining order” (North 
2005:42, my italics). Thus, state resilience is achieved by means of standardizing the ‘rules 
of the game’ and the ‘rules of the mind’. But who are the key actors behind the processes of 
regime change, and how difficult are they to accomplish?  
 
2.4 Elites, Crises, and Warfare 
The Role of Elites  
Even though the theoretical considerations undertaken thus far have largely dispensed with 
an actor-analysis, institutions and mental models are ‘humanly devised’. Constructed by and 
for individuals and groups in order to ‘govern the behaviour, rights and obligations of two 
or more individuals by creating regularized role relationships’, they are tools to allocate and 
regulate power. Thereby, the proposition that institutions are created “to serve the interest 
of those with bargaining power to create new rules” (North 1990:260f.) points towards a 
central role of elites in shaping regime ecologies which are the outcome of a political 
process that involves institutional and socio-cognitive engineering (cf. Cleaver 2002). That 
elites are central to state-making is a well-established argument, also beyond the institutional 
literature.133 They are considered key actors in effecting social transitions (Field/Higley 
1985:8; Huntington 1990; cf. Case 1995:4) and are generally understood to be “those who 
are in a position to strongly and regularly influence the exercise of political power 
 
                                                     
133  On their role for state-building, see e.g. Plato’s Republic (Richards 1966); Mosca 1896; Schumpeter 1942; 
Tilly 1992; Dogan/Higley 1998. On their role for nation-building, see e.g. Nairn 1977; Hobsbawm 1977; 
Anderson 1983; Posen 1995. Also for cases of externally led state-making endeavours it is acknowledged 
that “[t]he issue of elite engagement in statebuilding processes is significant” (Scott 2007:6, referring to 
Chesterman 2004; Morales-Gamboa/Baranyi 2005; Barnett/Zürcher 2006).  
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(Bottomore 1964:7) and/or those who “represent certain social or political groups within 
societies” (Tudor 2010:36).  
Accounting for the pivotal role of elites in socio-political processes, the regime prism 
proposes that a society’s ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ are advanced, negotiated 
and implemented first and foremost by elites. This is not only because elites depend on the 
prevalence of particular institutions and socio-cognitive systems for their power, but also 
because it is they who control – by virtue of being elites – the necessary bargaining power 
to create and standardize rules. Henceforth, I understand elites to be  
a minority of individuals in a population that possess, by virtue of their 
strategic position in a social group, the power and capacity to create, alter and 
promote particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ within a social 
group.  
In light of the fact that more complex social groups have numerous sets of ‘rules of the 
game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, this definition implies that there are different elites within 
society – one per each (sub-)regime.134 Patriarchs, priests and government officials share the 
fact that they preside over a particular (sub-)regime, exercising leverage over the particular 
set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that defines a nuclear family, religious 
denomination, or state respectively. It follows that elites who operate within a particular 
regime ecology are anything but a homogenous group of actors. As they derive their powers 
from different institutional structures, elites rather tend to compete with one another. 
Particularly in cases where socio-political hierarchies are shallow, ill-defined or weakly 
enforced – e.g. in conditions of state fragility – elites compete over the question of which 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ are the authoritative ones and, thus, who should 
preside over them.135  
Bates’ (1995) proposition that this process of negotiating a political settlement amongst 
elites plays an important role in the modification of old and creation of new institutions 
gave rise to a still growing literature on the nexus between elites and state trajectories. The 
bottom-line of the scholarship on ‘elite settlements’,136 ‘political settlements’,137 and ‘elite 
 
                                                     
134  In this respect, my definition of elites, which partly draws on Field and Higley (1985), departs from their 
conceptualization of ‘elite’ in that it is not restricted to those elites that ‘affect national political outcomes’ 
(ibid.:8). In line with my understanding of regimes, my understanding of elites is more sociological than 
political, and not restricted to the state. In this I follow Jessop (2006:111), who suggests that “there can be 
no adequate theory of the state without a wider theory of society.”  
135  See also e.g. Turton (1997:1), who similarly argues that elites manipulate ethnicity to consolidate power. 
136  Burton/Higley 1987; 1998. 
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bargains’,138 which builds on the literature on power-sharing,139 is that elite bargains need to 
be inclusive rather than exclusionary in order to be constitutive of peace-building and state-
making. Although there is some truth to this reasoning, I argue that inclusive elite bargains 
were neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for state-making. They are not a necessary 
condition, because the underlying assumption that inclusiveness was required in order to 
prevent a situation of regime plurality and enforce an authoritative regime does not 
necessarily hold. The existence and persistence of dictatorships and authoritarian 
governments, which by definition exclude certain elites, constitute forceful empirical 
evidence against this assumption.  
Neither are inclusive elite bargains a sufficient condition for state-making. While inclusiveness 
evades the blatant regime contestation that exclusionary elite bargains are likely to 
experience, it does not overcome the challenge of regime plurality by itself. Although 
inclusive elite bargains might generate a ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’ (Bayart 1993),140 
this is by no means guaranteed. It is just as likely that such inclusive elite bargains not only 
legitimize the co-existence of different sub-regimes, but even cement the prevailing regime 
plurality. Thus, by means of accommodating diverse elites and their respective claims to 
entertain particular sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, inclusive elite bargains 
can, in fact, inhibit regime standardization.   
Having scrutinized the analytical framework of ‘elite bargains’, it has to be acknowledged 
that inclusive elite bargains are not futile. Particularly in situations in which none of the 
existing elites has the necessary power and capacity to enforce an authoritative set of rules 
across all sub-regimes, inclusive elite bargains are probably the only (promising) option in 
order to move towards a greater standardization of a particular set of institutions and socio-
cognitive systems. Under such conditions, inclusive elite bargains can create a minimum of 
consensus allowing a group of elites to preside over the overall regime ecology, and 
permitting them to implement particular ‘rules of the game’ and broadcast certain ‘rules of 
the mind’ by drawing on the sub-regime each elite presides over.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
137  Fritz/Menocal 2007; Whaites 2008; OECD 2008. 
138  CSRC 2005; Lindemann 2008; Di John/Putzel 2009. 
139  E.g. OECD 2011:2.  
140  By the ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’ Bayart means the fusion of potentially competing elites to form a 
single dominant class – in other words an assimilation in the sense of increasingly converging ‘rules of the 
game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, i.e. regime standardization.  
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Thus, while not disputing the benefits of, and potential need for, inclusive elite bargains, the 
regime prism highlights the fact that they are but a first step on the road to state-making. 
Consequently, it can be proposed that the fragility or resilience of a state hinges less on the 
nature of the elite bargain, but more on the condition whether it allows for the 
standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. 
Thereby, this argument is in line with the proposition that elites need to possess a 
‘consensual unity’ (Higley/Burton 1989:18f.; Burton et al. 1992:11), ‘elite solidarity’ 
(Putnam 1976:121f.), or ‘elite coalescence’ (Nordlinger 1972:54), in order to be effective. 
Elites themselves, however, do have an interest in standardizing particular rules, not only 
because it increases their powers, but also because “within a homogeneous population, 
ordinary people were more likely to identify with their rulers, communication could run 
more efficiently, and an administrative innovation that worked in one segment was likely to 
work elsewhere as well” (Tilly 1992:107). 
State-Making as Crisis-Prone Undertaking 
While Dogan and Higley (1998:3) rightly argue that “[c]rises are the birth certificates of 
regimes”, it is similarly true that situations of regime change are inherently crisis-prone. 
Principally, this is because alterations in regime ecologies go in tandem with changes in the 
allocation and distribution of institutions and socio-cognitive systems that convey power. 
As existing (sub-)regimes are altered and new institutions and socio-cognitive systems 
introduced, negotiated and implemented, the elite profiting from the new setup is not 
necessarily congruent with the one that benefited from the former situation. Thus, elite 
competition about which rules and rulers acquire authoritative status is likely to turn into 
elite contestation and crisis.141  
Situations of elite contestation are periods of crises. Such situations enhance uncertainty for 
all individuals involved about which ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ apply. They 
also entail the very probable risk of a fragmentation of the existing regime ecology, with the 
consequence that the elites presiding over respective sub-regimes no longer share an over-
arching set of authoritative institutions and socio-cognitive systems. Thus, the fracturing of 
regime ecologies and the (partial) dissolution of hierarchical order not only increases 
uncertainty about the applicability of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, 
 
                                                     
141  Abdi I. Samatar (1994:66) makes the valid point that states in the process of dissolution do not face a 
crisis, but “a multitude of crises.” 
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but also invites elites to strengthen their respective sub-regimes in order to enhance their 
bargaining power. Yet, as sub-regimes delineate each other and contest supremacy, they 
invite violent struggle as an ultimate ratio to prevail vis-à-vis other sub-regimes.  
On this basis it can be theorized that (sub-)regime changes that occur quickly (e.g. 
revolutions) contain a larger potential for violent conflict in the aftermath of change than 
alterations of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that proceed incrementally. The 
rationale behind this argument is that individuals, as well as elites of (sub-)regimes, have less 
time to respond to such changes – by adaptation, mitigation or opposition – thus rapidly 
enhancing uncertainty and insecurity. Unless such quickly evolving changes in the 
institutions and socio-cognitive systems can be enforced authoritatively by those who are in 
charge of the respective alterations, such situations have a high potential for crisis, violent 
opposition, and war.  
Warfare: An Independent Variable? 
As shown in Chapter 1, the role of war in state-making is hotly debated. In order to shed 
additional light on the current discussion, I argue in the tradition of Rasler and Thompson 
(1989), Kestnbaum and Skocpol (1993:667) and Cramer (2006:48) that we need to 
disaggregate the ‘black box’ of warfare and understand under what conditions, how and what 
kinds of wars may be constitutive to state-making.142 Consequently, this thesis seeks to go 
beyond the current understanding that the ‘state-creating wars’ are “those that had an 
external orientation and a territorial nature” (Biró 2007:12), and that, conversely, the ‘state-
destroying wars’ are internally oriented (Sørensen 2001b:345-347).143 Thus, I refrain from 
pigeon-holing wars according to superficial categories such as ‘old’ and ‘new’ (Kaldor 1999), 
or ‘inter-state’ and ‘intra-state’, because the relevance of such categories can be seriously 
questioned, e.g. in contexts where state borders have been considered ‘artificial’ and 
‘superficial’ in the first place.144 
 
                                                     
142  Cf. Bates et al. (2002:599) and Kalyvas (2005:92), who similarly argue that it is not the presence or 
magnitude of war, but rather its structure and form that are decisive for its impact on state-making. 
143  See also Kaldor (1999), Herbst (2000) and Leander (2004:69), who argues that ‘new wars’ “do not make 
states, but rather unravel them.” 
144  Moreover, Ayoob (2000:150) rightly concludes that “what we now call internal war contributed to state-
making equally, if not more than interstate war” as the [c]onstruction and imposition of political order is, 
by necessity, more a domestic than an international activity.” See also Holsti (1996:44), who argues that 
“[s]tate-making was essentially an internal undertaking.” 
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In order to uncover the role of war in processes of state-making, I depart from the 
proposition that violent conflicts are ‘political distortions’ or ‘social deviations’.145 
Constituting a “continuation of policy by other means” (von Clausewitz 1976:87), wars can 
rather be understood as one of many forms of social action. Consequently, they can be 
scrutinized with the regime prism to investigate whether or what kind of wars foster 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, thus contributing to state-making. This 
conceptualization comes with numerous benefits. First, rather than restricting the analysis 
to the aggregate level of different types of war, the regime prism allows analysing which 
components of war might exert effects that contribute to state-making. This not only 
accommodates the fact that both inter- and intra-state wars can exhibit elements that are 
constitutive of regime standardization, but also allows investigating how these bellicose tools 
of regime standardization can possibly be substituted by non-violent means. Second, by not 
rooting the analysis of the role of war for state-making in variables that significantly vary 
over time,146 but by putting social processes at centre-point, the regime prism allows a 
comparative analysis of wars and their impact on state trajectories over time and space. 
In line with the theoretical argument presented so far, I propose that wars – or rather 
certain components thereof – are constitutive of state-making under the condition that they 
contribute to the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of 
the mind’ amongst a population that forms, or will form, the state’s populace. Hence, wars 
may contribute to regime standardization in numerous ways, for example by eliminating 
alternative and competing sets of rules. Whether achieved by the displacement or 
elimination of populations who share such sub-regimes, or by destroying or suppressing the 
practice of the latter,147 the effect is a reduction of ‘regime plurality’. This proposition not 
only goes in line with the concept of ‘institutional multiplicity’ (CSRC 2005), but also with 
one of the most robust findings of the war termination literature – namely that outright 
military victory is associated with a more stable and durable peace.148  
Wars can, however, not only realize their potential to enhance regime standardization based 
on their (victorious) outcome, but can also fortify institutional and socio-cognitive 
 
                                                     
145  Cf. Gamst 1986:147, fn. 2. 
146  See e.g. Kaldor (1999), who differentiates ‘old’ from ‘new’ wars on the basis of differences in terms of 
numbers of casualties, types of weapons, sources of resources, etc.  
147  Cf. Ropp (1959:13), who understands war as “an act of force to compel our adversary to our will” (cf. 
Nathan/Lamb 2000:9). 
148  Licklider 1993; Toft 2003; Fortna 2003; Luttwak 1999. 
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standardization within the warring groups during the course of war. Social groups engaged 
in bellicose activities experience a situation in which there is less room to deviate from a 
particular set of rules than during peacetime. For example, soldiers and rebels are subjected 
to much stricter ‘rules of the game’ than civilians, and emergency laws confine the space of 
interpretation. It is in this sense that Simmel (1964:92) suggests that “[a] state of conflict 
[…] pulls the members so tightly together and subjects them to such a uniform impulse that 
they either must completely get along with, or completely repel, one another” (my italics). 
While he goes on to show that war leads to “the formation of an organ of the strictest 
efficiency” (ibid.:87f.), i.e. the army, other scholars have noted that “[h]istorically, 
improvements in state administrative capacity are associated with warfare” (Goldsmith 
2007:34). All of these indicators point towards the beneficial effects war may have on 
institutional standardization.  
Yet, the role of war is not restricted to institutional standardization, but also affects socio-
cognitive standardization. In the European historical context it is acknowledged that “military 
factors are vital in shaping the emergence and course of modern nationalism” (Mann 
1986)149 and according to Renan (1882), Turton/Fuki (1979), Ferguson (1984), Holsti 
(1996), and others it was “very difficult to create national self-consciousness without war” 
(Howard 1979:108). Similarly, “[s]cholars of colonialism suggest that the most important 
factor in the formation of national consciousness in colonised societies is the resistance to 
foreign domination” (Bereketeab 2000:181).150 Starting with the army’s consistent uniforms 
that turn every individual into a uniform soldier and ending with the sheer unitary play-back 
of ideologies among military personnel, warfare can significantly contribute to the 
standardization of an (‘imagined’) community.151 Accordingly, Jacquin-Berdal (2002:41) 
states for the context of the Horn of Africa that “[…] the role that war plays in spreading 
national identity among individuals who until then had only a vague understanding of the 
meaning and implications of their national belonging, cannot be overlooked.”152 Just as 
 
                                                     
149  Quoted in Smith 1998:80. 
150  Hodgkin 1956; Emerson 1960; Leonard 1982; Smith 1983; Anderson 1983. 
151  See also Conversi (2007:372) who proposes that “the broader relationship between homogenization and 
war should be reconsidered as a key feature in the historical development of nationalism”, whereby he 
defines ‘homogenization’ as “the sociopolitical process of deliberately fostering cultural homogeneity.” 
The argument that military service and war can contribute to nation-building is, however, disputed by 
Krebs (2004). 
152  Cf. Clapham (2010:11), who argues that the war of 1998/99 helped Eritrea to “consolidate a sense of 
Eritrean nationalism”, and Ottaway (2002b:1013), who shows that war and military victory were the first 
step towards (re-)constituting the state in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
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states are clearly more than mere ‘war machines’,153 “the armed forces do much more than 
make war” (Pereira 2003:394; Davis 2003:18) – they significantly contribute to regime 
standardization.154 
However, war is “paradoxical in that it can both facilitate the creation of states […] and also 
bring about their demise” (Ropp 1959:13). While there is theoretical and empirical evidence 
that suggests that certain of its elements can foster institutional and socio-cognitive 
standardization, war does not invariably exercise this function. In historical perspective it is 
probably safe to argue that at least as many wars unmade as made states. Wars can, for 
example, create immense insecurities amongst the populations involved, leading them to fall 
back on more stable and trustworthy sub-regimes in order to have their lives protected and 
needs met – a danger particularly in young nations, in which the authoritative rules are 
looser. Wars can also result in such economic and administrative stretching of the state that 
its leadership cannot maintain processes of regime standardization across the entire territory 
and its population. It is in these and other ways that wars can lead to institutional and socio-
cognitive de-standardization, cum state-unmaking.  
As wars do not make states in and of themselves, they should conceptually be treated as an 
antecedent condition, i.e. “a phenomenon whose presence activates or magnifies the action of a 
[…] hypothesis” (van Evera 1997:10). This is what Taylor and Botea (2008:28) hint at when 
stating that “for war to strengthen contemporary developing world states, before major war 
they must have at least some degree of the political and national coherence that was created 
as a consequence of war in modern Europe.” Yet, despite the possible catalyst effects war 
may generate, it has to be clearly stated that, just as with inclusive elite bargains, war is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for state-making. Moreover, I want to caution 
against these insights leading us to view “warlords as an alternative form of governance in 
the ‘Westphalian periphery’” (Biró 2007). Rather than being ends in themselves, wars are 
brutish expressions of deep, transitory crises aimed at the establishment of authoritative 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.  
 
 
                                                     
153  Cf. Schlichte (2003:38), criticizing that “[s]tates are not simple war machines and warfare does not 
automatically lead to a strengthening or weakening of the state.” 
154  I discussed the role of war on regime standardization in greater detail in Helling (2009).  
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2.5 On Administration and Indicators of Standardization 
Having established the argument that state-making can valuably be conceived of in terms of 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, and that elites play a central role in this 
process, the question is how the standardization of a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and 
‘rules of the mind’ is brought about and what indicators lend themselves to investigate 
trends of regime standardization. Based on a broad and varied literature, I advance the 
‘central administration thesis’, proposing that changes in a society’s rules hinge on 
modifications to its form of organization. Hence, while elite bargains largely determine who 
plays the ‘game’, central administration sets the framework of how the ‘game’ is played. 
Returning to the earlier proposition that state-building and nation-building are interlinked, I 
suggest that alterations in a society’s institutional structure generally go hand in hand with 
modifications to its socio-cognitive configuration. In this respect, I argue that it is central 
state administration that is the prime driver for processes of institutional and socio-
cognitive standardization and that the organization of areas such as security, resource 
mobilization and communications, provides indicators for trends in state trajectories.  
Administration 
The functioning of a specific social group and its identification as such hinges on the fact 
that its members adhere to a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. 
Yet, as these institutions and socio-cognitive systems primarily serve a certain social strata 
within that group, namely the elite (North 1990:260f.), compliance with the rules by all 
individuals is by no means assured – particularly in situations in which different elites strive 
to implement dissimilar regimes. Consequently, and in order to assure regime continuity, 
the authoritative set of rules need to be managed and enforced. In order to do so, elites 
presiding over social organizations rely on a more or less complex network of individuals 
and organizations, i.e. an administration. That such administrative organizations are key for 
state-making is commonly argued, not only because they “provide a basis for statehood 
(Röder 2007:335), but also because they “create meaning” (Anderson 1983:53).155  
Having been set up to maintain standing armies, collect revenues, and assure internal order 
(Tilly 1992, cf. Lynn 2006:20), central government administration is generally understood as 
 
                                                     
155  ICPE 1983; Tilly 1992; Reinhard 1996; Bourdieu 1999; Herbst 2000; Goodnow 2003; Röder 2007; 
Pestritto 2007. See also Evans and Rauch (1999), who demonstrated that there is a strong relationship 
between administrative capacity and economic growth (cf. Henderson et al. 2007:515). 
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“the administrative machine that is established to assist those who exercise supreme 
political authority within a given state” (Adamolekun 1999:17, cf. Evans 2005:192), or, 
simply, as the “management of public affairs” (OED 1989).156 While every social 
organization depends on administration to accomplish its goals (Marx 1946:4), larger social 
organizations, such as states, are particularly dependent on central administration, because 
the enforcement of rules on an inter-personal level is unfeasible. According to Huntington 
(1968:9) “[t]he more complex and heterogeneous the society, the more the achievement and 
maintenance of political stability becomes dependent upon the working of political 
organization.”  
Yet, the importance of administration for regime standardization transcends the sphere of 
‘institutional capacity building’. Also with regards to the formation of group identities, 
administration plays a key role (Giddens 1985:116). Along these lines, Barth (1969) shows 
that the sharing of a common culture was less the definitional characteristic of an ethnicity, 
but rather an ‘implication of result’ of its organization, and Anderson (1983:53) stresses that 
“administrative organizations create meaning.” Giddens (1985:116) attributes such 
significance to administration that he includes “unitary administration” in his definition of a 
nation, and others have also convincingly argued that state administrations have been a 
primary source of nationalism.157 One reason for the importance of administration in 
identity-creation is that the spatial borders created by administration are much firmer than 
the more fluid ones of language, history or culture. In this train of thought, Mayall 
(2006:553) states that it was the bureaucratic, colonial state in Africa that “pulverised 
traditional society and laid the foundations for an imagined modern community.”158  
 
                                                     
156  I prefer the concept of ‘administration’ over ‘bureaucracy’ – which is generally understood as either the 
“most highly developed and complex type of formal organization and administrative system,” (DSS 2002) 
or “a system of government in which most of the important decisions are taken by state officials rather 
than by elected representatives” (ODE 2005; see also Andreski 1984) – for a number of reasons. First, the 
notion of bureaucracy carries connotations of ‘rationality’ and ‘efficiency’, and is, thus, less suited for the 
‘regime prism’, which (a) does not solely concentrate on ‘high-end’ administrations that are in most 
instances reserved to ‘open access orders’ (North et al. 2007), and in which (b) political-economic 
implications of (state) administrations are not ignored. While administration is, per se, technical, it is not 
apolitical, as the way power is distributed and exercised is inherently contentious. Second, the term 
‘bureaucracy’ is largely reserved to refer to state administration and given the rather sociological approach 
of the ‘regime prism’, which does not solely focus on the state, the notion ‘administration’ appears to be 
more apt. 
157  Cf. Jenkins/Plowden 2006:1; Mann 1986:44; Tilly 1992:116; Breuilly 2006:xxv; Jacquin-Berdal 2002:35. 
158  See also Smith 1983:56. 
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Acknowledging the importance of central administration for state-making endeavours and 
understanding central administration in a broad sense to range from the ability to use 
coercive measures in a targeted way to the ability to carry through propaganda, I define 
central state administration to be a  
hierarchically structured network of official organizations that serves an 
acknowledged political elite to implement an authoritative set of ‘rules of the 
game’ and concomitant ‘rules of the mind’ designed to control individuals 
within a claimed territory. 
From this understanding of central state administration it is clear that states depend on it 
for their survival (Lynn 2006:20),159 as in its absence it is impossible to enforce a certain set 
of rules within a large, dispersed and complexly structured population that commonly 
characterise states. Most contemporary states are, however, neither characterized by a full-
blown and totally operational central administration nor by a complete absence thereof. 
Fragile states, for example, generally have only a modicum of central administration, 
supplementing a lack in administrative capacity with coercive means and/or elite bargains 
to ensure the sharing of and adhering to certain rules across a geographically defined 
population. Yet, the less rulers (can) rely on central administration to implement a certain 
regime, the greater the risk of regime plurality, which not only results from the rulers’ 
inability to subject individuals to an authoritative regime, but also flows from allowing elites 
of sub-regimes to fill the void by making use of their own organizational capacity. Hence, 
Migdal (1988) suggests that alternative forces within society challenge the state, if the latter 
is unable to carry out its duties.160 
Given the centrality accorded to administration for processes of state- and nation-building 
– as well as social organization more generally – it seems to be questionable to wholly 
neglect this central component in analytical frameworks aimed at understanding state 
trajectories.161 This is particularly the case in light of the fact that central administration has 
been found to be inextricably linked to political structure (Marx 1957:9) and to (not) affect 
every individual of a given state in one way or another – from the collection of taxes and 
distribution of rationing cards, to the issuing of passports and registration of license plates. 
 
                                                     
159  See also Devlin and Moguillansky (2011) who suggest that “a professional and motivated state 
bureaucracy” was the core ingredient of high state capacity. Similarly, Tilly (1985:45), Jackson (1990:23), 
and Herbst (2000:124) acknowledge that, prior to 1945, states with only weak administrative structures 
and divided populations were swallowed up by stronger powers (cf. Spears 2004c:15). 
160  Similar propositions are made by Englebert 2000:67; Holsti 1996; Azam 2001:430; Khan/Gray 2006. 
161  See e.g. the concept of HPOs (Böge et al. 2008) or of the ‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/2007). 
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In line with Smith (1991:59) who proposes that “activities of taxation, conscription and 
administration endowed the population within its jurisdiction with a sense of their 
corporate identity and civic loyalty”, I argue that the provision of security, implementtation 
of taxation and nature of communication are three key indicators of a state’s administrative 
capacity, which allow for assessing trends in regime standardization.  
Security, Taxation, and Communication 
Although the importance of the state’s territorial aspect has been called into question,162 the 
provision of security across a claimed territory remains a central component for state-
making,163 not least because a state’s raison d’être is the containment of violence within its 
territory (Brons 2001:27). While “a complete monopoly of violence by the state occurred 
relatively rarely in history” (Giustozzi 2008:1), the nature of a state’s provision of security 
gives important clues to its capacity to administer and standardize an authoritative set of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. If, for example a state has a coherent national 
army and an effective police force it can be assumed to be in a better position to enforce 
regime standardization than one that relies primarily on a diversity of scattered and locally 
coordinated vigilante groups – not to mention a state that is challenged in the realm of 
security provision by other actors.  
Yet, even if possessing a national police force, states exhibit important differences in their 
ability to standardize certain institutions and socio-cognitive systems, depending on, for 
example, the composition of the security forces and the extent to which members of these 
security-providing organizations are transferred from one region to another, rather than 
being locally rooted. Thus, analyses of the nature of police forces, the organization of their 
chain of command, and their ‘autonomy’ from rules issued by sub-regimes provide 
important insights into the question of how well-positioned a central government is to carry 
through institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. The way a state mobilizes 
resources also provides important clues regarding its capacity to administer and standardize 
certain institutions and socio-cognitive systems, as the monopolization of the use of 
 
                                                     
162  Discussions abound about the “end of territoriality” (Badie 1995; Ruggie 1993), “the rise of the virtual 
state” (Rosecrance 1999), and “debordering the world of states” (Albert/Brock 2000), particularly for sub-
Saharan Africa, where the states’ administrations have generally not penetrated the polities’ territories 
(Herbst 2000; Ottaway 2002b; Zaum 2007). 
163  Milliken/Krause 2002:756; Seton-Watson 1977; Tilly 1975; Smith 1983. 
2   STATE-MAKING AS REGIME STANDARDIZATION 
78 
 
physical force is “inextricably linked to the development of a monopoly of taxation” 
(Migdal/Schlichte 2005:16).164 
The importance of taxation for state-making has long been realized and resurfaces in 
current approaches to analyse state trajectories,165 after having gone “missing from the new 
scholarship on state-building” (Bräutigam 2008a:2).166 Taxation informs state-building, as 
“[m]uch of the institutional apparatus of modern government and economic management 
has its origins in this compulsion to finance wars” (Cramer 2006:178; Moore 2004). 
Additionally, it also benefits nation-building, partly because “[t]he experience of being taxed 
engages citizens in the political process” (Moore 2008:35).167 As taxation is contested 
between state and society and thus demands enhanced state capacity in terms of (central) 
administration and enforcement mechanisms, “[t]here is no better measure of a state’s 
reach than its ability to collect taxes” (Herbst 2000:113).168 Thereby, it can be theorized that 
states that mobilize resources largely through customs revenues not only possess less 
administrative capacity, but also have less potential to carry through regime standardization 
amongst their populations compared to states that largely rely on domestic revenues.169  
A third clue regarding a state’s ability to foster regime standardization lies in its ability to 
(literally) ‘broadcast’ power. In the process of nation-building the importance of 
“communicat[ing] with one another on matters of common interest” (Touval 1963:25, my italics; 
Metzger 1977:4) has frequently been stressed. Thus, of importance is not only linguistic 
standardization (Anderson 1983),170 but also topical standardization, as it is important for a 
community’s ‘imaginability’ to share issues of common concern, fear and joy and to have a 
common pool of information. As suggested by neo-institutionalists “no two individuals 
have exactly the same experiences and accordingly each individual has to some degree 
 
                                                     
164  Jung 2000:6, 2003:17; Di John 2006. 
165   E.g. Bird 1989; Tilly 1992; Putnam 1993; Burgess/Stern 1993; Herbst 2000:130; Moore 2004:299, 2008; 
Hesselbein et al. 2006; Bräutigam et al. 2008. 
166  Cf. Chesterman et al. 2005; Fukuyama 2004; Levy/Kpundeh 2004. 
167  These theoretical considerations are supported by empirical observations of e.g. Azam and Mesnard 
(2003:456) in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, for which they argue that “Houphouët-Boigny, […] tried explicitly 
to build national unity by taxing his own ethnic group, the Akan cocoa and coffee growers, in order to 
fund visible public investments in infrastructure in the other regions of this ethnically divided country, and 
some other redistributive public expenditures, with evident success until his death.” 
168  Peacock/Wiseman 1967, Organiski/Kugler 1980; Evans et al. 1985:17; Levi 1988:1; van de Walle 2004:99; 
Snyder/Bhavnani 2005:572; Atzili 2006:157; Di John 2006. 
169  Cf. Lieberman 2002:99. 
170  Hobsbawm 1977; Hobsbawm/Ranger 1983; Gellner 2006; Abdi 1998. 
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unique perceptions of the world”, so that “their mental models would tend to diverge for 
this reason if there were not ongoing communication with other individuals” 
(Denzau/North 1994:14ff.). 
Gellner (2006:121f.) argues that “it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and 
importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one of the many communications, which 
itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism”, and Deutsch and Foltz (1963) 
point out that “nations could be constructed by political elites with adequate means of 
communication for nation building.”171 Thus, a state’s ability to communicate matters of 
common interest and legal concerns as well as the population’s (voluntary) absorption of 
such information via (state-owned) media provides important clues about the state’s 
potential to achieve socio-cognitive standardization. For analyses of state trajectories it is 
thus of interest, to investigate the nature of a country’s media and communication 
landscape. In a nutshell, states with a strong media apparatus and potentially a dominant 
position within the media landscape can be expected to be better positioned to carry 
through socio-cognitive standardization compared to those in which diverse media outlets 
are largely loyal to particular sub-groups, such as ethnicities.  
2.6 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter has developed the idea that social change in general and state trajectories more 
particularly can valuably be conceptualized in terms of alterations in ‘rules of the game’ and 
‘rules of the mind’. Consequently, state-making has been understood as a process in which 
an authoritative set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems is standardized amongst a 
population residing in a geographically delineated territory. In line with this reasoning the 
chapter proposed that state fragility can be captured analytically as a situation characterized 
by regime plurality and contestation amongst different sub-regimes for domination. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that central administration was a key component for 
establishing and maintaining a regime, as it constituted the primary tool to carry through 
standardization.  
Based on these theoretical findings, the chapter shed light on a number of debates 
surrounding the issue of state-making. One major conclusion that emerged from the 
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development of the analytical prism of ‘regime standardization’ is that states continue to 
matter and that they represent more than mere containers of ‘hybrid political orders’. 
Rather they can be understood as projects aimed at arresting ‘hybridity’ by providing an 
overarching set of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Another key 
conclusion is that state-making is less about the establishment of a particular form of 
government such as ‘liberal democracy’, or the provision of specific services, but much 
more about achieving a situation in which all members of the state’s population share a 
particular set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems.  
More particularly, the analytical framework developed throughout this chapter provides a 
particularly apt tool for investigating and understanding the rise and fall of diverse Somali 
state-making endeavours. The Somali territories in the Horn of Africa have not only seen a 
variety of state-making projects since the end of colonialism in 1960, but have also 
experienced numerous terrible wars – wars that were, however, not always detrimental to its 
state-making attempts. Applying the prism of regime standardization to the cases of 
Somalia and Somaliland it will be seen that alterations in the overall regime ecology are, as a 
rule, brought about by elites, intertwined with crises, and accompanied by changes in state 
trajectories. What this analytical tool will also shed light on is the question of why and how 
the Somali state trajectories differed – a question to which we now turn.  
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3  
State-Making Trajectories in Somalia 
On July 1st, 1960, the sovereign Republic of Somalia was formed as a merger of the British 
Protectorate of Somaliland and the Italian-governed Trust Territory of Somalia. The 
Republic was perceived as constituting a particularly promising case of state-making in sub-
Saharan Africa (Lewis 2002:205; Ake 1996:6), largely because it was allegedly free of the 
multifaceted societal fragmentation that other newly independent African countries faced.172 
Scholars characterized Somalia as being marked by ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious 
homogeneity (Castagno 1959:340; Martin 1966:2),173 and suggested that Somalis formed one 
of the rare true nations on sub-Saharan African soil (Fitzgibbon 1982a:2; Laitin/Samatar 
1987:xiv).174 These suppositions of Somali exceptionality gained currency in the early 1960s, 
as Somalia was seen to embark on “distinctive democratic processes” (Contini 1964:3) that 
culminated in a “genuine democracy” (Africa Watch 1990:14).175 The newborn country at 
the Horn of Africa appeared to have set foot on the highway to state-making.  
Yet, by the mid-1960s, this highway already seemed to have turned into a meander, as 
Somalia’s political system degenerated into an “artificial democracy” (Adam 1999:262), 
 
                                                     
172  See e.g. Omar (1996:ix), who states that Somalia had an “unenviable advantage over other African 
countries” due to its “ethnically homogeneous population” at the time of independence.  
173  For this ‘homogeneity thesis’ see also Touval 1963; Martin 1966:2; Farer 1976:50, 1976:70; Sheikh-Abdi 
1977:657; Woodward 1977:281; Porter 1984:186; Africa Watch 1990:1; Hashim 1997a; Warsame 2001; 
Lewis 2002:1; Arab 2004. While some suggest that Somalis were ‘mono cultural’ (Bekalo et al. 2003:461), 
others go so far as to speak of the “homogeneity of Somali clans” (Legum/Lee 1977:31, my italics). 
However, this position is contested by again others (e.g. Mukhtar 2007; Adam 1995; Adan 1994; Besteman 
1996b; Osman 2007), who contend that”[c]lannism is the Somali version of the generic problem of 
ethnicity or tribalism” (Adam 1993:2) and that “Somali is a nation that binds together people of distinct 
cultures, customs, traditions, languages, values, as well as destinies” (Eno 2007b:132; Interview 1). 
174  Legum/Lee 1977:31; Laitin 1977b:14; Issa-Salwe 1994:vi; Adam 1999; Lewis 2002:138; Lata 2004. Others 
even see Somalis as a primordial nation (Abdi 1979:20; Porter 1984:186; Mohamed 1992:4; Lewis 2002:138). 
175  See also ACR 1969/70:B174. Municipal elections took place in November 1963, national assembly 
elections in March 1964 and March 1969, and presidential elections in June 1967. Consequently, Zambian 
president Kenneth Kaunda lauded the democratic practices of Somalia (cf. ACR 1968/69:200).  
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“democracy gone mad” (Mansur 1995:114; Abdullahi 2007a:43) and “commercialized 
anarchy” (Lewis 2002:206). The largely free and fair elections of the early 1960s, which had 
been contested by a handful of nationalist parties, gradually lapsed into a “semi-anarchy” of 
dozens of clan-based camps (Adam 2008:1). Simultaneously, Somalia was confronted with a 
steadily deteriorating economic situation (Markakis 1987:90),176 a ramshackle infrastructure 
(Lewis 2002:171), and an appalling administrative apparatus (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141). 
Having experienced the first attempted coup d’état in Africa only one year into its existence 
(Adam 2008:190), the decade’s history peaked in the assassination of President Abdirashid 
Ali Shermarke on October 15th, 1969. Five days later, a bloodless coup d’état followed.  
Having taken power, Major-General Mohammed Siyad Barre dissolved the civilian 
government and promised to re-establish order and eradicate the inefficiency and 
corruption that had become endemic (ACR 1969/70:B175; Lewis 2002:207). As the 
majority of the population had been dissatisfied with the increasingly clannist and nepotistic 
politics of the 1960s, Barre’s coup and military clampdown gained immediate popular 
support (Fitzgibbon 1982b:141; Gassem 1994:23; Interviews 19, 21, 55, 121).177 In line with 
revolutionary propaganda, international observers judged that the military takeover had 
been ‘inevitable’ (Lewis 2002:206), and that “[t]he military intervened in 1969 only after the 
civilian institutions collapsed under the weight of their own talk” (Laitin 1977b:7, my 
italics).178 Hence, the military agents were perceived as heroes who “rescued the Somali 
nation from imminent collapse” (Dool 1998:85) and who led the Somali state back onto the 
road of state-making given an “improved economic performance, expanding social services 
and a better culture of governance” (Abdullahi 2007a:43; Interview 66).179 
Why had Somalia’s democratic state-making project of the 1960s ultimately faltered, and how 
did Barre rescue the Somali nation from ‘imminent collapse’? The Somali literature presents 
several arguments to address these questions. While Somalia’s early achievements in state-
making were attributed to its unique social homogeneity, fierce nationalism, and vibrant 
 
                                                     
176  Cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:77, fn. 3; see Bradbury 2008:34. The country’s unemployment rate, for 
example, was ten times higher in 1967 than in 1960 (Butani 1973:3).  
177  ACR 1969/70:B175; Africa Watch 1990:15; Ghalib 1995:120; Tripodi 1999a:2; CRD 2004:12; Abdullahi 
2007a:43; Bradbury 2008:36.     
178  ACR 1969/70:B174ff.; Barre 1969; Laitin 1979a:175; HRW 1990:15; Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:85. While 
acknowledging that such narratives have been common justifications for military involvement in political 
affairs across the globe, this chapter shows that the civilian-led governments had, indeed, come to face 
stagnation regarding its state-making project prior to the military coup. 
179  Laitin 1982:61, 1993:129; Abdi Samatar 1994:71; Lewis 2002:208.  
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democracy (e.g. Farer 1965), its demise in the second half of the 1960s was seen to lay in 
archaic clan-politics and nepotism (e.g. Lewis 2002). Alternatively, it has been suggested 
that it was bad economic performance (Markakis 1987:90f.; Laitin 1993:125), the colonial 
legacy (Issa-Salwe 1994), and the misfit between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of 
governance that were to be blamed for state-unmaking (Mansur 1995:115; Abdullahi 
2007a:43; Lewis 1980). A different set of scholars locates the collapse of the Somali state in 
international politics, holding either the “black colonialists of Ethiopia” (Fitzgibbon 
1982b:141) or “Soviet complicity” (Payton 1980) accountable. Simultaneously, the greater 
progress achieved under early military rule is generally attributed to the “strong rule of a 
new type [which] was urgently required if the country was to be rescued from the morass of 
poverty, insecurity and inefficiency into which it had sunk” (Lewis 2002:206, referring to 
Farah 1976).180  
Although all of these explanations contribute to our understanding of Somalia’s tumultuous 
state trajectory between 1960 and the mid-1970s, I argue that the current underlying state-
making and state-breaking in Somalia was one of changing levels of institutional and socio-
cognitive standardization. Furthermore, I argue, first, that the Somali state and nation were 
much less ‘homogeneous’ at the time of independence than generally suggested. Second, I 
postulate that the commonly underestimated scale of state-making was considerable due to 
the regime plurality the young state inherited from colonialism. Third, while the political 
elite of the 1960s ultimately failed to carry through regime standardization, I show that the 
military coup d’état was accompanied by a marked change regarding the overall regime 
ecology, which saw an increased standardization of the authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and 
‘rules of the mind’. Thus, the major difference that can be observed between the civilian 
and military governments concerns the breadth and depth of their institutions.  
Addressing these issues, this chapter compares the “order that the military brought to 
Somali politics” with the “disorder that had discredited and deadlocked the previous 
parliamentary system” (Spears 2010:134). While it cannot provide an encompassing account 
of the state’s social, economic and political development, it primarily aims to display the 
theoretical validity and analytical value of the regime standardization prism. Section one 
provides a snapshot of the colonial years prior to independence, scrutinizes the ‘national 
 
                                                     
180  See also Ghalib (1995:141) and Contini (1969:11), who suggests that “[i]n order to counteract divisive 
tendencies it was necessary and urgent to build a truly unitary state by integrating the laws and institutions 
of the Northern and Southern Regions.” 
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narrative’ of Somali unification, and, in suggesting a ‘rational narrative’ shows how 
fragmented the newly independent country was in institutional and socio-cognitive terms. 
Section two analyses the state trajectory of the 1960s, depicting how regime plurality was 
perpetuated during civilian rule. The third section moves to the military take-over of 1969, 
suggesting that the subsequent era was characterized by increasing, yet shallow, processes of 
regime standardization. An interim conclusion compares the two state-making endeavours 
and sums up the key findings.  
 
3.1 The Pre-Independence Era: ‘Nation in Search of a State’?181  
After the Horn of Africa gained particular geostrategic importance with the opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1869, diverse colonial powers secured territory along Cape Guardafui. Britain 
established the Protectorate of British Somaliland in 1887, which was paralleled by the 
foundation of the Protectorate of French Somaliland in 1885, and the Italian Colony of Somalia 
along the cape’s southern shores in 1889.182 Witnessing the territories it considered part of 
its historical empire being partitioned among European powers, Ethiopia also asserted its 
regional presence in the Somali-inhabited Ogadeen.183 With the British-controlled Northern 
Frontier District (NFD) of British East Africa184 forming the last tile in the colonial mosaic, 
Somalis found themselves administered by five different powers at the turn of the 
century.185 
Sixty years later, the Somali flag was solemnly hoisted in a blaze of glory in Mogadishu. 
After the imperial and territorially divisive ‘Scramble for Africa’, the unification of British 
Somaliland and the Italian-governed trust territory of Somalia constituted a first step in 
creating a single state for all Somalis (Interview 43). A white, five-pointed star on a light-
blue background, the Somali flag was testament to the republic’s objective to also 
 
                                                     
181  Laitin/Samatar 1987. See also Laitin 1976:449; Labahn 1990:155.  
182  Henceforth, I refer to these entities as ‘British Somaliland’, ‘French Somalia’ and ‘Italian Somalia’ 
respectively.  
183  I use the term ‘Ogadeen’ to refer to the geographic region, while ‘Ogaden’ denotes the population. The 
Ogadeen roughly corresponds to the following Ethiopian zones: Dhagabhur, Fiiq, Wardheer, Korahe, 
Gode, Afder and Liben. See Appendix, Map 1. 
184  Later known as Kenya’s North Eastern Province. See Appendix, Map 1. 
185  See Appendix, Map 2. For more detailed accounts of Somalia’s colonial history, see e.g. Brown 
(1956:250ff.), Galbraith (1970), Muhammad (1972:8), and Said Samatar (1993:10ff.). 
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incorporate the NFD, the Ogadeen, and French Somalia into its jurisdiction.186 Given this 
territorial fragmentation and the common claim that Somalis formed a true nation, they 
quickly earned the widely accepted sobriquet of being a ‘nation in search of a state’ 
(Laitin/Samatar 1987). How far was this characterization adequate? 
Although it cannot wholly be dismissed, I argue that it tends to be misleading. Being 
generally based on the ‘homogeneity thesis’187 and suggesting that unification in 1960 was 
driven by national aspects, the characterization of Somalis as constituting a ‘nation in search 
of a state’ overestimates the cohesion provided by Somali national identity at the time. I 
propose that nationalism was only one of numerous competing socio-cognitive systems, 
that it was gradually trumped by other ‘rules of the mind’, and that it was not deeply rooted 
in society – partly because it lacked a common institutional framework across the diverse 
Somali polities, which could have aided its perpetuation. By clarifying that Somalia was 
characterized by regime plurality at independence, the subsequent section provides the 
backdrop against which the state trajectories of the 1960s and 1970s are analysed.  
Unification as Expression of Nationalism?  
Although anthropological accounts asserted that Somalis identified primarily with their 
respective kinship groups (Lewis 2002), the pertinent scholarship quickly established 
consensus that Somalis shared a common national identity, rooted in the population’s ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural and religious homogeneity.188 Other scholars traced Somali nationalism 
back to figures such as Ahmed Gran (1506-1543) and Sayid Hassan (1856-1920).189 While 
the latter suggestion can be scrutinized on empirical grounds,190 the former is doubtful in 
 
                                                     
186  See e.g. art. 1, §1 and art. 6, §4 of the Somali Constitution, and the 1959 speech of Prime Minister 
Abdillahi Iise (cf. Lewis 2002:161). Moreover, the creation of the United Liberation of Western Somalia 
group in 1960 (Henze 1985:30), the formation of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in 1963 
(Issa-Salwe 1994:38), and the four-year Somali insurgency in the NFD (known as the ‘shifta war’) 
subsequent to Britain’s decision to grant Kenya independence on December 12th, 1963 (Lewis 2002:201; 
Bradbury 2008:34f.) are testament to Somalia’s irredentist objectives. See also Massey 1994:126. 
187  See fn. 173.  
188  See fn. 173 and 174.   
189  Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi «Gran» ruled the Muslim Somali state of Adal and waged ‘jihad’ (‘holy war’) 
against Christian Ethiopia. Sayid Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan «Guray» established the Dervish State 
largely in the territory that was to become northern Somalia and fought a ‘jihad’ against the colonial 
infidels between 1900 and 1920. Hence, the British dismissed him as a religious fanatic and nicknamed 
him the ‘Mad Mullah’. See Hess (1964), Kakwenzire (1986), Thurton (1969), Silberman (1960), Beachy 
(1990); Sheik-Abdi (1993). 
190  While e.g. «Guray» was frequently portrayed as the “father of modern Somali nationalism” (Laitin 
1979b:95f.; Muhammad 1972:8; Said Samatar 1879:1ff.), evidence suggests that his support was confined 
to the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli clans (Spears 2010:166, fn. 11), while being opposed by the Isaaq, who 
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theoretical terms, as it fails to acknowledge that “[n]ationalism is primarily a political 
principle” (Gellner 2006:1, my italics). Moreover, even if accepting the underlying allegation 
that “the distinction between ‘nation’ and ‘tribe’ is only one of size” (Lewis 1967a:105), it 
remains debatable whether the Somali were as homogeneous and united as commonly 
suggested (Martin 1966:2). 
Until the 1970s, a dearth of comparative studies of Somali society quickened the 
‘homogeneity thesis’191 which Somalis were eager to exploit, as it provided a strong basis for 
their political claim for a single state. Yet, some scholars point towards “important social 
and economic cleavages” within Somali society (Cassanelli 1996:14),192 and others call the 
steadfastness of Somali nationalism into question. Luling (1997:290), for example, wonders 
how far the “enthusiasm for national unity […] carried beyond the intellectual elite”, and an 
Ethiopian observer remarked immediately after Somali unification that “[t]he hard truth is 
probably that they have not yet formed any clear feelings of nationality” (cf. Spears 
2010:128).193 Yet, if not Somali homogeneity, what were the roots of the national 
sentiments that surfaced from the 1940s onwards (Muhammad 1972:130), and why were 
they so volatile?  
While the evolution of Somali nationalism cannot be explained monocausally, a key source 
seems to lay in alterations of institutional patterns. This is supported by Lewis (2002:105), 
who observes that public interest in the national objective hinged on a “burning cause to 
command attention.” One such ‘burning cause’ that brought about a change in the 
overarching ‘rules of the game’ occurred between 1941 and 1950, when Britain established 
the British Military Administration (BMA) over British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, and the 
Ogadeen after having defeated Italian forces. Stimulated by the fact that diverse Somali 
territories were, for the first time, under a single political umbrella (Compagnon 1995:45f.), 
Somalis in the former Italian colony founded their first political party with British support. 
Proclaimed in Mogadishu on May 13th, 1943, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) expanded 
rapidly, levelling out at about 25,000 members in 1946 (Said Samatar 1993:17).  
 
                                                                                                                                     
aligned themselves with the British (Touval 1963:52; Laitin 1979b:96). Moreover, Gilkes (1993:4) argues 
that «Guray’s» appeal was rooted more in Islam than political nationalism. 
191  The potential for intra-Somali comparison emerged, by and large, only when the anthropological work of 
Lewis (1961, 1982a, 1988) on the northern, nomadic clans, was complemented by the work of Luling 
(1972, 1977, 1984, 1989) on the southern, agricultural communities. 
192  Mukhtar 2007; Adam 1995; Adan 1994; Besteman 1996b; Osman 2007; Eno 2007b:132. 
193  See also Castagno 1959:362, 1960:11, 1964:512; Gorman 1981:22; Mohamed 1992:4; Compagnon 
1995:454; Shultz 1995:83; Turton 1972:124.  
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The looming threat that British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin might fail to consolidate the 
amalgamation of the three largest Somali-inhabited territories to form a single trusteeship – 
a policy goal objected to by Russia, the USA and Ethiopia (Touval 1963:79f.)194 – boosted 
Somali nationalism. Party membership of the SYC – renamed the Somali Youth League 
(SYL) in 1947 – increased, as the latter opened offices throughout the BMA and NFD. 
When, under considerable pressure by major powers, Britain returned the Ogadeen to 
Ethiopia in 1948, massive protests occurred (Said Samatar 1993:17ff.; Barnes 2007), and 
SYL-membership soared to 93,000 by early 1948 (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:53).195 And when, 
six years later, Britain announced that it had also irrevocably ceded the Haud and the 
Reserved Areas to Ethiopian rule in a treaty dated November 29th, 1954, Somalis (largely 
from the north) formed the National United Front (NUF), in order to regain the ‘lost 
territories’ (Lewis 2002:151).196  
Again, it was changes in the institutional framework that triggered alterations in the socio-
cognitive sphere, as it was only after the Haud fiasco that “the political parties [in British 
Somaliland] began actively to consider the possibilities of eventual union with Somalia” 
(Lewis 2002:153). This is affirmed by Mohamed (1992:5) and numerous interviewees who 
suggest that it was the return of the Haud and the Reserved Areas that revived Somali 
nationalism throughout the territories, particularly in the north (Interviews 24, 30, 121, 
135). In this sense, prominent Somali advocate Michael Marino saw the good in the bad 
and declared in February 1956 that the “great calamity” of colonial partition could emerge 
as Somalia’s “greatest blessing” (cf. Spears 2010:125), as it invigorated a Somali national 
consciousness and (rational) desire for unity (cf. Mohamed 1992:5). 
Thus, the politico-territorial integration and accompanying changes in the authoritative set 
of ‘rules of the game’ that occurred between 1941 and 1950 can be understood as having 
strongly impacted on the emergence of an ‘imagined community’ in the Somali territories 
(cf. Lewis 1967a:104). This ‘imagined community’ not only flowed from the foundation of 
‘national’ political parties (Compagnon 1995:45f.), but also from the establishment of closer 
 
                                                     
194  Castagno 1959:392; Drysdale 1964:67; Mohamed 1992:4.  
195  Lewis 2002:130; Mohamed 1992:5; Said Samatar 1993:19. In the meantime, the SYL entertained 79 
branches outside the capital and was supported by one hundred full-time staff and about 300,000 
supporters (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:53).  
196  Castagno 1964:542; Eshete 1991:9; Said Samatar 1993:24; Barnes 2007. ‘Haud’ is Somali for ‘south’ 
(Markakis 1987:55) and depicts a territory of rich pastureland to the south of British Somaliland. The 
Reserved Areas refer to a territorial strip between the north-western part of the Haud and Djibouti, today 
corresponding to parts of the administrative entity of Jijiga and Shinile – see Appendix, Map 1.  
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economic ties, amongst others (Markakis 1987:52). As Geshekter (1983:27) observes, the 
rise of nationalism in British Somaliland first appeared within “an emergent class linked to 
international demands for livestock and its by-products, and inter-territorial transportation 
opportunities in the eastern Horn.”197 Yet, as could be observed during the 1960s, these 
national sentiments were ephemeral, and unification appears to have been based as much 
on rational calculations as national sentiments.  
Unification as Rational Strategy  
Between 1954 and 1960 the Somaliland community of British Somaliland remained 
unsuccessful in gaining back the ‘lost territories’ – territory which was particularly vital for 
maintaining their pastoral livelihoods (Markakis 1987:55). In the absence of the necessary 
political leverage the population of British Somaliland “was convinced that the only way to 
retrieve the Haud and Reserved Area was to join forces with the South” (Mohamed 1992:5; 
Interview 135). Unification with Italian Somalia would enhance their chances of regaining 
control of these areas, as an alleged ‘nation’ could hardly be deprived of its right to self-
determination – particularly in the wake of the United Nation’s 1945 declaration of the 
right to national self-determination. Hence, it was functional and rational for Somaliland’s 
political elite to embark on a national rhetoric, as this was an essential step in achieving 
their aim (Bradbury 2008:32; Spears 2010:129). 
Given this it seems obvious why it was particularly the populace of British Somaliland that 
pushed for immediate union (Jama 2000) and why the union came to be challenged by the 
very same population shortly after its consummation, when the expected returns – i.e. the 
re-appropriation of the ‘lost territories’ – did not materialise (Interviews 113, 135). To 
explain both instances, the ‘rational narrative’ seems to be better placed than the ‘national’ 
one, a train of thought strongly reinforced by Ghalib (1995:28f.), who argued that “had it 
not been for the handing over of those territories, so vital to the transhumantic life pattern 
of herdsmen and herds alike, there would hardly have been the emotional desire for an 
immediate union with the South, nor even the demand for immediate independence” (see 
also Interviews 135, 113).198 Simultaneously, Mohamed (1992:5) highlights that the demand 
 
                                                     
197  Cf. Markakis 1987:52. See also Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:56; Castagno 1964:542. 
198  Omar Arteh Ghalib from the Isaaq clan-family became Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs under Barre. 
See also Spears (2010:129) and Touval (1963:107), who felt that even though the SNL’s protests had been 
expressed in national terms, its objectives were parochial, being prompted by “immediate and vital 
interests in the grazing areas… rather than nationalist ideals” (cf. Markakis 1987:56). 
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for immediate unification was not shared by all Somalis, as, for example, the political elite in 
the south was divided along tribal lines and not prepared to share government privileges 
with its northern brethren at any cost.  
Also, the agricultural Sab communities in south-central Somalia were cautious about 
unification. United in the Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali (HDMS),199 the Sab communities 
lobbied during the 1950s for a federal formula for the new state of the post-colonial era 
(Compagnon 1995:225) – a proposition that partly originated in the circumstance that 
about 85 per cent of the administrative and police posts had been taken by members of the 
dominant pastoral Samaale communities (Castagno 1959:359). The HDMS went so far as to 
lobby the UN to prolong the decade-long trusteeship period that the former Italian colony 
of Somalia had been subjected to after the BMA terminated in 1950 (Marchal 2002:220). 
They advocated the creation of a separate Digil-Mirifle state and expressed sympathy 
towards Ethiopia, which had made overtures to the Somali people by proposing that they 
were part of the ‘Great Ethiopian family’ (Lewis 2002:157). 
That the national ‘rules of the mind’ were trumped by other socio-cognitive systems was 
also true for the population of French Somalia, which shared a political vision distinct from 
the propagated Somali national one. Lewis (2002:136f.) remarks that the isolation and 
insulation the French colony had experienced under imperial rule strengthened the 
particularism of the Somali that hailed from the Ise clan and their conformity with Franco-
Ethiopian co-operation: 
“As in other French territories, this canalization of political activity towards the 
metropolitan country, profoundly affected the later development of political 
parties, serving to insulate political movements in French Somaliland from 
those in other parts of Somaliland. The general effect of French policy was 
thus the isolation of the Côte from the tenor of Somali advancement 
elsewhere.” 200 
Similarly, the different set of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ that the Ogaden Somalis had 
been subjected to during colonialism triggered the moulding of a distinct set of ‘rules of the 
 
                                                     
199  Founded with Italian support on March 25th, 1947, this party represented largely members of the Sab 
communities (Rahenweyne and Digil clans), the Bantu peoples of the inter-riverine region, and some of 
the local Arab community (Issa-Salwe 1994:33f.; Said Samatar 1993:18). 
200  After having endorsed the continuation of French control in referendums in 1958 and 1967, French 
Somaliland became the Republic of Djibouti in 1977, refraining from joining the Somali union, despite 
historic, ethnic and cultural linkages (Lewis 2002:203).  
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mind’.201 Some of its communities were pleased by the fact that the Haud and the Reserved 
Areas had stayed with Ethiopia – as this lessened their competition with the pastoralists of 
British Somaliland over valuable grazing land202 – and even appealed to the Ethiopian 
government to seal the border (Spears 2010:122). As “the Ogaden themselves […] do not 
move their herds outside their territory” (Markakis 1987:173) this demand was sensible for 
Ogaden Somalis, and revealed that they were “less influenced by Somali nationalism” than 
other communities (Touval 1963:134; Lewis 1958b:350, cf. Markakis 1987:56, 173).203  
Multiple other examples could be cited to scrutinize the orthodox ‘national narrative’ of 
Somali unification and display in contrast, how the Somali population entertained not one, 
but plural socio-cognitive systems.204 These partly opposing sets of ‘rules of the mind’ 
existed alongside the socio-cognitive system of the clan, which continued to be a strong 
underlying identity pattern (Lewis 2002:147) that did not stop at ‘national parties’ (Markakis 
1987:54; Castagno 1962:513).205 Acknowledging the plurality of sets of ‘rules of the mind’, 
Massey (1994:125) talks of “Somali nationalities” (my italics), and even Lewis (2002:138) 
suggests that Somali nationalist activities largely focused “upon local issues in British 
Somaliland and Somalia, while elsewhere it was suppressed and condemned to a clandestine 
existence.” The fact that the NUF, the first political organization that united delegates from 
all parties and political groups from northern and southern parts of the Somali territories, 
was only established in 1959 (Lewis 2002:155), supports this argument.206  
 
                                                     
201  The Ogaden constitute one of the biggest Darod sub-clans and represent some 40-50 per cent of all 
Somalis living in Ethiopia (HRW 2008:13). 
202  Touval 1963:107; Henze 1985:30; Markakis 1987:56, 173; Lewis 2002:244; Spears 2010:122. 
203  Even in light of the Ogadeen War of 1977/78 it was observed that “[s]trong pro-Mogadishu feelings 
among Oromo were rare” (Henze 1985:54) and that “Somalis in the Ogaden will alternately use Ethiopian 
or Somali identities depending on the stakes” (Hashim 1997). 
204  See e.g. the comportment of the Somali Progressive League (SPL), which presented a petition to the Four 
Powers Commission – a committee of representatives from Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the 
USA, which was established to decide Somalia’s future and visited the country in 1948 – to have Somalia 
ruled by Italian Trusteeship for another thirty years (Compagnon 1995:179). Interestingly, later Somali 
President Barre was a member of the SPL and characterized as “not qualifying for a great nationalist” 
(Compagnon 1995:179).  
205  See also Lewis (2002:147), who elaborates e.g. on the cleavages between the Darod and Hawiye clan 
families within the SYL. 
206  The NUF had been created as a political platform of the SYL and the Somali National League (SNL), the 
predominant ‘national’ party in British Somaliland. Interestingly, however, the SNL made no effort to 
extend its activities among the Ogaden across the border. And while there is no record of protest by the 
SNL against the return of the Ogadeen to Ethiopia, “there was a good deal of it after the return of the 
Haud” (Markakis 1987:56). 
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Somalia at Independence: Marked by Regime Plurality  
As well as enhancing our understanding of the reasons leading to unification, the ‘rational 
narrative’ points out two important issues. First, it shows that neither the Somali state nor 
nation were marked by ‘homogeneity’ at the time of independence. Unsurprisingly, 
colonialism rather left the Somali territories marked by a plurality of institutions and 
concomitant socio-cognitive systems. The diverse colonies had differed regarding their 
administrative systems207 and had carried out separate elections;208 their economic structures 
varied as much as their official languages, legal traditions, and security architecture;209 and 
they had been marked by the disparate state traditions and visions of their colonial 
masters.210  
Second, the preceding discussion shows that it was changes in the institutional realm that 
triggered alterations in the socio-cognitive sphere; i.e. patterns of identity, such as 
nationalism, largely hinged on particular ‘rules of the game’. Yet, as these institutions were 
not well-established, national sentiments were also anything but deeply rooted in society, as 
became apparent shortly after the Republic of Somalia was proclaimed in 1960. This lack of 
an overarching institutional framework was also reflected in the party landscape, with the 
absence of a truly ‘national’ party. While the SYL and HDMS enjoyed popular support 
particularly in the south, the principal parties in British Somaliland were the Somali 
National League (SNL) and the United Somali Party (USP) (Said Samatar 1993:18).211 
Furthermore, Lewis (2002:138) remarks with regard to the institutional fragmentation of 
Somalia at the time of independence that “the divisive effects of the nineteenth-century 
partition of Somaliland, particularly in respect of Ethiopia’s portion, had now become more 
 
                                                     
207  Even under the BMA, “[n]o integrated administrative structure for the Somali areas was established” (Said 
Samatar 1993:16, fn. 20) and British Somaliland retained its own separate administration (Lewis 2002:117).  
208  While ‘national’ elections were held in Italian Somalia in 1956, ‘national’ elections for the legislative 
council were held in British Somaliland in 1960 (Lewis 2002:146, 154). 
209  Lewis 2002:136; CRD 2004:19; Africa Watch 1990:13; Interview 45. 
210  Britain had been a major world power with a long tradition of ruling overseas territories, whereas Italy 
itself had unified only in the late 19th century (Metz 1993:11). It should, however, be noted that 
colonialism led to a plural regime ecology not only due to the introduction of new rules, but also because it 
amplified existing ones (see e.g. Lewis 1982a:282). On the institutional differences, see also Contini 
(1969:11).  
211  In contrast to the SYL that had been created by the British in order to strengthen the links with the 
United Kingdom, the SNL evolved from the people (Interviews 119, 135). While the SNL was mainly 
associated with the Isaaq clan-family, the USP enjoyed most support among the Dir (Gadabursi and Iise) 
and Daarood (Dulbahante and Warsangeli) clan-families. 
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firmly entrenched than before” and that this “inevitably strengthened the barriers opposing 
Somali nationalist endeavour and consolidated the colonial legacy of fragmentation.”212 
 
3.2 From Independence to Incapacitation: The State Trajectory 
of the 1960s  
Shortly after British Somaliland and Italian Somalia unified on July 1st, 1960, the Somali 
Republic faced serious challenges – one being that the northern population was soon 
disenchanted with the coalition (Ahmed/Green 1999:116; Lewis 2002:172; Interviews 30, 
113). Unification had not resulted in the re-appropriation of the ‘lost territories’ and 
northern political, administrative and commercial elites lamented about southern 
domination (Said Samatar 1993:27).213 That northerners in general and Isaaq in particular 
began to lose faith in the union (Bradbury 2008:33) became particularly obvious on June 
20th, 1961, when more than fifty per cent of the northern population voted against the joint 
act of union and provisional constitution (Drysdale 2001:133).214 Only a few months later, 
in December 1961, Somalia experienced the first attempted military coup d’état in sub-
Saharan Africa (Adam 2008:190), when Sandhurst-trained soldiers tried to take over major 
northern towns (Ahmed Samatar 1993:83). While the immediate cause for the revolt lay in 
the fact that southern police officers came to command northern units (Interview 135), the 
coup leaders “urged a separation of north and south” (Said Samatar 1993:33, 27).215 
What seems to be a conundrum when viewed through the lens of the ‘national narrative’ 
and ‘homogeneity thesis’ appears to be less astounding when regarded through the regime 
prism. As established previously, the ‘dual colonial heritage’ (Bradbury 2008:32; Gassim 
2002:vi) had left the Republic of Somalia marked by a plural regime ecology at the time of 
independence – a plurality that was likely to exert divisive effects. In this train of thought 
 
                                                     
212  In Ethiopia, for example, “[n]o party political activity was permitted and any overt expression of Somalia 
nationalist sentiment was firmly dealt with” (Lewis 2002:182). 
213  In the words of one informant, the north was ‘swallowed’ by the south (Interview 121). 
214  Lewis 2002:172; Compagnon 1995:527; Touval 1963:120f.. The reasons for this outcome of the 
referendum are contested, with some scholars suggesting that the rejection of the constitution did not 
result from popular dissatisfaction, but was the outcome of a campaign by dissatisfied northern politicians 
(Abdi Samatar/Ahmed Samatar 2006:23).  
215  On the argument that the coup “clearly had secessionist objectives” (Huliaras 2002:158), see also Adam 
(1994:25f.). For the coup’s significance see Lewis (2002:173ff.) and Ghalib (1995:123ff.). Interestingly, 
Barre was to rely for his coup in 1969 on five officers from the north (Compagnon 1995:308). 
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Markakis (1987:87) proposes that “[t]he many problems attending the administrative and 
economic integration of the two regions, the cause of considerable political friction in the 
following years, constituted an additional hindrance to political cohesiveness.” Whereas 
enthusiasm about unification had been high (Africa Watch 1990:13), little to no attention 
was given to the mechanics of integrating these two territories and amalgamating their 
thoroughly distinct institutions (Ahmed Samatar 1988:48; Adam 1994), as well as socio-
cognitive systems.216 As unification proceeded “without any serious negotiations about 
important political and economic issues, beyond a division of Cabinet seats” (Africa Watch 
1990:13; Lewis 2002:162), the “very extensive differences” that existed between the two 
territories with respect to “almost all aspects of government” were “left to sort themselves 
out afterwards” (Lewis 2002:162). 
While there was to be one flag, one president, one parliament, and one government, it was 
decided that the two territories would continue to function separately with regard to their 
administrative, judicial, and economic systems until they could be fully integrated (Lewis 
2002:163). Regime plurality was, thus, cemented in the new state, posing significant 
challenges to state-making. Having proposed understanding state-making as a process in 
which an authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ comes to be shared 
by a particular population, the questions of when the different institutions became ‘fully 
integrated’ and how Somalia’s prevailing regime ecology developed throughout the 1960s 
arise. Were developments geared towards institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, 
i.e. state-making, or rather towards the fragmentation of rules, i.e. state-breaking?  
The Persistence of Legal Plurality  
The plurality of ‘rules of the game’ that characterized the Somali Republic showed 
prominently in the judicial proceedings following the abortive coup d’état of 1961. Having 
been put on trial in Mogadishu, the coup plotters were acquitted “on the basis that, in the 
absence of an Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland” 
(Rajagopal/Carroll, 1992:14, cf. Adam 2008:190). While those rejecting the union took this 
 
                                                     
216  It has to be noted, however, that different parties took dissimilar stands regarding the process of 
unification. While the SNL advocated a gradual unification that allowed for the Protectorate to narrow the 
developmental gap with Somalia, the NUF argued that unification should be postponed. As the public of 
British Somaliland vigorously endorsed the former position (Interview 30), its leadership “passed a 
resolution calling for immediate independence and union with Somalia” (Lewis 2002:162). See also 
Interview 75.  
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as a vindication of their case (Bradbury 2008:33), the decision cemented the co-existence of 
the five legal traditions Somalia had inherited – Italian law, British common law, the Indian 
Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, Islamic shari’a, and Somali customary law (Battera/ 
Campo 2001:6; Interviews 60, 82).217 Thus, apart from the judicial challenge posed by the 
absence of a legally valid Act of Union,218 the young state faced defiance due to the 
divergences of its legal systems.  
This plurality of ‘rules of the game’ was even institutionalized by law no. 5 of January 31st, 
1961, which provided for the continuation of the diverse legal systems until de facto 
unification was effected. Although in January 1962 the National Assembly began the 
process of amalgamating the organization of the judiciary by delegating powers to the 
government to prepare a law on the binding advice of a special commission, it was not until 
some years later that the judicial systems in northern and southern Somalia were unified.219 
After several deferrals, the final text of the Criminal Procedure Code was approved by 
legislative decree no. 1 of June 1st, 1963, and came into force in the entirety of the state’s 
territory on August 1st, 1965 (Singh/Said 1973:vi).220 While the unification of the different 
court systems had been effected by legislative decree on June 12th, 1962 (Cotran 1963: 
1017), “the judicial practice of lower courts in Somaliland continued to follow the English 
Common Law model” (Battera/Campo 2001:7). Thus, although some progress had been 
made regarding the unification and administration of justice (Contini 1969:43f.), numerous 
problems remained unresolved seven years after unification (Battera/Campo 2001:7).  
One of these remaining legal challenges lay in the fact that some vital aspects of the 
economy, such as contracts, companies, copyright, patents, and trademarks, were left 
unintegrated – a flaw that remained until the early 1970s (Muhammad 1972:300). A key 
reason why the legal landscape remained fragmented was the country’s continued linguistic 
plurality. In order to circumvent the problem of translating and linguistically harmonizing 
different legal traditions and laws, it was decided that both Italian and English were to 
 
                                                     
217  Lewis 2002:170f.; Bradbury 2008:32.  
218  In strict legal terms, “[t]he Somalia Act of Union was approved “in principle” but not enacted into law” 
(Muhammed 1972:133).  
219  For more details on the permanent Consultative Commission for Integration, see Cotran (1963:1017), 
Muhammad (1972:297), Said Samatar (1993:27). 
220  Cf. Muhammad (1972:226), who argues that the new organization of the judiciary came into effect on 
September 1st, 1962 in the northern regions and on October 1st, 1963 in the southern regions.  
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remain official languages of the court system (Battera/Campo 2001:7) – but this left the 
judicial system linguistically, and, consequently, judicially divided.221 
Taking Linguistic Fragmentation Lightly  
Although the first party programme of the SYL, which dated from 1947, had spelled out 
the goal “to develop a Somali language” (Sheikh-Abdi 1977:661, cf. Lewis 1963:150f.; Ware 
1965:175), and despite the cabinet of the young state agreeing on October 18th, 1960 to 
establish a committee to investigate the literacy problem, the government failed to 
linguistically unify the country. While most Somalis spoke Afmay, written correspondence 
took place in English in the north and Italian in the south of Somalia, as the Somali tongue 
remained scriptless. Part of the problem was that policymakers could not agree on certain 
controversies encompassing the linguistic question involving technical, religious and 
political quarrels, and they also faced strong and irreconcilable lobbies from different sides 
of the population (Warsame 2001:341ff.). Hence, “English, Italian and Arabic were all used 
as official languages in a haphazard manner” (Adam 1994:26), resulting in what was 
described as “babelian bureaucracy” (Laitin 1977a:114; Contini 1963:15).  
Although this “linguistic chaos” (Warsame 2001:346) inhibited Somalia’s state-making 
trajectory, it is questionable as to how far it was in the immediate interest of the political 
elite to carry through linguistic standardization. According to Laitin (1976:455f.), “[t]heir 
inability to agree upon a national script ensured that the ruling élite would be small,” as the 
regulation that knowledge of at least one of the three official languages – i.e. Arabic, Italian, 
or English – was required for recruitment into the civil service meant that those individuals 
and groups who had been favoured by the colonial regimes would continue to dominate the 
state apparatus. Whether it was by error of commission or omission, the inability to 
implement a script for the Somali language was seen to symbolize the state’s more general 
paralysis (Adam 2008:1), and exemplified its inability to conduct institutional and socio-
cognitive standardization. 
The linguistic rift not only created obstacles to efficient jurisdiction and administration 
(Adam 1983:33), but also entailed further challenges to the Somali union and its state-
making project. As English increasingly supplanted Italian and Arabic as the predominant 
 
                                                     
221  For a comprehensive account of the legal (dis-)integration, see Contini 1963. 
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official language by the late 1960s (Laitin 1976:464),222 northerners were suddenly 
advantaged when it came to employment in the government sector and beyond (Laitin 
1977a:126f.). This fostered the fortification of separate identities amongst English-speaking 
northern Somalis and non-English speaking southern Somalis. “By the late 1960s a 
‘Southern Identity’ was beginning to form and Somalis became increasingly aware that 
Northerners were migrating to the South and getting the best jobs” (Laitin 1976:464) – an 
observation which led to resentments (Lewis 1967b:276). Thus, it was judged that “[t]he 
regional imbalance is closely related to the linguistic situation” (Laitin 1976:466).  
The Challenge of Administrative Plurality 
Regime plurality in the Somalia of the 1960s surpassed, however, the legal and linguistic 
spheres. The administrative apparatus was also characterized by discrepancies between 
north and south. The resulting problems were compounded by the fact that the 
administrative machinery remained “in an extremely rudimentary state” (ICPE 1983:49), 
leading Galaydh (1986:131) to argue that “an effective and responsive administrative 
machinery was palpably missing.” While the government employed some 16,000 individuals 
(Potholm 1970:211f.), it lacked “institutions designed to insure [sic] that the desires of the 
government are superimposed on society” (Potholm 1970:212), resulting in a situation in 
which the state’s political institutions did not penetrate the populace (Brons 2001:165). 
Thus, central administration “ventured into rural areas only during elections” (Adam 
1995:70), which is why “[t]he majority of the Somali population remained detached from 
the modern state framework” (Brons 2001:165). 
Compagnon (1995) and others scrutinize the latter proposition, suggesting that society was 
not detached, but (too) closely attached to the modern state. It was argued that the 
administrative apparatus could be understood as a “consortium of rival lineages and clan 
interests which people regard in terms of the number of kinsmen they can count in its 
ranks” (Labahn 1982:139, as quoted in Lewis 1961:282), and adds that “[e]ach ministry thus 
 
                                                     
222  One example of this is provided by the Criminal Procedure Code, which was published on December 31st, 
1964 in Italian and on November 6th, 1965 in English. “However, by Article 8 of Law No. 1 of February 
17th, 1968, it is specifically provided that where there is a conflict between the Italian text and the English 
text, the latter shall prevail” (Singh/Said 1973:vi).  
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resembled a clan-dominated empire” (my translation).223 However, no matter how one 
conceives of these state-society relations, the effect on Somalia’s state trajectory remained 
the same: the state’s central administration was unable to enforce a single authoritative set 
of ‘rules of the game’ across the territory. As this meant that institutional standardization 
was not carried through and that different sets of rules applied in different regions, state-
making was hamstrung. Along these lines Labahn (1982:139) shows that “[t]he 
administration constituted a mirror image of the traditional social structure and could 
contribute little to a speedy social transformation” (my translation).224 
Yet, it would be misleading to deny that some progress was made regarding regime 
standardization. Although the Somali union experienced “serious difficulties in 
amalgamating different administrative, judicial, and economic systems” during the “first five 
years or so” (Adam 2008:191), improvements were made towards the latter half of the 
decade.225 While Lewis (2002:178) suggests in one source that administrative integration had 
largely been accomplished by the end of 1963,226 he asserts elsewhere that this was not an 
accepted fact before Mohamed Ibrahim Egal became Prime Minister in 1967 (Lewis 
1993b:29, cf. Bradbury 2008:34). But even by the late 1960s, full harmonization of the 
different ‘rules of the game’ had not been achieved. Taxation was one case in point. When, 
as late as 1968, the higher taxation rates of the south were imposed on the north, 
Somaliland’s population incited a tax revolt. Some protestors were left dead (Adan 1994) 
and many others abandoned their settlements in order to avoid taxation (Interview 135). 
Thus, the fact that at independence the state lacked the “administrative capacity to collect 
taxes from subsistence herders and farmers” (Laitin 1993:125) remained largely unchanged 
a decade later. Thus, Dool (1993:245) argues that “[t]here was nothing wrong with the 
unity, but the Somalis as a whole have failed to administer themselves.” 
 
                                                     
223  See also Laitin (1976:452), who similarly proposes that between 1960 and 1969 “[p]olitical appointments 
were made constantly to enhance ‘clan’ power, and different ministries became straps for different clans. 
What had started out as a putative nation was being torn apart at the seams through clan ‘tribalism’.” 
224  On administrative challenges, see also Issa-Salwe 1994:50. The speedy unification of the different 
administrative structures was also hampered by British and Italian expatriate officials, who had remained 
in the country after independence. As they were naturally strongly attached to their respective systems of 
administration, they tended to hinder rather than facilitate administrative integration (Lewis 2002:171).  
225  See also Besteman 1996a:581. 
226  March 1962 saw e.g. the ratification of the Civil Service Law, and in August 1963 the regulations 
governing municipal and rural district councils were harmonized. Furthermore, in May 1963, the 
Assembly passed legislation extending the existing southern pattern of universal suffrage to the north, and 
one month later, Article 29 of the Constitution was revised to prohibit proselytization except by Muslims, 
thus standardizing the previous British Protectorate practice throughout the Republic. 
3   STATE-MAKING TRAJECTORIES IN SOMALIA 
 
98 
 
Between Elite Competition and Elite Bargain 
While Egal declared in 1968 that since the establishment of the first Somali parties in the 
1940s the “once arrogant, overpowering influence of tribal loyalties” had been “replaced by 
national political consciousness” (Egal 1968:222, as quoted in Höhne 2006a:10), reality was 
much less clear cut. The new political elite was systematically trying to marginalize the 
‘traditional authorities’ and dispense with the clan regime, which they considered divisive, 
antiquated, in the way of modernization, and a vestige of colonial imperialism (Castagno 
1962:9; Lewis 1988:43).227 On the eve of independence, on March 2nd, 1960, the legislators 
of the Somali Republic abolished the status of clan by law no. 13 which included the 
replacement of collective punishment by individual penalties in order to weaken clan 
solidarity (Lewis 2002:156; Hoben 1988:205f.). As even “public disclosure of clan affiliation 
was prosecuted” (Hoben 1988:206), “tribalism was officially buried by the government” 
(Gassem 1994:25).228 Hoping to replace the emerging void with state institutions, this 
repudiation of the clan regime was a classic state-making endeavour. 
However, the government could not wholly neglect the traditional authorities. In the 
absence of an effectively functioning central administrative apparatus that could broadcast 
and implement the state’s ‘rules of the game’, the government relied on them and the set of 
institutions and socio-cognitive systems they presided over to manage the population. Thus, 
while officially denouncing the traditional leaders, the civilian governments of the 1960s 
generally incorporated them into the administrative architecture and paid them a stipend 
(Said Samatar 1993:39) – just as the British had done during colonial times (Fox 1999:21).229 
The co-opted traditional authorities thus acted as a substitute for the missing state 
administration to implement at least a modicum of the state’s ‘rules of the game’. Even Dr. 
Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, leader of the SYL and later President of the Somali Republic, 
who sternly opposed ‘tribalism’ (Potholm 1970:2010), could not dispense with the 
 
                                                     
227  This endeavour was also shown in the decision of the SYC and SNL to confine party membership to 
young men between the ages of fifteen and thirty in order to exclude from the party “reactionary elders 
who did not understand modern requirements” (Castagno 1964:521). Also see Ware (1965:175f.), 
according to whom the SYL advocated the elimination of tribal and communal friction. 
228  Yet, the ‘anti-clannism law’ “was not generally implemented, for the new regime had no more effective 
control over tribal areas than had the colonial government” (Hoben 1988:206). 
229  Having similarly realized the fact that the new political elite could not wholly dispense with the traditional 
authorities, but needed them as an important link to the general public, the SYL had extended its age limit 
of party members to sixty in March 1947 (Castagno 1964:521). According to one informant, the political 
elite also drew on the traditional authorities, because the former were wholly ignorant of the mechanisms 
of their society, but needed to be able to instrumentalise the traditional system if they wanted to govern 
the country (Interview 135). 
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traditional authorities and judiciously applied the much maligned principle of ‘ethnic 
balance’ when forming several governments between 1960 and 1964. For him as for any 
other Somali politician, it would have been politically suicidal to disrespect the clan when it 
came to policy making, the distribution of political offices, and the mobilization of 
(political) support.230  
Thus, from an analytical perspective it could be argued that an elite bargain emerged 
between the old and the new political leadership, as this constituted the only means to 
exercise at least some degree of control over the population. Yet, it seems as if the inclusive 
elite bargains of the 1960s (Compagnon 1995:193) exacerbated, rather than mitigated, the 
state-making challenge in the medium term, as the elite came to be too inclusive. While in 
1960 only a handful of parties had competed for parliamentary seats, by 1964, there were 21 
parties with 973 candidates contesting a mere 123 seats (Potholm 1970:202). The situation 
worsened in 1969 (CRD 2004:12), when more than 1,000 candidates were put forth by over 
60 parties for the same 123 seats (Samatar 1994c:115; Lewis 2002:204).231 The constant 
fragmentation of parties constituted a true bonanza of clan politics and was testament to 
the plurality of regimes that existed alongside the ‘national regime’, posing a key obstacle to 
state-making in Somalia. 
“In these early years [of independence in 1960], Somalia’s multiparty politics degenerated 
into greed and corruption” (Adam 1995:69). Somalia’s parliament, once a symbol of 
democracy, had turned into a “sordid marketplace where deputies traded their votes for 
personal rewards with scant regard for the interests of their constituents” (Lewis 
1972:399).232 Thereby, the irresponsible and greedy behaviour of the politicians severely 
impacted the administration, as the rent-seeking performance of the political elite trickled 
 
                                                     
230  Cf. Laitin 1977a:81, referring to Castagno 1964. Numerous other examples of increasing clan clientelism 
and the accommodation of traditional authorities in the state apparatus can be found in the literature. See 
e.g. the election of Abdirisak Haji Hussein to parliament that hinged solely on his clan’s support 
(Compagnon 1995:192) – in contrast to the election of Abdullahi Iise in 1956, who was elected on a 
national rather than clan basis; or see the immediate post-election time in March 1964, when President 
Osman selected his council of ministers more on merit rather than clan, thus failing to gain the vote of 
confidence from the National Assembly (Said Samatar 1993:32f.).  
231  Cf. Markakis 1987:54; Castagno 1962:513. CRD (2005:5) even talks of “[m]ore than 80 clan-based political 
parties” that competed in the 1969 elections, and Potholm (1970:204) asserts that there must have been 
over 130 registered parties shortly before the coup.  
232  Lewis 2002:205f.; Compagnon 1995:195. President Egal, for example, felt the need to spend as much as 
USD 1.25 million to buy off members of parliament in 1969, in a country with a budget of only USD 30 
million (Samatar/Samatar 1987:683). “In addition, the government openly raided the national treasury (to 
the tune of $5 million) to buy public votes” (Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:84). 
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down to the bureaucracy (Laitin 1976:453). The elite bargains and politics of the 1960s had 
resulted in so little regime standardization that coercive means were the only ones left to 
the government to enforce a certain set of ‘rules of the game’. Thus, shortly before the 
elections of 1969, the government “pressured the chief of the National Police Force 
(General M. A. Musa) to put his troops and logistics at the disposal of SYL party faithful” 
(Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:84).  
A State Marked by Regime Plurality  
Regime plurality and institutional and socio-cognitive fragmentation transcended the 
administrative, legal, and linguistic spheres. “The legal codes, administrative procedures, 
currencies, working languages, civilian and military grades of the two territories all differed” 
(CRD 2004:19). The northern and southern regions of the Somali Republic also utilized 
diverse fiscal and accounting procedures, were marked by dissimilar legal and tariff systems, 
and their civil servants were paid through different payrolls (Lewis 1967b:272).233 Said 
Samatar (1993:27) adds that “[p]olice, taxes, and the exchange rates of their respective 
currencies also differed” and that “[t]heir educated elites had divergent interests, and [that] 
economic contacts between the two regions were virtually non-existent.” The latter could 
mainly be traced back to the fact that infrastructural integration was a long time coming and 
the distance between the north and the capital in Mogadishu was hard to overcome 
(Bradbury 2008:33).234 While the mid to late 1960s saw an incremental advancement of 
institutional standardization, alternative regimes – such as clan or regional ones235 – 
continued to carry major weight.  
That socio-cognitive systems apart from the national one remained powerful is shown by 
Lewis (2002:169), who argues that  
“the possibility of sharp regional cleavages between north and south could not 
be ruled out. For despite the underlying cultural unity of the Republic as a 
whole and the all-pervasive character of clan ties, the long experience of two 
distinct colonial traditions had left quite different imprints in north and south, 
to a greater extent indeed than was immediately apparent.” 
 
                                                     
233  Issa-Salwe 1994:49; Besteman 1996a:581; Cotran 1963:1017; Contini 1969:43f.. 
234  See Lewis (2002:171), who also states that “[t]here was no direct telephone link between Hargeisa and 
Mogadishu”, and Issa-Salwe (1994:50), who argues that “[i]n the rainy season the capital sometimes 
remained completely incommunicado with the rest of the country.” Drysdale (1964:165) concludes that 
this lack of infrastructure prohibited “true national integration.” 
235  See e.g. Mohamed (1992:6), who argues that “the political system […] was geared to create regionalism.” 
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Different colonial ‘rules of the game’ had thus left a legacy of different ‘rules of the mind’. 
Yet, this observation transcends the colonial framework, as different sets of institutions that 
existed within Somali culture also resulted in the development of diverse socio-cognitive 
systems. Even though the agricultural communities in southern Somalia “are a mixture of 
many different clan elements, and include large numbers of people of Darod and Hawiye 
origin” they “possess a strong sense of separate identity” (Lewis 2002:159). Thus, Spears 
(2010:128) rightly points out that “while Somalis may have felt a certain cohesiveness in 
their common identity, there were other political, physical, and developmental barriers that 
worked against the realization of a sentimental nationalism.” One aspect that worked 
against the civilian regimes, for example, was their relinquishment of a (political) ideology, 
to which the population could have ‘tuned in’ and unified – a tool Barre was to make 
significant use of. Consequently, state-making in the 1960s was impeded by the fact that the 
cultural, administrative, language and mentality differences between north and south 
Somalia were just too big, resulting in a situation in the pre-1969 era in which there was 
“one country, but two nations” (Interview 1).  
 
3.3 From Demise to Resurrection: Somalia’s Trajectory of the 
1970s  
Five days after the assassination of President Shermarke,236 the army carried out a bloodless 
coup d’état on October 21st, 1969.237 Having occupied strategic locations within Mogadishu, 
coup leader Mohamed Siyad Barre immediately moved to dissolve the institutions of 
civilian government.238 While he suspended the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, 
abolished all political parties, and abrogated the constitution within hours of the coup, 
Barre announced the drafting of a new constitution and the ruling of the country by decree 
in the interim (ACR 1969/70:B175; Lewis 2002:207). Subsequent months saw the creation 
of an “institutional tabula rasa” (Compagnon 1995:305f.), followed by several institutional 
 
                                                     
236  An action allegedly motivated by personal rather than political motives (ACR 1969/70:B174). 
237  The coup was not the first attempt to jettison civilian rule. On the eve of elections in March 1969, a plot 
by senior army officers was only narrowly avoided (ACR 1969/70:B177, cf. Payton 1980:501). 
238  Born in 1919 to a pastoralist family of the Marehan clan in the Ogadeen, Barre was educated as police 
officer, rising to the highest possible rank of the colonial police force during the BMA. Upon 
independence in 1960, Barre became vice commander of the Somali army. By 1966, he held the rank of 
major-general and had become commander in chief.   
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and administrative alterations (ICPE 1983:28ff.).239 Having hoped for a commencement of 
better politics and an end to bribery, corruption and nepotism, the population initially 
benefited from “improved economic performance, expanding social services and a better 
culture of governance” (Abdullahi 2007a:43; Lewis 2002:208).240 What was the underlying 
current of the post-1969 state trajectory and how did the military government put the 
Somali Democratic Republic241 on the track of state-making in the early 1970s? 
I argue that the coup was accompanied by a marked change in the prevailing regime 
ecology. Quite in contrast to civilian rule, which had largely witnessed an exacerbation of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, military reign constituted a first serious attempt 
in Somali history to dispose of regime plurality and carry through institutional and socio-
cognitive standardization. While alternative regimes were either banned (clan regimes), co-
opted (regional), or subdued (religious), the state’s rules were broadcast through an 
elaborate administrative infrastructure and with military precision. Hence, I disagree with 
those scholars who postulate that the Somali ‘state collapse’ started with the drift towards 
one party rule in 1969 (Abdullahi 2007a:43). And in light of the fact that the military take-
over enjoyed popular support during the early years,242 I similarly scrutinize the argument 
that, starting from 1970, Barre’s government was only concerned with political survival 
(Compagnon 1995:428).243 Although a number of sympathetic accounts about some of 
Barre’s policies are scattered throughout the literature,244 there is a dearth of analytical 
investigations into the dictator’s state-making efforts in the early to mid-1970s – a gap this 
section aims to reduce.  
 
                                                     
239  Laitin 1979a:178; Lewis 1982b:18; Adam 2008:7. 
240  On the newly instilled discipline in the administrative apparatus, see also Interview 19. On the improved 
economic performance, see Laitin (1982:61, 1993:129) and Abdi Samatar (1994:71) who shows that due to 
Saudi Arabia’s booming oil exports, the prices of sheep/goats, cattle and camels increased from USD8, 
USD30, and USD40 in 1960 to USD44, USD195, and USD278 in 1978 – a development from which 
Somalia profited particularly during the early years of Barre’s reign. However, it has to be noted that the 
development plans of 1971-1973 and 1974-1978 were more than 80 per cent financed by bilateral and 
multilateral loans (Marchal 1996:1). See also Interview 66. 
241  After the coup, the ‘Somali Republic’ was renamed the ‘Somali Democratic Republic’.  
242  That the military coup was largely welcome can also be inferred from the fact that “things were so 
peaceful in the northern town of Hargeisa […] that [unlike in the south] there was not even a curfew in 
force” (Africa Confidential 1969:8, cf. Spears 2010:170). 
243  Yet, it is true that Barre was careful to fortify his own position while ensuring that no other individual 
could build up a power base (see e.g. Lewis 2002:207; Said Samatar 1993:40; Compagnon 1992:9).  
244  For a favourable account of the literacy programme, see e.g. Adam 1980; Ahmed Samatar (1988:103) and 
Laitin (1977a). Lewis (1972) and others praise the efficacy of the new order (see Ahmed I. Samatar 
1988:3). Davidson (1975a/b, cf. Payton 1980:494) lauds the military regime’s accomplishments regarding 
democratization and ‘scientific socialism’. For a more general laudation on Barre’s accomplishments, see 
Pestalozza 1974.  
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Streamlining the Administration  
Institutional and administrative alterations lay at the heart of the shift from civilian to 
military government. At the central level, Barre replaced the cabinet and the National 
Assembly with the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which consisted of twenty-five 
high-ranking members of the security forces and ruled, in the form of an executive 
committee, along the institutional and ideological framework set out in the First Charter of 
the Revolution of 1969. The SRC was complemented by a subordinate Council of the 
Secretaries of State (CSS), which comprised fourteen, mainly civilian secretaries who were 
responsible for the day-to-day government operations (Said Samatar 1993:38).245 While the 
SRC “embarked on an energetic revitalization of the country’s government, economy and 
social services” (Lewis 2002:208), the organizational alterations were mirrored on lower 
administrative echelons.  
The regional governors and district commissioners, which had existed more in name than 
in practice under civilian rule (Lewis 1979:23), were replaced with more effective regional 
and district revolutionary councils (SDR 1972:1; Issa-Salwe 1994:49). By law no. 9 on local 
government reform of August 9th, 1972, “[l]ocal councils, composed of military 
administrators and representatives appointed by the SRC, were established under the 
Ministry of Interior at the regional, district, and village levels to advise the government on 
local conditions and to expedite its directives” (Said Samatar 1993:39). Whether the SRC’s 
proclamation was eyed with suspicion as a tool to enhance “control of the masses” (Laitin 
1979a:178) or rather as genuine attempt to bring governance closer to the people (Davidson 
1975b:29, cf. Spears 2010:134),246 this move significantly increased the administrative 
penetration of Somali society (Lewis 1982b:18; Laitin 1979a:178). 
That the military government enhanced the state’s administrative grip also showed in the 
territorial reorganization that it effected in later years. The 8 regions and 47 districts247 that 
 
                                                     
245  With the exception of police commissioner Major-General Jama Ali Korshel, who was put in charge of 
Internal Affairs in addition to being vice-president of the SRC, the other thirteen secretaries of state were 
“youngish civilian technocrats” (ACR 1969/70:B177). Their appointment was allegedly marked by “an 
attempt at subordinating ethnic considerations to individual talent” (ACR 1969/70:B177; Lewis 2002:208; 
Compagnon 1995:324). More generally, Laitin (1999:147) comments on the “relatively meritocratic 
assignment of jobs” that characterized staffing in the public sector under Barre, and the fact that “Siyad’s 
first cabinet was clearly chosen on merit and not by ascriptive criteria” (ibid. 1976:456; Spears 2010:134). 
Yet, until 1974, most ministries were presided over by the military members of the SRC (Lewis 1979:21).  
246  Slottved 1980:232. 
247  Potholm (1970:189) talks of 36 districts and 48 municipalities. 
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had existed during civilian rule were reconstituted by the decentralization law of 1974 to 15 
regions and 78 districts (Lewis 1979:23),248 thus enhancing the possibility to effect a greater 
institutionalization of the authoritative ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’: the new 
regions and districts were designed in such a way as to cut across traditional clan boundaries 
and were, where necessary, renamed so as to exclude tribal or clan names, placing emphasis 
instead on the settlement (digmo) as the basic unit of association and identification in an 
effort to extirpate lingering lineage loyalties (Lewis 1989:573). 
The immediate “battle for the renewal of the administration” (Pestalozza 1974:81) enabled 
the SRC to transmit its power throughout the country (Compagnon 1995:334; Laitin 
1979a:178). Consequently, different observers spoke of a “bureaucratization of public life” 
(Samatar/Samatar 1987:683) and a “fantastic expansion of the bureaucracy” (Lewis 
1982b:18; Interviews 19, 116, 137), which “brought about internal discipline” (Omar 
1996:xiiv; Interview 121).249 The latter was rooted partly in changed recruitment patterns for 
administrative personnel, which further fostered standardization. Civil servants were now 
nominated on meritocratic rather than clan parameters (Lewis 2002:208)250 and the civilian 
administrators of the previous government were either replaced by young police and army 
officers (Issa-Salwe 1994:53; Interview 19),251 or required to undergo military training and 
political education, as ideological conviction was considered “an indispensable quality” 
(SDR 1972:2).252 During a three- to six-month military course at Camp Halane (Adam 
2008:45f.),253 participants also attended a daily three-hour administrative course (ACR 
1970/71:B160). As “those found to be incompetent or politically unreliable were fired” 
(Said Samatar 1993:38), the state machinery newly comprised a unified and sworn in class 
of administrative technocrats with military obedience.254 Coupled with the expansion and 
 
                                                     
248  Adam (1983:36) counts 16 regions and 81 districts. 
249  See also Laitin (1976:454f.) and Gorman (1981:40), who also stress the discipline among civil servants.  
250  Castagno 1970:27; ACR 1969/70:B177; Lewis 1979:20f.; Said Samatar 1993:38; Spears 2010:134. 
251  Adam 2008:45; ACR 1969/70:B177; Samatar 1988:86, cf. Bakonyi 2001:77. 
252  Laitin 1979a:178; Said Samatar 1993:38; Adam 2008:59.  
253  ACR 1969/70:B177, 1970/71:B160; Pestalozza 1974:94f.; HRW 1990:25; Adam 2008:45f.. Camp Halane 
had been a military academy on the outskirts of Mogadishu, but was converted into a training centre for 
Somalia’s civil servants (Lewis 2002:212).  
254  The institutional and socio-cognitive standardization of civil servants was expanded to all students who 
had completed four years of secondary education and who were to undertake a six- to nine-month 
placement as ‘national volunteer teachers’ (Hughes 1977:44; Lewis 1979:22; ICPE 1983:52ff.; Adam 
2008:47). 
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overstaffing of the civil service (Slottved 1980:219),255 regime standardization could be 
realized on a broad level. 
Given that “[t]he military, both before and after the coup, has respected lines of authority, 
and its members have adhered closely to their rôles” (Laitin 1976:452), the militarization of 
the administrative apparatus served the important function of making it more effective and 
efficient.256 Furthermore, it provided the state with so much control over the population 
that even skirmishes among Somali nomads in the hinterland were effectively stopped and 
disputants were coerced to bring their conflict to the central government (Laitin 1976:456, 
1979:183; Interviews 116, 135).257 Lewis (1979:21) emphasizes that “[t]he command 
structure of the Somali army thus forms the backbone of the state”, and Compagnon 
(1995:334) observes that, by the mid-1970s, the administrative architecture reflected the 
tight control that the SRC maintained on all levels of administration via its military 
intermediary.258 
Boosting Control and Coercion  
In tandem with rendering the administrative apparatus more effective, Barre also 
strengthened the state’s ability to control and coerce. Not only had the reforms “impressed 
on the public the supremacy of the military” (Bradbury 2008:37), Somalis also witnessed the 
appearance of a growing number of organs of ‘thought control’. In its mildest form, they 
took the shape of ‘orientation centres’, which were established in every permanent 
 
                                                     
255  “As of 1976 it was estimated that approximately 72,000 Somalis, out of a paid work force of 167,000, 
worked for government salaries” (Laitin/Samatar 1987:107).  
256  For the militarization of the administration see e.g. the regional revolutionary councils, which were 
“presided over by the military governor acting as ‘chairman’ (guudoonshiye) and assisted by the local military 
and police commanders, the regional NSS [National Security Service] chief, and the representative of the 
President’s political office whose main task is to see that the local Orientation centre (hanuunin) is properly 
organized and well attended” (Lewis 1979:23). Another example can be found in the militarization of the 
police force (Interview 42; Ofcansky 1993:215). See also ACR 1969/70:B177; Compagnon 1995:334. 
257  Yet, this judgment is disputed by Lewis (2002:214) who argues that “[d]espite its elaborate and heavy-
handed character, however, this essentially autocratic pattern of government still touched the nomadic 
majority of the population relatively lightly.” 
258  That the army constituted a key tool for regime standardization can also be deduced from the observation 
that already by the late 1960s, “most Somalis believed that the SNA was less influenced by clan divisions 
and corruption than the civilian sector” and that “[t]he military also had succeeded in integrating British- 
and Italian-trained units more rapidly than had civilian institutions” (Ofcansky 1993:201). This success is 
partly attributed to the military commander-in-chief Barre who “had followed a policy of mixing recruits 
from different parts of the country in order to cultivate nationalism among the solders” in the 1960s 
(ibid.:206).  
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settlement in the countryside, no matter how small (Lewis 1979:23f.; Interview 116),259 and 
the nomadic population was also encouraged “to regard the orientation centre at a regularly 
frequented water point as the hub of social and political activities” (Lewis 2002:214). These 
‘indoctrination centres’ – as they are referred to by Greenfield (1991:15) – were the loci 
where public lectures on ‘scientific socialism’ were held, and also hosted other social events 
that had originally taken place in the traditional framework of the clan, such as wedding 
ceremonies and funerals. Consequently Dool (1993:18) argues that “[t]he centres penetrated 
into the heart of the society.” 
The orientation centres “were reinforced by other agencies which checked deviations from 
official policy” (Lewis 2002:212; Interview 42). Prominent amongst these were the National 
Security Service (NSS) and the National Security Courts (NSC), which jointly dealt with a 
wide range of ‘political’ offences including nepotism and tribalism, as well as with such 
charges as ‘lack of revolutionary zeal’ and treason (Lewis 2002:212).260 The internalization of 
revolutionary fervour was further assured by members of the people’s vigilantes, called the 
‘Victory Pioneers’ who were mainly recruited from amongst the unemployed (Lewis 
1979:22, 2002:11). Soon after its formation in the summer of 1972, this organ counted 
some 20,000 members and was feared among the population, as it collaborated closely with 
the revolutionary councils that could – according to decree no. 1 of January 10th, 1970 – 
arrest anyone suspected of subverting the revolutionary regime (Compagnon 1995:344). 
While vigilantes’ surveillance was supported by the military intelligence units, they also 
acted as initiators of self-help schemes (Laitin 1979a:178).261 
This increase in control and coercion not only contributed to institutional and socio-
cognitive standardization among the population, but also reinforced the establishment of a 
more effective civil service. “Members of the public services were kept under surveillance 
and N.S.S. reports played an important part in promotion and demotion” (Lewis 2002:212). 
Furthermore, “[i]n monitoring and seeking to control public opinion, considerable use was 
also made of agents provocateurs” (Lewis 2002:212; Interview 19). The organizations that 
comprised the security apparatus thereby “not only facilitated political order but they also 
 
                                                     
259  Lewis 1989:573, 2002:211; Dool 1993:18. Towns such as Hargeysa and Burco had an average of four 
orientation centres, whereas settlements such as Odweyne and Gabiley about two (Interview 137).  
260  While the NSC was founded on January 3rd, 1970, the NSS was established on February 15th, 1970.  
261  On self-help schemes and crash programmes, which were “designed to build national consciousness” 
(ACR 1971/72:B188), see Markakis (1987:219), Farer (1979:112), Gorman (1981:41).  
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allowed Siad Barre […] to build and secure a power base from which he could exercise 
control and domination” (Spears 2010:138). All of this surveillance and coercion thus 
helped in establishing a unified and standardized administrative apparatus and a population 
with an enhanced degree of socio-cognitive homogeneity – albeit an unnatural one.  
Confronting Clannism 
The reorganization of the administrative architecture had been carried on a flood of anti-
tribalism and anti-nepotism (ACR 1969/70:B177; Lewis 2002:207). Just as the nationalist 
parties before independence and the civilian governments of the 1960s had sought to 
eliminate clannism in pursuit of unity,262 the military dictatorship “saw the destruction of 
tribal society as a necessary step toward the creation of a new social, political, and economic 
order based on ‘scientific socialism’ ” (Hoben 1988:205). Aiming to eradicate “the divisive 
force of tribalism and clan rivalry” (Lewis 1982b:18) and to arrest trends of social 
stratification (Sheikh-Abdi 1977:662), the military government embarked on a “war on 
tribalism” (HRW 1990:23) destined to “create a stable sense of national identity” (Lewis 
1982b:18). Compared to his predecessors, Barre progressed further in this endeavour, at 
least in the medium term.263 Condemning ‘tribalism’ as the “most serious impediment to 
national unity” (Said Samatar 1993:39), Barre stated in a menacing address to regional 
judges that  
“[t]ribalism and nationalism cannot go hand in hand… It is unfortunate that 
our nation is rather too clannish; if all Somalis are to go to Hell, tribalism will 
be their vehicle to reach there” (cf. Lewis 2002:222).264  
Thus, Barre banned the use of specific terms that carried a clannish connotation, replacing, 
for example, the traditional Somali term of address ‘cousin’ (ina’adeer) with the socialist 
notion ‘comrade’ (jaalle) and renaming local lineage headmen (akils) ‘peace-seekers’ (nabad-
doon) (Lewis 2002:209f.; Interview 137).265 Moreover, “[t]he legal and political functions of 
 
                                                     
262  Interestingly, «Guray» (see fn. 189, 190) had also tried to abolish clannism. Using the Salahiya order of 
Islam as the ideological base of his twenty-one-year jihad against Ethiopian and European rule (1899-
1920), “he imposed on his followers a ban against the use of clan names” (Castagno 1964:518). Yet, as 
with later Somali leaders, «Guray» failed to overcome clannism and had to resort to it in order to wage his 
war (Castagno 1964:518). 
263  Even in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the first paramilitary opposition movements formed, they 
were cautious not to be perceived as being ‘tribalist’, as this would likely have limited their chances of 
success (cf. Spears 2010:142). 
264  See also Barre’s speech ‘The evils of tribalism’ (April 21st, 1971), cf. Haji 2001:269. 
265  Across the globe, such standardization of greetings has been used to effect everyday identification with a 
particular regime (see e.g. the raised arm in Nazi Germany, the raised fist in communist societies, etc.).  
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clan elders, the aqils, were placed under increased state control” (Brons 2001:173), as was 
evidenced in the fact that the establishment of the Regional Courts of Appeal on March 
11th, 1971 was accompanied by a Supreme Court ruling that sharia practitioners and akils 
could not represent litigants in the Supreme Court (ACR 1971/72:B188). Furthermore, the 
dictator confronted clannism by decreeing that social events were to be held in the 
orientation centres, rather than within the traditional context of clan families. Barre’s 
repression of the clan regime also entailed the replacement of traditional blood-
compensation (diya) given by one clan to another by the death sentence for the perpetrator 
in cases of murder (Lewis 1979:24, 2002:208).266  
The national campaign against tribalism culminated in early 1971, when effigies 
representing ‘tribalism, corruption, nepotism and misrule’ were symbolically burnt or buried 
in the Republic’s main centres (Lewis 2002:209). As “[t]he intense clan factionalism that 
characterised the political life at the end of the 1960s was still fresh in memory” 
(Compagnon 1995:210, my translation), the population largely welcomed the rigorous 
policy (Interviews 30, 55), and “Somali nationalism had reached its peak” (Adam 2008:192; 
Interviews 114, 156). No matter if motivated by a personal agenda for political survival,267 
or a broader ideological vision, the displacement of plural (clan) mental models with a 
singular (state) mental model contributed to socio-cognitive standardization. 
Building an ‘Imagined Community’ 
The ‘war on tribalism’ was substantiated with a “crash programme of nation-building” 
(Sheikh-Abdi 1977:662; Laitin 1976:455f.). Central to the latter was the advent of the 
country’s overarching ideology of ‘scientific socialism’, which was announced on the first 
anniversary of the revolution on October 21st, 1970.268 While the civilian regimes had played 
the non-alignment card during the Cold War, Barre “adopted ‘Scientific Socialism’ to unite 
the nation and eradicate its ancient clan divisions” (Lewis 1989:573).269 Succinctly, this was 
 
                                                     
266  Brons (2001:173) argues more generally that “[c]lanism was officially banned and punished by death.” 
267  Laitin (1982:60), for example, proposes that Barre had a personal interest in minimizing clan as a basis for 
advancement due to the fact that he hailed from a minority clan. 
268  In Somali, ‘scientific socialism’ translated literally into ‘sharing wealth based on wisdom’. See also 
Guadagni 1974:38. 
269  This was followed by the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Somalia and the 
USSR on July 11th, 1974. It should be noted that ‘African socialism’ had become very prominent with the 
Arusha Declaration of 1967, which captured Nyerere’s desire to “establish a more egalitarian society by 
narrowing the gap between government and party officials and the mass of the people” (Ahluwalia 
2001:57f.). 
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stated in the slogan ‘tribalism divides where Socialism unites’ (Lewis 2002:209). While some 
argue that ‘scientific socialism’ was “a political instrument to repress the civil rights and 
freedom of the citizens” (Gassem 1994:24), others point out that this ideology was more a 
‘bluff’ than a ‘good hand’ (Laitin 1977b:11).270 In any case, this ideology and the govern-
ment’s emphasis on the “need for the entire population to undergo political indoctrination” 
(HRW 1990:24) was highly significant for the creation of national identity and unity 
(Sheikh-Abdi 1977:662), which “mobilized and excited Somali citizens” (Laitin 1982:63).  
The long-desired introduction of a Somali script was another tool Barre used to enhance 
national identity. As the Somali language was “the most powerful sign of their nationality” 
(Warsame 2001:343; Laitin 1977a:25) and played “a crucial role in the formulation of 
Somali identity” (Adam 1983:31), it came to be a key criteria for Somali citizenship (Laitin 
1977a; Markakis 1998:126). In line with the proposition that Somalis constituted not only a 
‘nation in search of a state’ (Laitin/Samatar 1987), but also a “nation of poets in search of 
an alphabet” (Contini 1964), the leadership realized the importance of not only being able 
to speak but also read and write the same language.271 Hence, on the third anniversary of the 
revolution, Barre announced the SRC’s decision to utilize Roman characters for writing 
Somali (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:102),272 and, in a speech on March 8th, 1974, postulated that 
alphabetization “will be the weapon to eradicate social balkanization and fragmentation into 
tribes and sects. It will bring about an absolute unity” (cf. Lewis 2002:217, 1979:28).  
And, indeed, “[t]he conscious attempt to link nationalist sentiment and modernization by 
creating an ‘imagined community’ of people who could speak, read, and write the same 
language could not be more clear” (Besteman 1996a:588). Once the Somali script was 
adopted, replacing English, Italian and Arabic as the official tongues, the government 
wasted no time in introducing its blanket implementation within the administration (ACR 
1972/73:B230) and in all schools (Dool 1993:55; Warsame 2001:350ff.). Partly due to the 
introduction of a common script and the fact that “[b]ooks on every subject were 
 
                                                     
270  See also Hughes (1977:41) who points out that ‘scientific socialism’ did not include antireligious 
propaganda, and Lewis (2002:116) who argues that the economy barely exhibited any particular traces of 
socialism. See also Compagnon 1995:299; Interviews 116, 135. 
271  See Gellner (1983) and other theorists of modern nationalism, for whom literacy is a decisive ingredient in 
national self-consciousness (cf. Lewis 1989:574). 
272  Since 1963, Latin had been considered the most suitable orthography for the Somali language (Warsame 
2001:346; Laitin 1977a). The army and police had used the Roman script for the formation of their 
conscripts since 1964 (Compagnon 1995:241) – a fact that surely played into Barre’s orthographic 
decision. For contributions on the orthographic question, see Contini 1963; Laitin 1977a; Geshekter 1979; 
A.H. Mohamed 1980; Saeed 1982; Adam 1983; Abuhamdia 1995; Warsame 2001. 
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immediately translated into Somali and introduced into the schools with military precision” 
(Dool 1993:55), Somalia acquired, for the first time in its history, a “standardized 
educational system” (Warsame 2001:349). The latter was further standardized with law no. 
61 of July 23rd, 1972, which ruled that all private schools were to be integrated into the 
public system (Warsame 2001:350; ACR 1972/73:B2300; ICPE 1983:76). Barre abolished 
school fees in 1971 (ACR 1971/72:B189) and “as a result of the new emphasis on literacy 
and language, new schools were built, even in some of the most remote areas” (Ahmed 
Samatar 1994:116), increasing levels of education.273 
Six months after Barre’s announcement introducing a common script, a National Literacy 
Campaign was launched on March 8th, 1973. Both the Urban Literacy Campaign (1973/74) 
and the Rural Development and Literacy Campaign (1974/75) were considered “highly 
successful” (Lewis 2002:216); they boosted adult literacy rates from 7-10 per cent in the late 
1960s to 60-65 per cent a decade later (Slottved 1980:218).274 Another aspect of this success 
could be found in the political realm. According to Laitin (1977a:129)  
“The new rulers have not faced regional fission, and their use of authoritarian 
control only partly explains why they have not. Their attempt to build a Somali 
nationality in the Somali language rather than one in the English language is, it 
seems to me, part of that explanation. Somalia’s regions were united on a 
domestic issue, and common external enemies were no longer necessary to 
maintain Somali unity.” 
Similarly, Lewis (1979:28) proposes that the “literacy campaign has quickened sentiments of 
national identity and self-awareness”, and Pestalozza (1974:17f.) argues that the literacy 
effort changed the entire country.275  
 
                                                     
273  In contrast to the civilian governments, Barre significantly enhanced levels of education. Total school 
enrolment amounted to 30,408 in 1966-67 and 38,439 in 1968-69; the military government boosted these 
figures to 45,944 in 1970-71 and 107,403 for the period of 1973-74 (Laitin 1979a:186). Similarly, Farer 
(1979:112) argues that “[d]uring 1970-71 alone, the primary school population increased by one hundred 
percent.” On educational progress, see also Warsame (2001:349f.), Butani (1973:9), Gassem (1994:29). 
274  See also Ahmed Samatar (1988:103). According to official statistics, some 1.5 million individuals followed 
the literacy classes, and some 800,000 passed the final literacy test (see Compagnon 1995:369; Adam 
1983:37f.). Yet, despite the successes with regard to the literacy campaign, it should be borne in mind that 
the literacy programmes were much less successful than is commonly claimed. For example, as late as the 
early 1980s, Italian remained the language of instruction at university level (ICPE 1983:24f.) – which 
might have been partly due to the fact that Somali did not lend itself to teaching scientific subjects. For 
detailed accounts of the literacy programme, see Andrzejewski (1974, 1977), Mohamed (1975), 
Compagnon (1995:369), Warsame (2001:356) and Lewis (2002:116). For an interesting analysis of the 
political implications of adopting written Somali see Laitin (1977a). 
275  While the introduction of the Somali script had the positive short-term effect of boosting nationalism, it 
also came at a cost for the elite, as knowledge of either Italian or English was no longer a prerequisite to 
enter highly-rated positions. On this discussion, see Laitin (1977a:10) and Marchal (2002:220f.).  
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One of these changes concerned the fact that the introduction of the Somali script “opened 
the possibility of popular control of citizens and workers over the state bureaucracy” (Laitin 
1979a:179), while another one lay in an alteration of the media landscape as the Barre 
government sought to disseminate its ideology. The introduction of a Somali script implied 
that the foreign language newspapers were subjected to competition, a competition that the 
authoritarian political climate quickly decided in favour of Somali newspapers. In fact, the 
two daily newspapers at that time, the Arabic Najmat October and the Italian Stella d’Ottobre 
and the weekly English paper Dawn closed down on January 21st, 1973 (Warsame 2001:357; 
ACR 1973/74:B247), being replaced with the government’s daily newspaper Xiddigta 
Oktoobar (October Star).276 The latter not only provided the population with news, the latest 
achievements of the government, and information about ‘scientific socialism’, but also 
supplied its readers with a ‘thought for the day’ (Lewis 1979:18) in general pursuit of 
ideological hegemony.  
Furthermore, Barre vastly increased radio propaganda (Lewis 1979:23), with which he was 
said to “establish his oppressive grip over Somali society” and which he turned into a 
massive “propaganda machinery” (Adam 2001:viii).277 During the 1970s, a network of 
loudspeakers was installed in every city quarter and each orientation centre, diffusing the 
song Guulwaadde Siyaad, which opened and closed the daily radio transmissions. This song, 
which was part of Barre’s personal cult and had started being broadcasted after the arrest of 
General Gaveire in 1971, was listened to and sung by civil servants, pupils, urban blue-
collar workers, and others at least once a day (Compagnon 1995:355). With the exception 
of the Somali Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation, the state had a “monopoly 
of the media of communication, and plays, songs and poems were widely used to convey 
the message of the revolution to the illiterate masses” (Markakis 1987:219). While the ICPE 
(1983) judged that Somalia’s communication outside the main cities remained ‘primitive’ 
even during the reign of the military regime, Markakis (1987:219) assesses that the Public 
Relations Office (PRO) “grew octopus-like into a multifaceted organisation whose tentacles 
reached every corner of Somali society.” 
 
                                                     
276  Xiddigta Oktoobar had a daily circulation of about 10,000 copies, compared to the combined print run of 
the foreign language newspapers of approximately 6,000 copies per day (Warsame 2001:357; ACR 
1973/74:B247). 
277  See also Lewis 1979:23; ACR 1971/72:B190; Bennett 1997:10. The expansion of the propaganda 
machinery also showed in the fact that the Ministry of Information was given a portfolio on ‘Public 
Guidance’ (Lewis 2002:208), and that a full-time “six-man Censorship Board was appointed in March 
[1971]” (ACR 1971/72:B190), in order to tailor information to SRC guidelines (Said Samatar 1993:39). 
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A State Marked by Regime Standardization 
While regime standardization had significantly increased during Barre’s early rule, numerous 
‘building sites’ remained. One example can be found in the clan regime with its long-
established institutions and socio-cognitive systems, which still played an important role in 
society.278 Hence, Gorman (1981:41) points out that “[t]here were still clan differences, 
especially among the nomadic sections of the population, and there was still some 
resistance to the assertion of central and hierarchical governmental authority over the highly 
individualistic Somali.”279 Another, antithetic building site lay with the Somali Revolutionary 
Socialist Party (SRSP), an organization without roots in history, which failed to instil 
significant participation of the population in the fortunes of the state, even though the 
party’s administrative penetration was allegedly far-reaching (ICPE 1983:101).280 Also other 
policies designed to enhance state control failed,281 thus missing out on enhancing levels of 
standardization. 
Some policies not only failed, but led to a reduction of levels of standardization. One of these 
was the introduction of the Family Law of 1975. In a speech to mark the United Nations’ 
(UN) decision to make 1975 a year to improve the place of women in society, on January 
11th, 1975 Barre announced that the inheritance law was to be extended to female members 
of society (ACR 1974/75:B266), thus meddling with religious institutions. While most 
religious leaders did not rebuff the law, “some traditionalist religious leaders in the north 
[saw it] as further evidence of their belief that the SRC was trying to undermine the old 
structure of Islamic society” (ACR 1974/75:B271).282 Although none of the Somali Islamist 
movements283 was strong enough to credibly challenge the rule of Barre (Marchal 2004:4), 
 
                                                     
278  “Although tribalism was legally abolished some years ago, persistence of clan-consciousness has continued 
to be a major concern of the modernizing élite. The SRSP programme emphasizes the need to uproot 
tribalism as inimical to national reconstruction” (ACR 1976/77:B327). 
279  In this regard, Gorman (1981:41) refers to the fact that “an attempt by the junta soon after the coup to 
levy taxes met stiff resistance throughout the country and had to be abandoned.”  
280  The SRSP was founded between June 26th and July 1st, 1976, with 74 members – 19 of whom had 
formerly belonged to the SRC (ACR 1976/77:B326) – and had roughly 12,000 at the end of 1976 (Hughes 
1977:49) increasing to only 20,000 two years after its creation (Lewis 2002:223).  
281  For instance, Barre’s policy goal of sedentarization after the 1974-75 drought, which was to enhance 
administrative control over the elusive nomadic population (ACR 1975/76:B305; Bradbury 2008:40). 
282  See also Greenfield (1991:15f.), who states that there was “widespread revolution” against the execution 
of the religious leaders, and that Barre’s ‘revolution’ “had reached the zenith of its popularity.” 
283  Inspired by similar movements in Saudi Arabia (Wahabiyya) and Egypt (Ikwaan al Muslimun), small religious 
groups had started to emerge in the early 1970s. These Islamist movements actively promoted a regime 
that was founded on strict sharia rule. Furthermore, several other Islamist organizations were founded 
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ten of the religious leaders were sentenced to death (ACR 1975/76:B305). The govern-
ment’s rash response shocked many Somalis and the incident served to radicalise Islamic 
groups in Somalia, some of whom were to resurface in new Islamic movements in the civil 
war three decades later (Le Sage 2004; Marchal 2004; cf. Bradbury 2008:37). As Abdullahi 
(2007a:44) has it, this clash between the military government and religious leaders gradually 
led the two forces of Islamism and clannism to “unite in favour of regime change.” By the 
mid-1970s, however, other divisions emerged, corroding regime standardization. 
Overall, the years prior to the Ogadeen War “could be described as successful” (Omar 
1996:73). While Omar justifies this ‘success’ with the fact that Barre “enhanced the 
country’s image abroad” (ibid.), there are good reasons to argue that some progress was 
also achieved on an internal level. Viewed through the regime standardization prism, the 
early to mid-1970s were characterized by the standardization of an authoritative set of ‘rules 
of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. In this sense, other observers considered that “Barre 
elicited a higher degree of societal cohesion in Somalia than had previously existed” 
(Gorman 1981:41), and that “[w]e may take the years 1974-76 as the high tide of the Somali 
state system” (Rawson 1994:151).284 Having used strong state organs to build nationalism 
(Interview 156), the Somali state appeared to have reached – despite certain shortcomings – 
a level of standardization of its institutions and socio-cognitive systems as never before.  
 
3.4 Interim Conclusion  
Even though both the civilian and the military state-making endeavours ultimately faltered, 
they significantly differed with respect to the breadth and depth of their respective regime 
standardization. While the state-making project of the 1960s failed to overcome the regime 
plurality inherited from colonialism, that of the early to mid-1970s was characterized by 
increasing institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. As Laitin (1976:463, 466) has it, 
the emergent social stratification based on urban-rural, regional, and linguistic differentials 
that became recognizable by the late 1960s was discarded by the military government.” 
Thus, rather than being solely marked by processes of ‘state collapse’ (Abdullahi 2007a: 43), 
 
                                                                                                                                     
during the course of the 1970s, notably an-Nahda and al-Ahli (Abdullahi 2001; cf. Renders 2006:146), and 
were implicated in the protest against the promulgation of the 1975 Family Law. 
284  Laitin 1982:60f.; Adam 2008:7; Ahmed Samatar 1994b:116.  
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Barre’s early rule brought about an enhancement of state-making. By means of banning 
clannism, revitalizing nationalism, and introducing scientific socialism, amongst others, the 
dictator propelled the sharing of common, national ‘rules of the mind’ and “Somalia 
experienced for the first time the establishment of an efficient state” (Gorman 1981:40). 
However, the common argument that the differences in state trajectories stemmed from 
divergent institutions and policies (Lewis 2002:206; Farah 1976; Ghalib 1995:141) can be 
scrutinized on the basis that there has been a considerable continuity with regard to policies 
and concomitant rules from the civilian to the military leadership. Both governments, for 
example, aspired to acquit themselves of clannism,285 had a similar take on traditional 
authorities,286 tried to ensure a particular clan balance,287 attempted more or less successfully 
to introduce a script for the Somali language, and tried to stimulate national sentiments. 
Thus, this chapter proposed that the major difference between the two state-making 
endeavours lay less with different policies rather than with the degree to which the 
respective leadership was successful in bringing about regime standardization – which was 
partly a function of the state apparatuses’ divergent organization and administration. As 
Lewis (1972:406) remarks with regard to the policies of the military government: “These 
ambitions and slogans are not new; and dissatisfaction with the previous civilian leaders 
centred not on their aims, but on their failure to implement them effectively and sincerely.” 
Yet, the euphoria with which the SRC had been welcomed began to wane in the mid-1970s 
(Ahmed I. Samatar 1993:85; Interview 19), seeing the socialist ideology running out of 
steam (Laitin 1982:63). “After about eight years of relatively meritocratic assignment of jobs 
and successful economic reform, along with a state ideology of scientific socialism” (Laitin 
1999a:147), Barre embarked on a war to reclaim the Ogadeen of eastern Ethiopia, which 
was to herald a change in Somalia’s state trajectory. It is to this perennial issue of long-
standing Somali irredentism and the second phase of his rule to which we now turn.  
 
                                                     
285  Compare e.g. Lewis (2002:156) and Hoben (1988:205f.) for the civilian governments with Compagnon 
(1995:213) and Brons (2001:173) for the military government. 
286  Compare e.g. Castagno (1960:9) and Lewis (2002:156) for the civilian governments with Compagnon 
(1995:213) and Brons (2001:173) for the military government.  
287  Castagno (1970:27), Lewis (1979:35), Laitin (1982:60), Bakonyi/Stuvøy (2005:364) and Adam (2008:1) 
observe that Barre was careful not to overly disturb clan balance at the central political level. See also 
Compagnon (1995:215). However, it is true that “[a]fter Siyad’s rise to power in 1969 the interriverine 
clans were underrepresented in the ministry and in regional and district positions of leadership” 
(Besteman 1996a:583).  
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4  
War and State-(Un)Making  
The policy of détente towards Ethiopia that Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal had heralded in 
1967 was continued by Siyad Barre. Although he sustained his primarily diplomatic strategy 
to re-appropriate the Ogadeen even after Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassi was overthrown 
on September 12th, 1974 (Henze 1985:32), ‘war clouds’ gathered over the Horn of Africa 
(Farer 1976), ultimately discharging into one of the most ferocious conflicts in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Woodward 1977:281; Tareke 2000:635). Although the war sparked national fervour, 
it resulted in a U-turn of the progressive state-making project Barre had initiated (Mohamed 
1992:6; Bryden 1999b:3; Tripodi 1999a:1). During the 1980s Somalia’s economy plunged 
(Laitin 1993:130ff.; Compagnon 1990:281; Kivimäki 2001:12), its politics came to be 
marked by ‘bad governance’, nepotism and clan politics (Sheik-Abdi 1981:163; Tripodi 
1999a:1), and the country witnessed a massive weapons overflow (Luckham/Bekele 
1984a/b). Moreover, parts of the population experienced relative deprivation, which 
aggravated existing grievances (Africa Watch 1990:1). Thus, the war is frequently perceived 
as a “milestone on the road to the collapse” (Abdullahi 2007a:45).288 
Yet, the Ogadeen War was not the only conflict Somalia experienced between 1977 and 
1991. Following the Somali defeat in 1978, armed resistance against Barre’s rule took root. 
Officially pronounced in London on April 6th, 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) 
was one of the first rebel groups to form. After moving its headquarters to the Haud 
shortly after its formation, the Isaaq-based SNM waged a guerrilla struggle against the 
Somali government in the country’s north-west. In alliance with other militias that formed 
throughout the decade, the rebel movement aimed to overthrow and replace Barre. In light 
of his defeat and particular developments unfolding in 1991, the SNM decided to abrogate 
 
                                                     
288  Tareke 2000:666; Hamrick 1993; Laitin 1982; cf. Besteman 1996a:589.  
4   WAR AND STATE-(UN)MAKING 
116 
 
the union of 1960 and declared the Republic of Somaliland an independent state. Although 
Somaliland has not been internationally recognized, this alleged ‘success story’289 that has 
also been considered to be “very much a product of war” (Spears 2004b:185), survived as a 
de facto polity for the subsequent two decades. 
One puzzle emerging from those two war trajectories is why the former led to state-breaking 
while the latter resulted in state-making? This question arises particularly in light of received 
wisdom which holds that particularly civil wars are destined to break rather than make 
states (see e.g. Kaldor 1999; Rotberg 2002). While some regional analysts acknowledge that 
war has played an important role in state-making processes in the Horn of Africa in general 
(Ahmed/Green 1999; Clapham 2001) and Somaliland more particularly (Jacquin-Berdal 
2002),290 the conundrum of why the two wars led to divergent state-making outcomes 
largely remains. There is a dearth of structural comparison of these two wars and their 
impact on the respective state trajectories, and the few existing explanations that illuminate 
the role violent conflict exercised on Somali state trajectories lack a common denominator.  
The variables that accrued from the Ogadeen War and allegedly contributed to the 
unmaking of the Somali state differ in nature from those warring factors that supposedly 
led to the ‘success’ of Somaliland’s state-making project.291 While, for example, the 
economic decline Somalia experienced throughout the 1980s goes a long way towards 
explaining the state’s demise,292 Somaliland’s state-making endeavour can hardly be 
explained in terms of economic prosperity. Furthermore, most accounts of Somaliland’s 
state-making endeavour suppress the crucial role of the decade-long insurgency altogether, 
suggesting that the polity’s post-war reconstruction started “from scratch” (APD 2002b:19; 
Bradbury 2008:4), principally ‘based’ on an institutional ‘tabula rasa’ after 1991. Yet, by 
neglecting the role of the civil war in Somaliland’s state-making endeavour, these accounts 
not only gloss over war-to-peace continuities, but also dismiss the hypothesis that war may 
be constitutive of state-making.  
 
                                                     
289  On the characterization of Somaliland as ‘success’, see subsequent chapters. 
290  Huliaras 2002; Spears 2004b:185; Bradbury 2008:2; Bakonyi 2009.  
291  While the factors that are thought to have contributed to the unmaking of the Somali state were 
mentioned before, the positive effect of the civil war in northern Somalia is, if considered at all, found to 
largely lie in the abolition of dictatorial rule (see e.g. Bradbury 2008:50). 
292  The amount of US military and economic aid Somalia received dwindled from USD 34 million in 1984 to 
USD 8.7 million in 1987 – a fraction of the government’s requested USD 47 million (Said S. Samatar 
1993:46).  
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Applying the regime prism to the Ogadeen War of 1977/78 and analysing the Somali civil 
war of the 1980s, I aim to shed light on their divergent impact on the respective state-
making projects. While being well aware of the caveat that the first war constituted an inter-
state war, whereas the latter constituted an intra-state conflict, I argue that they are 
comparable when viewed through the regime standardization prism. As proposed in 
Chapter 2, both types of war can either contribute to or abrogate processes of institutional 
and socio-cognitive standardization, thus being either constitutive or obstructive to state-
making. In the case of the Ogadeen War, I suggest that the prosecution of the war 
undermined the state’s ability to conduct institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. 
The civil war instigated by the SNM, however, had more complex influences on the 
enhancement of particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. While the SNM-led 
war resulted in the emergence of an alternative and dominant power centre in the north-
west that had significant leverage over the choice and implementation of a particular set of 
rules, and although it contained developments that were constitutive of state-making, it did 
not lead to outright regime standardization. 
While the role of war in processes of state-making will be taken up again in Chapter 5, this 
chapter begins to deconstruct the ‘black box’ of war. Section One sets out by providing a 
brief historical background to the Ogadeen War and its evolution before delving into an 
analysis of how the war effort affected institutional and socio-cognitive standardization 
both during the war years and throughout the 1980s. I suggest that although some of the 
emergent fissures had already existed in an embryonic form prior to the Ogadeen War, the 
unfolding drama of institutional and socio-cognitive de-standardization stood in stark 
contrast to the state trajectory of the 1970s. Section Two provides a brief overview of the 
SNM’s anti-government war in the country’s north-west, and investigates how this civil war 
contributed to the state-making endeavour that culminated in the formation of the Republic 
of Somaliland. An interim conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings. 
 
4.1 The Ogadeen War and its Effect on State-Breaking  
The eighteen month Ogadeen War between early 1977 and mid-1978 was embedded in a 
long conflictive history (Clapham 2001; Gamst 1986:133). ‘Western Somalia’, which 
includes the Ogadeen, the Haud, and the Reserved Areas, had already been home to the 
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struggles of Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi «Gran» and Sayid Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan 
«Guray» in the 16th and early 20th centuries respectively (S. S. Samatar 1993a:12f.; Lewis 
2002:63ff.).293 Around the time that Somalia gained independence, Ethiopia was trying to 
enhance its control over the Ogadeen – an objective that can be read as attempt to increase 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization on the part of the Ethiopian leadership294 – 
which sparked further conflict. Ogaden rebels turned to Mogadishu, where they harvested 
weapons and encouragement to form liberation movements (Henze 1985:30). After the 
Somali-backed insurgency activities peaked in 1963 (Henze 1985:30), Ethiopian and Somali 
troops clashed along their common border in early 1964.295  
Overpowered by Ethiopian forces, Somalia engaged in peace negotiations in April 1964, 
halted its support for the rebel movements (Nkaisserry 1997:10), and slowly commenced a 
policy of appeasement (Henze 2000:262f.).296 Nevertheless, unrest among the Ogaden and 
Oromo population continued, accompanied by rising nationalist sentiments (HRW 
2008:16). Thus, in 1966, Ethiopia declared martial law in ‘Western Somalia’ (Henze 
1985:31) and it took the leadership in Addis Ababa until 1971 to pacify the region (Matthies 
1977:422ff.).297 Yet, when the Ethiopian Emperor was overthrown in September 1974, 
plunging the country into civil war, Somalis within and outside of ‘Western Somalia’ saw a 
historic window of opportunity (Farer 1979:120) and felt an “irresistible temptation” 
(Markakis 1998:131) to finally re-appropriate the ‘lost territories’.  
This objective was promising due to political changes not only in the region, but also in the 
prevailing international environment. The military support Somalia had secured from the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1963 expanded significantly after Barre’s 
coup d’état in 1969, his embrace of socialism in 1970, and the signing of a bilateral Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974. Although Ethiopia had received military backing 
from the United States of America (USA) from 1953 onwards, Somalia started closing the 
 
                                                     
293  See Chapter 3, particularly fn. 189, 190.  
294  After having neglected ‘Western Somalia’ for several decades, Ethiopia strengthened its regional presence 
in the 1950s in anticipation of Somali irredentist claims (Gorman 1981:30, cf. Lockyer 2006:4). Ethiopia 
promoted national integration e.g. by establishing schools in the Ogadeen from 1957 onwards and 
introducing Amharic – a language barely known in the region – as medium of instruction. Moreover, it 
fortified its provincial bureaucratic structures and started levying a head tax in 1963 (Markakis 1998:128) – 
measures that were all indicative of regime standardization.  
295  On the sporadic fighting between 1963 and 1988 see also Lockyer (2006:1). On the roots of Somali 
liberation movements in the Ogadeen see Legum/Lee (1977:33), Farer (1979:123). 
296  Markakis 1998:128; 1987:177ff.. 
297  Lewis 2002:231ff.; HRW 2008:16, referring to Markakis 1987:191ff.. 
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gap and soon claimed one of the finest military forces in sub-Saharan Africa. By 1970, it 
had a military manpower of 20,000, which ranked it among Africa’s top five,298 and by 1973 
the military balance in the Horn of Africa shifted in favour of the Somalis for the first time 
in recorded history (Legum/Lee 1977:32).299  
Yet, Somalia’s military window of opportunity started closing again, when the newly 
empowered Ethiopian military junta of the Dergue hoisted the socialist flag, striking a USD 
380 million arms supply deal with the USSR in December 1976 (IISS 1978).300 Disgruntled 
Somalia re-evaluated its options and three months after the USA had promised military aid 
to Somalia in July 1977 (Ofcansky 1993:183; Weiss 1980:11) officially renounced the 1974 
Soviet-Somali treaty. While this completed the phenomenal great powers switch, the USA 
ultimately refused to supply weaponry to Somalia, largely because the latter continued to 
pursue its irredentist policy, leaving Egypt and Saudi Arabia as sole funders of military aid 
to Somalia.301 
Although bolstering his military, Barre refrained from seeking an outright military solution 
to the Ogadeen dispute (Matthies 1987:239f.; Lewis 2002:227f.). In order not to have his 
diplomatic options torpedoed, he brought the United Front (UF) – an umbrella 
organization of numerous Ethiopian-based Somali guerrilla movements that had been 
established in 1973 – under strict government control (Interview 141). By 1975 the UF 
came to be so strongly controlled, organized and equipped by Mogadishu, that it was 
considered “an arm of the Somali army” (Gilkes 1994b:722).302 In January 1976, the 
movement was split for logistical and propaganda reasons into the Western Somali 
Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Abo-Somali Liberation Front (ASLF) (Compagnon 
 
                                                     
298  This is particularly impressive in light of the fact that Somalia was home to only about 4.1 million people, 
thus giving it the highest ratio of military personnel to both the general Somali population and those of 
military age in sub-Saharan Africa (Adam 2008:57). The four African states with larger numbers of 
soldiers were Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire and Uganda (Lewis 1994:174, fn. 42).  
299  Matthies 1977:426f, 1987:239; Farer 1979:120; Gorman 1981:65ff.; Henze 1985:53; Laitin/Samatar 
1987:139f.; Library of Congress 1993:115. Between 1972 and 1975, Somalia’s arms imports rose from 
USD 21 million (1972) to USD 206 million (1973) to USD 324 million (1974), before declining to USD 83 
million (1975) (all figures in constant 1990 USD; World Bank 2011b). 
300  After it had broken politically with the USA in April 1977, Ethiopia secured further arms support from 
the USSR worth USD 1 billion between November 1977 and March 1978 (Matthies 1987:242). See also 
Henze (1985:56, cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:133), Porter (1984:191ff., cf. Matthies 1987:240). 
301  While Egypt provided about USD 30 million in military assistance (Metz 1993), the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) promised military aid in the range of USD 400 million in September 1977, on the condition that 
Barre expell the Soviets (cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:134), which Barre did. For more information on the 
arms race see Henze (1982b) and Interview 141. 
302  Markakis 1987:225f.; Tareke 2000:640; Lockyer 2006:5.  
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1995:378).303 Aiming to keep militancy on either side of the Somali-Ethiopian border at bay, 
Barre not only restricted the WSLF’s activities (Gilkes 1994b:722), but even avoided 
mentioning their existence to the Somali population (Markakis 1987:227; Lockyer 2006:5). 
Instead, Barre sent emissaries to Addis Ababa to negotiate autonomy for the Ogadeen 
(Lewis 2002:232). Yet, when the respective regional and international-level negotiations 
failed,304 Barre availed himself of the Somali guerrillas (Laitin 1979b:112). Throughout 1976, 
the WSLF developed into “one of the largest and most capable insurgent movements in 
Africa” (Lockyer 2006:6), starting to move west in early 1977 (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:133; 
Markakis 1998:31). By spring, the ASLF controlled most of the countryside in Bale (Lewis 
2002:233), by June the WSLF had conquered 60 per cent of the Ogaden, and by the end of 
July, Ethiopia had conceded control of its eastern territories, except for the cities of Jigjiga, 
Harar, and Dire Dawa (Ofcansky 1993:185).305 Only then, on July 13th, 1977, did Barre 
officially commit his regular troops to the war (Nkaisserry 1997:15), reinforcing some 
6,000-15,000 WSLF fighters with 35,000 soldiers (Lockyer 2006:9, referring to Marcus 
1994:196f.; Matthies 1987:241f.).306 Thus, “the Somali irredentist dream of national re-
unification with one of the lost territories was about to be realized” (Nkaisserry 1997:16). 
After a swift military advance, the tables turned in 1978 (Weiss 1980:8). Due to massive 
military support, which had been airlifted together with some 1,500 Soviet military advisors 
and about 15,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia in late 1977 (Henze 1985:56; Ofcansky 
1993:183; Urban 1983:44), the Somali attacks on Dire Dawa and Harar failed. When the 
 
                                                     
303  Legum/Lee 1977:33; Markakis 1998:131. While the WSLF represented the interests of the Somalis in 
‘Western Somalia’ and voiced historical claims to autonomy, the ASLF acted in the name of the Oromo 
and Arsi in the Ethiopian regions of Bale and southern Sidamo and was considered less nationalist in 
orientation (Markakis 1987:226). Representing a minority in the territory it claimed, the ASLF had mainly 
been established for strategic reasons – to multiply regional opposition groups within Ethiopia 
(Compagnon 1995:378), conciliate Oromo sensibilities, and counteract the Oromo Liberation Front 
(OLF), an ethno-nationalist movement, mainly based in the Bale and Hararghe provinces, whose 
territorial claims overlapped with those of the Somali state (Tareke 2000:639). 
304  Cuban President Fidel Castro and Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny tried to settle the Ethiopian-Somali 
dispute diplomatically in February 1977, suggesting a socialist federation and ‘Pax Sovietica’ between 
Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), a 
suggestion Somalia rejected (cf. Weiss 1980:4f.; Henze 1983:35f.; Porter 1984:195). 
305  Ahmed I. Samatar 1988a:133, referring to Africa 1977:41f.. 
306  On the Somali invasion, see also Porter (1984:182, fn. 2), Legum/Lee (1977:88), Weiss (1980:8). Although 
Barre steadfastly maintained until February 1978 that the SNA was not involved in combat operations 
(ACR 1977/78:B374; Legum/Lee 1977:88), evidence suggests that some 1,500 Somali regulars had already 
started operating in Ethiopia in early 1977 (Ottaway/Ottaway 1978:209; Lockyer 2006:7). What the Somali 
leadership admitted, however, was that regular troops ‘on leave’ had been allowed to ‘volunteer’ for the 
guerrilla forces from early 1977 onwards (ACR 1977-78:B374; Legum/Lee 1977:88). 
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Ethiopian-Cuban-Soviet counter-offensive resulted in the fall of Jigjiga on March 5th, 1978, 
Somali defeat was inevitable (Compagnon 1995:384). Barre recalled the Somali National 
Army (SNA), which had lost some 8,000 men, three-quarters of its armoured units, and half 
of the Somali Air Forces on March 9th, 1978 (Ofcansky 1993:183).  
While various reasons can be put forward as having sparked the conflict over ‘Western 
Somalia’,307 it appears that it was the decision of French Somalia to declare independence on 
June 27th, 1977 that ultimately sparked the military invasion a few weeks later (Interview 
135). This dealt a decisive blow to the idea of ‘Somali nationalism’ as well as the ideal of 
‘Somali nationness’, and needed to be countered by a clear demonstration that Somalis 
belonged together – before the existing regime plurality among the diverse Somali 
territories led to further fragmentation. How did the war affect the lurking pluralization of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, and what was its impact on the Somali state 
trajectory?  
Socio-Cognitive (De-)Standardization  
Along the lines of the ‘war-is-development-in-reverse’-thesis, the Ogadeen War is usually 
held responsible for the breakdown of the Somali state.308 Yet, if viewed through the regime 
prism, a slightly more nuanced picture emerges. Although it is indisputable that the war had 
significant repercussions on Somalia’s state-making project throughout the 1980s, it appears 
that the impact of the war per se on levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standard-
dization was less clear cut. In fact, the war effort seems to have led, overall, to an increase 
in regime standardization, as mass conscription into the army and fierce national sentiments 
augmented the sharing of a common set of rules. While the war triggered processes of 
regime de-standardization that set in subsequent to the violent conflict, some of these could 
probably have been circumvented had the political leadership chosen other policies in the 
war’s aftermath. The subsequent paragraphs illustrate how the inter-state war influenced the 
standardization of particular rules during and after the war.  
 
                                                     
307  See e.g. the ambivalent US-policy that abetted Somalia’s decision to launch its offensive (Gorman 
1981:70ff.; Ottaway 1982:116f.; Halliday/Molyneaux 1981:225ff.; Halliday 1985:202f.; Korn 1986:34ff.; 
Makinda 1987:114ff.), Somalia’s fear of a re-deferring power balance in favour of Ethiopia (Thurston 
1978:17; Ayoob 1980:50f.; Luckham/Bekele 1984b:17, cf. Matthies 1987:241), and the massive availability 
of weapons, amongst others.  
308  See fn. 288. 
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Strengthening Common ‘Rules of the Mind’ 
By the mid-1970s, nationalist sentiments had started to wane, partly due to Barre’s 
increasingly repressive policies, his denunciation of Islam, and the population’s growing 
objection to ‘scientific socialism’ (Interviews 113, 19). Yet, the prospects of ultimately 
‘liberating’ the ‘lost territories’ not only led to a skyrocketing of nationalism (Farer 
1979:126),309 but turned into a “national obsession” (Lewis 2002:236) that resulted in 
increasing popular demands to invade Ethiopia (Laitin 1979b:112).310 Widespread 
enthusiasm about decisive military action and general discontent with Barre’s inert and 
inconsiderate policy led to “considerable unrest in the capital city” (Laitin 1979b:112). 
Students in Mogadishu launched protests and spurred nationalist agitation to force the 
government’s hand (Markakis 1998:131),311 leading General Wako Guto312 to advise Barre to 
immediately advance military steps, “if serious domestic upheavals were to be avoided” 
(Lewis 2002:232; Compagnon 1995:377; Laitin 1979b:112).  
However, as Barre did not want to move beyond increasing the government’s support for 
various Ethiopian-based guerrilla movements (Markakis 1998:131), he had several hundred 
students and numerous leading rebel leaders arrested (Markakis 1987:224ff.), which resulted 
in the formation of an organized opposition to the military government (Ahmed I. Samatar 
1988:140; Ododa 1985:285; Lewis 2002:238). In order to keep internal turmoil at bay and 
re-direct the mounting aggression of the Somali people, Barre finally decided to commit the 
SNA to war (Lewis 2002:232; Interview 113), not least because this war constituted an 
important source of legitimacy for Barre. Additional impetus for Somali nationalism was 
provided by the termination of Somali-Russian relations in 1977, “as the population was 
impressed by the historical significance of the hour, and the damaging ‘betrayal’ by 
ideological comrades” (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:134f.). Moreover, the general mobilization 
Barre announced on February 9th, 1978 “made for unity” (Greenfield 1991:16; Lewis 
2002:238; Ododa 1985:285) and hardened the “ideological cement” (Compagnon 1995:428, 
my translation), resulting in the war marking “the high point of Somali nationalist fervour in 
recent Somali history” (Lewis 1989:573; Interviews 55, 113).313 
 
                                                     
309  Lewis 1989:575, 1980:236ff.; Markakis 1987:224, 1998:131. 
310  Farer 1979:120; Ottaway 1982:130; Matthies 1987:239. 
311  Markakis 1987:224; Compagnon 1995:377; Lewis 2002:232. 
312  Guto had been a prominent leader of Somali guerrilla forces in Ethiopia, later leading the ASLF 
(Legum/Lee 1977:33). 
313  Gorman 1981:68; Cabdi Sheik-Cabdi 1977:657, cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:132. 
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Searching for the Internal Enemy  
Yet, military defeat “produced a national mood of depression” (S. S. Samatar 1993:45) and 
was followed by vehement accusations against the military government (Ahmed I. Samatar 
1988:137; Gassem 1994:31). In public discourse, defeat was blamed on Barre’s greediness 
and hubris, as it was believed that Ethiopia would have signed a peace agreement in 
September 1977, ceding the desired territories to Somalia (Spears 2010:139).314 In order to 
smooth the waves of disgruntlement and discuss outstanding military challenges and 
opportunities, Barre met with numerous generals and officers in Hargeysa. Although the 
soldiery was encouraged to speak their minds, six of the most critical were executed, which 
was interpreted as “major evidence that Siyaad had insufficient respect for his army” (Laitin 
1979b:113).315 Only one month after the military defeat, some soldiers responded by 
mounting an abortive coup d’état on April 9th, 1978 (Tareke 2000:66; Ododa 1985:285),316 
making it plain to Barre that he could no longer rely on the military, the organ that had 
constituted his primary tool for regime standardization, or state-making, prior to the war.  
Finding itself cornered, the government came to join the divisive search for culprits. As the 
attempted overthrow of Barre had largely been executed by officers of the Majerteen clan 
(Laitin 1979a:96),317 they were summarily accused of high treason. While the blame soon 
shifted to the Isaaq clan, who had formed one of the earliest and most persistent 
opposition movements that did not falter like the SSDF, the conceptualization of 
scapegoats in clan terms “ended any sense of national unity” (Bradbury 1997:7). Similarly, 
Abdullahi (2007a:56) suggests that the military defeat and the fact that Barre spurned his 
own army in the war’s aftermath “was indeed the beginning of the downfall of the very idea 
the army was found[ed] upon: Somali nationalism.” Instead, it “quickly led to widespread 
public demoralization and to an upsurge of ‘tribalism’” (Lewis 1989:575).  
 
                                                     
314  See also Compagnon 1995:430. Yet, this assumption is not supported by evidence (cf. Jackson 2010:31).  
315  Sheik-Abdi 1981:171; Matthies 1987:275. Other sources speculate that 24 officers were shot, but the 
Somali embassy in Paris rejected such accusations (Hassan 1980:5, cf. Compagnon 1995:430). 
316  The attempted coup was led by Mohamed Sheikh Usman «Irro» and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, amongst 
others. For further details, see e.g. Africa Research Bulletin 1978 (cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:138). While 
the coup failed, it led to the formation of the first anti-government guerrilla movement, the Somali 
Salvation Front (SSF). In October 1981 the SSF renamed itself the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), 
regrouping the SSF, the Somali Workers’ Party (SWP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia 
(DFLS) (cf. Pérouse de Montclos 2001:3). 
317  Lewis 1980:246; Compagnon 1995:432; Sheik-Abdi 1981:171. Note: the Majerteen had held the key to 
power throughout most of the civilian era (Laitin 1982:61). 
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From Nationalism to Clannism 
While it is hard to establish when the re-tribalization of Somali society set in, it is 
indisputable that an incremental revival of clan consciousness surfaced after the Ogadeen 
War (Adam 2008:192; Gassim 2002:vii; Interviews 55, 121). Suddenly, “it became possible 
for clan names once again to be publicly mentioned” (Greenfield 1991:16) and clannism 
“infiltrated the regime, bureaucracy and population at large” (Abdullahi 2007a:44).318 As 
well as the divisive search for a culprit for the Ogadeen debacle, Barre’s over-swift 
promotion of Marehan and (ex-WSLF) Ogaden officers within the SNA contributed to the 
clannisation of society, given that their promotion strengthened the dictator’s clannish 
power base due to his family links to these two clans (Brons 2001:184).319 These 
developments were enhanced by the increasing urbanization Somalia had experienced after 
the drought of 1974/75 and the Ogadeen War of 1977/78, which marked one of the most 
rapid processes of urbanization in Africa (Cassanelli 1996:20).320 Largely settling with their 
own kin, the inflowing population revived clannism into a strategy of survival (Compagnon 
1995:504), thus heralding a clannisation of urban areas unseen until then (Marchal 
2002:222f.).321 
Nationalism gave way to clannism also as a result of the inflow of some 700,000 Ogaden 
Somali refugees,322 who feared Ethiopian reprisals. The burden of what the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described as “the most serious refugee 
problem in the world” (Fitzgibbon 1982a:62), was mainly borne by Somalia’s north-west, 
where about half of them arrived (Lewis 1989:575, 2002:246f.; Spears 2010:139). Attracting 
above-average international aid, being encouraged by Mogadishu to settle in the northern 
region, and receiving land titles and arms from Barre to repel a potential Ethiopian 
invasion, the refugees created resentment among the Isaaq population (Omaar 1992:232; 
 
                                                     
318  Abukar 1992:109-37, 181-185; cf. Abdullahi 2007:44. 
319  Gilkes 1994a:47; Compagnon 1990:278. 
320  While Mogadishu had about fifty thousand inhabitants in 1960, it had grown to over one million by the 
mid-1980s. Concurrently, Somalia’s urban annual growth rate rose from around 5.0-5.3 per cent between 
1950-1975 to 9.9 per cent for the 1975-1980 era (UNDESA 2012). 
321  Abdi Samatar (1992a:625) quotes a peasant in Jowhar stating the following in spring 1990: “Son, the 
tribalism business is the work of the urban people. They cook it there and then serve it to us.” 
322  While NGOs put the number of refugees at 500,000, Somali authorities claimed double the number 
(Compagnon 1995:420), and Mohamed (1992:6) even speaks of 1.5 million refugees. Similarly, Moseley 
(1980:A1) suggests that while some 700,000 Ogaden lived in refugee camps, a further 600,000 resided 
elsewhere in Somalia (cf. Lockyer 2006:12). The official figure ultimately agreed upon was 700,000. See 
Ahmed I. Samatar (1988:139), Lewis (1989:575). 
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Spears 2010:139).323 Apart from causing “considerable disruption in the country’s internal 
structures” (ION 1985:2), the refugees’ arrival sparked a Somalia-wide discussion about 
Somali (national) identity. Although it had been convenient to declare a large population 
living beyond the borders of ‘Somalia proper’ as constituting Somali citizens as long as an 
irredentist policy was pursued (cf. Markakis 1998:126), opinion soon turned once this 
populace infiltrated Somalia and put pressure on its dwindling resources.  
Once the fragmentation of the national identity was set in motion, the vicious circle of 
socio-cognitive de-standardization could seemingly not be reversed. The more fragile 
Barre’s position got, the more he resorted to ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics to keep the clans 
opposed to his rule in check.324 Thus, he instrumentalized the Ogaden and other clans in the 
north-west to supress the challenge arising from the Isaaq.325 And the more Barre drew on 
the clans to which he was closely related – the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dhulbahante – the 
more the opposition reverted to its own respective clan structures, as trust was increasingly 
confined to kinship ties (Markakis 1998:132; Adam 1995:76). Although the opposition had 
been at pains not to form along clan lines after the aborted coup d’état of 1978 in order to 
emphasize the national character of their opposition (Compagnon 1995:441),326 the political 
landscape quickly turned into a “purely tribal confrontation” (Sheik-Abdi 1981:171). While 
Compagnon (1995:441) observes that “[t]he opposition became clannish only later in the 
1980s” (my translation),327 Lewis (1961) attests that the upsurge of tribalism constituted 
“the traditional divisive response to extreme political and economic insecurity” (as quoted 
in Markakis 1987:233).328  
 
                                                     
323  See also Interview 55, in which it is suggested that the Ogaden people that were armed by Barre “came 
here, to Hargeysa, as an occupation force”, and Interview 113, according to which looting soldiers that 
returned from the Ogadeen also created resentments amongst the Isaaq.  
324  Henze (1982a:55) thus concludes that “[s]ince his defeat in the Ogaden […], he has retreated into reliance 
on his own clan links. His earlier vision of a Somalia rising above tribalism has faded into invisibility.” 
325  Barre mainly relied on the Gadabursi, Isse, Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli, but also the Majerteen, once he 
had won them over after their attempted coup d’état (Adam 1995:76). For a clan genealogy, see Annex, 
Chart 1. 
326  See e.g. the formation of Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF), founded by former Minister of 
Justice Osman Nur Ali in Rome in 1976 (Ofcansky 1993:190), which constituted a trans-clan movement 
(Compagnon 1995:507). Just as the largely Majerteen-based SSF had Mustafa Haji Nuur from the Isaaq 
clan as its first general-secretary, SODAF had a non-Majerteen leader in 1979, namely the former mayor 
of Mogadishu Omar Hassan Mohamoud «Istarliin» from the Hawiye clan (Roobdoon Forum 2009). 
327  See e.g. Gassem (1994:43f.) who describes the development of the SSDF from a national to a clan 
movement dominated by the Majerteen. Similar claims can be made for the SNM – see later sections.  
328  See also Ahmed I. Samatar (1988:138) and Omaar (2004:91), who point out that “[i]n an impoverished 
country where life is a struggle for basic survival, and there is no public service ethos, dependence on 
family and clan is a necessity, not a choice.” See also Interviews 24, 156, according to which peoples’ 
reliance on the clan is a function of a governments (in)ability to provide basic services.  
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Losing the Regime Standardization Tool of Ideology 
Barre’s ability to continue broadcasting an overarching set of ‘rules of the mind’ in the 
manner characteristic of his rule prior to the Ogadeen War was further impeded by the loss 
of ‘scientific socialism’ as a common ideological framework. While popular enthusiasm for 
the revolution had allegedly dissipated by the mid-1970s (Laitin 1993:130; Interview 19), it 
became downright obsolete in the post-war era (Labahn 1990:160). Somalia’s switch in 
superpower affiliation not only prevented it from officially perpetuating ‘scientific socialism’ 
as a guiding ideology, but also “undermined whatever legitimacy state sponsored and 
managed economic projects had previously acquired” (Abdi I. Samatar 1993:32). This 
political dogma no longer had the support of the population, which rephrased the various 
slogans so as to ridicule Barre, ultimately leading the government to abolish all ideologically 
motivated songs (Compagnon 1995:356).329  
Thereby, the ideological shortfall not only impeded the carrying through of socio-cognitive 
standardization, but also had repercussions on the ability to maintain the standardization of 
common ‘rules of the game’, as the loss of ‘scientific socialism’ called the existence of the 
orientation centres and party offices into question. With these administrative structures 
being rejected by the population, Barre increasingly relied on coercive measures to maintain 
compliance with the state’s regime. In contrast to Numeiri in Sudan, Barre did not resort to 
Islam upon abandoning socialism (Adam 2008:11), even though religion constituted 
another ‘natural’ umbrella of the Somali people that could possibly bridge the divisive 
forces of clannism – as the Derwish movement of the early 20th century as well as the SNM, 
whose fighters came to call themselves ‘mujahedeen’, had done.330 This was probably 
because after having seriously challenged Islam during the mid-1970s, later resorting to it 
was not a valid option, not least because parts of Barre’s opposition had captured the 
religious terrain (cf. Rawson 1994:157). Thus, after the Somali leaders had abandoned the 
‘scientific socialism’ on which they had relied for “ideological and organisational coercion 
and cohesion of their ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, government institutions 
and the society as a whole were without a compass to guide them” (Elmi 1992:14).  
 
                                                     
329  Barre also came to target other elements characteristic of ‘scientific socialism’, such as self-help schemes. 
For example, despite constituting a crucial part of his nation-building project of the early 1970s, he 
repressed an Isaaq self-help project designed to improve the war-ridden public (health) infrastructure in 
December 1981, as he perceived this initiative to be related to SNM (Bakonyi 2001:83).  
330  For a theoretical argument, see Londsdale (1981), who emphasizes the importance of the Christian 
religion for state- and nation-building in Europe due to its universalistic character (cf. Schlichte 1996:118; 
Bakonyi 2001:67). See also Souare (2007b:209).  
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Institutional (De-)Standardization 
While socio-cognitive standardization appears to have increased prior to and during the 
course of war before plunging throughout the 1980s, the trajectory of institutional 
standardization is more difficult to establish. In part, this is due to the scarcity of reliable 
data and documentation when it comes to the Ogadeen War.331 Nevertheless, there are 
indications of the state’s inability to maintain the processes of institutional standardization it 
had exercised prior to the war, such as the dissipation of its monopoly over the means of 
violence, the evolution of administrative plurality, and its decreasing ability to strike 
inclusive elite bargains largely due to the country’s economic malaise and subjection to 
measures of austerity at the hands of the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
Ambivalent Warring Effects on the ‘Rules of the Game’ 
While information indicating institutional (de-)standardization for ‘Somalia proper’ during 
the war years is scarce, there are clues that institutional standardization was enhanced in the 
newly gained territories. For example, the Somali government “quickly set about imposing 
central control, brushing aside an attempt by WSLF cadres to form a civil administration” 
(Markakis 1987:230). Barre barred WSLF Central Committee members from entering the 
Ogadeen and appointed two extraordinary commissioners to administer the liberated areas 
instead.332 Also on the lower administrative echelon, those individuals who had initially led 
the rebel movement were immediately removed from the scene, filling the posts of district 
governors with army officers true to party lines. As the new administrators were alien to 
their respective regions they were supported by a number of traditional authorities that 
acted as intermediaries with the local population. Simultaneously, Ogaden army officers and 
members of the Ogaden intelligentsia were posted in other parts of Somalia (Markakis 
1987:230). 
Reflecting very much the British system of indirect rule, this administrative set-up not only 
prevented the Ogaden in general and the WSLF more particularly from broadcasting an 
own regime, but also facilitated Barre to implement the set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules 
 
                                                     
331  Two of the three most substantive accounts of the Ogadeen War are almost solely based on Somali oral 
testimonies (Markakis 1987; Gilkes 1994b), and the third major account is constructed mainly from 
secondary and a few unnamed primary sources (Porter 1984) (cf. Tareke 2000:635). 
332  Major Abdirizak Mohamed Abokor (Darod/Majerteen) was appointed to administer the Ogadeen, while 
Colonel Mohamed Omar Jess (Darod/Ogaden) was to administer Bale and Sidamo (Compagnon 
1995:313).  
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of the mind’ he favoured. This was particularly important in light of the fact that the WSLF 
wavered between a future marked by full independence, autonomy within a federal Somalia, 
and integration into the Somali state (Gamst 1986:143; Tareke 2000:639; Markakis 
1987:228).333 Yet, while the first steps were being taken to establish an administrative 
structure in the Ogadeen, the occupied territory was far from seeing a significant 
administrative penetration and build-up of infrastructure (Lockyer 2006:9)334 – a fact largely 
owed to the brevity of the Somali state’s presence in the Ogadeen.  
A Crumbling Army 
A similarly mixed picture regarding regime standardization emerges for the armed forces 
that pressed into Ethiopia. Although the general mobilization of early 1978 points towards 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization within the military,335 such processes did 
not extend to the Ogaden-based guerrilla units, who were dealt with in a distinct manner. 
Not only were they treated as military spearhead and cannon fodder (Interview 141), but 
they also remained without pay and depended on donations of regular SNA soldiers for 
basic needs such as food, water, and ammunition (Markakis 1987:230). Thus, while the 
army did not differentiate between different clans during the course of the war (Interview 
141) – a fact that indicates regime standardization – different ‘rules of the game’ existed for 
those who were uniformed and those who were not.  
Subsequent to the war, however, the once unified army started to fragment. Disapproval of 
Barre’s conduct of the war and his uncompromising dealings with the army in its aftermath 
led to an abortive coup d’état by a number of high-ranking officers on April 9th, 1978 
(Tareke 2000:66; Ododa 1985:285) and a mutiny in the ranks of some military units – 
during the suppression of which some five hundred soldiers reportedly died at the hands of 
forces loyal to Barre (Lewis 2002:245). When six months after the attempted coup 
seventeen of the officers involved were executed (Sheik-Abdi 1981:171), another army 
mutiny occurred in the north (Markakis 1987:233). These developments “crystallised the 
deep divisions within the armed forces” after the lost Ogadeen War (Laitin 1979b:95). 
 
                                                     
333  While the WSLF aimed for separation of the Ogadeen from Ethiopia, it came to be “cool on union with 
Somalia and its increasingly despotic regime” (Gamst 1986:143). In a public statement, a WSLF 
spokesman maintained that the movement sought “self-determination for the people of the Ogaden, not 
merger with Somalia” (Henze 1982a:56). 
334  Lockyer 2006:9, referring to Watson 1986:167.  
335  Greenfield 1991:16; Ododa 1985:285; Compagnon 1995:428; Lewis 2002:238. 
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From being the “backbone of the state” (Lewis 1979:21),336 the army had become 
fragmented (Abdullahi 2007a:45). These divisions were to proliferate, as neither the failed 
coup nor the mutinies were to be the last of their sort (Ododa 1985:285).  
Despite Barre drafting increasing numbers into the army, the military also suffered from 
regime de-standardization. While the army’s ranks swelled from about 23,000 troops in the 
mid-1970s337 to some 50,000 by 1981 and an alleged 65,000 by 1990 (Ofcansky 1993:181),338 
the military no longer had the considerable prestige it had enjoyed prior to the war 
(Ofcansky 1993:202). Rather, the army had to rely on forced conscription (Gassem 
1994:35) and increasingly depended on Barre’s related Marehan, Ogaden and Dhulbahante 
clans. From only four Marehan military officers in 1969, two decades later their numbers 
had increased to a disproportionate 50 per cent (Labahn 1990:174). Hence, “[b]y the end of 
the 1980s the command structure [of the army] had collapsed, largely as a result of the 
over-swift promotion of untrained Marehan” (Gilkes 1994a:47).339 
The army’s low morale,340 the fact that its leadership could no longer resort to either the 
ideology of ‘scientific socialism’ or the dream of ‘Greater Somalia’, and the military’s 
command structure “had lost its independence and professionalism, becoming an 
inseparable part of the party” (Abdullahi 2007a:45; S.S. Samatar 1993a:49) further 
contributed to its de-standardization. And as Barre came to understand after the attempted 
coup that the army could be dangerous to him, he “systematically began to dismantle the 
cadres and the leadership”, destroying the army and with it the state (Anonymous 2005:136; 
Compagnon 1992:9). Furthermore, as the SNA suffered approximately 7-8,000 casualties 
(Tareke 2000:665),341 this not only diminished military prowess, but also constituted a 
significant loss of an ideologically standardized group. Thus, it was judged that “[t]he SNA 
never recovered from its defeat in the Ogaden War” (Library of Congress 1993:116), and 
 
                                                     
336  Laitin 1976:452; Compagnon 1995:334.  
337  By late 1977, there had allegedly been some 35,000 SNA and an additional 15,000 WSLF combatants 
(Tareke 2000:638; Adam 2008:53, 1994:27). 
338  Lefebvre 1991, cf. Osman 2007a:110. 
339  The great loss of personnel devoted to ‘scientific socialism’ as well as the accelerated ‘Marehanisation’ of 
politics and administration resulted in “exasperating the systematic purge of talent that had been going on 
for some time” (Sheik-Abdi 1981:167). 
340  The same argument is made for the Somali Police Forces, Interview 42.  
341  Gilkes 1994b:736, fn.51; Lefebvre 1991:178, cf. Compagnon 1995:430. Overall, it was estimated that as 
many as 25,000 Somali lives had been lost during the war (Ahmed I. Samatar 1987a:875, referring to 
Sivard 1982:15) – given a total population of about five million (Sivard 1982:15; cf. Ahmed I. Samatar 
1988:137) a truly significant loss.  
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came to be hardly distinguishable from the insurgency groups in regard to its organization 
and procedure (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 2005:366). 
Dissolving Power Monopoly  
The fragmentation of the military went in tandem with a loss of the state’s power 
monopoly (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 2005:365). Due to “considerable anxiety in Somalia that the 
Ethiopian advance would not stop at the border but would press on into the Republic” 
(Lewis 2002:239),342 Barre issued significant quantities of arms to the civilian population in 
the north, particularly to the Ogaden refugees (ibid.). The dissolution of the state’s 
monopoly over the means of violence accelerated once Barre faced military opposition to 
his rule, as the dictator organized paramilitary units and encouraged the creation of clan 
militias – particularly amongst the Darod – which were trained and financed by the state 
(Ofcansky 1993:207). Especially in combination with a resurfacing clannisation, the 
dissipation of the state’s power monopoly impeded the maintenance of an overarching set 
of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. 
“Finally, Barre was in deeper trouble in the provinces than even he realized; his security 
machinery had lost its ability to intimidate and coerce” (Rawson 1994:157). Thus, 
skirmishes over land titles re-occurred between nomads; Islamic fundamentalists, who 
claimed SSDF affiliation, briefly took over the town of Las Aanod; and a clash between 
Ogaden and Marehan groups put the town of Kismayo under mob siege for a week (ibid.). 
The state’s monopoly of violence had diminished to such an extent that Barre could no 
longer prevent a “sudden increase in criminal violence” in the Mogadishu of the late 1980s 
(Kivimäki 2001:3, referring to Simons 1994:819), and it was not long before the vanishing 
power monopoly was replaced by a power plurality (Compagnon 1995:428) that was 
incrementally occupied by opposition movements.  
Administrative Turmoil and Decline 
Indications of institutional de-standardization can also be detected in the administrative 
sphere, which came to be beset with bureaucratic mismanagement (Abdi I. Samatar 
1993:28, referring to World Bank 1981). Following the parliamentary elections on 
December 30th, 1979, which largely resulted from Western countries pressuring the 
 
                                                     
342  Fitzgibbon (1982a:72) even states that “Somalia has actually been invaded.” For a Somali government 
account of the 1983 border transgression by Ethiopia, see Somalia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1983). 
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government into liberalizing the economy and political life, Barre reshuffled the cabinet and 
abolished the position of his three vice-presidents. While the fact that the newly elected 
‘People’s Parliament’ consisted only of individuals that belonged to the government party 
(S.S. Samatar 1993a:46) and the swift reinstallation of the SRC in October 1980 point 
towards regime maintenance,343 Barre’s repeated political reshuffling throughout the 1980s 
led to an institutional plurality that was detrimental to state-making.  
While rulers frequently rotate officeholders “to regulate and control rent seeking, to prevent 
rivals from developing their own power base, and to demonstrate their power” (Bratton/ 
van de Walle 1994:463, cf. Hagmann 2005a:9), such tactics resulted in weakening of Somali 
state. After having declared a state of emergency on October 21st, 1980 (Compagnon 
1995:438), the state disposed of three parallel and overlapping executive structures: the 
party’s politburo with its Central Committee, the CSS, and the SRC (Ottaway 1982:119ff.; 
Lewis 2002:249).344 Each of these executive organizations was given its day in the sun, “only 
to be quickly superseded by another political constellation” (Rawson 1994:155). While this 
comportment neutralized political opponents and left processes of decision-making solely 
in the hands of Barre (Said S. Samatar 1993a:46), it also paralyzed the state’s administration 
and undermined state organizations and institutions (Rawson 1994:155).  
The state’s ability to maintain its administration and, thus, central tool for regime 
standardization was also diminished by the macroeconomic policy agreements that Barre 
struck with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in February 1980, July 1981 and July 
1982. Not only did these contracts force the Somali state to cease acting as the last resort 
employer of all secondary school graduates (Interview 55), they also led to a significant 
downsizing of its administrative apparatus – by 1985, the Somali government had dismissed 
some 5,000 civil servants (Laitin 1993:132f.). In order to maintain cohesion amongst the 
remaining administrators, Barre increased military domination by reappointing loyal military 
officers to administer most of the country’s districts and regions (Compagnon 1995:438).345 
Furthermore, he consigned “the director-generals of all ministries to a five months’ stint in 
 
                                                     
343  Only six months after it was reinstated, Barre expelled 10 of the SRC’s 17 members (Henze 1982a:55). 
344  The state of emergency as well as the SRC were disbanded again in March 1982, just before Barre paid his 
first official visit to the USA (Ododa 1985:288; Lewis 2002:249). 
345  Ododa 1985:288; Lewis 2002:249. As Barre “preferred subordinates who would take orders rather than 
convey popular wishes” (Adam 2008:45f.), all but seven of the 85 new district and regional party 
secretaries he appointed in January 1981 were from the military (Ahmed Samatar 1987a:881, referring to 
Africa Confidential 1981:6). 
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the national orientation centre in Mogadishu”, in order to bring “all the country’s top civil 
servants under close military control” (Lewis 2002:246).  
Yet, despite these efforts to create a coherent and effective administrative structure, the 
administrative apparatus was increasingly self-absorbed, retreating from its actual task of 
governing the population (A.S. Mohamed 1980:205). The “absence of all representative 
institutions and the transformation of state institutions into instruments of oppression 
meant that clan was the only safe retreat and the only means with which to organize and 
mobilize opposition to the regime” (Spears 2010:141, referring to I.M. Samatar 1997:40) – 
thus perpetuating regime de-standardization. Barre added fuel to the fire when he resorted 
to his last option in trying to run the country, reinstalling the elders as a ‘traditional’ 
network of administrators (Osman-Shuke 2004:149; Elmi 1992:14).346 Barre either tried to 
appease them,347 or aimed at “destroying the cohesion of the community, leaving it bereft of 
its respected and experienced leaders” (Africa Watch 1990:123; Greenfield 1991:26).348 
Either way, the traditional authorities increasingly acquired power over politics and the 
military, which provided a smooth transition into the important role they played in 
numerous rebel movements.349 
 
4.2 Civil War and its Effect on State-Making  
Whereas the Ogadeen War resulted in the unmaking of the Somali state, the ensuing civil 
war led to the formation of a new political entity: the Republic of Somaliland. Although it is 
argued that Somaliland “challenges the image of war” (Bradbury 2008:2) and that this polity 
 
                                                     
346  While Barre relied on the traditional authorities after the mass dismissal of civil servants in 1974 
(Interview 135), which had been dictated largely by economic pressures (S.S. Samatar 1993:38), and partly 
used them to mobilize human and material resources for the Ogadeen War (Marchal 2002:220f.; Interview 
135), his reliance on them was never as pronounced as in the second half of the 1980s (Interview 137).  
347  In 1981, for example, “he distributed money to the elders of the Majerteen clan, which had been a victim 
of his barbaric repression since 1979, in order to buy them back in” (Compagnon 1995:500, my 
translation), and applied similar tactics to the Isaaq clan (Compagnon 1995:470, 500, referring to 
Laitin/Samatar 1987:159; Gilkes 1989:57). 
348  The SSDF, for example, atrophied not only due to a heavy reliance on foreign funding from Libya, but 
also Barre’s ability to divide the Majerteen. Publicizing defections through the official media and 
appointing some SSDF defectors to prominent positions, Barre rendered the SSDF almost defunct 
(Ghalib 1995:184; Adam 1995:76). 
349  See Compagnon (1990:280) who proposes that, by the late 1980s, the army’s loyalty depended more on 
clan elders than the état-major. 
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was “very much a product of war” (Spears 2004b:185), the war’s role in Somaliland’s state-
making project remains understudied. While scholars such as Prunier (1990/91), 
Compagnon (1990a, 1998), Marchal (1992, 1997a), de Waal (1994), Bakonyi (2009), and 
Spears (2010) have significantly contributed to our understanding of the early organization 
of violence and the dynamics of war in Somalia and Somaliland, the connection between 
the civil war and Somaliland’s state-making endeavour is frequently not subjected to any 
greater scrutiny. Instead, most accounts of Somaliland’s state-making commence their 
analysis with the unilateral declaration of independence of 1991 at the very earliest.350 Yet, 
neglecting the bellicose decade preceding Somaliland’s formal creation is not only proble-
matic empirically, but also conceptually, as this leaves the World Bank’s (2003) disputable 
proposition that war constituted nothing but ‘development in reverse’ unquestioned.  
Scrutinizing prevailing accounts the following section addresses the questions if and how 
the civil war affected Somaliland’s state-making project. Aiming to go beyond the argument 
that the war’s central contribution lay in the de-construction of the oppressive Somali state, 
the following analysis contributes to existing knowledge on the civil war and the state-
making endeavour. Although the war was not uniformly constitutive of Somaliland’s state-
making and does not serve as a clear-cut counter-example to the Ogadeen War as regards 
bellicose effects on state trajectories, I posit that some of Somaliland’s central foundations 
as a de facto state arise from the anti-government war. While the war was neither part of an 
intentional state-making project, nor can it be said as having resulted in comprehensive 
processes of regime standardization, it nevertheless shaped the subsequent rise of an 
embryonic state in Somaliland.  
The SNM, Its Struggle, and Secession  
Founded by a group of Isaaq émigrés living in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in April 1981, the 
Somali National Movement (SNM) was announced shortly thereafter in London on 18th 
May. Created by an intellectual elite with the objective of overthrowing Barre’s dictatorial 
 
                                                     
350  In fact, it is generally argued that the 1991-1993 period was characterized by peace-building and that state-
building did not set in until 1993 (Bradbury 2008:77; Ali/Walls 2008). Along these lines Battera (2004:7) 
suggests that “[t]he Burco Congress represents the beginning of the state-building process in Somaliland” 
(see also Battera/Campo 2001:8).  Pham (2012:19) even suggests that state-building in Somaliland did not 
start before 2001. A notable exception is I.M. Samatar (1997).   
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government351 the organization soon transferred its headquarters to the Ethiopian border 
region next to north-western Somalia and launched guerrilla attacks on government 
installations within Somalia in early 1982. Facing increasing rebel activities in Somalia and 
Ethiopia, Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam signed a joint communiqué on April 3rd, 1988, 
agreeing to cease their support for insurgents operating in each other’s territories. Losing its 
Ethiopian sanctuary (Compagnon 1990b:266), the SNM’s survival was at stake, leading the 
rebels to launch a daredevil attack on Somalia’s north-west. Given its success in establishing 
a presence in the rural areas and increasingly gaining popular support, Barre had the 
northern cities of Hargeysa and Burco bombed to rubble in 1988, in order to retaliate 
against the Isaaq’s support of the SNM. Yet, this and similar measures “only served to 
accelerate the transformation of the SNM guerrilla war into a conventional one” (Aideed 
2004:196). The movement’s exponential growth from about 1,200 to up to 50,000 fighters 
(Flint 1994:37) led Prunier to conclude that there was no SNM, but “simply the Isaaq 
people up in arms” (ibid. 1990/91:109).352 
Throughout the struggle, the SNM tried to establish ties with other rebel movements, and 
aided the formation of the largely Hawiye-affiliated United Somali Congress (USC) in order 
to increase military pressures on the government (Interview 72). Yet the bonds with the 
movements that mainly emerged in the late 1980s353 remained spurious. By January 1991, 
the SNM controlled large parts of former British Somaliland, and expanded its military 
control from the rural to the urban areas. As the latter had largely been abandoned by the 
civilian population and SNA soldiers alike (Interviews 7, 121),354 the SNM took control over 
Hargeysa, Burco and other settlements without decisive battles (Interviews 121, 141). This 
military advance was paralleled by the USC’s achievement in driving Barre out of Moga-
 
                                                     
351  One informant argues that the reason for the anti-government war lay at least partly in Barre’s inability to 
regain the Haud and the Reserved Areas, as well as his adherence to socialism, which was not well-
perceived amongst the Isaaq businessmen who counted amongst the country’s wealthiest entrepreneurs 
(Interviews 99, 113). 
352  Prunier 1994:62; Bryden 1994:38; Adam 2008:193; Bakonyi 2009:437. However, other sources attest that 
the SNM numbered ‘only’ some 3,500-5,000 regular fighters, while the vast majority of its force was made 
up of spontaneous, clan-based warriors (Interviews 7, 24, 75, 4). 
353  The USC was founded in May 1989, but soon split into two factions headed by Mohamed Farah Hassan 
«Aideed» and Ali Mahdi Mohamed respectively. This was followed by the establishment of the Ogaden-
affiliated Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in August of the same year. The United Somali Front (USF) 
was launched in November 1989 by the Issa clan, as was the Harti-affiliated United Somali Party (USP). 
Numerous other rebel groups and changing alliances were forged in the years around the fall of Barre (see 
e.g. Adam 2008:16f.). 
354  The informant estimates that the population of Hargeysa, for example, dropped from about 500,000 in 
1988 to some 5,000 by 1991. 
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dishu on January 27th, 1991. Ignoring prior agreements between the diverse rebel move-
ments, the USC unilaterally proclaimed Ali Mahdi Mohamed President of Somalia, leading 
to a renewed feeling of marginalization in the north and subsequent abrogation of the 1960 
consummated union between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia (Adam 2008:17).  
While the general literature on Somaliland suggests that “secession had never been a stated 
aim of the SNM” (Bradbury 1997:18; Interview 112) and that it was a spontaneous act from 
the ‘grassroots’ (Drysdale 1992b),355 there is also evidence to the contrary. According to 
Gilkes and others, the debate over secession was present within the SNM as early as 1981 
(ibid. 1993:6; Interviews 34, 72, 113),356 and “[o]nly a small group of intellectuals believed 
that Somalia would remain unified” (cf. Bryden 1994b:37). That the idea of abrogating the 
union of 1960 circulated amongst the Isaaq is evidenced by the fact that the Isaaq-based 
dissident group Ufo (‘hurricane’) also alluded to it, when it secretly gathered on June 26th, 
1981 – the anniversary of Somaliland’s independence from British rule – and hoisted a 
Somali flag that featured only one of the star’s five spikes (Bryden 1994b:37). Yet, the SNM 
refrained from voicing the goal of independence publicly out of fear of potential political 
repercussions (Interviews 34, 113).357  
Ultimately, the Somaliland leadership declared independence, a decision the literature 
commonly explains with reference to long-standing grievances on the part of the Isaaq, 
which “have made it impossible to keep alive the dream of unity” (Africa Watch 1990:1).358 
This reason has rightly been called into question (Bakonyi 2009:435),359 partly because 
grievances were not a unique feature of the Isaaq community. Moreover, not all Isaaq – let 
alone all northern communities – welcomed secession.360 At the same time, alternative 
 
                                                     
355  Warsame/Brons 1994:20; Bradbury 2008:79.  
356  I.M. Samatar 1997:46f.; Spears 2010:139. According to one informant, first thoughts of secession and 
independence surfaced after the Ogadeen War, triggered by the fact that the Somalis were incapable of 
regaining the lost territories of the Haud and the Reserved Areas (Interview 135).  
357  According to some, the SNM feared broad-based opposition at the hands of other clans and their militias 
(Interview 34), while others point towards the fact that the announcement of this objective could have led 
the international community to prematurely reject this endeavour (Interview 113). Again others emphasize 
Ethiopia’s objection to independence (see Bryden 1994b:37), arguing that “[t]he Ethiopians were pressing 
our [SNM] leadership to unite with SSDF. And we were refusing because our policies were different” 
(Interviews 34, 1). 
358  Omaar 1994:232f.; Adam 1994:24; Lewis 1989:576; Drysdale 1992b:14; Huliaras 2002:158; Dool 1998:242; 
Terlinden/Ibrahim 2008a:2.  
359  See also Adam (2008:192), who states that the element of grievances has frequently been overstated.  
360  For one, Isaaqs had major land holdings in Mogadishu (Laitin 1999a:147) and numerous northern 
businessmen held a strong stake in Somalia’s economy (Compagnon 1993:11). For another, in the years 
following the declaration of independence, different parties of Somaliland’s minority clans such as the 
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explanations have been advanced, among them a rational narrative that largely points 
towards economic deprivation in the north as the key motivation for secession.361 In this 
sense, it has been argued that “the material imperatives of pastoralism took precedence 
over and made a mockery of nationalist ideals” (Markakis 1987:234).362  
In any case, it appears that a separate socio-cognitive system had formed in the north. 
Whether it was due to the distinct colonial experiences, grievances, and/or rational 
considerations, “[t]he majority of the people of Somaliland have developed a sense of 
identity distinct from the rest of Somalis” (Huliaras 2002:157). While this was expressed 
with the announcement of independence on May 18th, 1991, the latter should not be 
confounded with the separation between north and south Somalia, which had incrementally 
turned into a political reality long before (I.M. Samatar 1997:46). Although Bradbury 
(2008:50) argues that the “particular nature of the SNM as a politico-military movement 
[…] influenced the form of polity that emerged in Somaliland after the war”, it remains 
unclear how the anti-government war further affected the the formation of the new polity – 
either in terms of institutional and/or socio-cognitive standardization or otherwise.  
 
Effects of the Civil War on State-Making363  
Establishing Military Domination  
The monopoly over the means of coercion that had evaporated throughout the 1980s was 
increasingly appropriated by the SNM. Controlling ever greater parts of the country’s 
north-west, the rebel movement expelled any remaining SNA soldiers from the region and 
 
                                                                                                                                     
USP argued vociferously against the de facto secession (Bryden 1994b:40; Samatar 1994c:123). Moreover, 
the Isaaq sub-clan confederation of the Garhajis entertained, under the leadership of «Tuur», close 
relations with «Aideed» (USC) and favoured renewed union with the south (Interview 112). 
361  In fact, the Saudi Arabian livestock import ban of 1983 hit northern livestock herders particularly hard. 
Moreover, khat-traders were also deprived of their livelihoods in the same year (Klein 2007:54), after Barre 
captured the lucrative business and suppressed Isaaq activity there (HRW 1990:85; Hansen 2010:3, 
referring to Simons 1995:76 and Samatar 1985:55ff.; see also Dool 1998:47) – not least to disrupt the 
channel of communication it provided between the Isaaq living in north-west Somalia and the SNM, 
which operated out of Ethiopia where khat is cultivated (Interview 135). See also Brons (2001:190). On 
the cultivation of khat in Ethiopia, see Anderson et al. 2007. 
362  Reno 2003a; Zierau 2003; Elmi/Barise 2006:33. That the war was not only fought for political, but also 
economic reasons, showed for example in the fact that the SNM repeatedly attacked the port of Zeyla, the 
town of Looyacadde and some other smaller places including Luqaya (for details see, Africa Confidential 
1989) in order to “prevent control of the lucrative trade between Northern Somali towns and Djibouti 
passing out of the hands of the Isaaqs and into those of the Gadabuursis” (Marchal 1996:81). 
363  This section draws on an article published by the author, see Helling 2010.  
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continued fighting the regional clan-based pro-Barre militias, which soon succumbed to the 
SNM’s “overwhelming military power” (Renders 2006:196; Interview 4).364 Although the 
SNM has frequently been mocked for constituting a “weak, inexperienced, decentralized, 
clan-based” organization, which was “unable to provide capable national leadership and 
vision” (Adam 1995:78),365 it achieved what no other Somali insurgency movement had – to 
emerge from war unappealingly in military terms.366 Yet, although the SNM constituted the 
“most powerful military force in the north-west” (Bradbury 2008:79)367 and had a 
“legitimate claim to exercise power” (Compagnon 1998:82), it neither had nor could 
establish a fully-fledged monopoly over the means of violence in the area it claimed. 
Allegedly, this was rooted in the SNM’s doctrine of ‘clan self-determination’, according to 
which “one clan cannot ‘liberate’ another, or by extension subjugate it” (Adam 1994:31).368 
Hence, the SNM generally refrained from annihilating armed opposition fronts, subduing 
their respective population and attempting to militarily control the corresponding territory. 
While adherence to such a policy was facilitated by the relative coherent clan settlement 
pattern in Somaliland and reduced the fighters’ potential to commit atrocities that would 
have fueled inter-clan grievances, this idealizing view of the SNM as a guerrilla movement 
that respected ‘clan self-determination’ is challenged by empirical evidence. On different 
occasions the SNM did retaliate against clans supportive of the Barre government 
(Interviews 141, 4)369 – particularly in areas, which had historically been contested by 
different clans (Bradbury 2008:79; Compagnon 1990b:266).370 The doctrine also appears to 
 
                                                     
364  Bradbury 2008:79; Walls 2009a:8. The SNM’s military prowess was also projected off-shore, as the 
movement “seized an oil tanker and two other ships off the coast, and issued warnings to international 
shippers not to deal with the “dying Somalia regime”” (Anderson 2009:6). 
365  Prunier 1990/91:112; Abdullahi 2007:45; Bryden 1994:37. However, Dool (1998:242) puts these 
judgments into perspective, arguing that “[o]f all the Somali political movements, the SNM was 
undoubtedly the most organized and efficient.” 
366  See Interview 4, in which it is pointed out that the different outcomes of the civil war in north and south 
Somalia with regards to the power monopoly was decisive in the subsequent state trajectory. 
367  Walls 2009a:8; Adam 1994:36. 
368  Bradbury 2008:79; Walls 2009a:13. 
369  Also other authors have noted that “the SNM shot Isaak civilians on the basis that they were apparently 
government spies” (Africa Watch 1990:193), that it committed human rights violations (Gersony 1990), 
and that some of the captured SNA soldiers were subjected to summary trials and executions for alleged 
‘war crimes’ (ICG 2003, cf. Bradbury 2008:79). 
370  In early August 1990, for example, the SNM infiltrated the Gadabursi town of Boroma, which resulted in 
200 dead and 5,000 displaced persons (Compagnon 1990:266; Interview 141) and also attacked the 
Warsangeli settlement of Hadaftimo in eastern Sanaag, which produced further streams of refugees 
(Bradbury 2008:78). See also the incidences in the settlements of Dilla, Aynabo, and Erigavo. For a 
detailed study on the war’s effect on settlement patterns in Erigavo, see Yusuf (2010). However, it should 
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have evolved as much out of necessity as noble principle, as the SNM hardly had the 
military prowess to control non-Isaaq territory (Compagnon 1993:13; Bradbury 2008:79; 
Interview 28). Ultimately, it can also be argued that the SNM refrained from violently 
subduing non-Isaaq communities, because this could have resulted in the formation of an 
anti-Isaaq clan confederation (Interview 34). 
Yet, although the SNM did not have an outright monopoly over the means of violence 
across the territory that was to become Somaliland, it can be considered as having a quasi-
monopoly over the means of coercion, as its military clout and predominant power position 
allowed it to indirectly control the evolving political developments (Höhne 2010:178).371 
Posing a serious and credible threat to all non-Isaaq communities, “cooperation with the 
Isaaq was inevitable” (Renders 2006:196),372 leaving non-Isaaq clans no “viable alternative” 
(Terlinden/Ibrahim 2008a:2f.) than to engage in ceasefire and peace negotiations 
(Compagnon 1990b:266; Renders/Terlinden 2010:737). In this sense, the process of 
reconciliation and peace-making that is generally considered central for Somaliland’s state-
making project “was helped by the military supremacy of the SNM” (Omaar 2004:87).  
Hence, Somaliland’s experience is roughly in line with Luttwak’s (1999) logic of ‘letting 
wars burn out’, as the military predominance of the SNM created relatively clear hierarchies 
amongst the different clan-based militias within the evolving polity. This provided an 
environment that facilitated the introduction of one particular set of rules, even though the 
absence of a monopoly over the means of violence inhibited the outright enforcement of a 
particular regime. While the war thus contributed to Somaliland’s state-making endeavour, 
this should not, however, lead to the conclusion that the SNM itself was fully standardized 
in institutional and socio-cognitive terms. As became apparent in the post-1991 era, the 
guerrilla movement that appeared to be cohesive during the course of the war was marked 
by internal fragmentation.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
also be noted that such military trespasses were condemned by the SNM leadership, which ordered its 
troops to abstain from such retaliations (Interview 141; see also Prunier 1990/91:116). 
371  See the declaration of independence, which was allegedly supported by all clans’ delegates assembled in 
Burco in 1991 (Gilkes 1992:43; Compagnon 1993:13, 1998:82; cf. Huliaras 2002:160). Yet, it is unclear as 
to how far the non-Isaaq clans’ support for independence constituted a genuinely free decision, as the 
SNM’s military predominance restricted these clans’ freedom of choice. That the decision in favour of 
independence had not found strong support beyond the Isaaq clan can be inferred from the later Awdal 
declaration of independence in 1995, the formation of the Makhir State of Somalia in 2007, and the 
separatist movement of the Sool, Sanag and Cayn (SSC) in the late 2000s. 
372  Menkhaus 1997:11; Compagnon 1990:266.  
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Adapting to Economic Self-Reliance 
Arguably, “[m]aking money is an important […] aim in warfare” (Keen 2000:3), partly 
because war is expensive and needs to be financed. The close connection between ‘making 
money’, organizing warfare, and state-making has been uncovered by historians in the case 
of European war- and state-making (Tilly 1992).373 In the Somali case the nature of war 
financing also seems to have impacted the subsequent state trajectories. While rebel 
movements in south-central Somalia generally had easy access to large amounts of capital to 
finance their operations (Reno 2003a:18f.; Leonard 2009:8), the SNM had to establish 
internal mechanisms to fund its struggle. Having been established some eight years prior to 
most other guerrilla movements, the SNM faced a highly uncertain outcome, preventing 
major Somali(land) entrepreneurs from readily switching from the government’s to the 
insurgency’s side to have their assets protected – a decision that came to be much more 
self-evident during the later years of the war.  
Furthermore, potential external funders, such as Libya or Ethiopia, were not ready to grant 
the SNM financial assistance in the early 1980s (Adam 1995:76; Cliffe 1999:91; Interview 
72). Although some observers have overstated the situation by arguing that the SNM was 
self-reliant in terms of arms, money and resources (Interview 36), the literature generally 
agrees that apart from some “token contributions” in the form of fuel and ammunition 
(I.M. Samatar 1997:42), the SNM did not receive “any substantial external aid” 
(Compagnon 1998:79; Adam 2008:194; Interviews 34, 65).374 Consequently, the rebel 
movement needed to rely on its own resources and ability to fundraise (I.M. Samatar 
1997:43; Interview 24). This financial autonomy not only came with the benefit of provi-
ding the SNM with more freedom than most other militias, such as the SSDF, enjoyed,375 
but is also thought to have strengthened the insurgency movement (Cliffe 1999:91).  
 
                                                     
373  Hintze 1906; Elias 1977; Howard 1978; Weber 1985; Mann 1986.  
374  Other authors, however, argue that the SNM received not inconsiderable support from Ethiopia (Cliffe 
1999:91; Gilkes 1989:54). According to one informant, the biggest provision of arms the SNM received 
from Ethiopia was 500 AKs and 6 technicals (Interview 121). However, the SNM also received some 
initial support from the PDRY in order to “break the discriminatory sanction on it” (Elmi 1992:22f.; see 
also Drysdale 2001:137).  
375  For example, former US chargé-d’affaires in Addis Ababa described the SSDF as “practically a creation of 
the Ethiopian and Libyan Governments” (cf. Korn 1986:76; see also Rawson 1994:163). According to a 
former member of the SSDF, this rebel group received USD 50 million and 300 pieces of artillery from 
Libya alone (Interview 107). 
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At its inception, the SNM raised resources mainly among the Isaaq diaspora (Adam 
1995:76; Interview 4) by what was judged to be a “highly evolved fund-raising structure” 
(Bryden/Farah 1996:8). However, this fund-raising architecture was less elaborate by far 
than that of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) (Ahmed/Green 1999) and 
ultimately “collapsed almost as soon as victory was realized” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8). Thus, 
this branch of the SNM’s resource mobilization does not seem to have been constitutive to 
the Somaliland state-making endeavour beyond the immediate financial support it provided, 
even though the resources flowing from the diaspora could have been used to establish a 
sustainable system of taxing remittances, as was the case in Eritrea. While, during its early 
days, the SNM was not only politically, but also financially “more representative of 
Somaliland’s exile communities than of its local population” (Jacquin-Berdal 2002:173), this 
soon changed, not least because the diaspora provided only an irregular and insufficient 
financial resource (Compagnon 1998:79f.).  
The SNM started to “raise funds through deals with commercial intermediaries within the 
abban system constructed outside of Barre’s control” (Reno 2003a:24).376 The Isaaq-based 
rebel movement also started to raise domestic resources – either drawing further on the 
business community or the population at large. After Barre banned the production and 
trading of khat377 in 1983 (Brons 2001:190; Abdi I. Samatar 1988:27; Anderson et al. 
2007:77), for example, SNM leaders met with prominent Isaaq merchants in the sector, 
negotiating with the provision of 17 vehicles, which were turned into so-called technicals 
(Interview 121).378 The SNM supposedly also drew on the khat traders’ resources by taxing 
the khat imported at So.Sh. 100/kilogram (ca. USD 0.60) (Interview 141). Both the reliance 
on business tycoons and the taxation of khat featured prominently with regard to war-to-
peace transitions, as both sources of income were maintained in the successively evolving 
state-making project.  
Subsequent to the SNM’s expulsion from its Ethiopian sanctuary in April 1988, and in the 
wake of the bombardment of Hargeysa and Burco the next month, the rebel movement’s 
 
                                                     
376  Abbans are clan-based credit systems with a long history in nomadic Somali society (Lewis 1994:114f.), 
which were revived under Barre during the 1970s in order to protect assets from the government’s 
nationalization policies. Abbans enabled businessmen to tap into locally organized informal remittance 
systems, which used customary clan authorities to guarantee contracts and protection, and to adjudicate 
on disputes.  
377  Khat/qaat, is a mild amphetamine-like stimulant, consumed by largely male Somalis, which had become a 
viable cash crop in the Northwest in the late 1970s.  
378  Technicals are pick-up trucks with (heavy) weapon-mounting capabilities.  
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ranks expanded exponentially, requiring the organization to raise further resources. 
Consequently, the SNM came to “develop a popular support base among the Isaaq” 
(Bradbury 2008:82) in order to maintain its struggle (Interview 4).379 One implication was 
that the movement became more decentralized, leading the SNM Central Committee to 
delegate the task of fund-raising to the different Isaaq sub-clans, who mobilized resources 
for their particular units (Bradbury 2008:70; I.M. Samatar 1997:43; Interviews 34, 72). 
Moreover, the population was soon subjected to compulsory tributes (Compagnon 
1998:80), obliging each household to not only second a male member to the SNM, but also 
make payment of one sheep (or its equivalent in cash) at least once a year – rules that were 
strictly applied during the course of war (Interviews 36, 78). Although the emergency laws 
enacted by the SNM guurti380 during the later war years substituted the traditional system of 
diya (‘blood money’) payment with a rudimentary system of taxation (Ahmed/Green 
1999:120), this never advanced to a state where it could be continued post-war and lead to 
the fortification of the subsequent state-making endeavour à la Tilly (1975).  
Nevertheless, the SNM’s economic self-reliance was “unique among liberation movements, 
past and present” (I.M. Samatar 1997:42; Compagnon 1998:80; Interview 24),381 and had the 
positive effect that it “enhanced accountability to its numerous supporters” (Adam 1995:76, 
2008:194; Interview 34). Moreover, it also meant that the majority of the Issaq population 
came to be accomplices of the SNM, thus turning the guerrilla war into a people’s war. 
Last, but by no means least, the reliance on their own population discouraged the SNM 
fighters from looting and preying upon communities that “provided critical income from 
remittances and which were the bases of the commercial organizations essential to the 
militia’s continued survival” (Reno 2003a:24f.). Tapping into local resources and 
mechanisms to finance the war effort thus not only put brakes on the emergence of 
warlords, but also led to an incrementally enhancing entanglement of rebel movement and 
population. The latter showed particularly in the fact that the community elders, who 
controlled many of the resources, gained in political importance over the years (Reno 
2003a:24; Compagnon 1998:84).382  
 
                                                     
379  Bryden 1999b:8; Brons 2001:204. 
380  See subsequent section. 
381  For a comparison of the SNM with the USC on this issue, see Bakonyi 2009:435.  
382  Although some similarly argue that “[a]ll the resources that the SNM needed had to go through the clan 
elders” (Interview 36), other informants suggest that while the elders were in Addis Ababa, amongst 
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Politico-Institutional Legacies  
Much scholarly work on Somaliland revolves around the role played by traditional 
authorities in processes of peace and state-making (Farah 2001; Renders 2006).383 Generally 
concentrating on the traditional authorities’ institutionalized forum of the guurti,384 the 
argument is frequently sustained that it was the marriage of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms 
of governance – or, in more fashionable jargon, the ‘hybridity’ of ‘political orders’ – that lay 
at the heart of Somaliland’s alleged success. While I scrutinize this proposition in Chapter 5, 
I want to point out here that the guurti in its form of a permanent council of elders is much 
less ‘traditional’ than commonly suggested (Compagnon 1993:19; Interview 55). Rather 
than having existed since time immemorial, the guurti is a creation of the SNM struggle 
(Interviews 4, 34, 36, 75, 103).  
While, in the early years, it had been the rank and file of the SNM who organized human 
and material resources by approaching the Isaaq population for support themselves 
(Interview 34), this changed when the movement grew in numbers and decentralized 
(Interview 7). Particularly after 1988, when Barre’s scorched-earth policy pushed large 
numbers of the Isaaq across the border into refugee camps in Ethiopia,385 “[c]lan and 
religious elders played crucial roles, distributing food aid and other relief, adjudicating 
disputes, and even recruiting fighters for the SNM” (Adam 1995:82; Interview 4).386 The 
elders’ ability to mobilize resources and adjudicate disputes was harnessed by the guerrilla 
movement, when it realized that it could no longer maintain its struggle without the 
traditional authorities’ cooperation (Interview 36). On an experimental basis, the SNM 
leadership established an advisory body of self-selected Isaaq elders who represented their 
respective sub-clans (Renders/Terlinden 2010:728) and who increasingly took over the task 
of mobilizing resources (Interviews 4, 55). The creation of the guurti in the mid-1980s387 had 
largely to do with the fact that the young officers who had deserted the SNA for the SNM 
had very little idea about how the clan system worked (Interviews 103, 113, 135). Having 
 
                                                                                                                                     
others, the SNM ‘mujahedeen’ on the ground established the important connections between the 
movement and the population (Interview 72). 
383  Hagman 2005c; Höhne 2006a; Glavitza 2008; Moe 2009a; Richards 2009. 
384  Permanent council of elders. 
385  “In the eight months between May 1988 and January 1989, an estimated 300,000-500,000 Somali refugees 
had arrived in eastern Ethiopia from northern Somalia, sometimes at the rate of 4,000 a day” (Gersony 
1990:5). 
386  Compagnon 1993:12; Brons 2001:204. 
387  While some date the formation of the guurti to 1984 (Interviews 4, 113), others argue that its creation took 
place in 1986 (Interview 34).  
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been educated in urban centres within Somalia and abroad, and exposed to waves of 
nationalism and ‘scientific socialism’, they had very little knowledge when it came to clan 
issues and relied on the traditional authorities to exert leverage over rural communities.388  
Given that communal support was essential to their struggle (Compagnon 1998:77), the 
SNM incrementally incorporated the elders into its structure (Bradbury 2008:97). Bryden 
(1999b:8) proposes that “[i]n order to survive, the SNM cadre had no choice but to lead 
through persuasion and consensus, and in the later years of the struggle even went so far as 
to incorporate the Isaaq elders into its formal membership.” However, this inclusion of the 
traditional authorities appears not to have been by choice. According to a former high-
ranking militia fighter, the elders were a “nuisance” to the SNM, in part because their mode 
of operation constantly created frictions (Interview 113).389 Even though the guurti was a 
creation of the SNM (Interviews 4, 34), which officially held the reins (Interviews 75, 113), 
the rebel movement’s military and political leadership soon saw itself being taken hostage 
by the elders (Interview 113). Together with their command over resources (Adam 2008: 
201), the elders’ political clout had increased significantly (Renders/Terlinden 2010:728).  
Within the guerrilla movement, the guurti came to be equal in importance with the Central 
Committee, the legislative organ of the SNM (I.M. Samatar 1997:44), largely because it 
allowed the SNM to expand in such a way as to include all of Somaliland’s clans and to 
create a broader constituency (Bradbury 2008:97).390 While Bradbury (2008:69) maintains 
that the evolution of the guurti can be explained with reference to the “objectives of the 
SNM’s political manifesto to meld traditional and modern forms of political organization”, 
it seems as if the council of elders was created out of necessity and was much more an 
unintended product of the civil war. Nonetheless, it had a major impact on Somaliland’s 
state-making project and is frequently argued as having constituted a key difference 
regarding the divergent state trajectories in north and south Somalia (Interview 4).391 
 
                                                     
388  Simultaneously, the traditional authorities are said not to have had any idea about modern governance and 
democracy. Hence, the SNM leadership needed to rule through the elders and instruct them what 
decisions to take. In the words of one informant, “[t]he elders couldn’t read nor write, and most of them 
didn’t believe that the earth was a globe… It was very difficult” (Interview 113). 
389  The informant further argues that “the guurti was our problem, is our problem, and will be our problem.” 
390  Yet, it was not until after the war that the guurti was established as a national platform, including traditional 
authorities of other regions and clans (Interview 103). 
391  However, as pointed out before, the formation of councils of elders was not restricted to north-western 
Somalia (see e.g. Gundel 2006). Thus, one informant postulated that the proposition that north-west 
Somalia had better elders than south-central Somalia was “nonsense”. Instead the informant explains the 
divergent state trajectories partly with reference to the fact that, in contrast to all other rebel movements, 
 
4   WAR AND STATE-(UN)MAKING 
144 
 
Democratization  
One of the rare connections the existing literature makes between war-making and state-
making in the case of Somaliland concerns the continuity of democratic governance. It is 
generally acknowledged that Somaliland’s democratic structures of governance were a 
legacy of the war, as the SNM had allegedly already been marked by democracy (Adam 
1995:76; Bryden 1999b:9; Interview 28). Not only had all but one of the SNM’s six 
chairmen between 1981 and 1991 been civilian, rather than military (Adam 1999:270),392 but 
these recurrent changes in leadership are commonly interpreted as having brought about an 
institutionalization rather than personalization of power (I.M. Samatar 1997:33).393 
According to observers close to the ‘cultural diversity narrative’, these democratic practices 
were rooted in the culture of ‘pastoral democracy’ (see Lewis 1961) and resulted from the 
apparent traditional shunning of ‘charismatic leaders’ in Somali society (Adam 2008:198).  
However, there are also alternative explanations, such as external factors, why dictatorial 
tendencies were generally prevented from taking root in the rebel movement. According to 
Reno (2003a:24, referring to Adam 1993:10) “Mengistu also interfered in SNM’s internal 
affairs, and had early leaders arrested to hinder the SNM’s utility as a vehicle for personal 
ambitions of political entrepreneurs” (see also Interviews 1, 34). The increasingly broad 
participation the SNM experienced was also a function of the movement’s particular 
funding mechanism, which gave community elders an increasing stake in political decisions. 
Membership of the SNM Central Committee increased from eight in 1981 to 99 in 1990. 
Also the fact that the SNM leadership featured members of different Isaaq sub-clans hints 
at democratic elements within the movement, although it remains unclear how democratic 
its decision-making processes really were.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
the SNM had a decade-long experience in handling clan issues in general and the traditional authorities 
more particularly (Interview 113). 
392  The original civilian leadership under Ahmed Mohamed Gulaid «Jimaleh» (Habar Awal) was replaced in 
1982 by the religious leader Yusuf Sheikh Ali Sheikh Madar (Habar Awal), who gave way to a military 
wing under former SNA officer Abdulkadir Kosar Abdi (Habar Yonis) in 1983. With the fourth SNM 
Congress in July 1984, the civilian leadership regained control of the movement, seeing Ahmed Mohamed 
Mohamoud «Silanyo» (Habar Jalo) filling the position of SNM Chairman until 1990, when Abdirahman 
Ahmed Ali «Tuur» (Habar Yonis) took over. 
393  However, it has to be acknowledged that «Silanyo», who became President of the Republic of Somaliland 
in 2010, held the post of SNM chairman for six years, between 1984 and 1990. Moreover, Spears 
(2010:145) assesses the impact of such irregular leadership more critically, suggesting that it not only 
prolonged the SNM’s struggle, but also resulted in internal divisions.  
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Similarly ambiguous is the proposition that the guerrilla movement’s democratic practices 
expanded into Somaliland’s state-making project. As will be shown in Chapter 5, politics in 
the young Republic of Somaliland were, in fact, anything but democratic. Although not 
unexpected, particularly the early years of the newly-formed de facto state exhibited few 
traces of democratic governance. This showed, for example, in the unsurprising fact that 
the transitional government that ruled Somaliland between 1991 and 1993 was a one-to-one 
copy of the organizational structure of the rebel movement – and thus little representative 
of non-Isaaq communities. The chairman and vice-chairman of the SNM assumed the 
offices of president and vice-president respectively and almost all the executive members of 
the SNM came to be in charge of a cabinet post (Warsame/Brons 1994:20). Indeed, “the 
SNM’s leadership structure was transferred virtually intact to the government of the new 
state” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8).  
Developing a Common Identity 
The war between the SNM and the Barre government catalysed the fragmentation of a 
national socio-cognitive system into clan-based identities, which increasingly came to the 
fore throughout the 1980s. While the country was politically divided into two only in 1991, 
a division into different identities had incrementally taken place long before (I.M. Samatar 
1997:46; cf. Spears 2010:151f.), and was fortified through the war experience. First, the fact 
that Barre singled out the Isaaq clan for punishment reinforced the formation of an 
alternative socio-cognitive system among that part of the population. Second, the war 
pushed the SNM fighters out of a national and into alternative identities. Most obviously, 
members of the SNM identified as members of the Isaaq clan. However, the clan was not 
the only institution that issued a particular set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. 
When at the second SNM Congress in 1982 leadership changed to Sheikh Madar, who 
descended from the religious family that founded Hargeysa in the nineteenth century and 
who belonged to the Saudi-based group of the SNM, the rebel movement committed itself 
to sharia law and instructed its fighters in Islamic teaching and practice (Bradbury 2008:64). 
Apart from thus tightening a particular set of ‘rules of the game’, the guerrilla force also 
decided to rename its fighters mujahedeen (‘holy warriors’). This introduction of a new 
identity was judged “good for morale” (Adam 2008:209). Another contributory factor to 
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the emergence of a new identity among communities in north-west Somalia was the fact 
that the narrative of ‘colonial difference’ as well as ‘cultural difference’ was maintained.394 
Although the ‘colonial difference’ and ‘cultural difference’ theses fall short of explaining – 
in institutional terms – the divergent state trajectories in post-1991 Somalia, they support 
the proposition that different socio-cognitive systems had formed in northern and southern 
Somalia. In this train of thought Huliaras (2002:174) concludes that “unlike most other 
African countries, warfare has played a crucial role in the formation of a strong sense of 
identity – at least for the majority of its population.”395 He continues to argue that  
“In sum, as happened in the case of medieval Europe (Tilly 1990; McNeill 
1982; van Creveld 1991), warfare had played a central and indeed essential role 
in the process of nation-formation in Somaliland. War shaped the ‘imagined 
community’ that later proved essential in providing a government apparatus 
with the moral basis needed to ensure the willing participation and often self-
sacrifice of its citizens” (ibid.:159). 
Similarly, Omaar (1994:234) suggests that the SNM-led guerrilla war “reinforced the bonds” 
among the Somalilanders, and Höhne (2006b:398) argues that  
“as a result of the civil war and certain developments in northern Somalia, new 
identities have formed on the ground. These identities are not new in the sense 
that they are invented from scratch, but they combine existing identity markers 
in a way that is particularly meaningful in the current political context.”  
Although a certain level of socio-cognitive standardization had thus been reached by the 
end of the civil war, it would be misleading to conclude that the Somaliland polity emerged 
from war with one single identity. While it is obvious that non-Isaaq communities enter-
tained ‘rules of the mind’ that diverged from those of the Isaaq, also within the SNM not all 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ were commonly shared.396 Thus, at the time that 
the SNM called for the Berbera and Burco conferences in the early 1990s, the population 
did not share the same set of institutions or mental models.  
 
                                                     
394  The colonial era created a difference in perception between North and South and this contributed to the 
creation of Somaliland (Interview 55). 
395  Once the war was won, the SNM radio station, which could broadcast as far as Arabia, transmitted for 
one hour per night (Interview 4). 
396  For one, the SNM did not have a coherent ideology or political vision that transcended the objective of 
removing Barre from power. For another, the fact that the SNM had beaten about the bush with regard to 
possibly declaring independence if they were military victorious contributed to the maintenance of regime 
diversity. For these and other reasons little changed from the SNM’s initial composition as a fairly 
heterogeneous collection of Isaaq politicians and intellectuals (Renders 2006:202f.). Hence, Somaliland’s 
regime ecology was characterized by the parallel existence of numerous regimes that were structured along 
(sub-)clan lines (e.g. Isaaq, Gadabursi, Dhulbahante), political lines (e.g. unionists, federalists), or 
ideological lines (e.g. SNM military wing, SNM civilian wing). 
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4.3 Interim Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that the two wars Somalia experienced between the late 1970s and 
early 1990s exercised important influences on the subsequent state trajectories. It suggested 
that even though the Ogadeen War did have an ambivalent effect on the state’s regime 
ecology, it set in motion or catalysed a number of developments that contributed to the 
demise of the state throughout the subsequent decade. While the regime prism does not 
provide a causal explanation for the breakdown of the Somali state, it reveals how war 
contributed to processes of institutional and socio-cognitive de-standardization. Exemplary 
for the fragmentation of the formerly authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of 
the mind’ is the reintroduction of Arabic as official second language in 1979, returning 
Somalia into a bi-orthographic polity (Abuhamdia 1995:49).397 Yet, as shown, such pro-
cesses of de-standardization occurred across the institutional and socio-cognitive spheres.  
The fact that processes of regime de-standardization erupted largely in the post-war era 
seem to indicate that it was not the war per se, but rather the policies implemented by the 
military junta subsequent to the war that contributed to the unravelling of the state. While it 
is clear that it was not solely Barre who fell back onto increasingly smaller common 
institutional and socio-cognitive denominators in the face of decreasing regime 
homogeneity – thus setting in motion a ‘vicious circle’ of regime de-standardization – it was 
first and foremost the military leadership that could have counteracted this trend. Had 
Barre handled the military defeat in the Ogadeen differently, or had he resigned from his 
position as head of state, the downward spiral of institutional and socio-cognitive de-
standardization could possibly have been prevented. Yet, it has to be acknowledged, too, 
that Barre’s room for manoeuvre was restricted, not least in light of the structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed upon Somalia by the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
which deprived him of a large administrative apparatus and drained him of necessary 
economic resources to buy in groups to the state-making project, amongst others.398  
 
                                                     
397  Interestingly, the linguistic heterogeneity and resulting challenges to nation-building in south-central 
Somalia was exacerbated in the early 2000s, as the constitution that followed the election of Colonel 
Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed as president of the Transitional Federal Government “accepts the existence of 
two languages, Maay and Mahaa, as official languages in the country” (Osman 2007a:127). 
398  The first SAPs were promulgated in 1981, when Barre opened the profitable banana industry to Italian 
investors (A.I. Samatar 1993:78). 
4   WAR AND STATE-(UN)MAKING 
148 
 
Thus, the “profound economic, political and social consequences” (Africa Watch 1990:8) of 
the Ogadeen War399 were aggravated by the fact that the state could no longer rely on 
institutional hegemony. Along these lines, Marchal (2002:227) argues that “the state 
produced no norm: to the contrary, one has to say, it multiplied them in order to better 
subvert them itself” (my translation). With regard to the de-standardization of particular 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ the developments of the 1980s resembled those 
of the mid to late-1960s, revealing the fact that processes of state-unmaking are marked by 
regime pluralization, i.e. institutional and socio-cognitive fragmentation. In this train of 
thought Ahmed Samatar (1994a:12) proposes that “the Somali state has died three times – 
as a regime, as an apparatus, and as an idea of group consciousness, or what Ibn Khaldun 
calls asabiyah.”  
The chapter also showed that the civil war of the 1980s played an important role in the 
formation of Somaliland. While it has to be acknowledged that Somaliland’s state-making 
project was not intentional, and that the war was neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for this state to be established,400 it appears to have been instrumental in state-
making in Somaliland. Although the SNM-led struggle did not culminate in a full-blown 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization of the population across the territory that 
was to become Somaliland, it laid important foundations for the later introduction of an 
authoritative set of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. The war had arguably been 
“formative in creating a ‘political community’ of shared interests” (Bradbury 2008:50), and 
served as a “cruel university in the arts of political mobilisation and popular leadership, 
preparing the SNM better than most for the challenges of peacetime leadership” (Bryden 
1999a:137).401 While it has to be accorded that Somaliland’s achievements cannot, of course, 
only be attributed to its ability to conduct war, it appears to be true that “[i]n sum, as 
happened in the case of medieval Europe […], warfare had played a central and indeed 
essential role in the process of nation-formation in Somaliland” (Huliaras 2002:159). 
 
                                                     
399  The costs of the Ogadeen War for Somalia were estimated as approximately USD 2 million per day (cf. 
Matthies 1987:246). 
400  See e.g. the case of Puntland, which “was unaffected by the civil strife that accompanied the collapse of 
the Somali state” (Battera 2003:230), but nevertheless formed a similar polity. Yet, in line with the regime 
standardization thesis it is widely acknowledged that Puntland “enjoyed better ‘ethnic’ starting conditions” 
as “[m]ost of its population belongs to the same clan federation – Majerten/Harti” (Battera 2003:230). 
401  Yet, Bryden’s assessment is challenged by the fact that, in its early years, Somaliland far from enjoyed such 
qualified leadership. Having survived the war, the coalition of the main Isaaq clans started competing 
among themselves in the post-1991 era, as prophetically anticipated by Ghalib (1995:219; cf. Spears 
2010:151). See Chapter 5.  
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5  
The Making and Breaking of Somaliland 
Somaliland’s state-making process has been labelled ‘unique’, ‘peaceful’, ‘democratic’, and 
‘bottom-up’. Diverse authors not only argue that Somaliland was ‘Africa’s best kept secret’ 
(Jhazbhay 2003) and constituted an inimitable state-making project (Hoyle 2000:85),402 but 
also that its state trajectory has largely been characterized by processes of ‘traditional’ 
reconciliation and ‘grassroots’ democracy (Adam 1995).403 These popular readings of its 
state-making endeavour not only led to a characterization of Somaliland’s trajectory as 
having been ‘peaceful’ (Othieno 2008), but culminated in truly amnestic assertions such as 
the proposition that during its process of state-making “[n]o civil war occurred” (Sufi 
2003:285).404 While authority has been added to this interpretation of Somaliland constitu-
ting a sui generis by portraying south-central Somalia as a diametrically opposed case of state 
failure, the stereotypical image of Somaliland’s alleged uniqueness has been fired by the 
literature’s strong, and partly romanticizing, emphasis on traits of ‘traditional governance’.405 
One of the most recent attempts to theoretically corroborate Somaliland’s supposedly 
unprecedented state-making process has seen the application of the framework of ‘hybrid 
 
                                                     
402  Kaplan 2008b:148; Jhazbhay 2009:50. 
403  Terlinden/Debiel 2003; Othieno 2008. 
404  See also Baldo (2006) who misleadingly titles “Somaliland: The Other Somalia with No War”, Bradbury et 
al. (2003:455) who argue that “[s]ince breaking away from Somalia in 1991, the people of Somaliland have 
charted a different path from Somalia away from violent conflict towards constitutional politics”, or 
Bradbury (2008:78) who states that in the 1991-93 period “[c]ivil war was averted by a series of peace 
conferences”, thus glossing over the conflicts in Burco and Berbera in 1992. Somaliland’s ‘peace narrative’ 
is mirrored in datasets of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP 2011), which does not report any 
armed conflict in Somaliland for the post-1991 era. Although the UCDP defines ‘armed conflict’ as “a 
contested incompatibility that […] results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year”, it oes 
not pick up on the violence that occurred in Somaliland in 1992 and 1994-95, for which casualties of 1,000 
and 2,000-4,000 have been reported, respectively (cf. Balthasar/Grzybowski 2012:153).  
405  For the concept of ‘traditional governance’, see Bradbury et al. 2003; Battera 2004; Kulessa/Heinrich 
2004; Le Sage 2005; Kyed/Buur 2006; Gundel 2006; Renders 2006; Hagmann/Höhne 2009. Yet, as Hashi 
(2005:2) rightly points out, “the traditional structures have weakened or acquired non-traditional roles.” 
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political orders’ (HPOs) (cf. Böge et al. 2008; Kibble/Walls 2010b). It is suggested that 
Somaliland’s formula for success lay in the prevalence of a political landscape characterized 
by HPOs, which “allowed for a healthy adaptation of statehood to local needs” 
(Renders/Terlinden 2010:723).406 Yet, as these scholars simultaneously acknowledge that 
the very same HPOs have come to “threaten to undermine the polity’s stability” (ibid.), this 
theoretical framework remains inconclusive with regard to the question of under what 
conditions or what kinds of HPOs are conducive rather than inimical to state-making. 
Analysing Somaliland’s state trajectory in the post-1991 decade, this chapter aims to shed 
light on these questions and contributes to a better understanding of how its state-making 
process unfolded in the aftermath of the SNM struggle.  
Contesting established paradigms, I firstly argue that Somaliland’s state-making process has 
not been as unique as generally claimed. Although clearly constituting a case of its own, 
Somaliland’s trajectory has numerous important parallels to earlier state-making endeavours 
within and outside of Somali territories. In line with this reasoning I secondly contest the 
position that the legendary ‘traditional authorities’ with their inclination towards ‘grassroots 
democracy’ lay at the heart of Somaliland state-making. My empirical research findings 
rather suggest that Somaliland owes its trajectory largely to shrewd and authoritarian elite 
politics. In fact, President Egal stopped at nothing, not even from instigating civil war in 
order to consolidate his power and reconstruct a previously deconstructed state. Thus, 
Somaliland’s civil wars were conducive to and constitutive for state-making.  
With regard to the theoretical realm the chapter suggests that the usefulness of the concept 
of HPOs is questionable when analysing state-making projects, as it falls short of 
accounting for divergent development paths. Applying the ‘regime prism’ to Somaliland’s 
state-making endeavour, the chapter shows that the defining criteria of any political ‘order’ 
to support processes of state-making lies in the influence this ‘order’ can exert on levels of 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. While state regime consolidation in 
Somaliland was in its infancy throughout the 1990s, implying that mechanisms of 
 
                                                     
406  This argument stands in close intellectual relationship with the proposition that past Somali state-making 
endeavours did not work because “Somali represents one of the greatest mismatches between 
conventional state structures and indigenous institutions among postcolonial countries in Africa” (Kaplan 
2008a:115; Renders 2007:440). At its extremes, it is argued that given the state’s alien nature, Somalis were 
‘better off stateless’ (Leeson 2006). Yet, these reservations against the state and concomitant embrace of 
‘traditional institutions’ neglect – amongst others – the fact that the institutions of the ‘suldaans’, ‘aqiils’ 
and other ‘traditional authorities’ were introduced by the Egyptians, reinvented by the Arabs, and utilized 
by the colonizers (Gundel 2006).  
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standardization could only be rudimentary, the chapter shows how the foundations for 
standardization that had been laid during the war were bolstered from the early 1990s 
onwards. Overall, I suggest that the polity’s trajectory of initial fragility and subsequently 
enhanced resilience has been characterized by fluctuating, but ultimately increasing, levels 
of state regime domination and standardization. 
The chapter sets out to show that, and scrutinize why, Somaliland did not experience a 
process of state-making in the two years after its declaration of independence in 1991. The 
section argues that this era was, in the absence of sufficient state regime capacity in terms of 
financial, military, and administrative aptitude on the part of the interim government, 
characterized by a retreat from the embryonic state-making trajectory set in motion during 
the civil war. Section two looks at Somaliland’s second state-making endeavour under the 
aegis of President Egal between 1993 and 1996. Despite numerous parallels with the 
previous era, the period saw, nevertheless, the advancement of the state-making project, 
leading me to ask why this difference occurred and how it could be explained. An interim 
conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings.407  
 
5.1 Tried Reconstruction, Implied Deconstruction (1991-93)408 
The bilateral truce and reconciliation meetings between the SNM and the non-Isaaq clans 
of north-western Somaliland that had accompanied the progressive military victories of the 
SNM intensified in early 1991409 and were followed by a ‘national’ conference in Burco. The 
latter culminated in an announcement of independence that was accompanied by a wave of 
enthusiasm and optimism (Bradbury 2008:81; Omaar 2004:87). Yet, the atmosphere turned 
 
                                                     
407  For a cartographic presentation of the Somaliland polity and the geographic location of its clans and sub-
clans, see Appendix, Map 3 and Map 4. 
408  In a modified version, this chapter is forthcoming in a special issue of the Journal of Eastern African 
Studies; see Balthasar 2013.  
409  In March 1991, the Gadabursi/Reer Nuur and Habar Awal/Saad Muse/Jibril Abokor started peace 
negotiations, and in June and October representatives of the Isaaq/Habar Yonis and Harti/Warsangeli 
met in Yubbe (Sanaag region), agreeing on the cessation of hostilities, sharing of pasture and water, and 
exchange of prisoners. Similar meetings occurred, amongst others, in (1) Oog (Sool region) between the 
Isaaq/Habar Yonis, Isaaq/Habar Jalo and Harti/Dhulbahante in October 1991; (2) El Qohle (Sanaag 
region) between Isaaq/Habar Yonis and Harti/Warsangeli in December 1990; (3) Ool (Sanaag region) 
between the SNM and Dhulbahante in February 1991; (4) Yagoori (Sool region) between the Isaaq/Habar 
Jalo and Harti/Dhulbahante in February 1991; and (5) Dilla (Awdal region) between the SNM and 
Gadabursi in February 1991 (cf. Renders 2006:196; APD 2008).  
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sour shortly thereafter410 and 1992 saw dwindling support for the government and the 
splintering of the SNM. Between January and October 1992 heavy fighting between the 
interim government and an SNM faction occurred in Burco and Berbera over the allocation 
of political power and economic resources, which led the young polity to the brink of all-
out civil war and almost resulted in the overthrow of the transitional government headed by 
Abdirahman Ahmed Ali «Tuur». By 1993, Somaliland far from resembled any kind of 
statehood, but instead its path appeared to be mirroring that of south-central Somalia. What 
had happened to the state-making project that had taken its first steps during the anti-
regime war, and why did «Tuur’s» attempts to consolidate the polity result in an unmaking 
of the nascent state?  
Berbera, Burco, and the Declaration of Independence  
The first multi-clan meeting in north-western Somalia arranged by the SNM took place in 
the port town of Berbera, the region’s most important economic hub. Held from February 
15th–27th, 1991, the Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyiga (‘Brotherhood Meeting of 
Northern Clans’) was significant in two ways. First, it sought to restore trust and confidence 
between the Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans (APD 2002b:19), as not only had they taken 
different sides during the war (Interview 7), but also because the SNM’s military takeover 
had not been entirely peaceful (Compagnon 1990b:266; Interview 141).411 Secondly, it was 
agreed that all sea and airports constituted national assets, rather than clan property.412 
Although these were significant accords, the conference was overshadowed in importance 
by the subsequent conference in Burco. 
The Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyiga (‘Grand Conference of Northern Clans’), which took 
place between April 27th and May 18th, 1991, is generally considered the first major 
‘national’ conference. The meeting occurred in parallel with the SNM Central Committee 
meeting, and was attended by the SNM leadership, prominent northern ‘traditional 
 
                                                     
410  According to some, the tide had already turned with the Burco conference itself (Interview 8).  
411  See also Drysdale 1992b:32; ICG 2003; Bradbury 2008:78. Of the approximately 3 million Somalilanders 
in 1997, 66 per cent were believed to be Isaaq, about 19 per cent Harti, and 15 per cent Dir (Mesfin 
2009:1; Interviews 99, 155). 
412  Arguably, SNM chairman «Tuur» (Isaaq/Habar Yonis) had a vested interest in this, being loathe leaving, in 
particular, the economically most important port of Berbera under the control of the Isaaq/Habar 
Awal/Iisa Muse. Furthermore, «Tuur» had agreed with Mohamed Farah Aideed (USC/SNA) and Ahmed 
Omar Jess (SPM) in the Mustahil meeting of 1990 that their movements were to take control of the ports 
of Berbera, Mogadishu and Kismayo respectively, in order to secure the economic foundations for a post-
Barre polity (Interviews 149, 111). 
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authorities’, and numerous intellectuals, militia commanders, religious leaders, and 
businessmen, amongst others. The conference’s aim was to further reconcile the 
antagonistic factions as well as to delineate the region’s political destiny. Although secession 
had not been on the agenda of the SNM central committee (Bradbury 2008:80; Interviews 
36, 111), it ultimately announced the withdrawal of the former British Protectorate of 
Somaliland from the 1960 union with the ex-Italian Colony of Somalia and unilaterally 
declared independence on May 18th, 1991 (Drysdale 1992b:24).413  
According to prevailing analysis, the declaration of independence was very much a 
spontaneous decision, which was rooted in ‘popular pressures’ from the ‘grassroots’ and 
enjoyed the support of all constituencies (Bradbury 2008:81f.; Interview 144). Although 
many of the SNM leadership were, indeed, reluctant to secede from south-central Somalia 
(Interview 36)414 and even sent a delegation to Mogadishu to negotiate a political way 
forward with southern faction leaders (Interview 8), it seems that factors other than ‘the 
peoples’ voice’ crucially affected the decision to declare sovereignty.415 In general, the 
SNM’s prospects of significantly shaping the political developments in Mogadishu were 
undone when Ali Mahdi Mohamed (USC/SSA), rather than Mohamed Farah Aideed 
(USC/SNA), with whom the SNM had entertained close relationships, took over the 
presidential seat in Mogadishu in early 1991 (Stevenson 1993:142; Interview 112). 
Moreover, «Tuur»’s chance of obtaining an important political post in Mogadishu was 
ruined by the fact that the position of prime minister in Somalia was already taken by 
another prominent Somaliland politician, Omar Arteh Ghalib (Interview 114). «Tuur» and 
the SNM leadership thus defaulted to sticking with Somaliland, at least temporarily. 
Under the aegis of SNM vice-chairman Hassan Iise Jama the conference delegates drafted a 
provisional National Charter (Interview 128), which mandated the SNM to form a 
transitional national government and run the newly-formed polity for an interim two year 
 
                                                     
413  Renders (2006:198) states that the preceding Berbera meeting had already seen the SNM publicly 
considering the revision of union with south-central Somalia. This is, however, disputed (Drysdale 
1992b:24; Interview 128), although talk of revising the 1960 act of union may have alluded to a future 
federal constitution (Bradbury 2008:80). Yet, it appears that the SNM leadership held an informal meeting 
on the question of secession in Hargeysa shortly before the Burco conference (Interview 128).  
414  SNM chairman «Tuur», for example, favoured a unified Somalia (Interview 75), which he voiced in a 
speech at Hargeysa’s Independence Garden prior to the Burco conference – affirming, however, that he 
would bow to public will (Interviews 128, 142).  
415  According to received wisdom, it was the general population that pressured the SNM leadership into 
announcing separation, thus supporting the overall argument that the formation of Somaliland came 
about by means of a truly ‘bottom-up’, ‘grassroots’ process (see Bryden e.g. 2003; Bradbury 2008:81f.).  
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period. As the SNM leadership had no ready-made plans for a post-war administration 
(Compagnon 1998:77; Bradbury 2008:85),416 its governance structure was largely copied 
over: the insurgency movement’s executive committee became the government, its 
chairman and vice-chairman president and vice-president respectively, and the enlarged 
SNM Central Committee of 99 members functioning as a national council or preliminary 
parliament (Brons 2001:247).417 As interim president, «Tuur», presented his 19 member 
cabinet, which had been carefully selected in order to forge an all-inclusive elite bargain 
(Bradbury 2008:85; Interview 108),418 on June 4th, 1991 (WSP 2005:61). 
As the interim government was clearly dominated by the victorious Isaaq,419 the «Tuur» 
administration was considered a “continuation of the SNM” (Interviews 36, 78; ACR 1990-
92:B371) as, with the exception of those from the non-Isaaq clans, all members of the 
council of ministers were SNM veterans (Interviews 28, 128). Yet, it was not the 
preponderance of the Isaaq-dominated SNM vis-à-vis other clans and their militias that 
turned out to be problematic. While the multiple inter-clan conferences that occurred prior 
to the Berbera and Burco summit had restored a semblance of trust between the Isaaq and 
their neighbours, they had done little to address the rivalry that had been smouldering 
between different factions within the SNM for many years (APD 1999:20; Interview 156).  
The decade-long liberation struggle had seen the emergence of two wings within the SNM 
– one ‘civilian’, one ‘military’. Whereas the former was mainly comprised of intellectuals 
who had proclaimed the formation of the SNM in London and Jeddah in 1981, the latter 
largely encompassed militaries who had started the armed resistance on the ground 
(Interview 113). «Tuur» enjoyed the backing of the ‘civilian wing’, but he was eyed with 
suspicion by the more hardline military elements within the rebel movement, referred to as 
 
                                                     
416  This lack of preparedness for the post-war period not only distinguished the SNM liberation struggle from 
the one led by the Eritrean EPLF (Bradbury 2008:85), but has frequently been quoted in support of the 
argument that the declaration of independence had not been a long-term objective of the SNM (Interview 
1).  
417  Renders 2006:202; Bradbury 2008:85. SNM cadres did, however, not only take over the new government, 
but also other administrative positions. The SNM veteran Mohamed Hashi Elmi – who was appointed 
Minister of Finance in 2010 – became first mayor of Hargeysa (Interview 96). 
418  According to WSP (2005:61) «Tuur» established a cabinet of 18 ministers. 
419  While the cabinet featured three representatives of each of the four Isaaq clans (Habar Awal, Habar Jalo, 
Garhajis, Arap), plus one extra representative from the president’s Garhajis/Habar Yonis clan, it included 
‘only’ two Gadabursi, two Dhulbahante, and one Issa (ACR 1990-92:B371; Drysdale 1992b:8).  
5   THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF SOMALILAND 
 
155 
 
Calan Cas.420 While the President included some members of the Calan Cas in his 
government – mainly because they were in charge of the most potent SNM militias – 
«Tuur» increasingly distanced himself from them. Not only did he feel challenged by these 
hardline elements, but he also wanted to avoid alienating non-Isaaq clans, who were already 
nervous about an Isaaq-dominated Somaliland (Renders 2006:10). The ensuing power 
struggles between «Tuur» and the Calan Cas were to determine politics throughout the 
transitional period and lay at the heart of why the interim government’s attempt for state 
reconstruction resulted in its deconstruction.  
From Attempted Reconstruction to Effective Deconstruction 
The tasks faced by the government were daunting. Within two years, the interim 
administration had not only to establish security, jump-start the economy, and restore basic 
services, but also to draft a constitution as a basis for the country’s first envisaged 
democratic elections. While the overall environment, characterized by a decentralized 
patchwork of militias, ramshackle infrastructure, roofless cities421 and uprooted populations 
(WSP 2005:61; Bradbury 2008:77), was anything but conducive to fulfilling these tasks and 
establishing a new state, the true challenges came from the split within the government.  
Scant Security and the First Civil War 
At the time that the interim government was installed, the security situation was precarious. 
The country was awash with arms, and even though many SNM mujahedeen demobilized 
voluntarily, numerous militias remained effectively organized or emerged from scratch in 
the context of physical and political insecurity (Interview 8).422 These militias frequently 
turned to extortion and banditry (WSP 2005:61; Bradbury 2008:88), but also provided a 
certain level of safety to their communities. While the decentralized structure of the SNM 
 
                                                     
420  It is commonly argued that the Calan Cas (‘Red Flag’) faction had a socialist inclination (e.g. Renders 
2006:202f.). However, most of its members were almost a-political, had little political vision, and were no 
more leftist than the ‘civilian wing’. While the name of Calan Cas has been used pejoratively to tag diverse 
opposition groups since the early 1960s, its origin dates back to 1962. Back then, the SDU was founded 
and, due to its socialist inclination, referred to as Calan Cas. This cognomen appeared to be particularly apt 
to label the SNM’s ‘military wing’ as the founder of the SDU and the leader of the ‘military wing’ were one 
and the same – Saleebaan «Gaal» (Interview 143).  
421  After the 1988 aerial bombings of Hargeysa and Burco, most houses were without roofs (Interview 147).  
422  Although it is frequently argued that Somaliland did not experience the ‘warlord phenomenon’ – partly 
due to the SNM’s military hegemony (Interview 4) and the region’s scarce resources (Interview 63) – 
numerous militias emerged following the defeat of the SNA (Interview 8). This was partly due to the 
“premature voluntary demobilisation of many of the SNM guerrillas, which allowed clan militia forces to 
emerge” (Brickhill 1994:8).  
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had been advantageous during the guerrilla struggle, the absence of a binding, centralized 
command posed a huge problem for regulating security in the war’s aftermath. Military 
control over the territory was exercised by locally dominant militias with very little control 
by central government. The government’s authority was, thus, confined to Hargeysa (Gilkes 
1993),423 and rested on those armed units under command of individuals belonging to the 
new government (Reno 2003a:26).  
Establishing control over roaming militias and expanding state authority by instituting a 
monopoly over the means of violence constituted a central state-making objective for 
«Tuur». The President aimed at unifying the diverse clan militias and transforming them 
into national security forces under central state command (Drysdale 1992b:30; Renders 
2006:202f., cf. ICD 1997:12). Yet, «Tuur’s» attempt to establish state-owned security forces 
provoked tensions within and outside of his administration. The government-critical Calan 
Cas, who still controlled much of the SNM’s military might, did not want to readily cede 
their power to «Tuur» – partly because he belonged to the ‘civilian wing’, and partly because 
the Calan Cas felt increasingly sidelined.424 The first power struggle ensued, when «Tuur» 
moved to create an integrated police force. 
«Tuur» and Vice-President Jama wanted the police under the direct control of the 
presidency but were opposed by the Minister of Defence, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed,425 who 
argued that it should be under the command of his ministry (Renders 2006:202f.). The tug-
of-war between «Tuur» and Kahin was perpetuated when it came to the question of whom 
to appoint as commander of Somaliland’s national army. Although they concurred that the 
 
                                                     
423  Similarly, yet over benevolently, Spears (2010:155) argues that the administration’s writ did “not 
convincingly extend throughout Somaliland.”  
424  Although the President and his representative had been appointed “as administrators who were supposed 
to work within the political programme of SNM” (Renders 2006:202, quoting Boobe Yusuf Ducale) 
«Tuur» “disregarded the political objectives agreed upon at the 1990 [SNM] Congress” (Renders 
2006:210). Feeling constrained by the insurgency movement and its modus operandi, and knowing that his 
powers derived more from his presidency than his SNM chairmanship, he disdained the movement (cf. 
Renders 2006:202, 210). Given that «Tuur» had not provided members of the Calan Cas with any of the 26 
new directorates within the Ministry of Defense – which he allocated to junior officers, intead – the 
complaint of the Calan Cas that they had not been sufficiently rewarded for their role played during the 
struggle was not unfounded (Renders 2006:205f.). 
425  A former colonel in the SNA, Kahin belonged to the Calan Cas faction. Other key members of the 
‘military wing’, who entered into Somaliland politics in the post-1991 era, were Col. Muse Behi Abdi, 
Habib Diriye Noor, Col. Ibrahim Abdullahi Degaweyne, and Dahib Mohamed «Gurey», most of whom 
had been military officers under Barre (Interviews 121, 116). 
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commander should hail from the Habar Awal clan,426 they disagreed as to whom. While 
Kahin suggested his Calan Cas companion Muse Behi Abdi, «Tuur» opted for Hassan Yonis 
Habane, who was more loyal to «Tuur» despite his Calan Cas affiliation (Interview 128). 
The rift within the government widened, when «Tuur» wanted to seize control of the 
militias’ heavy weapons and ordered that all clan forces were to immediately join the 
‘national’ army. Again, the President was confronted by Kahin, who advocated striking a 
careful consensus among the different SNM colonels as well as between them and other 
militia leaders. Therefore, it has to be acknowledged that Kahin’s position was not only 
rooted in the fact that he took the antagonistic environment that prevailed in Somaliland 
into account (Compagnon 1993:15), but was also based on the fact that «Tuur’s» high 
demands regarding demobilization threatened to cripple the power of the Calan Cas. Given 
Kahin’s caution and refusal to toe the party line, «Tuur» sacked his minister, handed the 
latter’s portfolio to Jama (ION 1991; Renders 2006:203), and proceeded with his plans to 
create an integrated national army, “by force if necessary” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8).  
The political brawl over power and resources quickly translated into a clan confrontation, as 
the elites of both sides resorted to clan mobilization to strengthen their positions 
(Interviews 33, 36, 55, 135).427 While «Tuur» could largely count on the support of the 
Garhajis, Kahin greatly relied on his Habar Jalo clan and its militia, of which he was in 
charge (Interview 108). The situation smouldered and then ignited in a “bloody power 
struggle” (Bryden 2003, cf. Renders 2006:212) in January 1992, when the Habar Yonis and 
Habar Jalo clashed in Burco – a town traditionally shared by the two clans. The week-long 
fighting led to some 300 dead, highlighting the weakness of the new government and 
undermining the population’s confidence in the new polity (Bradbury 2008:89). A 
conflagration set in, when Kahin approached the Dhulbahante for support (ION 
29.02.1992), and «Tuur» responded by sacking the only two Dhulbahante ministers. The 
 
                                                     
426  Given that the president was from the Habar Yonis, and the Minister of Defense from the Habar Jalo, it 
was obvious to all involved that, according to the unwritten law of clan balance, a Habar Awal was to be 
chosen (Interview 128).  
427  Bryden and Farah (1996:13) similarly argue that “the choice of violent confrontation seems not to have 
involved clans at all, but remained instead the prerogative of a narrow politico-military elite in both 
camps,” and that “political leaders deftly manipulated clan loyalties in order to broaden support for the 
conflict.” Although they further suggest that clan solidarity overruled the political disarray within the 
clans, there is evidence to the contrary. The Habar Awal, for example, were split along ideological lines. 
One prominent case can be made for Habane, who supported «Tuur» in the Berbera war, even though his 
adversary, «Degaweyne», also hailed from the Habar Awal (Interview 110). Conversely, while «Gaal» and 
«Tuur» both were Habar Yonis, they adhered to opposing political factions.   
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opposition easily increased its support base, particularly, as its resistance was candidly 
supported by a leading member of the SNM Central Committee – Ahmed Mohamed 
Mohamoud «Silanyo».428 
Thus, «Tuur» had failed to establish an integrated security force, a fact that was partly 
ascribed to his continued entertainment of the idea of revoking the declaration of 
independence and rejoining south-central Somalia (Interview 38). Increasingly in danger of 
being toppled, losing ever more control over the hard-line elements of the SNM in 
particular, and the situation in Somaliland more generally, «Tuur» reshuffled his cabinet in 
December 1992.429 Security continued to deteriorate (Flint 1994:37), as every clan 
established its own militia (Interview 63). By 1993, Hargeysa had become more insecure 
than Mogadishu (Interview 108), and competing SNM factions associated with different 
clans started clashing over control of resources throughout the country (Renders/Terlinden 
2010:730, cf. Jimcaale 2005:61).430 
Deficient Resources and the Second Civil War 
Apart from establishing control over the means of violence, mobilizing resources was 
another exigency for the «Tuur» government. As the funds provided by the Somaliland 
diaspora dried up with the victory of the SNM (Bryden/Farah 1996:8; Bradbury 2008:86), 
and given that international recognition and aid were not materializing for the self-styled 
republic, the interim government needed to establish and secure its own revenue streams. 
In light of the manifesting rifts within the government and costly civil war, the undertaking 
of resource mobilization became ever more acute – but also increasingly unrealistic. The 
more clan militias captured revenue-generating assets, the more the government was 
drained of resources.  
 
                                                     
428  «Silanyo» (Isaaq/Habar Jalo) had been the longest-standing SNM chairman, before he was replaced by 
«Tuur», in 1990. «Silanyo» had lobbied for «Tuur» as his successor, as he believed that «Tuur» would be 
easier to defeat politically than any other candidate – such as e.g. Mohamed Hashi Elmi from the Habar 
Awal – once the anti-government war was won (Interviews 103, 110). According to other accounts, 
«Tuur» was brought in by the Calan Cas, because the Habar Yonis had felt sidelined within the SNM 
(Interviews 108, 111). The support «Silanyo» lent to the Calan Cas in the early 1990s was also based on a 
grudge he had against the President, as well as Vice-President, who had been long-standing personal rivals 
(Renders 2006:205).  
429  Designed to revive some credibility, «Tuur» appointed a new cabinet, which saw the replacement of all 
ministers apart from the Vice President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new government was, 
therefore, predominantly composed of newcomers (Renders 2006:211). 
430  This was, for example, the case in Erigavo, where the Habar Yonis and Habar Jalo clashed over 
competing interests (Interview 63). 
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The polity’s greatest economic asset, and the one that could theoretically be most easily 
controlled and profited from, was the port of Berbera. Having sensibly been declared a 
national asset during the Berbera Conference in February 1991, the state of affairs was no 
longer as straightforward roughly one year later, when the Calan Cas were at daggers drawn 
with the government. Due to irregularities concerning the resources generated at the port, 
«Tuur» accused different individuals of the Iisa Muse clan, in whose territory Berbera lay, of 
withholding revenues and decided to confront them. Yet, in the midst of this turmoil, 
«Tuur» left the country for a diplomatic voyage and delegated the operation to Vice-
President Jama – “like a hand grenade with the pin already removed” (Bryden 2003:345). 
History repeated itself when Jama sacked the individuals suspected, amongst them Minister 
of Interior, Suleiman Mohamed Adan «Gaal» (Bryden/Farah 1996:8).431  
The dismissal of «Gaal» added to the grievances voiced by the Calan Cas as well as the 
Habar Jalo clan, as he was related to both groups. The hard-liners did not fail to exploit this 
headstart and quickly nurtured the argument that «Tuur» tried to fortify the political, 
economic, and military power of the Habar Yonis vis-à-vis other clans.432 As after the 
dismissal of Kahin, the Iisa Muse now joined the lament already voiced by the Habar Jalo 
and Dhulbahante – namely that the «Tuur» administration was Garhajis dominated 
(Bradbury 1997:26), thus stripping it of any ‘national’ legitimacy. Consequently, former 
SNM commander and member of the Calan Cas faction Colonel Ibrahim «Dagaweyne» 
pulled the plug on the government’s revenues from the port and brought it under the 
control of his Iisa Muse militia.433 This clearly challenged the government’s authority and 
deprived it of the means to raise revenue and create an army (Bradbury 2008:89). 
In a desperate attempt to stave off financial collapse, the government tried to secure the 
port militarily (Interview 110). History seemed to repeat itself once more, when this sparked 
 
                                                     
431  «Gaal» was alleged to have been indulgent towards a group of organized racketeers, who levied a small 
sum on imports without paying taxes to the treasury (Renders 2006:204). Interestingly, Jama’s 
comportment not only mirrored the action taken by «Tuur» vis-à-vis Kahin, but also the behaviour of 
Barre’s family during the period that the dictator was hospitalized after his car accident in May 1986. In all 
cases, strict clan politics replaced more nuanced decision-making processes. 
432  While it is true that most politicians who were relieved of their posts came from the Habar Jalo clan 
(Bryden/Farah 1996:8), ministers of other clans were also sacked, such as Abdirahman Aw Ali Fara «Tool 
Laawi», Minister of Education, of the Gadabursi (see Renders 2006:205).  
433  Also «Degaweyne» played the card of clan mobilization, inciting the Iisa Muse against the Habar Yonis 
(Brons 2001:248). It is widely acknowledged that while these and subsequent conflicts were rooted 
primarily in political and/or economic interests of certain elites, the elites mobilized their respective clans 
for support, thus putting a clannish spin on the wars (Interviews 30,33, 55).  
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fighting in Berbera in March 1992. The ‘national’ army was challenged by the Iisa Muse 
headed by «Degaweyne» (Interview 108), who bogged down «Tuur’s» attack at Darburuuk, 
about half-way between Hargeysa and Berbera (Renders 2006:205, cf. Horn of Africa 
Bulletin, 3/92). After some eight months of “extensive death and destruction” (Renders 
2006:207, cf. Farah/Lewis 1993:51), «Degaweyne» gained control of the port in August 
1992, and successfully pressed on to Hargeysa, thirty miles north of which his advance was 
stopped by government forces.434 Even if the government had managed to avoid military 
defeat,435 it was economically in dire straits, as alternative revenue streams also ebbed.  
This was, for example, the case for the khat trade, the second most profitable revenue 
stream; «Tuur» was unable to secure this resource for reasons similar to those that had lost 
him control of the port of Berbera. Just as the Iisa Muse controlled the port, it was the Saad 
Muse (related to the Iisa Muse by descent via Habar Awal) who had the greatest leverage 
over the khat business. Although the Saad Muse were not wholly in charge of the khat per 
se, it was their militias who largely controlled the Kalabaydh-Hargeysa corridor.436 While 
Kalabydh was under the authority of the Saad Muse lineage of the Jibril Abokor, comman-
ded by Haybe Omar, Hargeysa was largely controlled by the Saad Muse lineage of Hussein 
Abokor (Interview 118). Their antagonistic attitude towards the government lay largely in 
the fact that the militia leader of the Hussein Abokor was none other than Colonel Muse 
Behi Abdi – another SNM hardliner, who colluded with Kahin, «Dagaweyne», and other 
Calan Cas individuals.437 Hence, «Tuur» came out of the frying pan into the fire when also 
the Saad Muse largely turned against him (Gardner/el Bushra 2004:145ff.). 
Bereft of these two key economic resources and in face of the paucity of international aid, 
the interim government was unable to conduct programmes of disarmament, demobiliza-
tion and reintegration (DDR) and provide security (ACT 1990-92:B371). «Tuur’s» financial 
situation came to be so tenuous that his ‘national’ army even reverted to stealing vehicles 
from INGOs in order to convert them into ‘technicals’ and send them to the fighting zone 
(ION 05/1992; Interviews 8, 108). Having failed to develop a revenue base to finance state 
activities (Bradbury 1997:19; Interview 36), the government became more and more 
 
                                                     
434  Degaweyne was a brilliant infantryman and is said to never have lost a single battle (Interview 110).  
435  Yet, the Berbera war is believed to have cost «Tuur» his presidency in the medium term (Interview 153). 
436  Kalabaydh is a town close to the border to Ethiopia and a centre for khat imports from Ethiopia. 
437  Behi had, in fact, been a key SNM figure and evolved into the most important warlord between 1991 and 
1993 (Interview 108).  
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ineffectual. By October 1992, the situation in Somaliland had deteriorated so much that 
President «Tuur» and UN special envoy to Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, agreed to deploy 
350 peacekeepers to Somalia’s north-west (Renders 2006:206). While the troops were, 
ultimately, not dispatched as Sahnoun resigned from his post and Somaliland managed to 
broker a peace by itself, it shows that the young republic had hit rock bottom.438  
Flimsy Administration and Administrative Fragmentation 
Dwindling government resources were not only inadequate for financing a coercive 
apparatus, undertaking disarmament, and possibly offering spoils to members of the 
opposition, but also significantly weakened «Tuur’s» ability to set up and maintain a 
functioning administration. Several observers assert that during its two-year tenure, the 
government was “without coherent administrative structures” (Omaar 1994:234; Interview 
17) – either at the central or local level (Bradbury 2008:86; Interview 18). Similar to the 
trajectories of security provision and resource mobilization, administration also came to be 
deeply decentralized, weakening the central government.  
Once the Barre government had been overthrown, analysts were quick to point out that “as 
the civil war ‘rolled back’ the Somali state, it produced a situation of extreme decentralisa-
tion rather than anarchy” (Lewis et al. 1995; Menkhaus/Prendergast 1995b). Within the 
Somaliland territory, the numerous ad hoc created ‘councils of elders’ that had formed in 
response to particular local crises were an example of this. In Boroma, a guurti was formed 
to control the clan militia and to mediate with the SNM (Gilkes 1993:40); in Burco, in the 
wake of the city’s violent conflicts; in Erigavo, to replace the local Isaaq-dominated SNM 
administration that lacked cross-clan support in the Sanaag region;439 and in Las Anood, in 
reaction to security incidents involving foreign aid deliveries (Bradbury 1994a:75).440  
These councils differed from one district and region to another (Farah/Lewis 1993:18), but 
had in common that, in the absence of an operational central state administration, they 
 
                                                     
438  Although the fact that Somaliland did not see UN peacekeepers fits well with the ‘difference thesis’, the 
republic is also in this regard less unique than commonly argued. For the town of Luc at the shores of the 
Juba river in southern Somalia, for example, Doyle (1993:40f.) provides a similar narrative.  
439  Sanaag was characterized by political deadlock and it took a series of 16 peace conferences to handle the 
past conflict and improve inter-clan relations (see Renders/Terlinden 2010:739).  
440  This observation reaffirms the argument advanced in Chapter 4 that the guurti were a product of war. The 
formation of ‘councils of elders’ also occurred in different forms in southern Somalia, but the fluid 
military situation there prevented local councils from becoming well established (Gilkes 1992; Gundel 
2006:iv; Menkhaus 1999). 
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“took on the functions of local quasi-administrations, managing militias, mediating disputes, 
administering justice, interacting with international agencies and raising local revenue” 
(Bradbury 2008:86; Spears 2010:155). The Gadabursi guurti, for example, went so far as to 
appoint a local governor and to establish a commercial tax, which financed the militia, the 
hospital, primary schools, and the urban electricity supply.441 Similar actions were taken by 
the guurti in Erigavo which also set up a sub-committee to liaise with international NGOs 
working in the region (Bradbury 1994b). In Bocane, near Las Anood an administrative 
council was set up by Dhulbahante elders from Sool, Sanaag and the Haud in February 
1993, whose task it was to administer security, law, and order, and to manage social and 
economic development (Bradbury 2008:86, 1994a).442  
Thus, the role of the ‘traditional authorities’ was not restricted to peacemaking and 
reconciliation (Brons 2001:248, referring to Farah/Lewis 1993). Although they generally 
recognised that government administration was not their responsibility, they provided the 
seeds of local government in the absence of effective central authority (Bradbury 2008:87). 
However, for the state that was to be built, the formation of such decentralized local-level 
administrative bodies was highly problematic as the government lacked both the authority 
and resources to appropriate these structures and connect them to the central 
administration. As, significantly, «Tuur» “did nothing to either support or to challenge these 
local processes” (Bradbury 2008:87), the government came to be increasingly limited in the 
control it could exercise over the different regions. Hence, rather than being forged 
together during those early years, the young state was characterized by (administrative) 
fragmentation, which provided a ‘highway’ for the revival of regime plurality. 
State-Breaking in the Absence of Regime Domination  
Given the dismal performance of the «Tuur» administration Gilkes (1993) argues that the 
era of the interim government constituted “two wasted years.” Viewed through the regime 
prism this allegation is an understatement. Rather than simply having come ‘full circle’ or 
 
                                                     
441  Overall, the Gadabursi guurti played a role similar in function to the council that had advised the 
Gadabursi ugaas (i.e. highest traditional leader) during the colonial period (Farah/Lewis 1993:23). 
442  Two things are particularly interesting here. First, the timing of the establishment of the guurti in the Sool 
region is noteworthy, as it indicates that by February 1993 the state did still not reach into the hinterland. 
Second, this administrative council was named khussusi, according to the advisory council of «Guray» (the 
‘Mad Mullah’) (Bradbury 2008:86). This fact supports the allegation that 1991-1993 saw a multiplication of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, or a pluralization of the regime ecology, within Somaliland. 
Indeed, civil wars are formative periods with regard to identity, and the Dhulbahante can be said to have 
partly reverted to their historical identity under the ‘Mad Mullah’.  
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‘back to square one’, the «Tuur» era saw a withdrawal from the state-making project that 
had taken off during the anti-Barre war. The one step forward achieved regarding the 
formal establishment of a nascent state was followed by two steps back with regard to 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization.  
The declaration of independence created a mental model that claimed a dominant position 
and “called for a national identity across clan lines” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:730) and was 
nurtured by reference to the former British Protectorate, with whom it shared the same 
territorial delineation. Apart from the colonial history, the image of cultural distinctiveness 
from other parts of Somalia was furthered (Spears 2003:93f.), and the fresh spirit of 
reconciliation, which emerged from diverse peacebuilding initiatives, also “contributed to a 
‘sense of difference’ from war-torn Southern Somalia” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:730). Yet, 
«Tuur» himself did little to cultivate a sense of Somaliland nationalism (Bradbury 2008:87): 
to the contrary, “[t]he ferocity of the fighting damaged public confidence in the new 
Somaliland” (Bradbury 2008:89). By 1993, political organizations representing the Iise 
(United Somali Front, USF), Gadabursi (Somali Democratic Front, SDF) and Harti (United 
Somali Party, USP) publicly signalled their interest in reuniting with Somalia by participating 
in Somalia-wide peace conferences in Djibouti (Bradbury 2008:90). Thus, socio-cognitive 
standardization followed a downward rather than upward slope.  
Institutional standardization followed a similar trajectory. Although the formation of an 
interim government marked the onset of new ‘rules of the game’ to which all communities 
were formally bound to adhere, «Tuur» was unable to enforce the new institutions. Lacking 
the political, administrative and military tools to enforce the new ‘rules of the game’, «Tuur» 
was – in the absence of fiscal and military capabilities – increasingly condemned to observe 
the incremental administrative fragmentation of the political entity. The new state regime 
was outrun by the Calan Cas and ‘traditional authorities’ when it came to making the ‘rules 
of the game’, a situation that resulted in institutional multiplicity. State-making, an 
undertaking that hinges on the introduction and standardization of an authoritative set of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, did not occur during «Tuur’s» presidency. 
Somaliland’s plural regime ecology actually increased in the post-1991 years, for which three 
reasons can be identified.  
First, the «Tuur» government lacked the necessary material, human, and organizational 
resources to enact the newly formed ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. The interim 
leadership failed to access and mobilize resources to finance the establishment of both a 
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monopoly over the means of violence and the central administrative apparatus needed to 
broadcast the new state regime. Rather than the state, it was the Calan Cas and ‘traditional 
authorities’ who presided over the military, economic and administrative spheres (Interview 
36). Second, without sufficient regime capacity to dominate let alone standardize the state 
regime, it also failed to incorporate, co-opt and control those regimes that had those 
capacities. «Tuur» not only gambled away the fragile support of the fragmented SNM,443 but 
also lost the support of the ‘traditional authorities’.444 Although in both cases it was rational 
to keep these power centres at arm’s length, this further constrained «Tuur’s» ability to 
broadcast the state’s institutions and mental model. Third, it is questionable how far «Tuur» 
really was committed to building a Somaliland polity in the first place.445 How could this 
standoff be resolved? 
 
5.2 Shrewd Politics, Civil Wars, and Good Luck (1993-96) 
At the beginning of 1993, Somaliland was further from resembling any kind of statehood 
than had been the case when independence was declared. Somaliland’s proclaimed status as 
a sovereign state was seriously questioned from within and outside, not least because 
important centres of power were contemplating reuniting with the south, the transitional 
government found itself largely incapable of action, and it had barely advanced the 
country’s economy and its citizens’ livelihoods. Moreover, contests over military, political, 
and economic assets had resulted in violent conflicts, which not only contributed to the 
 
                                                     
443  Contributing to this was the fact that «Tuur» chose not to arrange for meetings of the SNM Central 
Committee – which had been transformed into a parliamentary-style national council – throughout 1992, 
even though it was legally bound to meet once every six months (Gilkes 1993). Part of the reason lay in 
disagreements over the clan allocation of seats, a lack of resources, and concerns about a coup (Bradbury 
2008:85f.). Moreover, «Tuur» denied the SNM an infrastructural base in the new state (Renders 2006:210).   
444  On November 12th, 1992, «Tuur» and Ibrahim Megag Samatar, Secretary-General of the SNM, met with 
elders in the Ministry of Interior and agreed that all powers which belonged to the SNM Central 
Committee would be handed over to the guurti. This move had been engineered by «Tuur», and it implied 
that the next president would not be decided at the SNM conference, but in the framework of the clan 
conference in Boroma. Given «Tuur’s» highly fragile stand within the fragmented SNM he thus hoped for 
a better chance of being elected for a second term. Yet, «Tuur» was not the only one trying to manipulate 
the ‘traditional authorities’ who, ultimately, appeased everyone and pursued their own agenda (Renders 
2006:211). 
445  Numerous informants alluded to the fact that «Tuur» was not wholly committed to the idea of an 
independent Somaliland and wanted to rejoin south-central Somalia (Interviews 38, 108). This is also 
evident in the fact that he did not work out a National Charter or Constitution (Interview 112). See also 
fn. 414. 
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country’s further devastation, but also shattered hopes for a more peaceful and stable future 
within the new polity. As in 1991, conferences were held to cease hostilities, re-negotiate 
the allocation of power and discuss the future of the state.446 Hatchets were officially buried, 
wide allegiance to Somaliland officially reaffirmed, and a new (form of) government 
installed. By mid-1993 the situation once again looked promising. 
Indeed, preliminary processes indicative of state-making took place. Newly appointed 
President Egal reappropriated the means of violence, acquired control over major 
economic resources, and expanded the government’s administrative apparatus. Nascent 
institutional standardization was accompanied by burgeoning attempts at socio-cognitive 
standardization, such as a newly introduced flag and currency served as a constant reminder 
of Somaliland’s ‘imagined community’. Nonetheless, this phase was also “difficult and not 
without violence” (WSP 2005:49). While some argue that “[t]he political system adopted at 
Boroma […] guarded against the re-emergence of authoritarian rule” (Bradbury et al. 
2003:462),447 I show that the new President embarked on shrewd authoritarian politics to 
carry through processes of state-making, despite the political consensus crafted at the 1993 
Boroma conference being overtly rejected by some constituencies and the following two 
years being characterized by civil war, bringing Somaliland to the verge of collapse. Why did 
the government emerge from conflict in a position of strength, consolidating the young 
state, and how did this state trajectory differ from the previous one? 
Sheikh, Boroma, and Shuffling the Deck  
The conflicts in Burco and Berbera in 1992 over the allocation of political, military and 
economic power led to nine months of inconclusive fighting, which led to a “situation like 
[in] Mogadishu” (Interview 76). These disputes were addressed at the Tawfiq 
(‘Understanding’) conference in Sheikh between October 28th and November 11th, 1992.448 
Although the conference led to important agreements on essential aspects of internal 
 
                                                     
446  While the prevailing literature suggests that ceasefires, peace, and reconciliation were negotiated by 
‘traditional authorities’ (Prunier 1994:2; Renders 2006:195f.; Bradbury 2008:79), there is evidence that 
SNM cadres and politicians also played a significant role in this regard (Interview 121). 
447  Bradbury 1994; Brons 2002. 
448  The Sheikh conference was embedded in a series of peace and reconciliation meetings in 1992/93. One of 
the most important and successful ones took place in Erigavo and led to reconciliation between the Habar 
Yonis, Habar Jalo, Dulbahante and Warsangeli (cf. Bradbury 1994a, 1997:22; Farah/Lewis 1993; Yusuf 
1996). While the conference took place between August and November 1993, the peace-making process 
continued up to 1995/96 (Interview 156). 
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security provision and resource allocation,449 and Brons (2001:250) argues that it was “a first 
step toward the formulation of a Somaliland state”, it did little to resolve the underlying 
political contestation. The latter was addressed in Boroma, where the second major 
‘national’ conference was held (Renders 2006:212). 
The Shirweynaha Guurtida Beelaha Soomaaliland (‘Conference of Elders of the Communities of 
Somaliland’) took place in parallel with the seventh SNM Congress, which had been 
scheduled to mark the ending of the transitional two-year period. Between late January and 
mid-May 1993, members of the warring factions, ‘traditional authorities’, and hundreds of 
official observers, advisors and others met in order to find a consensus regarding questions 
of security, resource mobilization, and the political future of Somaliland (Brons 2001:250; 
Bradbury 2008:98).450 The conference largely manifested the status quo with regard to the 
patchwork of the different ‘clanistans’ Somaliland had evolved into, as the ‘traditional 
authorities’ asserted their authority and reaffirmed the polity’s decentralized character. 
Ultimately, every clan would have its own local administration (Interview 35).451 
Comparable in importance to Burco 1991 for Somaliland’s state-making project, Boroma 
also evolved into a political thriller, which kept Somaliland on its toes in the years to come.  
This thriller started with the selection of «Tuur’s» successor – a process largely neglected by 
the existing literature, even though it set the stage for numerous political manoeuvres 
throughout the 1990s. While the prevailing literature suggests that the new political 
leadership was chosen in a swift, uncontested and largely harmonious process by the 
‘traditional authorities’,452 the underlying dynamics were much more conflictual. This was 
not surprising given the prevailing plural regime ecology and the fact that power was 
claimed by a minimum of two equipollent factions, rather than just one reasonably coherent 
 
                                                     
449  See Farah/Lewis 1993:57; Brons 2001:249; Gardner/Bushra 2004; APD 2002d; Bradbury 2008:96. 
450  The conference was held under the chairmanship of Sheikh Ibrahim Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Madar, who 
was part of a prominent religious family (Bradbury 2008:98) and had been chairman of the guurti under the 
aegis of the SNM (Interview 108). The prevailing reading of Somaliland’s peace conferences, which 
suggests that their success derived partly from the fact that the conference participants had ‘all the time in 
the world’ to settle disputes, as “in time-honoured Somali fashion time was elastic” (Bradbury 2008:98), 
glosses over the fact that in Somaliland the warring factions also had a staunch interest in resolving the 
conflicts as quickly as possible – in part because the factions had to compensate the conference’s host for 
their expenses for food, shelter, etc. (Interview 88). 
451  In the absence of sufficient state capacity, Sanaag, for example, was governed by a self-appointed 
governor between 1991 and 1997 (Interview 63). 
452  See e.g. Bradbury (2008:100), who leaves it at stating that “[i]n June 1993, the 150-member Guurti selected 
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as Somaliland’s new President, with Colonel Abdirahman Aw Ali as his Vice-
President”, thus glossing over the selection process per se as well as its highly political nature.  
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and uncontested player – as had been the case in 1991. The politics underpinning the 
negotiations over the allocation of political, economic and military power came to resemble 
the continuation of (civil) war by other means. Although the ‘elders’ in general and the 
Gadabursi guurti more particularly have, time and again, been credited for this “watershed 
event in Somaliland” (Bradbury 2008:98), the conference’s political outcome was largely the 
result of a tug-of-war amongst the political elite.453 
The fight over political power principally pitched «Tuur» and the ‘civilian wing’ against the 
Calan Cas. The latter featured Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, an enigmatic figure in Somali 
politics, as presidential candidate. While Egal had held numerous positions during the 
civilian era in the 1960s,454 it was also he who had dismantled the Somali National League 
(SNL) in 1962, stripping the former British Protectorate of Somaliland of its only 
significant political party.455 Moreover, after having served as ambassador to India (1976-78) 
and having been released from a ten-year prison term in 1989,456 Egal sided with the Barre 
regime and “heavily criticised the [SNM] movement, actively denouncing it, and even 
supported Barre’s repressive policies in the Northwest” (Renders 2006:216). When the 
SNM declared independence in 1991, Egal denounced this move as well (Bryden 2003),457 
and accepted an invitation from the Djiboutian government to take part in the July 1991 
peace talks, which aimed to restore a national government in Somalia (Renders 2006:216).458 
Against this background, the Calan Cas’ choice of Egal as candidate was anything but 
obvious, but made sense for a number of reasons. First, Egal’s critical stand on the SNM 
 
                                                     
453  Numerous informants affirmed that it was not the ‘traditional authorities’, but the political, economic and 
military elite who were in charge of the negotiations in Boroma as well as other conferences (Interview 
55), and that the elders were frequently instrumentalized by the respective elites (Interviews 12, 19, 113), 
thus contradicting the prevailing reading (e.g. Renders 2006:196).  
454  Egal originated from one of the wealthiest families in the region (Interviews 12, 104), had been Minister of 
Defense (1960-62) and education (1962-63) before being elected the fourth Prime Minister of Somalia 
(1967-1969). It was under his premiership that corruption and nepotism peaked, contributing to the 
dismantling of the Somali state and the military coup d’état.  
455  The reason why Egal had been chosen as a secretary general of the SNL was that the Habar Yonis wanted 
the Habar Awal to join their party in order to enhance its power. As Egal originated from one of the 
wealthiest families in Somaliland and had some leverage over the Habar Awal, the Habar Yonis settled for 
him. Yet, once incorporated into the SNL, Egal quickly took over. Out of career considerations, Egal later 
left the SNL and took numerous key figures with him into the southern-based SYL (Interview 153). 
456  Egal had been interned for political reasons. 
457  Spears 2010:157; Renders 2006:216. 
458  See also Spears (2010:157), who refers to the ICG (2003:10). Indeed, Egal’s stand on secession was not 
entirely clear. Although his hidden agenda appears to have aimed at a unification of north and south 
Somalia, he could hardly advertise this position as this would have been politically suicidal for a potential 
career in Somaliland (Interviews 14, 72, 88). 
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and the fact that he had never been involved in the rebel organization gave him an aura of 
neutrality, which made him acceptable to communities that were not aligned with the SNM. 
Second, he was from the Isaaq clan of Habar Awal, a clan that not only featured 
prominently amongst the Calan Cas, but also amongst the Isaaq business community. Third, 
and most important for his backers, Egal appeared to be, despite his political weight, one of 
the weakest of all candidates as he was not supported by a specific group from within 
Somaliland. Thus, Egal had not been selected by the guurti simply because he was a 
seasoned politician, who entertained good connections to the international community 
(Interview 113)459 and owed Somaliland its independence (Bradbury 2008:100f.), but he was 
also favoured by the Calan Cas as they thought that they could easily manipulate and rule 
through him (Interviews 14, 143).   
Besides being propped up militarily, Egal’s presidential campaign was also buttressed 
economically: his candidacy was largely financed by the money collected at the port of 
Berbera, which the Calan Cas controlled (Interview 153). He could draw on the financial 
support of numerous Habar Awal businessmen.460 Thus, the fact that Egal had greater 
authority than «Tuur» did not solely derive from his “recognised statesmanship and 
charisma” (Bradbury 2008:115), but also from his strong military and economic backing. 
Ultimately, and after a process that came to be considered unfair by some conference 
participants, Egal was declared President on May 5th, 1993, with a member of the Calan Cas 
faction, Abdirahman Aw Ali, Vice-President (Bradbury 1997:22). Besides a change in power 
– which did not see a ‘civilization’ (Walls 2008:1), but, with the ascendence of the Calan Cas 
rather a ‘militarization’ of power461 – the Boroma conference also witnessed a structural 
change, which was to have important repercussions on the state-making trajectory.  
In a nutshell, the governance structure of the 1991-93 era was changed to a presidential 
system, an alteration driven by the Calan Cas, as they desired a strong executive which they 
 
                                                     
459  Importantly, Egal had good relations with the British. 
460  One of Egal’s key financers was Muse «Fin» (nicknamed after the French tobacco company), who 
controlled the cigarette business at that time. Just like Egal, «Fin» was also from the Habar Awal clan 
(though from the Saad Muse sub-clan) and was connected to Egal through marriage on his wife’s side. 
The cigarette business is highly profitable and individuals controlling it generally control impressive 
amounts of cash (Interview 153). Another key financier was Mohamed Haji Abdillahi Abusita, owner of 
Daallo Airlines (Interview 87). 
461  In light of this observation, it is questionable how far the conflicts of the early 1990s did, in fact, 
drastically alter the balance of power against the SNM, as Renders and Terlinden (2010:730), amongst 
others, have it. It rather appears that the hardline members of the SNM emerged from conflict as winners 
(Interview 153). 
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could manipulate and its separation from the legislature (Interviews 36, 113). The 
‘traditional authorities’ also emerged from the conference considerably strengthened 
(Interview 153). Having evolved into key protagonists on the sub-national level with regard 
to political and military aspects, the ‘traditional authorities’ were institutionalized in the 
form of a national guurti (Interview 36).462 Besides creating a House of Elders, the National 
Charter agreed in Boroma established a House of Representatives as the second component 
of a bicameral legislative body, as well as an independent judiciary (APD 2002b:23). 
Acknowledging the clan as the basic organizing principle of society, a beel system of 
governance was chosen for the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives.463  
Enhancing Regime Capacity through Shrewd Power Politics  
Once renegotiated, the new state regime needed to be implemented. Yet, the tasks that Egal 
had to shoulder were no less daunting than those that had confronted «Tuur» two years 
earlier, largely because of the still prevailing plural regime ecology. While Egal had the 
benefit of siding with, rather than fighting against, the militarily and economically powerful 
Calan Cas, it was, simultaneously, a doubtful benefit. Not only did the Calan Cas’ 
predominance in the new government evoke the formation of a strong opposition, but also 
the politically victorious hardliners restricted Egal’s scope of action, leaving the latter to 
complain that he was held hostage by the Calan Cas (Interview 142). Despite these 
challenges, the new President made some headway in subsequent years, particularly with 
regard to security, resource mobilization and administration (Bradbury 2008:109).  
 
                                                     
462  This guurti came to be the highest organ of the new state, the final arbiter in institutional and political 
conflicts, and the most prominent and formalized element of its ‘hybrid political order’ (Jimcaale 2005:74; 
see also Renders 2006:213, cf. Farah/Lewis 1993:7). Its seats were “proportionally allocated to clans, 
according to a formula that had been devised at the 1990 Baligubadleh SNM Congress for allocating seats 
in the organization’s central committee, and expanded to include non-Isaaq and minority clans” (Bradbury 
2008:99; Mesfin 2009:5), itself based on records of the British colonial administration (see Adam 
1999:270). During the interim period of 1991/92, the guurti did not constitute a standing committee, but 
acted solely on an ad-hoc basis (Interview 103). Yet, while fortifying the guurti’s influence on processes of 
state-making, the new governance structure also foreshadowed the beginning of the political displacement 
of the ‘traditional authorities’ as independent actors within Somaliland (Renders/Terlinden 2010:731). 
463  In essence, the beel system has been described as a ‘dynamic hybrid of Western form and traditional 
substance’ (Jimcaale 2005) and established a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland’s main clans. The 
allocation of seats was based on principles of proportional representation, pluralism and ‘autonomy’, 
which also gave smaller and minority clans a better representation (APD 2002:23). Originally intended as a 
transitional arrangement for two years only, it lasted a decade. For a full description of this see Lewis et al. 
1995. However, these clan-based political arrangements were to generate new problems, as factionalism 
along clan lines took on the age-old character of clan competition (Bradbury 2008:100). 
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Increasing Resource Mobilization 
Upon taking power, one of Egal’s priorities lay in the mobilization of revenues to finance 
the state-making project. Until he could establish a steady revenue stream, he drew on 
alternative sources in order to keep the government’s day-to-day operations going and 
initiate first policies. Having already secured the support of important Isaaq businessmen at 
the Boroma conference, Egal called on Mohamed Omar Tani «Mullah», whom he asked to 
organize a multi-million US dollar loan,464 assuring the entrepreneur that the financiers 
would get their money back within six months. Supplied by mainly Djibouti-based 
businessmen (Interviews 99, 153), Egal paid them back through tax exemptions. The 
tradesmen furthermore gained in that they practically monopolized the trade between 
Berbera, Hargeysa, Ethiopia, and Djibouti (Bradbury 2008:112), and created a tool of long-
term market control (Renders/Terlinden 2010:732). Egal thus attracted the business 
community to invest in Somaliland.465  
A second major resource stream originated from the introduction of a proper currency, the 
Somaliland Shilling, in October 1994. While the adoption of a new currency had already 
been envisaged under the «Tuur» administration, it was only realized with further financial 
input from the Habar Awal traders (Renders/Terlinden 2010:731). The benefit of the 
Somaliland Shilling lay not only in the government’s ability to better manage the country’s 
economy and fiscal household, but it also produced a considerable financial windfall for the 
government (Bradbury 2008:112).466 At the same time, it came to cost numerous 
 
                                                     
464  The exact amount of the loan is unknown, but believed to be between two million (Interview 153) and 
seven million US dollars (Bradbury 2008:112). See also Interview 99.   
465  Even though Egal was a skillful and well-connected politician, it has to be acknowledged that he was also 
lucky. When he took power, the Isaaq business community found itself under intense political pressure 
from Hassan Guled, President of Djibouti. Similarly, Isaaq living in the Kenyan NFD suffered from 
discrimination, particularly after Daniel Arap Moi came to power with the help of Somali Oromos. With 
Somaliland having regained a certain level of stability, the Isaaq businessmen opted for investing there, 
rather than Djibouti or Kenya. Furthermore, the Habar Awal community was very much united in 1993, 
as they perceived Somaliland to be their project (Interview 153).  
466  The introduction of the Somaliland Shilling has been labelled “the biggest robbery in the 20th century” 
(Interviews 24, 30; Bradbury 1997:24ff.) and brought about the bankcrupcy of thousands of small, middle-
class businesses. Given that the Saad Muse constituted the power base of the Egal government, it is 
interesting to note that the vast majority of those who fell victim to the introduction of the Somaliland 
Shilling were Saad Muse (Interview 149). The new legal tender was largely confined in its acceptance to 
Hargeysa and Berbera, partly because one of Somaliland’s tycoons, Indah Dheero, strongly objected to the 
new currency as it negatively affected his livestock business with south-central Somalia. Together with 
former SNM chairman «Silanyo» and former chairman of the guurti, Saleban, he advised his Habar Jalo 
clansmen in Burco not to accept the Somaliland Shilling, as they feared that it would have disastrous 
effects on the business community (Interviews 36, 104, 149). However, other businessmen, such as Musa 
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businessmen dearly and the inequality the introduction of the new currency produced was a 
key reason for the outbreak of civil strife shortly thereafter (Interview 36).  
Thirdly, Egal reverted to his sub-clan network in order to access further resources. As the 
main revenue generating assets were under the control of the Habar Awal and/or key Calan 
Cas militia leaders, Egal found it much easier to access the state’s most profitable revenue 
streams compared to his predecessor (Interview 118).467 At the same time, regional 
developments played, once more, into the hands of Egal. First, as the southern ports of 
Kismayo and Mogadishu closed down due to conflict, Berbera ascended to probably the 
most important Somali port (Interview 114). Second, Egal was lucky in that Somaliland’s 
economy benefited from the revival of the livestock export trade when the Saudi Arabian 
market reopened to Somali meat. In order to draw on the port’s resources, Egal created the 
Berbera Port Authority in 1993, setting it up in such a way that part of the revenues flowed 
directly into the President’s office,468 eluding political control by the legislature. While this 
provided Egal with an immediate revenue stream of approximately USD 10-15 million per 
year, it led to accusations of corruption and impeachment hearings later in the 1990s 
(Bradbury 2008:111).469  
Egal also tapped the khat trade. Customs generated from khat constituted not only the 
second most profitable source of revenue, but were also a reasonably easy tax to levy, as 
most of the mild stimulant passes through the town of Kalabeydh close to the Ethiopian-
Somaliland border.470 Given that this town and its environs fell largely under the control of 
the Habar Awal militias, Egal could relatively easily establish a number of checkpoints and 
revenue offices to collect charges from the traders. Despite the levy put on the narcotic leaf 
by the government, its cost actually fell as the Egal administration eliminated the militia 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Dalab of the Iisa Muse, profited greatly from the new currency, as Egal allowed them to do business with 
the confiscated Somali Shillings (Interview 104).  
467  See Zierau (2003:60) who depicts how the Somaliland state largely came to be captured by a small Habar 
Awal elite, which “completely privatized” the state, as “[t]hey obviously want a weak state” (Prunier 1992, 
cf. WSP 1999:37f.; Interview 12). 
468  While custom duties levied on the import and export of goods fell to the Ministry of Finance, the 
revenues generated from service charges came under the presidency. This way, Egal could assure his 
Habar Awal/Iisa Muse clansmen that ‘their’ revenue remained under their clan control (Interview 118). 
469  “According to the director of Somaliland’s customs, Hassan Ahmed ‘Embassy’, in the first ten days of 
government control, the revenue collected from the port of Berbera amounted to 500 million Somali 
Shillings (US$150,000)” (Warsame/Brons 1994:25). These figures are supported by Mubarak (1997:2040), 
who states that the Berbera port revenue was estimated to be around USD 30,000 daily. 
470  This has largely to do with the fact that khat needs to be consumed quickly after it has been harvested, as 
it is “largely ineffective on the human body after 48 hours” (Hansen 2009:24). Thus, khat traders choose 
to import the substance via Kalabeydh, as this constitutes the quickest route into Somaliland.  
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extortion that had kept prices relatively high during «Tuur’s» reign (Flint 1994:38; Interview 
109). In fact, the government generated roughly ten per cent of its income from taxing the 
khat trade – in the early 1990s this was estimated to be worth USD 137 million in Hargeysa 
alone and USD 250 million for Somaliland as a whole (Gilkes 1995, cf. Bradbury 2008:112).  
Although Egal could generate resources in Berbera and Kalabeydh, he despised the fact 
that his revenue streams were dependent on the respective clans and their militiamen. 
Consequently, he tried to cut out the middlemen and establish more direct control, starting 
by reshuffling the individuals in charge. After having left the customs checkpoint in Kala-
beydh under the control of the militia of Habib Diriye Noor, an Calan Cas of the Habar 
Awal/Saad Muse/Jibril Abokor, for about six months, he transferred Habib’s friendly head 
of customs to Berbera and that of Berbera to Kalabeydh.471 While not stripping them of 
their positions, Egal had started to undermine the control each sub-clan had over the 
revenues generated. From then on, Egal practiced the reshuffling of administrators.  
Although Egal’s astuteness of approach was key to his success, his efforts to bring these 
revenues under his control was facilitated by the fact that the Garhajis, who had largely 
supported «Tuur», took a hostile position towards the new government and refused to 
relinquish their control over Hargeysa airport and its customs to Egal. This attitude was 
very much a tit-for-tat response to the Calan Cas’ denial in 1992/93 to allow «Tuur» access 
to the resources in Berbera and beyond. Consequently, the Habar Awal clan in general, and 
the Calan Cas in particular, responded to this challenge of the opposition by giving their 
President full support for his policies – hence allowing him to also draw amply on the 
resources of the Kalabeydh checkpoint in order to defeat the Garhajis (Interview 118). 
Consequently, Bryden and Farah (1996:8) judge that “tax collection is carried out effectively 
in areas that come under the sway of ‘Igal’s administration.” For September 1996 it was 
estimated that government revenue amounted to USD 10 million, rising towards USD 15 
million, thus having largely improved compared to previous years (Bradbury 1997:24). 
Usurping the Means of Violence 
Conference deliberations on security had culminated in the Axdiga Nabadgalayada ee Beelaha 
Soomaaliland (‘Somaliland Communities Peace Charter’), which laid down provisions for 
 
                                                     
471  Also the Iisa Muse militia that controlled the port of Berbera was given an extra six months (June to 
December 1993) to take revenue from the port, before it was to become a national asset (Interview 132). 
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peace agreements that were to be mediated by a national multi-clan guurti (Bradbury 
2008:98; Renders 2006:213, referring to APD 2002:23). Having identified the ‘traditional 
authorities’ as those actors who were ultimately responsible for controlling the clan militias 
(Interview 16), they were also given the obligation to remove them from major towns, 
dissolve existing roadblocks, form local police forces and settle outstanding disputes 
(Renders 2006:213; Bradbury 2008:99).472 With regard to the removal of clan-based 
checkpoints, Egal put particular emphasis on removing the roadblocks between Kalabeydh, 
Hargeysa and Berbera, the country’s main economic corridor. Although some of the 
militias initially objected to government authority, going so far as an attempt on the Finance 
Minister’s (Abdullahi Mohamed Duale) life, they finally gave in (Interview 132).  
In the wake of the Sheikh Conference, which brought the conflict over Berbera to an end 
in October 1992, Somaliland’s first police forces were established in Hargeysa, Gabiley, and 
Boroma (Bradbury 2008:97).473 This was the result of a consultation between the Ministry of 
Interior, and militia leaders, as well as the ‘elders’, who had a major say in selecting those 
individuals who were to participate in the formation of the national police force (Interview 
35). The different actors agreed that the Somaliland Police Forces were to be made up of 
some 60 per cent militia clan forces, 30 per cent police officers that had served in the 
former Somalia Police Forces under Barre, while the remaining ten per cent were to be 
allocated to civilians and members of certain clans (Interviews 15, 35). In the end, the new 
police force was mainly recruited among former militia fighters, as they not only constituted 
the most potent, but also most dangerous population group (Interview 42). Thus, the 
nascent and rather self-styled ‘police force’ of some 320 policemen474 that had existed under 
the «Tuur» administration in 1991 was enlarged to such an extent that by the early 1990s 
around 4,000 policemen had been registered. 
As the Boroma conference had led to provisions for a localized approach to establishing 
peace and security, and because Egal did not want to upset either the ‘traditional authorities’ 
 
                                                     
472  The influential role of the traditional authorities on the clan militias appears to continue to the present. 
According to a member of the NDC there are monthly meetings between the traditional authorities and 
other state organs – namely the ministries of defense, interior and justice – in order to advance the DDR 
process (Interview 6). It is also interesting to note that the Somaliland Peace Charter of 1993 stated in Art. 
IX, Para. 2 that “[i]t is incumbent upon every community to wage a relentless war against the armed 
bandits operating in its own locality and to secure and preserve its own security and stability”, thus 
disclosing that state-making was as much about using force as negotiating peace.  
473  According to a Somaliland National Police Law Enforcement Advisor, the Somaliland police force was 
established in 1993 (Interview 35). 
474  All of these policemen originated from Hargeysa (Interview 45). 
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nor the Calan Cas at an early stage, he initially announced that he had no intentions to 
centralize control over security forces or to form a national army. Yet, once Egal had 
established himself in office and secured sources of revenue, he launched efforts to take 
control over the coercive means. To this effect, he engaged in a major programme of DDR, 
but approached this delicate matter in a manner different from «Tuur». Not only did Egal 
pay off the owners of the technical (Interview 12),475 but he also bargained to assemble the 
clan militias in cantonment sites in order to retrain and absorb them into Somaliland’s new 
security forces, or provide them with skills for civilian life instead (Bradbury 2008:113). 
Most of the young polity’s first revenue was thus largely used to finance the DDR effort 
(Warsame/Brons 1994:25), and Egal, once again, committed businessmen to financially 
support this endeavour (Bradbury 1997:23). 
Acknowledging the highly political nature of demobilization, Egal used politics rather than 
blunt pressure to commit the diverse clans and their militias to the project. Having officially 
declared that DDR should be voluntary (Interview 107), the President approached the Isaaq 
clan of the Arap to demobilize first (Interviews 118, 141). The rationale for having this 
particular clan setting the process of demobilization in motion lay in the fact that the Arap 
had a clear interest in shifting control over coercive capacity from the clan to the state. 
Inhabiting a particularly resource-poor area, they had little to fight for and were in no 
position to defy other clan militias. In order to establish a level playing field as quickly as 
possible, Sultan Mohamed Farah agreed to lead the process of demobilization. This created 
pressure on other clans to follow suit, and, in early 1994, a well-staged ceremony was held 
in the Hargeysa football stadium, in which some clans publicly handed over their weapons 
to the government, which constituted an “important symbolic event in the process of 
consolidating the Somaliland state” (Bradbury 2008:114; Interviews 107, 114).476 
Apart from skilfully engineering demobilization, Egal also oversaw the establishment of the 
National Demobilisation Commission (NDC) in 1993 (Brickhill 1994:2).477 The NDC was 
chaired by Somaliland’s Vice-President, «Tool Laawi», and the government appointed Ali 
Mohamed Yusuf «Gurey», another Calan Cas of the Habar Awal clan, as executive director 
 
                                                     
475  At the same time, it is to be noted that the Boroma conference had ruled that all heavy weapons were to 
be handed over to the state (Interview 8). 
476  Had Egal alternatively approached e.g. the Habar Awal to demobilize first, other Isaaq clans would 
probably have thought that Egal simply wanted to turn the Habar Awal militias into his new army, and 
would probably have rejected joining the demobilization effort (Interview 118).   
477  Back then the NDC was called the Technical Committee on Security and Demobilization.  
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(Brickhill 1994:3; Interview 8).478 Although it has been claimed that Somaliland constituted a 
case of ‘autonomous recovery’ (Weinstein 2005a), it did receive important support from the 
international community: Egal’s DDR programme benefited from some Zimbabwean 
advisors (Interview 8) and the salaries of the NDC, for example, were paid by the UN 
through the Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction at least through 
to 2008 (Interviews 3, 6).479 Having commenced on February 1st, 1994, the NDC soon 
claimed that it had acquired three-quarters of the heavy weapons from five brigades in 
Hargeysa and western Somaliland, and that as many as 5,000 militia members had already 
been demobilized (Bradbury 2008:114, referring to Nyathi 1995:27).480 Although DDR and 
the formation of a national army had proceeded apace, the process was not uncontested.  
It was not before long that those opposed to the new government in general, and the Calan 
Cas in particular, accused Egal of having gone against the Peace Charter, which laid out 
decentralized security provisions. Thus, the Garhajis sub-clans who had supported «Tuur» 
rejected demobilization, rendering the NDC unacceptable in areas they controlled 
(Interviews 7, 38).481 Demobilization also had little success around Burco and did not take 
place in Sool or eastern Sanaag (Bradbury 2008:114).482 As alluded to before, two Garhajis 
units tightened their military control over Hargeysa airport, which lies in the territory of the 
Garhajis lineage of the Eidagalle, mirroring the earlier stance of certain Habar Awal militias 
under «Tuur» (Interview 8). Their non-compliance with Egal’s policies was likely to spark 
renewed conflict – an issue to which we shall return shortly. 
 
                                                     
478  However, there are allegations that the Ministry of Resettlement, Reintegration and Reconstruction was 
not effectively overseeing the work of the NDC, which largely explains the NDC’s ineffectiveness 
(Interview 3). Yet, it should not be forgotten that the NDC had only 36 members of staff throughout 
Somaliland, and that it always relied on the collaboration of local NGOs to carry out its mandate 
(Interview 6). 
479  In the early 1990s, Somaliland leaders anticipated substantial assistance for DDR from UNOSOM, which 
had a mandate and a USD 18 million budget (Bradbury 1994a:82). However, the USD 25,000 per month 
requested by the Somaliland government to carry out DDR never materialized (cf. Flint 1994:37). In its 
absence, the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, CARE, Oxfam and the Swiss Group 
supported the state’s DDR efforts (Bradbury 1997:23; Interview 8).  
480  On the DDR process, see also Brickhill (1994).  
481  Similarly to the attitude of the Calan Cas two years earlier, the Garhajis objected to demobilization, as 
their military prowess constituted their only political leverage, given that they had been politically 
displaced during the Boroma conference. Demobilization thus would have amounted to complete political 
defeat (Interview 14). 
482  Part of the reason why the Dhulbahante never disarmed lay in an agreement struck by Egal and Colonel 
Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, who became President of the semi-autonomous Puntland State of Somalila, 
which foresaw that neither one of them would extend their authority to Las Anood, in order to avoid 
conflict between Somaliland and Puntland and a destabilization of the region (Interview 141). 
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By March 1994, the 1st Brigade of the new national army was operative, and eighteen 
months later, estimates put the number of uniformed and armed soldiers as high as 15,000 
(Bradbury 1997:23).483 While the military forces had been centralized, the police forces 
established in early 1994 remained decentralized for several years, and the 300 member 
strong police force under the command of Colonel Jirif of the Habar Awal/Saad Muse/ 
Jibril Abokor was confined to Hargeysa (Interview 118).484 In Gabiley, Berbera and Burco, 
separate police forces of roughly 70, 100 and 200 officers respectively were established 
(Interview 141). Whereas the army quickly saw a mixing of different clans,485 the police 
units remained largely homogeneous in terms of clan composition for a long time 
(Interview 141). Nevertheless, DDR fell short of being a total success. In early 1995, an 
informed estimate suggested that some 10,000 militia members remained to be demobilised 
(Gilkes 1995, cf. Bradbury 1997:23), and efforts to do so were set back by the outbreak of 
war in late 1994, which led to a remobilization along clan lines (Bradbury 2008:115). 
Centralizing Administration 
Rapid progress was also made regarding the establishment of the state’s administrative 
architecture. Just as the advances in resource mobilization and security had been mutually 
dependent, the enhancement of central administration was similarly interlinked with these 
two issues. This was partly because Egal used civil service positions as bait for 
demobilization, as not only security personnel, but also civil servants were largely drafted 
from the ranks of the SNM militias. Although this meant that the administrative apparatus 
consisted of a majority of generally untrained and unskilled individuals (Interview 18), it 
significantly contributed to the provision of security. In the words of one member of staff 
of the Civil Service Institute (CSI), “[c]ivil service recruitment was part of the process of 
peace building, of rehabilitation and demobilisation of militias” (Interview 131; see also 
Interview 12). As civil servant positions were awarded to those who disarmed first, the civil 
service was quickly captured by the Isaaq (Interview 138).  
Even though Egal managed to appoint customs officers and establish a number of offices 
(Bradbury 1997:23), the government’s writ was still largely confined to western Somaliland. 
 
                                                     
483  The creation of the military and police forces was a true demobilization process. “The soldiers were hired 
if they had a big gun […]. Anyone with no gun wasn’t registered as national army soldier” (Interview 78). 
484  It is worth noting that the salaries of the 300 strong police force in Hargeysa were paid for by UNOSOM 
(Interview 141). 
485  Yet, it remains questionable to what extent the Habar Yonis and Eidagalle clans formed part of this new 
‘national’ army. 
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Therefore, and because the state could not afford to entertain a fully-fledged administrative 
apparatus stretching throughout Somaliland, the government started to develop functional 
local government structures, with responsibilities for revenue collection and municipal 
administration (Bradbury 2008:111).486 In order to establish a legal basis for a stronger 
relationship between the centre and the regions, the government attempted to redraft 
Article 21 of the National Charter in early 1995. This, however, was blocked by parliament, 
as the parties could not agree on issues of political representation and financial 
responsibilities. While local councils were happy to receive financial support from the 
central government for services including the police and education, they also wanted to 
retain their rights to make local government appointments without central government 
involvement. Eventually, backed by much financial and military capacity, Egal was able to 
make appointments centrally (Bradbury 2008:120). 
In his attempt to bring administration under the aegis of the central government, the 
President also aimed at removing elders’ initiatives, which had taken care of matters locally 
regarding administration and governance (see above).487 While ‘traditional authorities’ in 
Boroma, for example, had set up social services in co-operation with NGOs and negotiated 
development projects with international agents on their own, Egal emphasized that the 
state administration should deal with such things. Hence, international NGOs were 
required to move their headquarters to the capital of Somaliland or lose their permit to 
work within the polity’s borders (Renders/Terlinden 2010:733).488  
Apart from trying to capture local administration, Egal also started building a professional 
administrative apparatus at the central state level.489 In 1993, the President oversaw the 
 
                                                     
486  This decentralized approach to administrative reform occurred not only out of necessity, but was also 
stipulated by the fact that a constitution, which would have regulated the relationship between the national 
and regional levels, had not yet been adopted.  
487  A particular case in point concerns the regional administration of Erigavo. The Erigavo Peace Charter 
entailed provisions for the formation of a regional government – partly because the national state 
administration was much too weak to broadcast its power to Erigavo, and partly because the Habar Yonis 
(the dominant clan in Erigavo, which forms part of the Garhajis confederation) opposed the rule of 
President Egal. Thus, administrative power remained with the local elites beyond central state control. It 
was not until 1997 that the central government established some nascent control over Erigavo, which 
remained, however, largely under the control of the local administration, making it very difficult for Egal 
to (profoundly) influence the situation in Sanaag (Interview 156).  
488  Amongst the first INGOs on the ground in Somaliland were Save the Children (UK) and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (Interview 43). Egal’s effort to take control of such localized approaches to development 
mirror, to some extent, Barre’s demands towards the Ufo group in the 1980s.  
489  The recruitment of civil servants by competitive examination was, however, hindered by imminent civil 
strife in Hargeysa in 1993. Thus, rather than having civil servants recruited centrally through the Civil 
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establishment of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), through which some 800 civil 
servants were employed (Interviews 41, 138). In the sphere of administration, Bradbury 
(2008:111) makes the following assessment: 
“During the first two years of Egal’s premiership, government ministries were 
revitalised, offices were refurbished, morning and afternoon work hours were 
instituted, and a Civil Service Commission was created. Ministerial and civil 
service staff (which numbered about 2,500 in 1995) received regular salaries, as 
did MPs, the police and the army […]. A judicial system of regional and district 
courts was put in place, utilising the 1960 penal code.”  
Thus, it was judged that “Egal’s achievements in creating a functioning administration were 
considerable” (ibid. 1997:22). Similarly, others argue that while the period of the interim 
government was chaotic, law and order were established during Egal’s reign (Interview 78). 
Yet, the conflicts that were to erupt in subsequent months inhibited the further 
development of an administrative apparatus, particularly one that would have managed to 
reach out into and administratively incorporate the country’s eastern regions. This would 
have been particularly important given that the inhabitants of Sool and Sanaag felt largely 
marginalized in the Somaliland state, particularly after «Tuur» had been ousted. As a result, 
many Habar Yonis politicians ‘opted out’ of the central government, and the Habar Yonis 
militia clashed with government-aligned Habar Jalo troops in the neighbouring Togdheer 
region, blocking government access to the eastern regions for years (Gilkes 1995:11f.; Peace 
Committee for Somaliland 1995:6). 
War as State-Making by Other Means  
While euphoria had followed the successful conclusion of the Boroma conference 
(Bradbury 2008:109) and Egal managed to bolster his position and advance the state-
making project by securing revenues, improving security and building a nascent 
administration, the new polity remained fragile (Bradbury 2008:115). One of the challenges 
accrued from the fact that  
“the benefits of sovereign statehood that were expected to flow from the 
declaration – the ability to receive foreign aid, the ability to defend itself from 
external threats (most notably a desire of the south to reassert their authority), 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Service Commission (CSC), the different ministries hired personnel themselves, with the consequence that 
between 1993 and 1995 the civil service structure became increasingly bloated. While by the end of 1996, 
some 6,000 individuals were employed by the state, it was estimated that only a total of 3,750 staff were 
needed at that point in time (Interview 41). 
5   THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF SOMALILAND 
 
179 
 
and the ability to preserve the unity of the northern people – were not 
immediately forthcoming” (Spears 2010:151). 
Somaliland’s state-making project was, in fact, torpedoed from within and without. Due to 
the protracted internal struggles Somaliland experienced, UNOSOM, for example, did not 
recognize the legitimacy of the Boroma conference, sponsoring instead alternative 
leaderships, which contributed directly to the destructive round of civil strife in 1994-96 
(APD 1999:21). Of more immediate significance, however, was that the Egal government 
also stood on shaky grounds ‘nationally’.   
A key structural challenge for the young polity and its potential to carry through nation-
wide processes of regime standardization arose from the decentralized character Somaliland 
had taken during the 1991-93 period, which was corroborated at the Boroma conference. 
While Egal managed to consolidate state authority in Somaliland’s ‘heartland’,490 he 
struggled to render it meaningful in the ‘hinterland’. When the government tried to 
establish control over Zeyla491 to set up tax checkpoints, for example, sporadic clashes with 
the Iisa militia occurred.492 It was only in August 1995 that Egal asserted his power in the 
west (Bradbury 2008:116). Similar problems arose in the east, as the Harti clans remained 
critical of political developments: even though one of their members had been appointed 
Speaker of Parliament, they felt politically alienated (Bradbury 2008:100).493 Although 
problematic, this structural challenge was overshadowed by two political challenges from 
within the Isaaq clan family.  
In the wake of the Boroma conference, the supporters of the previous administration went 
into an opposition equally as strong as that the Calan Cas had posed to «Tuur». The 
Garhajis claimed that the process that had propelled Egal to power had been unfair. They 
were, however, additionally aggrieved by Egal’s choice of ministers, which not only fell 
short of Garhaji representatives, but also featured individuals that had violently challenged 
the «Tuur» government in 1992 (Bradbury 2008:101; Spears 2010:156; Interview 149).494 
 
                                                     
490  The ‘heartland’ is conceived of comprising the Kalabeydh-Hargeysa-Berbera corridor. 
491  Zeyla is a coastal town on the border with Djibouti and the third most important customs point in 
Somaliland (Interview 44). 
492  The Iisa militia received backing from Djibouti and Gadabursi from Ethiopia’s Somali Region.  
493  It should be acknowledged that the Harti were the second most powerful clan confederation after the 
Isaaq until 1993, which is when they were replaced in importance by the Gadabursi – partly signified by a 
Gadabursi and not a Harti becoming vice-president (Interviews 103, 108).  
494  “For the Garhajis the beel system adopted at Borama had not resolved the issue of power-sharing, and 
their objections to it highlighted the complexities of a system of proportional representation based upon 
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Furthermore, in light of the fact that Egal had started to centralize control over financial 
and military capacity, they claimed his government violated the National Charter (Bradbury 
2008:116). Consequently, only one month after the inauguration of the Egal government, 
the political consensus reached in Boroma was in shatters and the scuffle between different 
Isaaq and SNM-factions continued, manifesting in the Habar Yonis and friendly Warsangeli 
leaders refusing the two ministerial posts offered to them.495  
In July 1993, the fragile political situation grew more acute, when a number of Habar Yonis 
leaders gathered in Burco. At the meeting known as the ‘Liiban Congress I’ they also 
decided not to take up their seats in Parliament, and announced that they were not bound 
by the laws of Somaliland (Bradbury 2008:116). They withdrew their support for and 
cooperation with the Egal administration and, a year later, even declared Somaliland’s 
government illegitimate (Spears 2010:156; Garowe Online 2007). Their objection to the 
new government went so far that General Jama Mohamed Ghalib «Yare»496 and «Tuur» 
announced their preference for a renewed federation with Somalia (Interviews 2, 142), 
which led to the restoration of their relationship with the southern faction leader Aideed, 
which had initially been formed during the struggle against Barre (Spears 2010:156). 
The ‘War Project’  
In order to express their opposition to the Egal-led government in more than words, two 
Garhajis militias497 under the leadership of «Yare» tightened their control over the airport of 
Hargeysa in the summer of 1994 (Interview 149). They justified their claim not only by 
arguing that the airport fell into their clan territory, but also by making reference to the 
National Charter, which stipulated local security arrangements. In defiance of the 
government, they demanded extortionate landing fees and other charges from Somali and 
international travellers. “Even the efforts of ‘Iidagale elders to persuade the militia to 
 
                                                                                                                                     
lineages” (Bradbury 2008:117). Amongst the central Calan Cas figures Egal accommodated in his cabinet 
was the notorious warlord Muse Behi Abdi, Dayib Mohamed Gurey, as well as former Minister of 
Interior, «Gaal», whom «Tuur» had sacked for having withheld revenues of the port of Berbera.  
495  The Eidagalle sub-clan of the Garhajis was only offered one ministerial post, the perceived distinctly 
uninfluential Ministry of Religion (Interview 108). 
496  Having been chief of the Somali police forces and occupied diverse posts under Barre, «Yare» is a 
prominent Eidagalle politician. He opposed Somaliland’s independence and has participated in several 
governments formed in Mogadishu.  
497  To be precise it was the Kood Bur (Eidagalle) and Saddexaad (Habar Yonis) militias. However, it should 
also be noted that these wars did not originate from clan antagonism, but that certain elites mobilized their 
respective clan networks to gather support. In the words of one interviewee, “[i]t is the elite who needs 
the tribe” (Interviews 24, 30, 33).  
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surrender the airport to government control failed to elicit co-operation, confirming 
allegations that they received support and encouragement from members of the federalist 
group” (Bryden/Farah 1996:9).498  
Although political issues lay at the heart of the dispute, it also carried economic 
connotations (Interviews 19, 36). Historically, the Habar Awal were prominent 
businessmen, who resided in urban areas, had well-established links with Djibouti, and 
engaged in commodity trade. The Habar Yonis, for their part, have historically been more 
prominent in government, and the Garhajis and Habar Jalo generally dominated the 
livestock trade.499 Hence, by taxing and harassing commercial and aid flights, the Garhajis 
militia interfered in the business of the Habar Awal entrepreneurs living in Hargeysa, who 
were crucial to Egal’s ability to establish and maintain government capacity (Bradbury 
2008:119). Thus, in many ways, the challenges Egal faced resembled the conflict «Tuur» had 
fought in Berbera two years earlier.  
What ultimately sparked the fighting is open to debate. While some cite the introduction of 
the Somaliland currency as the last straw (Interview 36), others argue that the conflict was 
elicited by the recruitment of Gadabursi militias into the ‘national’ army (Bradbury 1997: 
25), or their resistance to the Egal’s disarmament efforts (Interview 7).500 In any case, the 
prevailing literature suggests that the violence that erupted in November 1994 was solely 
aimed at breaking the Garhajis opposition and advancing the government’s authority in the 
name of its state-making project. Restricted to this aspect, however, the dominant inter-
pretation not only neglects that the war also allowed Egal to dispense with certain members 
of the government, but also fails to realize that it was willingly engaged in by the President.  
Challenging the government’s authority, the Garhajis were a political thorn in the flesh of 
Egal, from which he wanted to liberate himself.501 This is, however, only part of the story, 
 
                                                     
498  It was, however, once again not only the ‘traditional authorities’ who were engaged in negotiations with 
the Garhajis. Organizations such as the SNM-veteran association Sooyaal also sent members to the 
Garhajis in order to find a solution to the conflict (Interview 8). Sooyaal had been established in August 
1991, not only to support ex-SNM combatants and their dependents, but also to “keep the SNM spirit 
alive” (Interviews 8, 75).  
499  “The livestock export was dominated mostly by Garxajis traders, especially Habr Yoonis/Isaxaaq and 
Ciidagale/Yoonis” (Marchal 1996:84). 
500  Again others hold the view that these civil wars were instigated by Barre, who wanted to destabilize 
Somaliland (Interview 75). 
501  Part of the reason why Egal wanted to liberate himself from the Garhajis opposition was that they were 
led by a number of very prominent politicians, including «Tuur» and «Yare», whom Egal needed to 
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as Egal also wanted to free himself of the grip of the Calan Cas. As alluded to before, the 
President felt hostage to the Calan Cas, leading one observer to argue that “[i]n 1993, Egal 
was not a leader, he was a guest” (Interview 142). Having been sponsored by the SNM 
military hardliners during the Boroma conference, Egal initially could not confront, but had 
to accommodate them. Being well aware of the historical tensions between the Calan Cas 
and the Garhajis,502 Egal accommodated the SNM hardliners e.g. in terms of ministerial 
posts at the expense of the Garhajis (Interview 95), thus fuelling the friction.503 Yet, once 
Egal felt more secure by increasingly acquiring control over the military and economic 
spheres, and gaining the support of an alternative power by closing ranks with the guurti, it 
became easier to dispose of the militia commanders. The undiplomatic behaviour of the 
Garhajis provided Egal with a great chance to kill two birds with one stone. Thus, Egal 
fuelled the war in order to weaken both the Calan Cas and the Garhajis (Interview 14). 
Being militarily challenged by «Yare» in light of his militias’ occupation of Hargeysa airport, 
Egal had a legitimate excuse to unleash his eager and self-satisfied military officers onto the 
opposition.504 In November 1994, government troops moved to take the airport by force. 
Having secured this objective, the government forces led by Minister of Interior, Muse Behi 
Abdi, and Vice-President and Minister of Defense, Abdirahman Aw Ali, proceeded to 
attack Toon, an Eidagalle village (Interview 108). Although this act of aggression rallied the 
Garhajis even more against the government (Bradbury 2008:117), it was functional for Egal 
in that it politically delegitimized the Calan Cas, who thus dug their own political grave.  
After having defeated the Eidagalle in Hargeysa, attention shifted to Burco, a historical 
Habar Yonis stronghold. As Egal was related to the Habar Yonis through his maternal 
lineage, attacking Burco was a much more delicate matter. However, wanting to politically 
eliminate the opposition around «Tuur» and assert his authority in eastern Somaliland, Egal 
needed to push on. Giving the military leaders plenty of rope and portraying the war effort 
 
                                                                                                                                     
neutralize politically as they threatened his position. Given the historical enmity between Egal and «Yare», 
which dated back to the 1950s/60s, the conflict also carried personal connotations, adding fuel to the 
conflict (Interview 142).  
502  In the imminent civil war, the Garhajis were, indeed, fighting at least as much against the Calan Cas as 
against Egal. While some Eidagalle were opposed to Egal, most of them perceived the Calan Cas as their 
main opponent, as the latter appeared to have pushed the Garhajis out of government (cf. Spears 
2010:157).  
503  According to one informant, Egal purposefully provoked the Garhajis, prompting «Yare» into challenging 
Egal militarily (Interview 142). 
504  The argument that Egal picked the war against the Garhajis is corroborated by the fact that he rejected 
calls for another national conference to resolve outstanding issues (Bradbury 2008:117). 
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as a ‘Calan Cas project’, the President managed to wash his hands of responsibility 
(Interview 14). When Egal sent ‘his’ troops to take control of checkpoints in the vicinity of 
Burco in March 1995, violence erupted. The resulting war sparked the heaviest fighting 
since the anti-Barre struggle. As many as 4,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives 
in Burco alone, up to 180,000 took refuge in Ethiopia (Bradbury 2008:116f.), and 
international NGOs left Somaliland (Interview 8).  
Although military supremacy on the part of the government troops constituted an 
important element in deciding the conflict’s outcome, Egal did not leave it solely to the 
military to defeat the opposition. First, having acquired the financial backing of a number 
of tycoons to finance the costly war effort,505 the President bribed certain Garhaji leaders 
into abandoning their opposition, undermining their solidarity (Interviews 107, 108). He 
thus earned the questionable fame of having encouraged a culture of corruption – just as 
had been the case during his prime ministership in the late 1960s (Interviews 132, 135). 
Second, Egal successfully labelled the warring parties in order to (de-)legitimize them. While 
portraying the opposition as struggling for re-unification with the south, he placed himself 
firmly in the independence camp, thereby claiming the moral high ground.506 Depicting the 
war as one that pitched ‘nationalists’ and ‘federalists’ against each other, he rejected calls for 
an inter-clan dialogue to resolve the conflict (Bradbury 2008:118; Spears 2010:157), thus 
refraining from ceding control over the situation to other actors, such as the guurti. Fighting 
such an ideological war, Egal managed to defeat his opponents politically “without 
resorting to undue amounts of force” (Spears 2010:158, referring to Bryden 1995:2). 
Aideed’s death on August 2nd, 1996 further assisted Egal’s victory, as external support for 
the ‘federalists’ diminished thereafter (Bradbury 2008:123).507 
 
                                                     
505  Some major financiers of Egal’s wars were Ibrahim Dheere, a Djiboutian-based Habar Awal, Indha 
Dheero, who allagedly contributed USD 3 million, and Mohamed Omar Tani «Mullah», a Djiboutian-
based hotelier. In total, about ten to twenty major financers supported Egal (Interviews 99, 107). 
506  For historical, geographical, and political reasons, the Garhajis were, indeed, largely in favour of 
unification, which was, however, politically suicidal (Interviews 14, 75). The portrayal of the opposition as 
pro-unionists gained credence when «Tuur», his former Finance Minister Ismail Hurre «Buba» and 
General «Yare» all accepted positions in Aideed’s government in Mogadishu. Given that these prominent 
leaders also took with them all senior politicians of the Garhajis, this Isaaq clan lost any say in Somaliland 
politics (Interview 142) – much like Egal had taken most prominent northern politicians with him when 
he crossed the aisle from the SNL to the SYL in the early 1960s, thus completely dismantling the SNL and 
depriving the northern Somali population of their political voice. Similarly, Dr. Ali Khalif Galayd, who 
had been part of the Dhulbahante delegation in Burco, also abandoned the Somaliland state-making 
project and became the first Prime Minister of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2000 
(Bradbury 2008:82). 
507  Aideed had publicly pronounced that he was fighting Egal’s administration (Bradbury 2008:118, 1997:25). 
See also URL: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Newsletters/HAB395_SML.html. 
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While Somaliland was in shatters, Egal emerged from these wars not only as winner, but in 
a strengthened position. As well as having eliminated the Garhajis opposition, Egal had also 
got rid of the Calan Cas, who had politically outmanoeuvred themselves (Interviews 14, 
116).508 Incrementally, the President sacked the Calan Cas from their ministerial positions, a 
process he had started during the conflict, replacing them either with individuals from 
smaller clans, ‘traditional leaders’, and/or members of the Garhajis (Interviews 14, 95). At 
the same time, he assured himself of the support of the guurti, whom he convinced that the 
Calan Cas constituted a threat to peace in Somaliland (Interview 112). In order to deprive 
the Calan Cas of the ability to militarily protest against his actions, Egal accommodated their 
rank and file by turning them into presidential guards. This not only served the purpose of 
removing their support base from the Calan Cas elite, but also to show other militias 
throughout Somaliland that it paid to belong to the state (Interview 108). 
While disposing of the Calan Cas, Egal simultaneously accommodated the aggrieved and 
defeated Garhajis (Interview 7).509 “Although the war had threatened to foreshorten 
Somaliland’s existence, in the end it served to consolidate public support for the territory’s 
independence and to strengthen central government” (Bradbury 2008:123). For Egal, the 
wars had constituted a ‘project’ and central tool for state-making, leading some to argue 
that “Egal intentionally ignited the conflict – it was really obvious” (Interview 142; see also 
Interviews 14, 149). 
Establishing Regime Hegemony 
Viewed through the regime prism, the 1993-96 period had seen a number of alterations 
compared to the 1991-93 era. Whereas the «Tuur» administration had largely been marked 
by institutional and socio-cognitive pluralization, i.e. processes indicative of state-breaking, 
Egal’s reign was characterized by a slow but steady resurrection of state regime domination. 
That such a shift would occur was anything but obvious at the 1993 Boroma conference. 
While the change from a parliamentary to a presidential system suggested that the state 
regime would grow stronger, most other developments pointed in the opposite direction. 
The ‘Conference of Elders of the Communities of Somaliland’ principally cemented the 
 
                                                     
508  Egal’s instrumental (ab)use of the Calan Cas constitutes a further parallel to Barre’s politics. Just as Barre 
had used the Isaaq to suppress the Majerteen (who consequently perceived the Isaaq rather than the 
dictator as the aggressor), Egal used the Calan Cas to suppress the Garhajis (who, similarly, perceived the 
Calan Cas rather than Egal as the aggressor) (Interview 30).  
509  On top of accommodating them politically, Egal helped some 20 to 25 Habar Yonis to restart their 
businesses after the war, by providing them with money to restart their enterprises (Interview 108). 
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decentralized character that the new polity had taken under «Tuur», thereby bolstering the 
clan regimes spearheaded by the ‘traditional authorities’ vis-à-vis the state. Even though the 
new political arrangements reaffirmed the legitimacy of Somaliland and were judged to have 
“signalled the birth of something like a Somaliland consciousness, some national identity 
with a sense of statehood” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:731), Somaliland constituted de facto 
little more than the sum of its parts.  
The subsequent years under Egal were characterized by a return to state-making. On the 
one hand, “President Egal masterfully nurtured and instrumentalized the embryonic 
popular sense of nationhood and statehood initiated at Borama” (Renders/Terlinden 
2010:731). On the other, even though he was unable to carry through outright institutional 
standardization, he managed to incrementally establish a basis for it. In clear contradiction 
to the «Tuur» administration, Egal succeeded in asserting state power beyond his own clan 
base, thus laying the seeds for the standardization of an authoritative set of rules, for which 
mainly two factors account.  
First, and in contrast to «Tuur», Egal incorporated those regimes with the necessary 
economic, military and/or administrative capacity to carry through processes of 
institutional and/or socio-cognitive standardization. Being well aware of the economic and 
military capacities of the Calan Cas and acknowledging the de facto – and since the Boroma 
conference also de jure – powers of the ‘traditional authorities’, Egal integrated them into the 
state. This not only restricted their ability to broadcast ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the 
mind’ independently of the state regime, but also allowed Egal to draw on their capacities to 
broadcast the state’s institutions and mental models. Thus, “[w]hile claiming superiority, the 
state effectively outsourced much of the security and judicial affairs to the elders” 
(Renders/Terlinden 2010:734) – a state-making approach that is far from unique to 
Somaliland. The President, however, did not leave it at this, but even enhanced the position 
of the ‘traditional authorities’ (Interview 103) and the Calan Cas, thereby creating ample 
opportunities to manipulate and instrumentalize them (Interview 108). 
Second, once Egal had incorporated the alternative regimes, deprived them of much of 
their capacity, and transferred the latter to the state, he embarked on a process of alienating 
and eliminating them. He drew the ‘traditional authorities’ so close to the power centre that 
they ultimately lost their neutrality and became partisan to the state, thus losing their 
political clout (Bradbury 2008:121; Interviews 10, 36, 94, 95). Regarding the Calan Cas, Egal 
increasingly sidelined its representatives in the government, replaced them with other 
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individuals, and used their own tactics to delegitimize them within society. The opposition, 
he crushed in political, military as well as financial terms. During the course of this process 
the boundaries between the state and the clan regime had softened, giving the government 
the option to interfere in cases where political stakes were high. This system of ‘mediated 
statehood’ (Menkhaus 2006/07:5) became part and parcel of statehood in Somaliland 
(Renders/Terlinden 2010:734).  
 
5.3 Interim Conclusion   
Although Somaliland had, by 1996, still not broken the back of its state-making endeavour 
as numerous further challenges remained in the years to come, it is indisputable that the 
young polity had come a long way during Egal’s reign. Considering the similar state-making 
challenges that both «Tuur» and Egal faced, the divergence in performance is, indeed, 
astonishing. While both leaders and their respective administrations had to come to terms 
with poor resource bases, abundant military fragmentation, staunch political opposition 
and, overall, a highly delicate landscape of plural regime ecologies, the state trajectories 
could hardly have been more distinct, stretching from state-breaking (1991-93) to state-
making (1993-96). Comparing these two phases numerous conclusions can be drawn, 
amongst which are the following.  
The first peculiarity that emerges in light of this narrative is that Somaliland’s state-making 
project appears to have been quite ‘ordinary’. Rather than having been purposefully driven 
by the ‘grassroots’ in a ‘bottom-up’ manner (Jhazbhay 2006:24; Adam 1995; Terlinden/ 
Debiel 2003), Somaliland’s state trajectories were much more the by-product of ‘top-down’ 
elitist power politics. Particularly Egal advanced the young polity’s state-making endeavour 
neither by resorting to (pastoral) democracy nor ceding the political steering wheel to the 
‘traditional authorities’, but by applying shrewd politics and autocratic leadership. 
Moreover, while Somaliland’s state-making endeavour shared a culture of bribery with the 
democratic period of Somali state-making in the late 1960s, the way Egal acted as ‘master 
manipulator’ of clans (Interview 151) was totally consistent with Barre’s tactics of playing 
off one clan against another. Numerous further parallels with earlier state-making projects 
can be drawn that fly in the face of assertions regarding Somaliland’s ‘uniqueness’ – 
parallels that also transcend Somali borders.  
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One of the commonalities the Somaliland state-making project shares with other state-
making endeavours around the globe goes in tandem with the second conclusion this 
chapter draws: “war makes states” (Tilly 1992:67). The processes Somaliland went through 
to arrive at a nascent state regime by late 1996 were anything but peaceful, and featured a 
minimum of four distinct violent conflicts during the first six years of the polity’s existence. 
While it is indisputable that these civil wars were brutish and had a negative impact on the 
lives of thousands of people, and while there might have been alternatives to violent 
conflict in order to achieve the desired outcomes, the civil wars fought in the mid-1990s 
were clearly constitutive of Somaliland’s state-making. Thus, violent conflict is not 
necessarily “development in reverse” (Collier 2004; Leander 2004), even if the respective 
war occurs today and in the form of a civil war. In the case of Somaliland, the civil wars Egal 
pitched not only enhanced state regime hegemony in institutional terms, but have been 
judged that “as in so many other instances, the notion of statehood was nurtured during the 
course of war” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:732, referring to Renders 2006:271, 279).510 
A third and, here, final conclusion concerns the theoretical framework of HPOs. Even in 
the context of Somaliland, which constitutes one of the key empirical cases in relation to 
which this theoretical lens has been developed, the HPO framework lacks analytical power 
to explain processes of state-making and state-breaking. Given that both the «Tuur» and the 
Egal administrations were distinctly marked by a blending of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
forms of governance, the theoretical framework of HPOs cannot answer the question of 
what kind of ‘hybridity’ was constitutive rather than detrimental to state-making. Rather than 
providing a powerful analytical tool to unveil and better understand state trajectories, the 
HPO lens seems to emanate in an historically unfounded and largely normative celebration 
of pluralism. In light of the fact that differences in the two post-1991 state trajectories in 
Somaliland can be identified with regard to the degree of state regime domination and 
(rudimentary) standardization, the analytical prism introduced here is likely to be better 
placed to provide further insights, instead. Moreover, the ‘regime thesis’ also seems to have 
the edge over the HPO framework in terms of assessing trends and may provide valuable 
insights into future lines of fragmentation and conflict in Somaliland.  
 
                                                     
510  See also Farah (1999) who points out that “Somaliland’s experience in peacekeeping and governance had 
been relatively violent (yet constructive).” 
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6  
Democratization and Its Perils for State 
Consolidation 
Somaliland’s case of state-making is frequently portrayed as constituting an impressive 
‘success story’ (Shinn 2002; Jhazbhay 2007; Harris/Foresti 2011).511 Besides having allegedly 
undergone a process of “autonomous recovery” (Weinstein 2005a),512 the young polity is 
generally lauded for having developed “home-grown democratic institutions” (Azam 
2010),513 a “vibrant democracy” (Forti 2011:5), and “a far better democratic track record 
than any of its neighbors” (Kaplan 2008b:148).514 These observations are generally made 
against the background of the SNM’s purported democratic legacy, the allegedly benevolent 
role ‘traditional authorities’ played in the process of state-making, and the numerous 
elections held during the 2000s, which have commonly been declared ‘reasonably free and 
fair’ by international observers (Abokor et al. 2002, 2006; Walls/Kibble 2011).515 Thereby, 
the Hargeysa conference of 1996/97 is frequently identified as the origin of Somaliland’s 
process of democratization (Ali/Walls 2008:16).  
While democratization has taken centre stage when it comes to praising and explaining 
Somaliland’s ostensible ‘success’, decentralization has been accredited a similarly important 
role. Agreed upon during the 1993 Boroma conference, the framework for decentralization 
was reaffirmed at the 1996/97 Hargeysa symposium and inscribed into the arising 
 
                                                     
511  Hoyle 2000; Bradbury et al. 2003:475; Omaar 2004:84; Battera 2004:2, 17; Eggers 2007; Henwood 
2007:168; Kaplan 2008a/b; Poore 2009; Walls 2009a:2; Kibble/Walls 2010a:14. 
512  Bradbury 2008:4; Omaar 1994; Economist 1999:35; Klein 2002; Mehler 2002:78; Jhazbhay 2003:80; 
Gabush 2004:320; Kulessa/Heinrich 2004; Höhne 2006b:404; Forrest 2007:233. 
513  ICG 2003:34; WB/UNDP 2008:11; Ibrahim/Terlinden 2010. 
514  Bradbury 2008:1; ICG 2003:10; World Bank 2005:19; Eubank 2010. 
515  Hansen/Lindeman 2003; Sarrouh 2003; Kibble 2007; Kaplan 2008a/b; Terlinden/Ibrahim 2008b; 
SONSAF 2011. As well as the constitutional referendum in 2001, there have also been local government 
elections (2002), presidential elections (2003, 2010), and parliamentary elections (2005). 
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constitution (APD 2002b:48; Bryden 2000). The calls for decentralization voiced by 
Somalilanders have been echoed by representatives of the international community (Jama 
2003:7; WB/UNDP 2006:20), who perceive decentralization as a key policy for enabling 
and enhancing ‘good governance’ in developing countries (e.g. WB 1997; Lake/Rothchild 
2005:1). In Somaliland, decentralization supposedly led, amongst other factors, to local 
government accountability (Eubank 2010), thus (mis-)leading some to assume that there 
was no need for a strong, centralized administration for state-making (Jhazbhay 2009:19).  
Scrutinizing overly positive views of democratization and decentralization and their 
(supposed) benefit for Somaliland’s state-making trajectory, I argue that both processes 
were ambiguous and highlighted the difficulties of state-making. Moreover, while much 
attention has focused on electoral processes and their purported freedom and fairness,516 I 
stress a number of other aspects. First, this chapter points out that democratization did not 
arise from the ‘grassroots’, but was largely driven by the power struggle between Egal and 
his political opponents – an insight that is barely surprising in historical perspective, yet one 
that hardly features in the pertinent literature. Second, I propose that a central peril of 
Somaliland’s state-making trajectory lay in the inability of political actors to rise above clan 
politics – a restraint that was arguably perpetuated rather than abated by the polity’s 
democratization and decentralization, as this had repercussions on processes of regime 
standardization.  
Proposing that Somaliland’s state-making progress was ambiguous in the decade following 
the 1996/97 Hargeysa conference I stipulate that, from a state-making perspective, both 
processes of democratization and decentralization occurred prematurely. One central 
element of this argument is that – in the absence of alternative identity-providing groups 
such as social classes or labour unions, for example – evolving political parties were not 
only likely but destined to mobilize their constituencies along clan lines rather than political 
programmes, which, invariably, led to a strengthening of the clan regime at the cost of 
state-issued rules. This argument is in line with the general proposition that “[e]thnicity 
provides a level of institutional identification to fall back on in times of contestation of the 
state” (Englebert 2000:67).517 Overall, the chapter suggests that the processes of 
democratization and decentralization aided and abetted regime fragmentation – as was 
 
                                                     
516  See fn. 515. 
517  Holsti 1996; Azam 2001:430; Khan/Gray 2006. 
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poignantly exemplified with the proclamation of the Makhir State of Somalia in 2007 and 
the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) State of Somalia in 2010 – ultimately rendering Somaliland 
into little more than a conglomeration of different ‘clanistans’ (Interviews 142, 144, 156).  
Concentrating on the proceedings of the 1996/97 Hargeysa summit, the first section of this 
chapter investigates how this event shaped Somaliland’s state trajectory. I show that Egal’s 
continued application of shrewd politics had quite ambiguous effects on the overall state-
making project – while it seems that the President could consolidate the state-making 
endeavour at its centre, there are clear signs that the same policies also led to an unmaking 
of the state in parts of its periphery. Section two is dedicated to the polity’s process of 
democratization, showing that it harboured particular challenges for the consolidation of 
the Somaliland state. Casting a closer look at some aspects of administrative decentraliza-
tion and political fragmentation, section three proposes that Egal had good reasons for 
stalling decentralization, as it appears to have weakened rather than strengthened the 
Somaliland state once it took root. An interim conclusion sums up the chapter’s findings. 
 
6.1 Hargeysa and the Perils of State Consolidation     
The violent conflicts that had ensued between 1994 and 1996 were, once again, concluded 
with a ‘national’ conference. Taking place in the capital between October 1996 and 
February 1997, the Hargeysa symposium re-established peace between the warring parties 
and aimed to address the conflict over the allocation and exertion of political power. 
Whereas the Garhajis reconciled with the President, the Habar Jalo and Harti clans of 
eastern Somaliland went into opposition. Ensuing developments forestalled a broad 
political settlement and nearly culminated in yet another round of civil war. But, for a 
number of reasons, Egal exchanged bullets for ballots and slowly embarked on a process of 
democratization – at least on the surface. Although the Hargeysa conference is commonly 
considered a success (APD 1999:21; Walls 2011)518 it also sowed seeds of enduring 
fragmentation (Interview 149).  
 
                                                     
518  It was a ‘success’ only in the sense that it was not followed by further civil war (Interview 8).  
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Traits of State-Making… 
The Hargeysa conference signalled the formal conclusion of the 1994-96 civil wars (WSP 
2005:66). As had been the case for the ‘national’ conferences in Burco (1991) and Boroma 
(1993), the Hargeysa symposium was also preceded by a number of intra- and inter-clan 
peace meetings. Importantly, these informal encounters evolved principally along two 
fronts – one in the west between the Eidagalle and Habar Awal designed to resolve the 
conflict over Hargeysa airport, and another in the east between the Habar Jalo and Habar 
Yonis envisioned to address the tensions that had erupted in Burco (Bradbury 1997:31). 
Thereby, the reconciliation amongst the eastern constituencies that had started in May 1996 
(Bradbury 2008:123) went far beyond a peace settlement, and led the antagonistic clans to 
political unification. Arguing that they had been side-lined in the political set-up of the mid-
1990s, the political leadership of the Habar Jalo and Habar Yonis decided to conspire 
against President Egal and his dominant Habar Awal (Interview 14).519  
Under the aegis of their most prominent politicians – such as Suleiman Mohamoud Adan 
«Gaal»,520 Abdirahman Ali «Tuur»,521 Mohamed Mohamoud «Silanyo»,522 and Ahmed Abdi 
Habsade523 – the Habar Jalo, Habar Yonis, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli formed a political 
block. This ‘Eastern Alliance’ posed a formidable opposition, particularly because the 
parliamentary representatives of these clans only needed an additional four votes to achieve 
a majority, with which government policies could be vetoed (Bradbury 2008:134; Interview 
142). Facing this broad-based and well-positioned opposition, Egal played a number of 
cards prior to and during the course of the Hargeysa conference to dispatch his rivals and 
secure his political survival. First, he hamstrung the involvement of traditional authorities in 
the inter-clan negotiations prior to the Hargeysa summit and positioned himself at the 
 
                                                     
519  While the Habar Yonis were disgruntled by the fact that they had lost the presidency in 1993, the Habar 
Jalo had yet to have one of their own in the president’s office (Bryden 1996b).  
520  Isaaq/Habar Jalo; «Gaal» was Minister of the Interior in the «Tuur» government (1991-93) and became 
Minister of Education in Egal’s first cabinet (1993-1996). 
521  Isaaq/Habar Yonis; «Tuur» had been SNM Chairman (1990-91) and interim President of Somaliland 
(1991-93). 
522  Isaaq/Habar Jalo; «Silanyo» became a member of Barre’s SRSP (1976), held the post of SNM chairman 
(1984-90), was appointed Minister of Finance by Egal (1997), and came to be President of Somaliland in 
2010. 
523  Harti/Dhulbahante; Habsade had been Barre’s last Minister of Foreign Affairs, became speaker of the 
House of Representatives (1993), Minister of the Interior of Puntland (1998), and – after he had fallen out 
with President of Puntland Mohamud Muse Hersi in 2007 – Minister of Information in Somaliland (2010). 
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centre of all negotiations (Renders/Terlinden 2010:732f.; Interview 112).524 The President 
justified this by arguing that the civil wars had constituted political rather than clan conflicts, 
thus rendering the involvement of the polity’s legitimate government essential.  
Second, Egal weakened the opposition by interrupting their negotiations in the village of 
Yarowe,525 which was about to turn into Somaliland’s new political centre as it hosted a 
political opposition that continuously grew in strength. Simply by advancing the date of the 
envisaged national summit at short notice, the President left the Eastern Alliance practically 
no time to complete their composition of a coherent road map to defy him. This act, which 
was expressed in the catchphrase at the time that “no one would be waited for” (la-isu-joojin-
maayo) (Hashi 2005:18), put the Eastern Alliance under increased pressure. It also meant 
that its hardline elements would either be late for the imminent negotiations in the capital, 
leaving Egal enough time to manipulate and win over some of the politically undecided 
clans in the absence of a well-organized opposition, or miss the summit altogether 
(Interviews 14, 142). Ultimately, the government convened the conference “although some 
clans were absent or not genuinely represented, and determined the clan quotas and 
candidates to the two Houses according to its political suit” (Hashi 2005:20). 
Third, to further weaken the opposition, Egal offered political posts and spoils to its 
members (Bryden 2003:13; Renders/Terlinden 2010:732f.; Interview 12). Having already 
started to sack the Calan Cas during the course of the conflicts, Egal continued to 
redistribute their positions amongst the opposition (Interview 108). The co-optation of 
«Silanyo», whom Egal secretly pledged to appoint Minister of Finance subsequent to the 
summit, is a prominent example, as it dealt a decisive blow to the Eastern Alliance. Not 
only did it effectively split the powerful Habar Jalo clan between their two most enigmatic 
leaders «Silanyo» and «Gaal» but «Silanyo’s» defection led several other opposition 
politicians to cross the aisle in his shadow (Interview 142).526 Simultaneously, Egal allegedly 
disbursed envelopes containing up to USD 30,000 and threatened to politically isolate all 
individuals who refused to join his side (Spears 2010:157; Interview 14). Consequently, 
numerous politicians and traditional authorities abandoned the opposition stronghold in 
 
                                                     
524  By and large, Egal simply suppressed the participation of the elders of his own Habar Awal clan, thus 
depriving the other clans’ elders of their equipollent negotiation party and bringing the talks to a halt.  
525  Located about ten kilometres south-east of Burco.  
526  These developments show clear parallels to the politics of the 1960s, particularly the developments that 
unfolded in the spring of 1962, when Egal dismantled his opposition party by abandoning the SNL for the 
politically dominant SYL out of career considerations (Interview 153). See fn. 455. 
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Yarowe in favour of the upcoming conference in Hargeysa (Bryden 2003:13; Bradbury 
2008:125; Interview 142).  
Once the conference got underway, Egal influenced its outcome by taking firm control of 
the proceedings. While the summit had officially been organized by the House of Elders, 
the latter was steadfastly controlled by Egal (Renders/Terlinden 2010:733). Furthermore, 
Egal exercised additional leverage over the conference on the basis that it was largely 
financed by the government – a novelty in Somaliland’s track-record of summits (Jimcaale 
2005:66f.; APD 2008). Moreover, the President had not only selected a conference 
presidium and secretariat already prior to the meeting’s onset, but had also handpicked 
roughly half of the 315 delegates (Interview 142).527 This led a group of seventy-nine 
prominent individuals to sign a petition in which they called for the appointment of a 
neutral guurti to ensure fair conference proceedings (Interview 112). While the government 
refused to tolerate any debate, going so far as to dismiss ministers suspected of not readily 
toeing the party line (Bradbury 2008:125), the House of Elders rejected the petition, 
incrementally becoming partisan to the government.  
As Egal’s co-optation of the traditional authorities (Hashi 2005:2) re-affirmed patronage as 
a central element of politics (ICG 2003:12), it allowed him not only to extend his political 
lead, but also to advance the state-making project. The suppression of the elders’ 
involvement in parts of the negotiations leading up to the Hargeysa summit transferred the 
queries on peace and politics from the clan into the purview of the state regime. Also, the 
President’s influence over the conference choked the credibility of the guurti, which 
increasingly lost its vital reputation as an independent actor the closer it was drawn to the 
executive (Interviews 5, 10, 112). Viewed through the prism of regime standardization, 
these elements of the Hargeysa conference signalled the demise of the clan regime. Making 
use of rather shrewd political tactics, Egal seemed to further advance Somaliland’s state-
making project – at least if understanding state-making as a process of institutional and 
socio-cognitive standardization. 
 
                                                     
527  The Hargeysa conference numbered about twice as many voting delegates as the Boroma conference, 
because Egal insisted on supplementing the traditional authorities by an equal number of parliamentarian 
delegates (ICG 2003:12; APD 2008). While he justified this modification by arguing that the legislature 
should have a say in national matters, this alteration lay largely in the President’s goal to maximise his 
chances of emerging from the conference as political victor. On a more general note, it can be observed 
that the incremental increase of conference participants mirrored the political trajectory of the 1960s, 
which had similarly seen an increasing buy-in of politicians in the absence of a strong executive.  
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…and Traits of State-Breaking 
One of the central conference objectives concerned the selection of a head of state. 
Although Egal had announced in early 1996 that he would not run for president again, the 
conference was, quite apparently, designed to consolidate his power and deliver a new 
government as per his plans (Renders/Terlinden 2010:733). While, by December 1996, 
eleven further individuals had announced their candidatures, the conference participants re-
elected Egal by a landslide of 223 out of 315 votes.528 Given that Egal had forfeited much 
of his support prior to the conference, “everyone in Hargeisa believes that he owed his re-
election as president […] to simply buying votes” (ION 1997:765). According to the same 
source, conference delegates had received between USD 1,500 and 5,000 per person for 
their electoral loyalty to Egal. Having won the election, the government’s tenure in office 
was extended for the third time, in this instance by an initial four years (Bradbury et al. 
2003:461).529 
While some observers have, nonetheless, concluded that the Hargeysa conference marked 
the beginning of Somaliland’s democratic trajectory (Ali/Walls 2008:16), others judge that 
the manipulation of the political system as displayed at the summit lay at the heart of the 
polity’s continuously limping democracy in subsequent years (Interview 142). Although it is 
questionable to what extent the 1996/97 symposium brought about a change in governance 
(Bradbury et al. 2003:458; Ali/Walls 2008:16), it certainly heralded modifications in 
government. Not only did the conference seal the political future of the Calan Cas, but the 
subsequent government reshuffle saw the ascendancy of a new league of young politicians 
and technocrats, most of whom hailed from the Garhajis clan and the Eastern Alliance 
 
                                                     
528  Amongst Egal’s challengers were «Gaal», who received 90 votes, and the mayor of Hargeysa and 
prominent SNM veteran Mohamed Hashi Elmi (Isaaq/Habar Awal/Saad Muse), who got two votes (ION 
1997:755).  
529  Originally appointed in 1993 to serve a two-year term, Egal had, with reference to the disruptive civil war, 
demanded a two-year extension for his government in May 1995. In September 1995, when the civil wars 
were still going on, parliament granted him an eighteen month extension which legitimized Egal’s rule up 
to the Hargeysa conference. The extension granted at the 1996/97 summit authorised Egal’s reign until 
March 2001. Shortly before his mandate ran out, the President demanded another extension, as the 
envisaged constitutional referendum and presidential elections were still outstanding. Thereupon, 
parliament granted him one last extension of twelve months to fulfill his mandate and avoid a potential 
political crisis (ICG 2003:13), leading some analysts to denounce his ‘politics of extension’ (Interview 103) 
– politics that were mirrored by his successor, who managed to postpone the presidential elections that 
were envisioned for 2007 for three years.  
6   DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS PERILS FOR STATE CONSOLIDATION 
195 
 
(Interviews 118, 149).530 The ‘civilization’ of government, which some analysts believe to 
have observed at the Boroma conference (Walls 2008:2), was ultimately realized at the 
Hargeysa summit.531  
Overall, Egal’s authoritative selection of new ministers indicated that he was no longer the 
‘political guest’ he had been in 1993, but had turned into a veritable ‘ruler’ (Interview 142). 
Yet, although he had managed to consolidate his position as head of state, Egal’s rule stood 
on shaky grounds. While some propose that “[t]he agreements reached at the 1997 
Hargeysa conference ushered in six years of uninterrupted stability” (Bradbury 2008:127), 
thus promoting that the summit constituted an outright success (APD 1999:21; Walls 2011; 
Interview 8), the late-1990s were rife with hefty power struggles and unambiguous traits of 
state-breaking. Whereas the opposition Egal came to face on the part of disgruntled Calan 
Cas, who were headed by the prominent «Degaweyne» (Interview 142), constituted little 
more than a classic power struggle among political contestants, the challenges of the Harti 
clan family not only menaced his position but Somaliland’s overall state-making project.  
Somaliland was dealt a decisive blow when leaders of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli 
clans who felt consistently sidelined by Egal withdrew their support for the Somaliland 
state-making endeavour (Interviews 142, 149). During the course of the Hargeysa 
conference, the President allegedly alienated all the prominent figures of the Harti clan 
confederation such as the politician Habsade and the respected traditional leader Garad 
Abdulqani Garad Jama, who had been moderately pro-Somaliland prior to the Hargeysa 
symposium (Höhne 2011:319). Egal sacked the former as Speaker of the House of 
Representative during the course of the Hargeysa conference, and rebuffed the latter who 
made his and his clan’s acceptance of the symposium’s outcome conditional on the 
fulfilment of at least one of his demands: either to have a say in the selection of those 
individuals who were to represent the Dhulbahante clan in parliament, or to reinstate 
Habsade as the body’s speaker. Rejecting these demands, Egal snubbed Abdulqani in 
particular and the Harti community more generally, particularly as those who gained key 
 
                                                     
530  While the Habar Yonis gained four cabinet posts and several assistant ministerial positions, they also 
received an additional five seats in parliament (Interview 7). Egal also allocated nine seats in parliament to 
minority clans, who had not been represented at the Boroma conference (APD 2002b:25; Interview 61).  
531  Yet, the take-over of civilians and bureaucrats from the former SNM cadres also meant that it was largely 
(Isaaq) politicians who had served in Barre’s administration before, who came to power in Somaliland 
(Höhne 2011:320).  
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ministerial posts, became army and police commanders as well as Supreme Court Chief 
Justice all hailed from the Isaaq clan (Interview 103).  
While some suggest that Egal deliberately alienated the Harti politicians in a short-term and 
self-interested political calculation (Interview 142), others claim that Egal sacrificed the 
Harti clans to gain the unanimous support of the Gadabursi and to consolidate the state-
making efforts in central and western Somaliland (Interview 156).532 Although the former 
proposition appears to be sensible, the latter appeals to a political economy analysis in that 
the Gadabursi-inhabited Awdal region is, with its fertile soils and custom checkpoints for 
lucrative khat imports, economically much more profitable than the scarcer environments 
of Sool and Sanaag.533 Moreover, western Somaliland is also politically of significant 
importance, not only because it is slightly more populous than the eastern region,534 but also 
because it connects Hargeysa with the highly important centre of Djibouti. Thus, Egal 
appears to not having had much of an alternative than prioritising the Issa over the Harti 
clan family. Moreover, Egal’s political affronts were seemingly more directed against 
particular Harti individuals rather than the entire clan confederation – after all, Egal had tried to 
appease the Harti throughout 1997 by appointing Badane, a Dhulbahante from Buuhoodle, 
Speaker of Parliament, making Mahmoud Mohamed Saleh «Fagadeh» (Dhulbahante) 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and announcing Mohamed Said Mohamed «Gees» (Warsangeli) 
Minister of National Planning and Coordination (Interviews 103, 108, 110, 156). 
Nevertheless, the Hargeysa summit led Harti politicians to turn their backs on the 
Somaliland state-making project, which implied that “roughly 30 per cent of the territory 
and 20 per cent of the population of the polity were not integrated” (Höhne 2011:322f.).535 
 
                                                     
532  According to this assessment, Egal predicted that he would not win the allegiance of the Harti clan family 
for the Somaliland project, not least because numerous Dhulbahante and Warsangeli politicians had joined 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu, thus leading him to focus his energies on 
securing the support of the Gadabursi (Interview 156).  
533  Although it is true that the eastern regions are home to most of the profitable livestock business, its value 
creation largely takes place in Berbera, where the state taxes livestock exports.  
534  This reflected, for example, in the fact that over 60 per cent of all votes cast in elections originated from 
the west (Abokor et al. 2006).  
535  It is important to note that the Harti abandoned Somaliland not only because some of their leaders were 
alienated and sidelined by Egal, but also because the leaders of their allied Habar Jalo, such as «Silanyo», 
had not only failed to openly challenge Egal, but even started to side with him (Interview 142). Moreover, 
the Harti decision to abandon Somaliland had a longer history. Already during the 1993 Boroma 
conference, the Harti political elite, including Ali Khalif Galaydh, had proposed a formula for power 
sharing between the presidency and the premiership. Yet, the Isaaq-based SNM pushed for a strong 
central presidency, gaining the support of the Gadabursi, who ultimately took the vice-presidency. 
Politically defeated, Galaydh abandoned the Somaliland state-making project and became the first Prime 
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Consequently, Abdulqani, Habsade and other Harti figures not only backed the formation 
of the Puntland State of Somalia in 1998 (Bryden 1999a; Bradbury 2008:126f.), but actively 
propelled the formation of this polity (Interview 149). Given that Puntland was a project of 
the Majerteen, with whom the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli are related by descent from the 
Harti clan family, the latter clans hoped for a greater accommodation of their demands in 
this polity. From then onwards, Puntland presented a competing ‘political bidder’ for the 
Harti population in eastern Sool and Sanaag, challenging the Somaliland state both in terms 
of identity and statehood (Renders 2006:362; Höhne 2009; Renders/Terlinden 2010:740).  
Centralizing the Former, ‘Peripheralizing’ the Latter  
Viewed through the regime standardization prism, the Hargeysa conference appears to have 
been less of a crystal-clear success (APD 1999:21; Bradbury 2008:127; Walls 2011; 
Interview 8) – it rather had an ambivalent effect on state-making. Although the symposium 
importantly advanced state-making, inasmuch as it comprised a number of elements that 
indicated a fortification of the state regime, having portrayed the civil strife as political rather 
than clan wars and repelled the traditional authorities during the course of the peace and 
power negotiations of 1996/97 (Interview 95), the President had successfully removed 
politics as the preserve of the clan and firmly embedded it in the purview of the state. This 
was reaffirmed with the adoption of a draft constitution, which drove another nail in the 
coffin of the clan regime, as it provided a roadmap for the substitution of the beel system of 
governance with a multi-party democracy, leading Battera (2005:305) to conclude that “the 
Hargeysa conference of 1996-1997 […] undoubtedly strengthened the central government.” 
That it was, henceforth, the task of the state rather than clan to determine the ‘rules of the 
game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ was clearly signalled by Egal, when he had a new national flag 
adopted on October 14th, 1996. 
What also fostered the state-making endeavour was the way Egal incorporated many of the 
traditional authorities, of whom he could not yet dispense with, into the state apparatus. In 
the wake of the Hargeysa conference, the central government increasingly employed 
traditional authorities in its ranks (Interview 95). As the President provided them with 
posts, for example as director generals (Bradbury 2008:124), he not only moved the 
traditional elders from a political to a more administrative sphere, but also from the clan 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Minister of Somalia in the Transitional National Government (TNG) that was established in Djibouti in 
April/May 2000 (Hashi 2005:17f.).  
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into the state regime. While this co-optation brought the traditional authorities under the 
purview of Egal, it entailed the risk that the elders could penetrate and undermine the 
state’s institutions and socio-cognitive system, if not kept on a short leash – a development 
that seemed to increasingly unfold under the later rule of President Mohamed Rihale Kahin.   
Yet, the progress in state-making that could be established at the state’s centre seemingly 
came at the cost of state-unmaking in the periphery. In contrast to the political 
displacement of the rather politically organized Calan Cas, which Egal had undertaken after 
he had largely deprived them of their powers and popular support, the alienation of 
Abdulqani and other Harti leaders took place before they were politically neutralized. 
Although Egal dabbled in damage limitation by co-opting other members of the Harti clan, 
he could not prevent the Somaliland state-making project from crumbling at its edges. 
During subsequent years, regime standardization was effectively restricted to the polity’s 
economic lifeline from Berbera to Hargeysa and Boroma, failing to extend effectively into 
the ‘periphery’.536 This was also reflected in the voting patterns in the upcoming 
constitutional referendum, to which the chapter now turns. 
 
6.2 Democratization and Its Challenges for State-Making     
Despite the fact that Egal had won the presidency again and was mandated to rule for 
another four years, he did not emerge from the Hargeysa conference as undisputed leader 
or in a position of unquestioned strength. Rather, his reign was seriously contested from 
different angles (Interview 142) – challenges that nearly ousted him from power a number 
of times in subsequent years. As had been the case under his premiership in the late 1960s, 
part of the population’s dissatisfaction derived from his shrewd power politics and the 
increase in corruption and patronage (ION 1997:792). Consequently, participants of the 
Hargeysa conference amplified their demands for the ratification of a constitution – 
officially to set the country on track for democratization, but also to confine the President’s 
sheer political omnipotence and create alternative mechanisms to eventually replace him 
(Interview 149).  
 
                                                     
536  See also Höhne (2011:322) who similarly argues that the state-making process “concerned only a portion 
of the country”, thus countering Bradbury’s (2008) presentation of the process of ‘becoming Somaliland’, 
which sweeps aside regional dissimilarities in Somaliland’s history and politics.    
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Although a draft constitution was adopted at the conference’s end in February 1997, it took 
another four years until its final version underwent plebiscite, paving the way for 
democratic elections. While some claim that Somaliland’s democracy was brought about by 
the ‘grassroots’ in a ‘bottom-up’ process (Jhazbhay 2006:24; Adam 1995; Terlinden/Debiel 
2003) and owed its introduction to Egal’s readiness to “break with the corrupt and 
unrepresentative practices of the past” (Bradbury et al. 2003:458), the evidence is less clear 
cut. For one, the process of democratization was less driven by the ‘grassroots’ than by the 
imperative of the President to stay in power. For another, the first years of democratization 
appeared to be marked by a continuation, rather than conclusion, of Egal’s ‘corrupt and 
unrepresentative practises’ – practices that not only secured his position at the helm of the 
state, but that also initially advanced Somaliland’s state-making project.  
Constitutional Manoeuvres 
While Egal had to give in to the opposition’s request to finally adopt a constitution, he was 
at odds with the parliament over the question of who should draft it. Ultimately, both sides 
came up with their own versions, which were combined into a single document to break the 
stalemate.537 However, the President was dissatisfied with this interim constitution and it 
took until the year 2000 before a mutually acceptable draft was produced. Thus, as had 
been the case after the 1993 Boroma symposium, the wake of the Hargeysa conference saw 
the President stalling the process of adopting a constitution (Bradbury 2008:131). This 
changed radically in August 1999, when Egal brought some urgency to the matter – an 
urgency that took the country by surprise and angered the opposition on the grounds that 
“there was no public and opposition consultation as promised before putting the 
constitution for popular endorsement” (Ibrahim 2007:223f.; ICG 2003:30).  
Justifying his aboutface by proclaiming that the international community would not 
recognize Somaliland’s independence “unless it installed a constitutionally based, 
appropriately elected and authentically democratic government” (Mesfin 2009:6), Egal 
portrayed himself as a stern reformer dedicated to introducing democracy. Yet, his sudden 
promotion of the constitutional process was driven by at least two further considerations. 
First, Somaliland’s existence was challenged by both the formation of Puntland in August 
1998 and the Mogadishu-based TNG in Arta, Djibouti, in May 2000, not least because the 
 
                                                     
537  Unsurprisingly, parliament had favoured a strong legislative branch, whereas Egal wanted to assign greater 
powers to the executive. 
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two polities laid claim to (parts of) Somaliland’s territory (Mesfin 2009:5; Abokor et al. 
2003). These regional developments were so alarming that Egal not only pressed for the 
effective introduction of the Somaliland police force in Erigavo in 1998/99 (Interview 66), 
but also introduced new public order laws in August 2000, decreed the unconstitutional 
creation of a National Security Committee (NSC),538 suspended habeas corpus, and banned 
public rallies. As “[t]he emergency laws were used to detain several Somaliland citizens for 
attending and voicing opinion in support of the Arta conference, as well as for questioning 
the government’s contracts with foreign commercial companies” (Bradbury 2008:132, 
referring to UNDP 2001:177), Egal might not have showcased the democratic character of 
his reign, but he certainly restricted the potential for regime fragmentation, by tightening 
state-issued rules.   
Second, Egal had an interest in advancing the constitutional process so as to carry through 
popular elections – elections that were more likely to assure his political survival than 
another clan conference that the opposition pushed for. «Gaal», who was one of the few 
remaining figureheads of the Eastern Alliance that maintained their opposition to the 
President,539 argued that the process of democratization should not move forward until still 
outstanding basic points of contention had been dealt with.540 While «Gaal» could garner 
significant support for the idea of holding another clan conference to re-evaluate the 
allocation of political power, Egal dreaded defeat if another summit was held (Interview 
142). Cunningly, the President presented himself as a modernizer, postulating that political 
power should no longer be contested in the framework of clan conferences, but national 
elections. As «Gaal» and the traditional authorities who supported him did not immediately 
concede, the President had them – Barre-style – arrested under the pretence of plotting to 
sabotage the constitutional referendum (Bradbury 2008:134), taking Somaliland to the brink 
of another war (ICG 2003:13; Bradbury et al. 2003:463; Ibrahim 2007:224). 
By late 2000, a 45-member committee, which had been jointly nominated by the executive 
and the legislature, produced a mutually accepted constitution pending endorsement by 
 
                                                     
538  The NSC is considered by some a remnant of Barre’s National Security Service (Interview 5). 
539  While Egal had co-opted «Silanyo», individulas such as «Tuur», Habsade, and Abdulqani had turned their 
backs on the Somaliland project.  
540  The unconstitutional formation of the NSC, the introduction of emergency laws, accusations of 
corruption, etc. provided «Gaal» with enough material that he could challenge Egal. 
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general referendum.541 While parliament had been given additional powers of financial 
oversight and increased co-determination regarding the approval of administrative 
appointments, the presidency retained most of the executive powers sought by Egal (ICG 
2003:12; Interview 142). Given the prevailing political climate, however, it was unclear 
whether the population would approve the document, particularly as many were 
apprehensive about the President’s rushed introduction of multiparty politics and felt that 
he could not be trusted to establish a level playing field for electoral competition (ICG 
2003:13).542 Ingeniously, Egal thus tied the vote on the constitution to a vote on 
Somaliland’s status of independence, which was reaffirmed in the constitution’s first article 
(ICG 2003:12; Abokor et al. 2003). This assured the President of an overall ‘yes’ vote 
(Jirdeh 2004:94).  
The constitutional plebiscite took place on May 31st, 2001, almost exactly one decade after 
the unilateral declaration of independence. According to the government, some 1.18 million 
people participated in the vote on the constitution, of which 97.9 per cent allegedly 
approved it. In light of the fact that the later parliamentary election of September 29th, 2005 
numbered ‘only’ a total of 670,320 valid votes – which was, however, 182,000 more than 
were counted in the presidential elections of April 14th, 2003 (Abokor et al. 2006) – and 
given that the referendum was boycotted in parts of eastern Sanaag, Sool, and Awdal 
(Bradbury 2008:133), the figure of 1.18 million voters appears to be doubtful. Moreover, 
even if discounting the vote of the Harti clan families, the near unanimous approval of the 
constitution seemed questionable, as numerous constituencies had not renounced the idea 
of a re-unified Somalia once and for all. In any case, the “[a]pproval of the new constitution 
paved the way for multiparty elections” (ICG 2003:13).  
Electoral Tactics 
The constitution foresaw the replacement of the beel system of governance with a modern 
form of a restricted multi-party democracy in which the head of state, legislature and district 
 
                                                     
541  The drafting of the constitution had been hampered by the fact that the sitting parliament, which 
consisted of unelected clan representatives, was responsible for drafting the law under which Somaliland’s 
first post-independence parliamentary elections would be held – an act that was “akin to requiring that 
members of parliament draft their own “death warrant” ” (IRI 2005:9). 
542  Along these lines, Ibrahim (2007:222) judges the constitutional reform to have been a “hasty and 
government-driven exercise with limited participation form the public, civil society or the opposition.” 
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councils were to be elected by secret public ballot.543 Although few disagreed that the beel 
system of power-sharing had been but a transitional framework for governance,544 the 
population feared that the freshly won stability could be undone by the introduction of 
competitive multi-party democracy (ICG 2003:13; Interview 150). Still, local and 
presidential elections were scheduled for 2001 and 2002 respectively (APD 2002b:27), and 
the government passed a law that legalized the formation of political organizations. 
Immediately, Egal announced the establishment of the country’s first political organization 
– the Democratic United Peoples’ Movement (UDUB). 
The President’s swift move led “a powerful group of clan sultans with strong backing in the 
east” to call for “UDUB to be dismantled and for a shir beeleed [clan conference] to be held 
to decide on the future of the country” (Bradbury et al. 2003:463), as they perceived Egal as 
not having established a level playing field for the formation of political organizations. 
Indeed, the law allowing for the establishment of political organizations only came into 
force on August 6th, 2001, a couple of months after UDUB had been established (ION 
2002). Practically simultaneously, Parliament tabled a vote of no-confidence in the 
President, when the management of port revenues and the government’s handling of a 
contract given to the French oil company Total Mer Rouge came under parliamentary 
scrutiny (Bradbury 2008:134, referring to IRIN 2001).545 Having survived this motion of 
impeachment by just one vote (Bradbury et al. 2003:463; Ibrahim 2007:224), and facing a 
strong opposition spearheaded by «Gaal» (Interview 36), Egal continued to push forth the 
democratization process in order to renew his legitimacy. 
 
                                                     
543  The multi-party democracy was ‘restricted’ in the sense that the number of political parties able to contest 
national elections was constitutionally limited to three in order to avoid a political fragmentation along 
kinship lines as had occurred in the 1960s. In order to become an accredited party, political organizations 
that contested district council elections had to gain a minimum of 20 per cent of the votes in at least four 
of Somaliland’s six regions (Bradbury et al. 2003:463). However, as no political association reached the 20 
per cent threshold, the three strongest ones were ultimately accepted as the three constitutional parties. 
Egal was, however, against the constitutional limitation of the number of parties (Jama 2009:17) – most 
likely because this impeded his divide and rule tactics. 
544  The beel system established at the Boroma conference in 1993, had come to be perceived as an impedi-
ment to effective government – particularly in view of the manipulation it had experienced during the 
Hargeysa summit, which exhibited its weakness as a mechanism for political change (Bradbury 2008:131). 
545  Part of the reason why there was so much opposition to the contract struck between Egal and Total Mer 
Rouge was that it created a monopoly position for the international oil company – a decisive market 
advantage that was against the country’s new constitution (Interview 100). Interestingly, one of Egal’s sons 
later worked for Total Mer Rouge (Interview 149).  
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By the end of September 2001, a further six political organizations had registered for the 
elections (Bradbury 2008:134).546 Having finally been forced to buy into the democratization 
process in order not to be left on the political offside, «Gaal» belatedly formed a political 
organization referred to as the Alliance for Salvation and Democracy (ASAD). As his 
deputy chairman, «Gaal» accommodated former vice-president Abdulrahman Aw Ali – who 
had been the only Gadabursi officer in the SNM, which brought him great respect – in 
order to counter Egal’s selection of the Gadabursi Mohamed Riyale Kahin as vice-
president.547 As ASAD was closely associated with the radical Calan Cas (Jhazbhay 2010:4) 
and featured numerous political heavyweights, this party posed a formidable challenge to 
Egal’s UDUB organization, particularly as the latter included numerous members of the 
detested former Barre administration. To realize his envisioned electoral victory, Egal 
needed to further weaken the opposition.  
After having appointed his former political adversary «Silanyo» as Minister of Finance in 
1997, the President exasperated him by transferring the Habar Jalo politician to the Ministry 
of National Planning and Coordination in 1999. Disappointed by this demotion, «Silanyo» 
resigned from his position in 2001 and left for the United Kingdom to undergo medical 
treatment. Deeming «Silanyo’s» attitude unacceptable, Egal made a political issue out of his 
resignation and threatened to also leave office, if his minister did not return to his post. 
Fearing a power vacuum, the guurti pressured «Silanyo» into returning (Interview 108), 
which pleased Egal as he needed him to appease and divide the Calan Cas, whose political 
strength increased in the framework of the newly formed political organization ASAD 
(Interview 142; ION 1997:792). Upon his homecoming, Egal asked «Silanyo» to mediate 
between him and the SNM hardliners – such as Mohamed Kahin, Muse Behi, and 
«Degaweyne» (Interview 142). Whether intended to or not by the President, «Silanyo» used 
his new appointment to distinguish himself politically and gain popularity, ultimately 
 
                                                     
546  UCID (Justice and Welfare Party), SAHAN (Somaliland Alliance for Islamic Democracy), BIRSOL 
(Salvation and Protection of Somaliland’s Aspirations), HORMOOD (Champions for Peace and 
Prosperity), UMAD (Unification of Somaliland’s Viewpoints), and ILAYSKA (Somaliland Beacon Light 
Party). KULMIYE (Unity Party) was registered later, and HORMOOD and BIRSOL ultimately merged  
(Jama 2009:18f.).  
547  Riyale had been an NSS officer under Barre and gone into the khat trade in the early 1990s. He had been 
selected by Egal in order to appease the Gadabursi clan, whose diaspora had pushed for an independent 
state of Awdal, issuing the “Awdal Declaration of Independence” in 1995 (Interview 88). Even though 
this declaration was not taken very seriously on the ground, as most Gadabursi were not in favour of an 
independent state (Interviews 95, 135, 151), Egal still needed to politically accommodate the non-Isaaq 
communities. Surprised by his nomination, Riyale was wholly loyal to Egal. Upon leaving for surgery in 
South Africa, however, Egal was allegedly worried about leaving Somaliland in Riyale’s hands in case of 
his death, because he considered the Gadabursi wholly unqualified for the position (Interview 142).  
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gaining so much confidence that he founded his own political organization, Kulmiye (Unity 
Party). This inevitably played into the hands of Egal and impaired «Gaal’s» chances of 
winning the elections, as «Silanyo’s» decision to stand for the presidency himself enticed 
other politicians and their supporters away from ASAD – particularly as «Silanyo» hailed 
from the same clan as «Gaal» (Interview 108). 
Having been postponed by about one year, local council elections finally took place in 
December 2002. Egal, however, did not live to see these, as he died unexpectedly on March 
3rd, 2002 while undergoing surgery in South Africa. In line with the constitution, both 
houses of parliament confirmed Vice-President Riyale as his successor. In the subsequent 
elections, UDUB emerged as winner, receiving some 40.76 per cent of all votes. Amongst 
the five other political organizations that contested the elections it were Kulmiye (18.19 per 
cent) and UCID (11.24 per cent) that also qualified as accredited national parties (Mesfin 
2009:6, referring to ICG 2003:18). That UCID came in third was surprising, given that it 
was unable to hold a candle to ASAD, both in clan and political terms (Interview 150). 
Thereby, the latter party was not only outrun by UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID, but in fact 
came in last among all the six political organizations, although it was headed by charismatic 
leaders such as «Gaal», «Degaweyne», Abdirahman Aw Ali, and Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, 
all of whom originated from populous and powerful clans (Interview 142). This surprising 
outcome was commonly attributed to voting irregularities and the fact that the National 
Election Commission and Political Party Commission had not only been appointed by the 
President (Jama 2009:18),548 but acted to his will (Interview 142).  
The democratization process had hardly been democratic itself (Hashi 2005:19), and the 
older generation in particular remained sceptical of it, as they remembered the troubles and 
problems that had come with democratization in the 1960s (Interview 150). The fear of 
premature democratization and its associated problems was supposedly such that even 
«Gaal», who had long been chasing after the presidential post, asked President Riyale to 
postpone the presidential elections. «Gaal» even offered to support the prolongation of 
Riyale’s term in office, if he held back the electoral process, a demand he rejected 
 
                                                     
548  Yet, the members of the committee were also confirmed by the House of Representatives in February 
2001 (Jama 2009:18).  
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(Interview 112).549 The public’s scepticism regarding the democratization process and 
outright fear of a revival of violence (Interview 150) thereby flies in the face of the assertion 
that “[m]uch of the process of democratisation has been enabled by an overwhelming 
public desire to avoid a return to conflict” (Kibble/Walls 2010a:1). 
Democratic Legacies 
The political thriller that had accompanied Somaliland’s state trajectory in the 1990s 
continued throughout the second decade of the polity’s existence, albeit at a less pulsating 
level. At the time the three political parties were established in late 2002, political 
contestation started losing momentum, undoubtedly influenced by Egal’s death (Bradbury 
2008:136). Having seen UDUB emerge from the district elections with a comfortable 
winning margin, Riyale led Somaliland confidentially towards the next elections. On April 
14th, 2003, Riyale championed the presidential election, beating his closest rival «Silanyo» by 
a margin of only 214 votes (Abokor et al. 2006), and won a five-year mandate to guide the 
country. Given the peaceful nature of both the transfer of power after Egal’s demise and 
the subsequent elections, international observers not only lauded Somaliland’s maturity 
(Bradbury 2008:136), but also interpreted the fact that a member of a minority clan was 
elected president as evidence of Somaliland’s democratic character (e.g. Abokor et al. 
2006:8; Bennet/Woldemariam 2011:7f.).550 
Yet, Somaliland’s democracy stayed restricted: its geographical reach remained limited 
(Höhne 2011:327), as exemplified by the parliamentary elections of September 29th, 2005. 
Although the two opposition parties – Kulmiye and UCID – together received 49 out of a 
total of 82 seats and, thus, an almost 60 per cent majority (Mesfin 2009:6),551 they lamented 
that the electoral process had not reached the ‘hinterland’. Most of the population of 
 
                                                     
549  It can be suspected the Riyale, just as Egal before him, pursued the democratic road in part because he 
probably rightly believed that he stood a greater chance of politically defeating «Gaal» in an electoral 
campaign than in a clan conference.  
550  However, according to some Riyale’s election had less to do with the desire of the Somaliland population 
to show the international community their democratic nature in making a Gadabursi president of a polity 
otherwise largely controlled by the Isaaq, but more with the fact that Riyale and his UDUB party were 
considered the lesser evil. As Kulmiye had developed into a collecting pond of former Calan Cas bigwigs, 
the party had become unelectable by the Garhajis. Thus, the presidential election, which pitted the Calan 
Cas (Kulmiye) against the faqash (a prerogative term referring to the former henchmen of Barre; UDUB) 
was decided in favour of the latter – despite a feeble presidential candidate (Interview 116). 
551  While UDUB had gained 33 seats in parliament, Kulmiye and UCID received 28 and 21 seats respectively. 
The fact that UDUB did not command an overall majority “makes Somaliland the only place in Africa 
where parliament is not controlled by the government” (Abokor et al. 2006). However, this changed in 
2010, when Kulmiye secured the presidential seat.  
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eastern Sool and Sanaag did not fully participate in the elections – which was largely due to 
insufficient infrastructure, prevailing insecurity, and the population’s partial objection to the 
Somaliland state-making project – thus skewing the results. Democracy also remained 
limited with regard to its character, as was not only illustrated by the way UDUB 
consistently attempted to stifle the media and incessantly harassed opposition sympathisers 
(Mesfin 2009:6f.), but as also exposed during the 2007/10 presidential elections.  
Originally envisaged for 2007, the presidential elections were repeatedly postponed until 
June 2010. While these elections were also praised as having largely been free and fair and 
for having brought about not only a change in personal leadership but also in political 
parties (e.g. Walls/Kibble 2011:13), the election was at least as much decided by ‘private 
deals’ as by ‘public polls’. It is widely acknowledged that the country’s largest money 
transmittance company, Dahabshiil, for example, provided an estimated 40 per cent of the 
funds for Kulmiye’s presidential campaign in 2009/10 (Interview 106). Upon winning the 
presidency, «Silanyo» appointed Hirsi, a cousin of Dahabshiil owner Mohamed Said Duale, 
as Chief of Cabinet/Minister of Presidency,552 and made the former Dahabshiil 
representative in London, Saad Ali Shire, Minister of National Planning and Development 
(Interviews 96, 100, 102). Also Telesom, the polity’s biggest telecommunication company 
and second most profitable enterprise in Somaliland, strongly supported «Silanyo’s» 
campaign financially. While Telesom is also said to have representatives in the government, 
such as Mohamed Abdi Gabose and Abdi Aw Dahir, who both hail from the Habar Yonis 
clan, the company was biased towards «Silanyo» because the owner of Telesom originates 
from the same clan as «Silanyo» – the Habar Jalo (Interview 106; see also Interview 96).  
As regards the democratic trajectory of Somaliland, disturbing parallels emerge with the 
early democratic period of the Somali state in the 1960s. While the 1960s proliferation of 
parties was avoided during the post-1991 period,553 Somaliland’s political parties were just as 
much about personalities and as little about political programmes as had been the case then 
(Interview 36). While this is little unique to Somaliland, the fact that ideological orientation 
and political agendas took a backseat meant that the three political parties differed primarily 
 
                                                     
552  This post constitutes the second most important position of the «Silanyo» administration. Prior to his 
appointment, Hirsi was chief executive officer of SomTel, the telecommunication branch of Dahabshiil 
(Interview 106). 
553  Yet, it should be acknowledged that, in 2010/11, civil society groups pressured the «Silanyo» government 
into opening up the political party space as they perceived the established parties to be too long-
established (Interview 94). 
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with regards to clan and economic interests (Interview 95). Political identification with a 
particular party was so meagre that it could be observed that UDUB members who had 
held ministerial posts in the Riyale government abrogated their party membership only a 
few days before the 2010 presidential elections – hoping to obtain a position in the new 
Kulmiye government (Interview 156). Moreover, some Somalilanders have acknowledged 
that their democracy was not only fragile, but that their presidents have had clear dictatorial 
traits (Interviews 5, 75, 112, 142, 151). In a similar vein, others argue that Somaliland was 
not a democracy, but a clanocracy (Interview 153) – thus exhibiting a further parallel to 
Somalia’s earlier democratic experience.  
Costs of Democratization 
Although international observers declared the elections of 2002, 2003 and 2005 as “largely 
free and fair” (Kibble 2007),554 other policy analysts conceded that, while far from ‘free and 
fair’, the elections had at least been peaceful (Interview 142). Also regarding the impact of 
democratization on state-making, it appears having been less triumphant as frequently 
claimed – at least if viewed through the prism of regime standardization. While the move 
towards elections was “intended to mark a progression from clan-based politics to party 
politics” (Abokor et al. 2006), this switch from the clan regime to state-issued ‘rules of the 
game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ was increasingly derailed during the course of Somaliland’s 
decade-long democratic experience. Whereas, in principle, multi-party democracy can 
facilitate such a change in regimes, it could not deliver this result in Somaliland, where 
politicians were unable to rise above clan politics.  
In Somaliland, democratization took place in an environment in which the clans’ ‘rules of 
the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ provided the only set of institutions and patterns of 
identity that politicians could readily appeal and revert to, in order to mobilise mass 
support. Generally speaking, the political landscape was characterized by the “absence of 
ideological differences between the three parties” (Höhne 2011:327; Interview 156), which 
effected a mobilization of party supporters along kinship lines (IRI 2005:4). In other words, 
democratization was largely inapt to bring about an alteration of the society’s overarching 
rules, as the political actors relied on precisely those rules in order to mobilise support. 
 
                                                     
554  See also fn. 515.  
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Under these conditions, processes of democratization generally hinder rather than facilitate 
regime standardization, cum state-making. 
This fall-back on the clan regime was reinforced by the system chosen for the parliamentary 
election of 2005, whereby the population voted for a candidate, rather than a party. As the 
process of nominating parliamentarians was “less about choosing candidates who would be 
loyal to their parties” than about selecting ones “who could command the largest ethnic 
numbers and strongest financial support from their clans” (IRI 2005:13) the parties 
ultimately ceded much of their control over the nomination process to clan leaders. This 
system perpetuated the importance of the clan, as it was the clan leadership – rather than 
the respective political party – that selected candidates and financed their campaigns. This 
absence of party support for local campaigns “removed a major incentive for candidates to 
take direction or advice from party officials” (IRI 2005:16). Consequently “voting patterns 
highlighted the continuing influence of clan politics, with marked regional variations in 
support for the political parties” (Abokor et al. 2006; Ciabarri 2008:65).  
The notion of a situation in which a clan-selected parliament was exchanged for a popularly 
elected one obviously “caused much anxiety among the clans” (IRI 2005:13). While the 
previous system had guaranteed each clan a certain level of representation in the legislature, 
the new system implied that clans would have to compete with one another for scarce 
positions – thus further boosting clan rules at the expense of the state regime. Under these 
conditions, the non-Isaaq clans’ reservations about a popularly elected parliament came 
true. While the Isaaq increased their parliamentary representation by nine seats to 57, some 
minority and the Harti clans lost out, the latter’s representation falling from 14 to a mere 10 
members, which increased their sense of marginalization within Somaliland (Abokor et al. 
2006). Although some members of the Dhulbahante and Warsangeli participated in the 
elections, many more rejected them, effectively shrinking the size of the polity (Abokor et 
al. 2006) and rendering the state’s politics more exclusionary (Hansen/Bradbury 2007:470f.; 
Ibrahim 2007:229).  
These developments led to the observation that democratization barely occurred in 
southern Togdheer, Sool and eastern Sanaag (Höhne 2011:327), thus forfeiting a certain 
degree of regime standardization across the territory claimed by the self-styled republic. 
Over a decade later, the Harti still feel largely unincorporated into the Somaliland state. 
While the Dhulbahante have frequently perceived it a mockery that they have generally 
been allocated ‘soft’ ministerial posts, the Warsangeli have often considered their 
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representatives in the Somaliland cabinets meaningless, as their respective ministers 
generally do not enjoy high standing within their clans or are even considered traitors 
(Interview 103). More generally, the democratization process is seen as one in which “the 
traditional structures have been absorbed into top-down socio-political and administrative 
systems that are a bottleneck to local governance and development” (Hashi 2005:4). Thus, 
democratization revalued the clan regime at the expense of the state’s institutions and 
socio-cognitive system. 
 
6.3 Defying Decentralization, Facing Fragmentation     
At the turn of the millennium, Egal’s rule had clearly stood on shaky grounds, which not 
only put brakes on his reign, but also the overall state-making project. The fragile political 
consensus in the years following the Hargeysa conference and the democratization route 
Somaliland embarked upon hampered Egal’s early policies of politico-administrative 
centralization. Although the President managed to largely delay and partly annul processes 
of decentralization as stipulated by the Boroma conference and the constitution, the polity 
was increasingly marked by political fragmentation in the decade following the 1996/97 
summit. While this process was catalysed by the imminent democratization that effectively 
split the territory into clan constituencies, fragmentation was aided by the fact that the 
political elite was largely unable to rise above clan politics. As, by the mid-2000s, 
developments towards regime standardization seemingly stalled, some political analysts and 
practitioners came to regard Somaliland as little more than a polity characterized by the 
“peaceful coexistence of clans” (Interview 142; see also Interviews 144, 156). 
Defying Administrative Decentralization  
Having experienced a highly centralized state under Barre, many Somalis were in favour of 
a greater diffusion of political authority and control in the post-1991 era (APD 2002b:45). 
Consequently, the Transitional National Charter (TNC) agreed upon in Boroma in 1993 
“mandated the Somaliland leadership to decentralize the system of government” (APD 
2002b:45). Nonetheless, Egal’s early rule (1993-1996/97) was clearly characterized by a 
centralization of the political system, which was most blatantly evidenced by his ‘war 
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projects’ of the mid-1990s.555 His objection to decentralization also showed in the 
continued central appointment of regional government officials, and the fact that the latter 
remained solely accountable to the central government. In November 1993, a few months 
after the Boroma conference, which had agreed on the formation of regional and local 
councils to decentralise the appointment of regional government officials, the Ministry of 
Interior issued a decree, which ruled that  
“[i]f a region/district could not agree in nominating a governor/mayor and 
deputy governor/mayor in 45 days time after a notice to do so, the central 
government will take the decision to nominate officers for the region/district, 
at request to parliament for approval by the ministry” (quoted in APD 
2002b:46). 
Subsequently, the executive passed the responsibility to advance decentralization on to 
parliament, which could neither agree on the form nor the nature of decentralization. 
Hence, after progress had significantly stalled, parliament returned this responsibility to the 
executive, authorizing the government in May 1995 to nominate local officials until local 
structures were up and running. This clearly played into the hands of Egal, his interest in 
centralization, and the process of regime standardization, particularly as, ultimately, not one 
single district or regional administration was nominated by local people between 1993 and 
2001 (APD 2002b:49). Yet, the process of democratization that unfolded from the late-
1990s onward loosened the central government’s grip over the regions, which showed, for 
example, in the fact that the appointment of town mayors eluded the president’s purview 
with the local council elections of 2002 (Interview 156).  
Prior to the local elections of 2002, however, President Egal continued his quest for 
centralization, which he justified by arguing that “Somalilanders were not yet ready to select 
their own leaders because of internal clan divisions and the inability of existing local 
government institutions to collect and manage taxes” (Interpeace 2006:5).  
“To prove its point, the government flirted with the idea of introducing 
nominated clan based local councils. The plan was to implement the experi-
ment in Hargeysa, and then expand the scheme to other major towns. But, in 
the event, the idea never got off the ground, largely because the dominant clans 
in Hargeysa could not agree upon a formula for sharing council seats” (ibid.)  
This disunity amongst the different clans residing in Hargeysa allowed Egal to posit that the 
state-making project could not rely on decentralized clan structures – a telling argument 
 
                                                     
555  See Chapter 5. 
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even though the disunity prevalent in Hargeysa was hardly representative of the situation in 
other parts of Somaliland.556 In any case, Egal took centralization so far that, by the late-
1990s, many Somalilanders perceived the governance arrangements to be a “reproduction 
of Siyaad Barre’s rigid, pyramidical hierarchy” (APD 2002b:45, 53).  
Although Egal was pressured to decentralise the political, economic, and administrative 
system, he appears to have done little. And while the constitution of 2001 re-emphasized 
the goal of a decentralised state apparatus (APD 2002b:46), its wording regarding the 
distribution of power and responsibilities between different levels of government was so 
ambiguous that its implementation was severely hampered (APD 2002b:47). Regional and 
district authorities largely continued to function in dependence on the central government, 
not least because the latter maintained its control over economic resources. The financial 
windfall local councils had expected to accompany the 2002 local elections did not 
materialize, compelling them to mobilise their own resources. Yet, the meagre taxes they 
collected hardly sufficed to finance their activities, let alone provide services to their 
constituencies (APD 2002b:45). The resulting notorious underperformance of local and 
national-level administrations led the population to increasingly retreat to their respective 
clan and rely on its services (Interviews 63, 66, 151).  
Facing Regime Fragmentation 
Thus, while Egal had successfully arrested de jure decentralization, he could not preclude it 
de facto in the form of regime fragmentation. The less the government’s ability to enforce 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization got – whether due to the absence of infra-
structure, a lack of political acceptance in the regions, or insufficient capacity to implement 
particular rules, for example – the more likely the respective population’s relapse was into 
its clan regime. The subsequent re-valourisation of the traditional authorities was, however, 
not only driven by the population, but also the central state government. In the absence of 
a functioning, effective and efficient administrative apparatus to sustain a relationship 
between the state and the population, and to potentially carry through regime standardiza-
tion, the elders provided the only connection between government and population. Hence, 
the government came to rely increasingly on traditional authorities in the first decade of the 
 
                                                     
556  In fact, reality diverged from this argument in that local administrations, generally spearheaded by 
traditional authorities, had formed in different urban and rural areas during «Tuur’s» reign. 
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21st century, officially employing some 937 traditional leaders – at a monthly salary of USD 
50-100 – throughout the country (MoI 2011; Interviews 14, 16, 95).557  
The fact that local and regional constituencies became more self-referential in formulating 
and realizing their (political) interests, and, thus, turned more towards their clan regime, was 
enhanced by the democratization process. The 2005 voter registration in particular, 
escalated clan consciousness, not least because prominent politicians announced in the 
national media that the provision of future state services depended on demographic 
parameters (Interview 117). As, in the absence of a census, the voter registration provided 
the polity’s only demographic record that could inform government policies, the (sub-)clans 
mobilised their members to register for elections in their home town (Interview 151). 
Simultaneously, clan representatives established their own committees to guide their 
members through the electoral process (Interview 140). Supported by the government, 
these committees often financed the transport of clan members to their home towns for 
voter registration and, a few months later, election (Interview 117). This process reinforced 
the peoples’ identification with their kin (Interview 156), thus abetting regime 
fragmentation rather than standardization.  
The re-valourisation of the clan regime in the political framework also shows in the fact 
that regional administrations largely reflect clan politics – e.g. with regard to staffing policies 
(Interviews 63, 138, 156) – leaving sub-national administrations largely independent of the 
central state administration (Interview 135). Although President Egal had started to shuffle 
civil servants, such as police and tax officers, and transfer them between the different 
regions, this practice largely ended at the turn of the millennium,558 as first political 
developments required Egal to shift his focus from state-making to political survival and 
second, his successor, Riyale reverted to appointing regional governors locally and avoiding 
overly reshuffling civil servants between different regions (Interview 118). Thus, the 
 
                                                     
557  While the inclusion of traditional authorities does not constitute an obstacle to state-making under the 
condition that they follow and broadcast the state’s ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, it is 
debatable in how far the traditional leaders employed by the Somaliland government bolstered or 
undermined the state regime. However, it is very plausible that the traditional elders only partly complied 
with and perpetuated the state’s rules.  
558  As the governors of Somaliland’s six regions always originated from the region of which they were in 
charge, Egal started to reshuffle the governors from 1997 onwards. In that year, for example, he 
transferred the governor of Awdal to Sanaag, and Sahil to Awdal region – an action that not only 
weakened the governors, but was also conducive to counter regime fragmentation along clan lines.  
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clannisation of regional administrative structures – the root of which lay in the fact that the 
non-Isaaq clans had not been defeated and subjugated in 1991 (Interview 142) – wore on.  
A Brief Case Study of Erigavo 
The processes of decentralization and fragmentation and their effects on state-making as 
sketched out above are exemplified by the developments in Erigavo, whose turn away from 
Hargeysa partly resulted from errors of omission and commission on the part of the central 
government. Regime standardization in the Sanaag region, of which Erigavo is the regional 
capital, was impeded by the fact that “[a]fter the birth of Somaliland in 1991, the 
government didn’t come to Erigavo in a long period of time”, as a local government official 
of Erigavo remembers (Interview 66; see also Interview 65). Due to the complex post-war 
political situation in Erigavo, which is home to four different clans,559 and the fact that the 
transitional government that was established in Hargeysa in 1991 did not reach that far into 
the periphery, the local populace agreed on their own Erigavo Peace Charter and regional 
government (APD 2008). Erigavo’s political seclusion was reinforced by the civil wars of 
the mid-1990s, which inhibited central government access to this region.  
With the political rapprochement between Egal and the Garhajis during the 1996/97 
Hargeysa conference, the central government started to establish some administrative 
control over Erigavo and the Sanaag region. This showed, amongst others, in the fact that 
the regional governor was no longer appointed by the regional, but by the national 
government (Interview 63). “As a result of the top-down efforts of the central government, 
an administration was established and the militia, especially of the Issaq, were finally 
integrated under the umbrella of the national army” (Renders/Terlinden 2010:740, referring 
to Actionaid Somaliland 1998:6). However, the regional administration was largely left to its 
own devices, not least because the governor whom Egal had appointed in 1997 nominated 
local candidates for various administrative positions, rather than having them selected by 
the respective ministries in Hargeysa, as official rules stipulated (Interview 63).  
Until 1998 there was only informal administration in Erigavo (Interviews 64, 69). Although 
the first police forces were sent to and stationed in Erigavo in 1997 (Interview 35),560 in 
 
                                                     
559  Namely the Isaaq/Habar Jalo, Isaaq/Habar Yonis, Harti/Dhulbahante and Harti/Warsangeli. 
560  However, the police force did not become effective until 1998/99 (Interview 66), a branch of the Bank of 
Somaliland only opened in 1999 (Interview 64), and it was not until 1998 that the informal administration 
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2003 people still carried firearms for their personal protection within the city (Interview 35). 
And also when taking other indicators for state presence into account, a picture emerges 
that leads to the conclusion that the region was more dependent on itself than on the 
central government in Hargeysa. For example, the 2005 inaugurated Civil Service Institute 
(CSI) has only ever conducted one single training course in Erigavo (Interview 131). 
Moreover, Erigavo’s main budget derives from local government taxation, which means 
that the most potent official financially in the regional capital is the locally elected mayor – 
not the centrally appointed regional governor. Hence, despite the district council’s 
ineffectiveness, politics are made much more by local than national actors (Interview 156). 
Overall, the regional government remained very strong, making it difficult for Egal to 
(significantly) influence the situation in Sanaag (Interview 156). Despite the fact that the 
political opposition of residents in Sanaag towards the Egal government died down in the 
mid to late 1990s, and even though the majority of the Sanaag population staunchly 
supported President Riyale in the 2000s, the region did not receive significant (financial) 
attention (Interview 156). This has, in part, been attributed to the fact that the central 
government has barely had any resources to incorporate Sanaag – and for that matter, Sool 
– into Somaliland (Interview 156). By way of example, not even a gravel road connects 
Erigavo to any other bigger town in Somaliland. This paucity of infrastructure has 
contributed to the fact that “[e]ven the system of administration existent in Somaliland is 
based on the clan system” (Interview 38). 
The truth of this statement was shown in particular in the formation of the Makhir State of 
Somalia, proclaimed on July 1st, 2007. The Makhir state constituted a Warsangeli project 
and was a response to the fact that this Harti sub-clan felt politically sidelined not only in 
Somaliland, but also Puntland, which came to be increasingly dominated by the Majerteen, 
another Harti sub-clan. Even though the self-declared government had already dissolved on 
April 8th, 2008, and a real administration had never formed, the project was proof of the 
degree of decentralization and lack of regime standardization in Somaliland.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
of Erigavo was replaced with a more formal one (Interview 69). The Somaliland government did not find 
acceptance in Erigavo until 2003 (Interview 65).  
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6.4 Interim Conclusion  
The literature on Somaliland frequently puts forth the argument that “[t]he inclusion of the 
traditional authority in the central government of Somaliland undoubtedly has been a vital 
component of state formation in the territory” (Richards 2009:201; Bryden 1996; Interview 
16),561 and that it was the elders who were “responsible for the success of Somaliland today” 
(Leonard 2009:13; Interview 2).562 This ‘benevolent elders’ thesis can be challenged on 
numerous grounds,563 leading some to point out that the role of traditional leaders in 
reconciliation, peace-building and state-making “has often been analysed with exaggerative 
and romantic views” (Hashi 2005:22). As this chapter implied, the role of traditional 
authorities in Somaliland’s state-making project was definitely not unambiguous. 
More directly, the chapter showed that the processes of democratization and decentra-
lization seemed to have been more problematic than benefitial to Somaliland’s state 
trajectory. Rather than advancing its state-making endeavour, both processes posed 
numerous and serious challenges to it. Viewed through the regime prism, democratization 
and decentralization hampered processes of regime standardization, as they facilitated the 
re-emergence and re-valourisation of clan regimes at the expense of the state’s sets of ‘rules 
of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. This was problematic in the sense that the political 
competition induced by democratization started to challenge the state regime before it 
could be consolidated. Under these considerations, the processes of democratization and 
decentralization were introduced prematurely, namely in a situation in which political power 
could be most easily mobilized and contested along lines of kinship rather than political 
 
                                                     
561  Bradbury 1997; Hofman 2002; Bradbury 2008; Jhazbhay 2008; Kaplan 2008b; Walls 2009a; Interview 16.  
562  Flint 1994:36; Massey 1994:123. 
563  Building on other prominent narratives such as the ‘colonial difference’ thesis (see Samatar 1987:59; 
Prunier 1998:225; Fox 1999; Brons 2001:129; Lewis 2002:169; Hofmann 2002; Huliaras 2002:158; Osman 
2007:101; Interviews 135, 156), the ‘benevolent elders’ thesis has numerous flaws. First, it overlooks the 
fact that also elders in the south took a pro-active role in peace-making (Gundel 2006:26ff.; Adam 
1995:79f., 2008:26; Brons 2001:261; see also I.M. Samatar 1997:36ff.). Second, this proposition inherently 
assumes that ‘traditional’ structures were static, thereby ignoring the fact that they had been changed by 
the (post-) colonial regimes over the previous decades (Osman-Shuke 2004:149). Third, the ‘benevolent 
elders’ thesis generally restricts the ‘traditional authorities’ involvement to their peace-making character in 
the 1990s, excluding the more bellicose role played in the 1980s. Fourth, the argument also conceals the 
fact that Somaliland, too, experienced conflict and power struggles and that its ‘elders’ have not always 
been successful in their peace-making and state-building efforts (Drysdale 1992b:8). This is particularly 
obvious when considering e.g. the region of Sanaag, which “illustrates the weakness of the traditional 
system of governance in building wider administrative structures” (Bryden/Faray 1996:8). Fifth, the 
argument cannot account for the case of Puntland, i.e. for divergent state-making trajectories within 
south-central Somalia. For a critical assessment of the role of the elders in state-making in Somaliland, see 
also Interviews 12, 55, 99, 128. 
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identity,564 which meant that both processes compromised rather than bolstered the young 
polity’s state-making endeavour. 
Coming to a similar assessment, Omaar (2004:91) proposes that “clan solidarity is a major 
impediment to the emergence of strong political parties based on a shared political vision 
and programme.” While I disagree with his proposition insofar as I suggest that it was not 
the clan that was too powerful to see the emergence of political parties, but rather it was 
that the political parties that were too weak to overcome the strong clan regime, I agree 
with his appraisal that, after all, “[in] an impoverished country where life is a struggle for 
basic survival, and there is no public service ethos, dependence on family and clan is a 
necessity, not a choice.” This is supported by Battera’s (2005:281) argument that “[t]he 
country still remains in a situation of transition, and transition favours the role of tradition”, 
an argument that neatly leads over to Ibrahim’s (2007:222) proposition that Somaliland’s 
transition to constitutional democracy was a “transition without transformation, because it 
did not entail significant societal change or political, legal and institutional reform.”  
Although the political developments highlighted in this chapter provide a sense of the 
degree of ‘stateness’ Somaliland has achieved over the course of its two decade-long 
existence, a more in-depth assessment of the nature of its state is needed. Thus, the next 
chapter turns towards a more in-depth assessment of levels of regime (de-)standardization. 
 
 
                                                     
564  A SNM veteran and former Minister of Defense under Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, for example, states that 
an individual’s loyalty lay much more with its respective clan than with the Somaliland state (Interview 24). 
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7  
The State of Somaliland   
Somaliland is frequently considered an exceptional case of state-making (Pham 2012). 
Having allegedly engaged in “[c]onstructing a state from scratch” (Bradbury 2008:4), the 
Somali Republic’s offspring is generally judged “a good example of how a fragile society can 
become an effective state” (Othieno 2008).565 According to existing literature, the polity 
established a functional administration (World Bank 2005:13), brought forth visible signs of 
sovereign and democratic statehood (Bradbury 2008:4), and, despite or possibly because of 
the absence of significant international aid, developed accountable political institutions 
(Eubank 2010).566 Given these and other achievements, numerous policymakers and 
academics suggest that international recognition should be extended to this ‘little country 
that could’ (Shinn 2002; Bryden 2003; Jhazbhay 2003).567 Yet, although few and far 
between, there are also more critical voices judging that, overall, “[t]he Somaliland construct 
is weak” (Battera 2003:239) and that “[i]t is not a state” (Interviews 12, 66).  
The previous chapters scrutinized Somaliland’s state-making endeavour and pointed 
towards some of the numerous challenges it faced during its first two decades. Thereby, it 
became clear that the advancement of Somaliland’s state-making project cannot be 
explained solely by ‘benevolent elders’ and ‘liberal democracy’. However, the question of 
how much progress Somaliland made in terms of state-making since having gained de facto 
independence in 1991 remains. Although the polity could boast significant achievements 
not only in comparison to south-central Somalia, but also in its own right, there was still 
much to be done. The application of the rule of law lacked conformity throughout the 
 
                                                     
565  See also comments by Alison Evans, director of the Overseas Development Institute, who states that 
“[t]he performance of Somaliand is a reason to be optimistic about its future” (Somaliland Press 2011).  
566  Eubank (2010:1f.) goes so far as to claim that “political actors within Somaliland have never received 
development assistance” and that there was a “lack of external financial assistance to Somaliland.”  
567  Hoyle 2000; Evans 2007; Farley 2010; Guebourg 2002; Henwood 2007; Economist 1999:35. 
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territory, the state’s currency was restricted in its use, and inland revenue enforcement and 
compliance remained minimal. While numerous challenges persisted, most of these were far 
from unique to the self-styled republic, but resembled those of other ‘fragile states’.  
Analysing a number of aspects that lie at the heart of regime standardization, this chapter 
assesses the state of affairs of Somaliland’s state-making project two decades into its 
existence. Questioning overly optimistic views on Somaliland’s progress I argue that its 
degree of state-making remained limited. While appreciating that levels of regime 
standardization generally increased between 1991 and 2011, I propose that this develop-
ment was neither linear nor evenly spread across regions or sectors. Rather, I argue that 
processes of regime standardization not only slowed down during the 2000s, but that this 
incremental retreat from state-making was institutionalized. In other words, processes 
indicative of destandardization were consolidated, making it difficult to overcome state 
fragility. Moreover, I suggest that the standardization of authoritative sets of rules had 
largely been confined to the ‘heartland’ that stretches diamond-like from Hargeysa to 
Berbera and from Boroma to Burco, remaining conspicuously absent from the ‘hinterland’.  
In order to investigate the extent of the polity’s progress in state-making the chapter is 
organized as follows. Section one casts a closer look at the trajectories of institutional (de-) 
standardization that were characteristic of the administrative architecture, security 
apparatus, and judicial system. It also includes an assessment of the state’s system of 
revenue mobilization and its implications for its ability to enhance regime standardization. 
Section two largely examines processes of socio-cognitive (de-) standardization by focusing on 
the introduction of the Somaliland Shilling, the evolution of the polity’s media landscape, 
and the development of the education system and their respective impacts on nation-
building. An interim conclusion sums up the chapter’s key findings. 
 
7.1 Making or Breaking the State? 
Although Somaliland had taken preliminary but significant steps towards institutional and 
socio-cognitive standardization under Egal during the 1990s, the polity increasingly 
struggled to maintain this process during the first decade of the 21st century. In central state 
administration, for example, although “government authority and bureaucracy was 
expanded” (Bradbury 2008:109) in the decade following the conclusion of the Hargeysa 
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conference in 1996/97, the impact the administrative apparatus had on processes of regime 
standardization was more ambiguous – an ambiguity that was mirrored in other sectors that 
lie at the heart of state-making. 
The State’s Administrative Reach 
In the run-up to the 1996/97 Hargeysa symposium, Somaliland’s administrative apparatus 
was significantly overstaffed, a trend that continued post-summit due to Egal’s continuing 
policy of using civil service employment as a tool for demobilization and to provide 
political spoils to his opponents (Interviews 104, 131, 138).568 Consequently, «Tuur’s» 1993 
transitional administration of around 800 civil servants had swollen to some 6,000 by 
1996/97, even though the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that Egal created shortly after 
having taken power in 1993 estimated that no more than 3,750 individuals were needed to 
run the state’s administration (Huliaras 2002:162; Scek 2007; Interview 40). While the 
quantitative and qualitative enhancement of the civil service in the 1990s earned Egal the 
reputation of having built a functioning state (Interview 17),569 the unsustainability of his 
inflationary staffing politics led him to initiate a civil service reform once the civil wars were 
concluded (Interviews 40, 138). 
Delayed by a couple of years due to political struggles, Egal started implementing the 
reform in 1999. The President announced the execution of competitive examination in 
order to separate the wheat from the chaff (Interview 40), which met with fierce resistance 
from civil servants, who feared for their positions, as those who would fail the exam were 
to be sacked (Interview 17). Although the administrative reform led to a decrease in the 
number of civil servants to the allegedly adequate size of 3,750 officials in 2000 (Oumar 
2011:15), this was but a transitory diminution (see Table 1). The continuing political 
struggles that partly evolved around processes of democratization led Egal to drop 
administrative reform as a policy priority in the early 2000s (Interview 138). Consequently, 
the afternoon working hours that he had introduced for all government employees in the 
framework of the civil service reform were also let slide (Interview 131) and, ultimately, 
officially abolished by President Riyale in 2002 (Interview 36). As this resulted in civil 
 
                                                     
568  It was particularly the Garhajis clan that profited from this policy (Interview 138). See previous chapters.  
569  The general judgement that, in contrast to Egal, «Tuur» had failed to build an appropriate administration is 
contested by some, who argue that Egal simply benefited from «Tuur’s» groundwork in creating a 
functioning civil service (Interview 153).  
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servants in government ministries, agencies and district councils working only about 24 
hours per week by the late 2000s (PFM 2008:26; UNCDF 2009:16),570 brakes were put on 
the administrative apparatus’ ability to contribute to regime standardization within and 
beyond its own ranks.  
Table 1: Trajectory of Civil Service Employment (2000-2011)571 
 
 
 
 
However, the standardization of common rules that was not accomplished through 
dedicated working hours was seemingly compensated for by the numerical expansion of the 
public administration machinery that could be observed throughout the 2000s (see Table 1). 
This increase can partly be explained by the fact that the Somaliland government 
geographically expanded its administration and increased health and education provision in 
the eastern regions (Oumar 2011:18; MF 2011:8; Interview 40).572 Viewed in combination 
with the fact that about two-thirds of all civil servants were frontline service providers who 
worked in the central government’s regional offices (MF 2011:8), Somaliland’s 
administration appeared to be an apt tool to carry through processes of institutional and 
socio-cognitive standardization. Yet, closer investigations reveal that central state 
administration was ill-placed to act as a proper catalyst for regime standardization.  
First, the degree to which standardization occurred within the administrative apparatus itself 
was restricted. First, civil service came to be a “purely Isaaq” business (Interview 138), 
largely rooted in the fact that its members were mainly demobilized SNM veterans and 
 
                                                     
570  Personal observation, Somaliland, 2008, 2009, 2011. In line with this circumstance, UNCDF (2009:41) 
observes that work ethics amongst public administrators was “extremely low.” 
571  Given that “there are no clear records of who is or [is] not a civil servant” (Scek 2007:13; Interview 138), 
the figures compiled in this table should be treated cautiously.  
572  Yet, this explanation is insufficient to account for the abrupt rise in civil servants in 2010, for which 
patrimonialism seems to be a better explanation. During the one-month transition period between the 
announcement of the outcome of the presidential elections on June 26th, 2010 and the handover of power, 
the outgoing government allegedly recruited an additional 1,000 individuals to the civil service. In the 
absence of laws and regulations that facilitated the dismissal of government employees and due to the fact 
that suspension of staff was an explosive political issue, Riyale and his lieutenants secured long-term 
access to state resources for their supporters despite the change in presidents and ruling parties the 2010 
elections brought about (Interview 138). Yet, the bloated nature of Somaliland’s public administration is 
also due to the fact that in 2011, for example, the state provided civil service salaries to some 863 
individuals who were not eligible, as they were either already retired (363), permanently sick (144) or ab-
sent (90), deceased (101), had resigned (73) or could be classified as ‘ghost workers’ (92) (Oumar 2011:18). 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2005 2008 2010 2011 
No. of civil servants 3,750 4,649 4,700 5,559 5,600 9,843 9,183 
Sources:  CSC undated:8; Bicker 2004:7; Scek 2007:3; PFM 2008:4; Askar 2009:12; Oumar 2011:15, 18; 
MF 2011:8; Interviews 18, 40.
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members of the Garhajis opposition whom Egal had accommodated in the administration 
throughout the 1990s. The imbalance was further aided by geographical factors, as the 
location of the administration’s headquarters in the Isaaq stronghold of Hargeysa put other 
clans at a disadvantage with regard to employment opportunities. Although non-Isaaq clans 
were incorporated into the administration at ministerial, director generals (DGs) and other 
high-ranking management levels in order to accommodate them politically, the lower 
echelons of the state apparatus predominantly featured members of different Isaaq clans 
(Interview 138)573 – a position of dominance they were to maintain in subsequent years.574  
Second, the fact that some 80 per cent of all civil servants still lacked adequate skills to 
perform their duties by the late 2000s (CSC 2009:17; Interview 61) also impeded 
standardization. This was due to several factors: civil service recruitment had frequently 
been driven by politics rather than meritocracy, about ten per cent of the civil servants were 
far above pension age (UNCDF 2009:17),575 and there was a lack of adequate training. In 
order to remedy this shortcoming, in October 2005, Riyale established the Civil Service 
Institute (CSI) mandating it with training government employees (Interviews 18, 138). Yet, 
the impact of the CSI remained largely restricted to Hargeysa, as the institute’s trainers only 
held one or two training sessions per year outside the capital (Interview 131).576 The state’s 
ability to enhance regime standardization also failed to live up to its potential in other 
respects; for example only ministers, DGs and other high-ranking state officials had to take 
an oath of loyalty to the state when sworn into office (Civil Service Law, Art. 12; Interview 
140), thus failing to officially commit lower-ranking civil servants.  
The extent to which the state’s administration could propel regime standardization beyond its 
own ranks was also restricted. First, despite its incremental expansion, state administration 
 
                                                     
573  The only Isaaq clan that was under-represented was the Habar Jalo, not only because of their geographical 
distance from the capital, but also their antagonistic stance towards the Egal government (Interview 138). 
While this Isaaq domination in the central state administration challenges the frequent proposition that 
Somaliland was a multi-clan project (Walls/Kibble 2011:13), it is to be noted that such imbalances are 
anything but abnormal in international comparison. When e.g. Czechoslovakia was formed after World 
War One, the formation of that state centred around the interests of the Czechs and Slovaks, rather than 
those of minorities, such as the Hungarians and Germans. 
574  It is estimated that, by the late 2000s, about half of all civil servants originated from Hargeysa, and that 
most of these were from the Isaaq/Habar Awal/Saad Muse clan, followed by members of the 
Isaaq/Habar Yonis (Interview 138).  
575  The regional government of Berbera, for example, estimated that about 35 per cent of its payroll staff was 
above 60 years of age (UNCDF 2009:17). 
576  According to the informant, the CSI held one single training session in Erigavo and none in Las Anood 
between 2005 and 2011. 
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remained limited in its geographical spread, leading the Ministry of Finance to observe that 
“there is excessive concentration of staff in Hargeysa, where more than two-thirds of civil 
servants are located, and correspondingly relatively low staffing levels in the regions and 
especially in rural areas” (MF 2011:9). Thus, little had changed since 1997, when ministerial 
staff was largely confined to Somaliland’s central and western regions,577 with hardly any 
representatives in Sool and Sanaag (CSC 1997:2, 12, 15).578 By the late 2000s, only 8 of the 
26 government ministries were said to have decentralised to regions and districts (UNCDF 
2009:5f.).579 The skewed distribution of the administration also showed in the spatial 
distribution of local government officials: out of a total of 3,500, about 900 worked for the 
municipality of Hargeysa, while a further 305 were employed in Berbera alone (UN/WB 
2006a:18; MF 2011:8). 
Second, the ability of the state’s administration to propel regime standardization across the 
territory was hampered by the fact that the administrative apparatus was fragmented into 
clan-based regional entities, leading some to characterize Somaliland as a ‘confederation of 
different clan administrations’ (Interviews 142, 144, 156). Moreover, regional councils and 
district committees cooperated only on a most informal basis, being dependent on personal 
relationships between governors and mayors (UNCDF 2009:7). The absence of a more 
formal relationship was largely rooted in the fact that the Ministry of Interior, which was 
tasked with the formation of district councils, did not have the capacity to fulfill its mandate 
(UNCDF 2009:18) – thus failing to broadcast the same ‘rules of the game’ throughout the 
regions. Furthermore, the implementation and standardization of common rules was 
inhibited by other factors, not least the fact that the office of the governor of Sanaag was 
equipped with neither a telephone nor a (web-enabled) computer by the late 2000s.580 
 
                                                     
577  The Ministry of Finance, for example, employed 42 staff in Hargeysa, 55 in the Sahil region (home to the 
port of Berbera), 41 in Awdal (passing zone for khat coming from Ethiopia), and 14 in Togdheer. 
578  The same applied to other government bodies such as the Bank of Somaliland, which had branches in 
Hargeysa, Berbera, Boroma, Zeila and Gabiley by the mid-1990s (CSC 1997:83), but only opened an office 
in Erigavo in 1999 (Interview 69; see also MNPC 1999:7). 
579  Namely the Ministries of Water & Mineral Resources; Agriculture; Environment & Rural Development; 
Public Works; Housing & Transport; Health; Family Affairs & Social Development; Livestock; and 
Education. 
580  Personal observation, Erigavo, 08.04.2009.  
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Security Providing Capacity581 
From 1991 onwards, Somaliland governments struggled to gain and maintain control over 
the means of violence. In the beginning, this was hampered by the fragmentation of the 
SNM and a situation in which some 32 heavily armed clan militias competed for military, 
political and economic shares (Interview 7).582 While «Tuur» had formed a nascent police 
force of 320 individuals in Hargeysa (Interview 45), the means of large-scale violence came 
under government control only once Egal decreed the formation of the SLPF on 
November 2nd, 1993 (Somaliland Law 2007; GoSL 2002d:3) and after he succeeded in his 
DDR and war projects of the mid-1990s. At that time, the government incrementally 
removed road blocks (Farah/Lewis 1997a:371; Interview 105), replaced clan militias as 
security providers at ports and airports, and – with the exception of three militias in eastern 
Somaliland – gradually integrated all militias into the state’s security apparatus (Interview 7). 
By 2004, the number of police officers had increased to some 4,340 (Interview 5) and 
reached about 7,200 by the late 2000s (Interview 42).583 Although it is questionable whether, 
by the turn of the millennium, “small but sufficient security forces have been deployed in all 
regions: most are uniformed, draw token salaries and have received basic police training” 
(APD 1999:38),584 the increase in personnel was accompanied by a steady boost in territorial 
reach. Yet, although Erigavo witnessed the creation of a police force in 1997,585 it took the 
government another decade to establish one in Las Anood (Interview 35). But, by the late 
2000s, there were some 63 major police stations throughout the country (DDG 2009), 
suggesting that the security sector had undergone and could relay regime standardization.  
However, similar to the trajectory of the administrative apparatus, this potential was also 
only harnessed to a limited extent. The degree to which standardization occurred within the 
security apparatus itself was constrained. First, analogous to the state’s administration, the 
 
                                                     
581  The subsequent analysis of Somaliland’s security architecture is limited to a preliminary picture on the 
trajectory of the Somaliland Police Forces (SLPF); my attempt to conduct in-depth research within the 
SLPF as well as Somaliland Armed Forces was restricted by Somaliland authorities. 
582  See Chapter 5. 
583  Other informants speak of approximately 6,000 (Interview 20) to 9,000 (Interview 15) police officers for 
the late 2000s. According to the SLPF’s own (electronic) records, there were a total of 5,777 police 
officers in 2009 (Interview 45). Yet, as always, all of these figures should be treated with caution. 
584  First, Forberg and Terlinden (1999) note that even in the capital of Hargeysa most police officers do not 
wear uniforms. Second, control of Sool and its capital, Las Anood, was not established before 2007. 
Third, even two decades into Somaliland’s existence security is mostly provided by non-state actors rather 
than a functioning police force (see DDG 2009; Balthasar/Grzybowski 2012).  
585  Yet, according to one informant this police force did not become functional until 1998/99 (Interview 66). 
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SLPF also came to be strongly dominated by SNM veterans of the Isaaq (WSP 1999:70; 
GoSL 2002d:12; Interviews 35, 42),586 largely because Egal had used the security apparatus 
as a collection device for demobilized militias. Moreover, he had entrusted the SNM War 
Veteran’s Association Sooyaal with the task of supporting the establishment of the SLPF 
(GoSL 2002d:3). Although some argue that the SLPF was free of any clan bias (Interview 
38), empirical evidence suggests that, by the late 2000s, the majority of police officers still 
originated predominantly from the Isaaq (Interviews 35, 45; see Table 2).587 Partly, this was 
because communities in eastern Somaliland did not have access to education, which 
formally disqualified them from entering police service (Interviews 15, 141).588 
Table 2: Origin of Somaliland Police Officers per Region (2009)589 
 
Source: Interview 45; the data on population distribution are WHO/UNICEF working estimates that were agreed 
upon with the Government of Somaliland, 2009. For similar, yet slightly older estimates, see UK Border Agency 
(2012:19) and Ambroso (2002:9).  
Second, regime standardization within the ranks of the SLPF was hampered by the 1993 
Peace Charter, which laid out decentralized security provisions. Although the initially highly 
decentralized manner in which police forces were formed (Interviews 35, 128) was 
increasingly centralized by Egal – for example by sending aspiring police units to the 
 
                                                     
586  That the new police forces were dominated by the Isaaq and meant to primarily secure Somaliland’s 
‘heartland’ is also reflected in the fact that the trained police troops were mainly stationed in Hargeysa, 
Boroma, Burco and Berbera (Interview 35). Furthermore, it should be noted that it was not until 2007/08 
that the first 370 militias from Buuhodle and Las Anood in Sool region were sent to Mandheera training 
camp (Interview 35). 
587  However, it also needs to be acknowledged that Isaaq represent about 66 per cent of Somaliland’s 
population, while the Harti and Dir communities represent some 19 and 15 per cent respectively (Mesfin 
2009:1).  
588  Despite this supposed entry barrier, it is estimated that 30-40 per cent of all police officers are illiterate 
(Interview 20), which constitutes a further impediment to rule standardization.  
589  The statistics show the regional origin of SLPF officers – a reasonable proxy for clan affiliation due to the 
clans’ settlement patterns – for the year of 2009. While it is obvious that the Isaaq clan holds a dominant 
position within the SLPF, it is claimed that, over time, other minority clans – such as the Gabooye – have 
also taken their share in the police force (Interview 35). 
Region No. of officers % of total 
Population 
distribution 
Marodi Jeeh (Hargeysa) 1,692 51.9% 39.3% 
Awdal 292 9.0% 12.5% 
Sahil 199 6.1% 5.1% 
Togdheer 580 17.8% 23.3% 
Sanaag 361 11.1% 10.1% 
Sool 133 4.1% 9.7% 
  
Total 3,257 100% 100% 
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Mandheera training camp that had been established in 1994 (Interview 45)590 – the police 
forces’ chain of command remained ambiguous even in the late 2000s. As was the case in 
the mid-1990s, a dozen years later traditional authorities still maintained significant control 
over the local police units, particularly in smaller settlements (Interviews 20, 35). While a 
positive side-effect of this control probably lay in the fact that the police did generally not 
prey on the population, the outcome of the local rootedness of the police forces is 
indecisive, as it clearly impeded the implementation of the same ‘rules of the game’.  
Third, institutional standardization within the police forces was handicapped by restricted 
routine transfers of police officers from one duty station to another. Although Egal aimed 
to create a true national force by having police officers rotate between duty stations 
(Interviews 35, 15), it is unclear to what extent this procedure was ultimately implemented. 
While it was allegedly applied to police commanders (Interview 35), the rank and file seem 
not to have been subjected to this procedure. Due to financial constraints on the part of the 
state as well as individual police officers, the latter depended on their families and clans in 
their home territories to top up their official salaries (Interviews 42, 23). This attachment of 
police officers to their home communities also aggravated regime standardization in other 
ways such as weakening the ‘esprit de corps’ to such an extent that police officers were 
believed to desert their units for their clan in case they had to pick sides (Interviews 6, 24, 
35). This questions the proposition that those combatants who fought on opposing sides 
during the 1988-91 civil war “today identify with Somaliland and are united in its defense of 
its independence and sovereignty” (Bulhan 2004:23). 
The degree to which the security apparatus could serve as an accelerator of regime 
standardization beyond its own ranks was also restricted. The lack of respect on the part of 
the population, lack of enforcement capacity (DDG 2009; UNDP 2010),591 and insufficient 
penetration of the country (Interview 38) resulted in the population engaging in their own 
policing (Interviews 9, 35). Far from being barely tolerated by the government, it was 
actively encouraged, as evidenced in a speech of one of Burco’s governors who announced 
at a local meeting that “[w]e [i.e. the state] have the responsibility of protecting you, but we 
cannot do it without you – it is you [who have to] protect yourselves” (Interviews 9, 35). 
Although it is argued that “[r]esidents in the west rely on the government for their security 
 
                                                     
590  Between 1994 and 2010, about 1,800 police officers graduated from the police academy (UNDP 2011). 
591  According to UNDP (2010), the SLPF is “[h]ampered by old and dysfunctional infrastructure, equipment 
and poor training and deployment.”  
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while those in the east depend on self-defense” (Bulhan 2004:29),592 it appears that no 
community relied for their security on the SLPF alone. The urban population particularly 
drew significantly on security provided by clan-based neighbourhood watch groups 
(Balthasar/Grsybowski 2012), opening the security sector to capture by traditional 
authorities and the clan regime,593 and leaving the Somaliland government to still grapple for 
the monopoly over the means of violence two decades after independence (Interview 5). 
Enforcing Which Rule of Law? 
Considered a key condition for building a viable state by the political leadership, the first 
steps to reinstall a formal judicial system were undertaken at the 1993 Boroma conference 
(Interviews 12, 19). This was backed with the adoption of a provisional constitution at the 
1996/97 Hargeysa summit, which revived previous laws passed by the Somali democratic 
governments in the 1960s. In the following dozen years the number of district courts 
increased, Somaliland’s system of law enforcement allegedly grew stronger, and the polity’s 
population was said to have progressively swapped traditional for positive law (Interview 
60). Yet, the trajectory of Somaliland’s judicial sector was not quite so unambiguous and, 
two decades after its formation, the country still featured a multiplicity of rules for dispute 
resolution: ‘modern’, ‘traditional’, and religious laws.  
Established as a three-tier system, Somaliland’s legal architecture included a Supreme Court, 
several Courts of Appeal, and Regional and District Courts.594 By the mid-2000s, there were 
six District and six Regional Courts, situated in Hargeysa, Gabiley, Boroma, Berbera, Burco, 
and Erigavo595 and five Appeal Courts, located in Hargeysa, Boroma, Berbera, Burco and 
Erigavo (APD 2002a). While the number of judges employed by Somaliland increased 
significantly over time (see Table 3), their regional distribution remained skewed (see Table 
 
                                                     
592  See Bulhan (2004) for an interesting survey on perceptions of security in different regions of Somaliland. 
The survey reveals, amongst others, that populations in MarodiJee (Hargeysa) and Awdal predominantly 
turn to local authorities, if threatened physically (83.5% and 82.2% respectively), while these numbers 
decline at the expense of respondents who turn to unspecified ‘other’ in other regions (ibid.:16).  
593  A study undertaken by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) reveals that throughout Somaliland, 
traditional authorities addressed about 70 per cent of all disputes and crimes, which generally fall into the 
category of domestic violence, whereas the police addressed the remaining 30 per cent, which generally lay 
in the criminal sphere. Yet, there are stark regional differences (DDG 2009). While the SLPF remains the 
primary security actor, interviewees admit that its writ across Somaliland is not universal (DDG 2009). 
594  While the District Courts deal with claims of up to Sl.Sh. 3 million (ca. USD 600) and offences punishable 
by sentences of less than three years, the Regional Courts engage in claims that exceed these limits. 
595  The Regional Court in Las Anood was only installed in December 2007. It is interesting to note that the 
director of that court used to work for the administration of Puntland (Interview 114).  
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4). This could also be observed with regard to the spatial distribution of the 33 practicing 
lawyers, 19 of which worked in Hargeysa, 9 in Burco, and 2 in Berbera, Boroma and 
Erigavo respectively (Farah 2009:34). 
Table 3: Number of Judges in Somaliland (1994-2009)  
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Regional Distribution of Judges (2009) 
 
 
 
Sources:  Interview 86; APD 2002a.596 
One obstacle that prevented the legal system from bringing about significant regime 
standardization across the territory lay in the incoherent amalgamation of overlapping, and 
at times contradictory codes, which built on British Common Law, Italian Civil Law, Somali 
xeer (i.e. traditional laws), and Islamic shari’a (APD 2002a). This plurality of ‘rules of the 
game’, and the fact that adjudication continued to be ad hoc and highly subjective (APD 
2002a), inhibited a standardized application of the rule of law (Interview 60). It also 
perpetuated confusion with regard to law enforcement, for example in situations in which a 
culprit was sentenced to imprisonment under civil law, but released on the grounds that 
traditional authorities from the respective lineages involved settled the case based on 
customary law outside the formal court system (Interviews 60, 140). 
Second, the significant lack of qualified personnel – including judges, lawyers, and clerks 
(APD 2002a) – was not conducive to broadcasting and enforcing the same rules across 
Somaliland. Acknowledging this scarcity of judicial manpower in article 1 of the Judiciary 
Organization Act No. 059/95 of 1995, the government moved to relax the strict 
recruitment procedures for judges, lawyers and other legal professions. The subsequent 
dilution of professionalism was enhanced by the fact that appointments were increasingly 
made on political rather than meritocratic grounds (Farah 2009:11). Thus, by June 2002, 
only 19 out of the 35 practicing judges possessed a law degree, while the remainder merely 
 
                                                     
596  According to UN/WB (2006b:15), there were a total of 93 judges in Somaliland in 2006. According to 
Ahmed Isamail Ali of the Ministry of Justice, the number of judges in Somaliland developed as follows: 
1994: 40, 2006: 56, 2007:84, 2009:97 (Interview 86). 
Region 
Marodijeh 
(Hargeysa) 
Awdal Togdheer Sahil Sanaag Sool 
No. of judges 37 12 13 5 15 15 
 
Year 1994 2002 2006 2007 2009 
No. of judges 40 35 56 84 97 
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had basic education, complemented by some experience in administering shari’a law (APD 
2002a). For the mid-2000s it was estimated that “only 10% of sitting judges in Somaliland 
possess a formal education” and that “there is no standardized judges’ training” (Farah 
2007:28, 34). Not unsurprisingly, it was concluded that “Somaliland’s judiciary has spent 
most of the past decade mired in incompetence, corruption and political indifference” (ICG 
2003:27; Bulhan 2004:5). 
Third, the challenge for the judicial system to act as a catalyst of regime standardization was 
compounded by regular interference in court matters both by politicians and other 
influential (clan) actors, leading to a lack of judicial independence (APD 2002a; Interviews 
5, 60). While officially, the two major judicial reforms were undertaken to curb corruption 
(Interviews 81, 82, 83), it is interesting to note that both reforms took place shortly after the 
2002 and 2011 elections (Interview 102). Hence, there is reason to speculate that the 
respective presidents ‘reformed’ the judicial sector for political reasons (Interview 94), a 
suspicion that is supported by the proposition that the judiciary was dependent on the 
executive and, ultimately, accountable to the head of state (Interview 60).597  
At the very least the latest of these ‘reforms’ undermined the standardization of civic law 
and the modern court system, given that allegedly some 80 per cent of those appointed as 
judges were sheikhs and individuals who were much more versed in shari’a than civic law 
(Interview 114; Farah 2009:11). Consequently, and because the population lost confidence 
in the civic law system (APD 2002a; Farah 2009:11),598 customary clan justice via xeer gained 
a ubiquitous primacy across Somaliland (Interview 81; Farah 2007:19). Although some 
suggest that legal heterogeneity was a development asset for Somaliland (Battera 2005:281), 
I argue that the fact that the rule of law still remained largely in the hands of non-state 
actors two decades after the Republic of Somaliland was formed demonstrates the 
weakness of its state-making project.  
 
                                                     
597  As the nine Supreme Court judges as well as the Attorney General are nominated by the President, some 
argue that the constitution gives the President too much power (Interview 114). 
598  This was partly due to the long-drawn procedures involved when taking a case to court, as well as the 
financial costs involved. While traditional law was free of charge, dispute resolution via positive law was 
costly. One informant estimated that a case of USD 5,000 in value costs about USD 1,000 to settle – some 
USD 200-400 for the court, some USD 300 for the lawyer, expenses for transport and witnesses, etc. 
(Interview 81). 
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Standardization through Resource Mobilization? 
The mobilization of resources is key to state-making, not only because it is imperative to 
finance state-building efforts (e.g. Herbst 2000:113), but also because it serves important 
functions for nation-building (e.g. Azam/Mesnard 2003:456), not least because “[t]he 
experience of being taxed engages citizens in the political process” (Moore 2008:35).599 The 
Somaliland case lends itself to the study of the relationship between resource mobilization 
and state-making, largely because its governments depended on local resources in order to 
pursue their state-making endeavour, as World Bank loans, grants from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and bilateral budget support did not materialize in the absence of 
international recognition (WSP 2005:104; APD 2002b:66). «Tuur» had faltered in face of 
this formidable task, and Egal needed all his statesmanship to mobilize sufficient resources 
to take the Somaliland state-making project forward.  
Crucially, however, Egal not only succeeded in mobilizing resources to pursue state-making, 
but he also managed to incrementally prevent competing actors from generating revenues, 
at least along the state’s most important economic routes. While between 1992 and 1997 
some 14 militia-controlled checkpoints had existed between Boroma and Hargeysa, and 
another 26 between Burco and Las Anood (Farah/Lewis 1997a:371), these illegal and 
mostly kinship-based barriers were removed with the conclusion of the inter-clan 
conferences in Boroma (1993) and Hargeysa (1996/97). Following the Hargeysa summit, 
domestic revenues grew significantly, increasing by more than 600 per cent between 1997 
and 2008 (Jama/Awad 2010:3). Whereas domestic revenues had stood at about Sl.Sh. 680 
million (ca. USD 3.5 million)600 in 1995, they reached some Sl.Sh. 194 billion in the fiscal 
year of 2007 (ca. USD 31 million)601 (Scek 2007:5; MNPC 1998, 2004; see Table 5 and 
Figure 1).602    
 
                                                     
599  See Chapter 2.  
600  Calculated on the basis of the then average exchange rate of about USD 1 to Sl.Sh. 200. 
601  Calculated on the basis of the then average exchange rate of about USD 1 to Sl.Sh. 6,300. 
602  However, caution is needed with regard to the exact numbers, as even government publications differ in 
their reporting and ‘calculations’. For example, the Government of Somaliland 2004 publication 
‘Somaliland in figures’ observes central state revenues in the area of Sl.Sh. 126 billion. At the same time, 
another Government of Somaliland publication dating from 2003 (MNPC 2003b) brings the amount of 
revenues to merely Sl.Sh. 88.5 billion for the same year of 2002. Other sources provide different data. 
When relying on reports of the APD (2002b:64) and the Ministry of Finance (MF 2006), it appears that in 
1995 Somaliland’s budget stood at about Sl.Sh. 1.9 billion, growing to Sl.Sh. 56 billion in 1999, and 78 
billion in 2001 (MNPC 2004). According to the Government of Somaliland publication of 2004, revenues 
peaked at Sl.Sh. 167 billion in 2001 (MNPC 2004).  
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Table 5: Central Government Revenue and Expenditure  
 
Figure 1: Central Government Revenue and Expenditure  
 
 
 
 
In light of these developments and the fact that “some 95% of the resources that finance 
the activities of the government are locally mobilised, mostly through taxation” (WSP 
2005:104; Bryden/Farah 1996:8), Weinstein (2004) portrays Somaliland as a case of 
‘autonomous recovery’, and Eubank (2010:20) postulates that it was due to its financial 
dependency on tax revenues that the polity established an “accountable government.” 
Following the broader literature on taxation and state-making (e.g. Tilly 1992; Moore 2004; 
Year Revenue 
(in million Sl.Sh.) 
Expenditure 
(in million Sl.Sh.) 
Surplus/Deficit 
1995 691 2,028 -1,337 
1996 12,069 16,125 -4,057 
1997 36,109 n.a. n.a. 
1998 40,971 42,760 1,789 
1999 55,456 54,942 514 
2000 67,795 135,602 67,807 
2001 76,255 166,820 90,564 
2002 106,638 117,967 11,329 
2003 120,808 120,808 --0-- 
2004 144,849 144,849 --0-- 
2005 148,252 148,252 --0-- 
2006 164,669 164,669 --0-- 
2007 202,760 202,760 --0-- 
2008 233,104 247,711 -14,607 
2009 261,994 258,496 3,497 
 
Sources: (1) MNPC 1998, MNPC 2004, MNPC 2007, and MNPC 2010, which refer to figures provided by 
the Ministry of Finance. Note: Some of the figures differ significantly from government publication to government 
publication. The MNPC 2004 publication puts the revenue for 2000, 2001, and 2002 at Sl.Sh. 
127,011,187,343, Sl.Sh. 167,614,943,238, and Sl.Sh. 125,719,493400 respectively. The above figures are 
taken from MNPC 2003, as they appear to be more sensible. 
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Bräutigam 2008a), these authors suggest that Somaliland’s mobilization of resources had 
positive implications on its state-making. Scrutinizing the role resource mobilization played 
in Somaliland’s state-making endeavour, the following paragraphs also argue that the 
‘accountability’ of the polity’s structures of governance can hardly be traced to its system of 
taxation, as Eubank (2010, 2011) wants us to believe. 
Depending on Custom Duties 
Although the significant increase of revenue that occurred during the first two decades of 
Somaliland’s existence is laudable, and even though the creation of a revenue regime by 
Egal constitutes a great state-making achievement, the potential of the polity’s tax regime to 
contribute to state-making was restricted. To start with, the overall revenue remained 
limited, which reflected in a revenue to GDP ratio of about 6 per cent (Jamal/Awad 
2010:2). Not only did Somaliland perform significantly below the average of other 
developing countries, which raised approximately 18 per cent or more of GDP in total 
revenue (Di John 2009; MF 2011:14),603 but it also fell behind in historical comparison. 
While the Somali state of the 1970s had seen a tax-to-GDP ratio of about 12 per cent 
(Jama/Awad 2010:2), even the period from 1984 to 1990, which was marked by political 
upheavals and war, witnessed the collection of 5-7 per cent of GDP in total revenue 
(UN/WB 2006a:iv).604 
Yet, not only the quantity of resources collected, but also the quality of Somaliland’s system 
of resource mobilization raises questions regarding its potential to contribute to state-
making. For a number of reasons, broad-based regime standardization is more likely to be 
brought about by the generation of internal revenue as compared to the collection of 
custom duties.605 Yet, Somaliland predominantly depended for the generation of revenues 
on a narrow set of custom duties – a feature hardly unique in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 
1997 and 2008, for example, customs contributed an average mean of over 90 per cent of 
 
                                                     
603  Yet, it has to be acknowledged that Somaliland roughly doubled the tax-to-GDP ratio between 2003/04 
and 2008/09, as overall revenues (approximately USD 18 million) had equaled about 3.2 per cent of GDP 
in 2003/04 (Jama/Awad 2010:3). 
604  Although one must acknowledge that the historical comparison has its flaws, it helps to put Somaliland’s 
efforts at revenue mobilization into perspective. 
605  Compared with the collection of custom duties, the mobilization of inland revenue requires, first, more 
administrative and enforcement capacity on the part of the state, which increases forward and backward 
linkages (Hirshman 1958) within the administrative apparatus. Second, once in place, inland taxation is 
better placed to create broad-based institutional and socio-cognitive standardization, as it involves more 
taxpaying individuals than is the case for custom duties. Third, it is inland revenue rather than custom 
duties that are likely to lead to greater demands for government accountability. 
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all tax and non-tax revenues to Somaliland’s budget (Holleman 2002:36; Interview 127),606 
not least because they were comparatively easy to monitor and collect (Jama/Awad 2010:6; 
Interviews 12, 120).607 But this dependency on custom duties not only made Somaliland 
vulnerable to external shocks (Holleman 2002:36),608 but also limited the government’s 
potential to effect broad-based regime standardization, particularly as the customs 
architecture remained underdeveloped. 
Once Egal had established custom offices along the most important trade routes during the 
course of the 1990s – largely in order to generate revenues from the import of khat 
(Interview 109; see Table 6 and Appendix, Map 5) – the structure of revenue generation 
remained largely unchanged in subsequent years. As in the early 1990s, in the late 2000s the 
vast majority of revenue collected originated mainly from two custom posts (Interview 5): 
whereas the lion’s share of approximately 70 to 80 per cent was generated in Berbera (Scek 
2007:3; MF 2006:20; Interview 44),609 custom duties on khat constituted a (much smaller) 
second source of revenue, contributing around 5 per cent in the 1990s, rising to about 12 
per cent in the 2000s to the government’s budget (Hansen 2009:14; Bradbury 2008:171).610 
While in 1999 the taxation of khat contributed close to USD 3 million to the state budget 
(APD 2002b: 32),611 the figure increased to USD 5.5 million for 2005 (Hansen 2009:14), and 
even more in the years thereafter.612 When geographically disaggregating the mobilization of 
 
                                                     
606  See also EIU (2008:6), which puts the figure at 80 per cent. 
607  However, when the Somaliland government attempted to impose closer inspections on imported goods at 
Berbera in August 2003, this elicited a negative reaction from traders (Bradbury 2008:238). 
608  While UNDOS (1998) suggests that the first livestock ban led to a 45 per cent fall in revenues for the 
Somaliland government, and thus a budgetary shortfall of USD 7.5 million, it was estimated within 
twenty-eight months of the second ban that the government had lost some USD 22.5 million in foreign-
exchange earnings plus an additional USD 6.6 million in exchange-rate earning as a result (Holleman 
2002). Moreover, it is worth noting that custom revenues accruing from the port of Berbera are highly 
dependent on the Ethiopian economy, as only some 10-15 per cent of all wholesale products that are 
imported through Berbera are destined for the Somaliland market, the majority being destined for 
Ethiopia (Interview 147). 
609  Breaking this figure down further it can be seen that taxes on the profitable livestock export trade 
provided the government with about 30 per cent of all its revenues, amounting to roughly Sl.Sh. 2.5 billion 
(ca. USD 10 million) per year (calculated on the basis of the 2000 official exchange rate of USD 1 to Sl.Sh. 
2,500). The other estimated 40 per cent of revenues raised at the port of Berbera were generated from 
import duties (Holleman 2002:36; Bradbury 2008:237). 
610  Rather than trying to impose a ban on this narcotic – a policy which had not only proven 
counterproductive in the past but was also largely impossible to enforce for a state like Somaliland – the 
political leadership of the young entity legalized khat and taxed the business worth some USD 250 million 
per year, instead (Gilkes 1995, cf. Bradbury 2008:112).  
611  USAID (2003:24) suggests that the revenue reaped from the taxation of khat amounted to roughly USD 
10,000 per day, thus providing a higher estimate than the one put forth by APD (2002b).  
612  While one informant argues that daily revenues accrueing from khat were in the range of USD 15,000-
17,000 (Interview 44), my own observations at the customs checkpoint in Kalabeydh suggest that this is 
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custom duties the spatial concentration in Berbera and Kalabeydh shows prominently over 
time (see Table 7), and is reflected in staff figures per customs post. While the head office 
in the capital leads the chart with some 63 employees in 2006, it was followed by Berbera 
(39),613 Hargeysa (22), Kalabeydh (20), Erigavo (20), Boroma (16), Burco (13), Seylac (13), 
Abaarso (11), Caynabo (7), Cahsa Caado (5), TogWajale (4), and Faraweyne (2) (Interview 
122; see Appendix, Map 5). 
Table 6: Overview of Customs Offices 
 
Source: Interview 44; see also Interview 122. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
an understatment. In 2011, some 70,000 kg of khat were imported daily into Somaliland – more than 
double the volume than in 2003 (Anderson et al. 2007:41) – leading to tax generation in the range of USD 
46,000. On the morning of the interview, the customs post in Kalabydh collected taxes worth Sl.Sh. 
283.757.017 (ca. USD 43,650), a figure in line with the suggested USD 1,386,000 that Kalabeydh collected 
each month from khat traders throughout the year (Interview 126). Thus, the yearly revenue generated 
from khat imports is believed to amount to about USD 15.5 million. 
613  While in 1993 only 10 tax officers were employed in Berbera, this rose to 39 in 2006 (Interview 122).  
Office 
Date 
established 
Type of tax 
office 
Taxing goods 
coming from 
Main goods 
Kalabaydh 1993 Customs Ethiopia 95% Khat 
Berbera  1993 Customs Overseas Different goods 
Abarso 1993 Checkpoint Ethiopia Khat 
Boroma 1993 Customs Ethiopia Mostly khat 
Hargeysa Airport 1993 Customs  Ethiopia and 
other cargo 
Different goods 
Ceyla 1994 Customs Djibouti Different goods 
Ceel Gal/ Asha-
Ado 
1994  Checkpoint Djibouti Different goods 
Burco 1996 Customs Bossasso Different goods 
Beer  1996 Checkpoint Bossasso Different goods 
Aynabo 2001 Customs and 
Checkpoint 
Bossasso and 
Mogadisho 
Different goods 
Erigavo 2001 Customs Bossasso Different goods 
Xiis (Habr Yallo) 2001 Customs UAE Different goods 
Maydh (Habr 
yonis) 
2001 Customs UAE Different goods 
Faraweyne 2002 Customs Ethiopia Different goods 
Harriad  2006 Customs Ethiopia Khat 
Ballygubadle 2008 Customs Bossasso/ 
Mogadisho 
Different goods  
Las Anood 2008 Customs Bossasso/ 
Mogadisho 
Different goods 
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Table 7: Revenues per Region 1999-2005 (in million Sl.Sh.) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on MF (2005, 2006). 
 
Depending on Inland Revenues 
To some, the incremental growth of revenue generated from the khat trade symbolized the 
increased formalization and strengthening of the state (Hansen 2009:14), which was also 
mirrored in attempts to enhance domestic taxation from the mid-1990s onwards (Interview 
52). To try to further regulate taxation the Somaliland House of Representatives passed a 
R
eg
io
n
  Year 
District Town 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
A
w
d
a
l 
 
 
Zeyla 
Zeyla 2,215 1,457 1,349 2,874 2,279 2,768 4,203 
Ceel Gaal 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 
Asha-Ado 0 0 58 43 34 24 49 
Boroma Boroma 420 615 784 1,343 1,938 2,445 0 
Gabiley 
Gabiley 9,676 0 0 0 0 0 2,079 
Kalabeydh 0 11,790 16,590 20,162 25,697 26,705 29,295 
Total Awdal 12,311 13,878 18,781 24,423 29,949 31,942 35,627 
 
G
a
lb
ee
d
 
 Hargyesa  
Hargeysa 2,985 717 1,770 2,455 2,332 4,754 4,596 
Abaarso 0 431 411 163 98 278 322 
Faraweyne 0 0 0 199 175 282 398 
Baligubadle 0 0 0 0 38 97 61 
Total Galbeed 2,985 1,148 2,182 2,817 2,643 5,411 5,378 
S
a
h
il
 
 Berbera Berbera  26,005 39,373 54,779 78,549 96,021 130,141 135,432 
Total Sahil 26,005 39,373 54,779 78,549 96,021 130,141 135,432 
T
o
g
d
. 
Burco Burco 277 666 666 387 536 896 684 
Total Togdheer 277 666 666 387 536 896 684 
 
S
a
n
a
a
g
 
 Erigavo 
Erigavo 0 0 46 144 241 347 431 
Ceelayo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Laasqoray 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maydh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xiis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Sanaag 0 0 46 144 241 347 431 
 
S
o
o
l 
 Las Anood 
Las Anood 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Caynabo 0 0 712 1,366 1,354 702 587 
Total Sool  0 0 712 1,366 1,354 702 587 
Grand Total 41,578 55,065 77,165 107,685 130,744 169,439 178,140 
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number of laws in late 1996,614 and a number of levies were introduced by presidential 
decrees.615 Simultaneously, the accountant general’s office and inland revenue departments 
were expanded, culminating in a situation in which they had established a presence in 
almost every region by the year 2000 (APD 2002b:63; see Table 8). Hence, it is suggested 
that “tax collection is carried out effectively in areas that come under the sway of ‘Igal’s 
administration” (Bryden/Farah 1996:8; Faray 1995:9), and that “[t]he government system of 
tax collection is improving and there is a steady growth in the revenue collected by central, 
local and parastatal government agencies” (WSP 2005:50).616 Although the effectiveness of 
tax collection remained questionable, it is indisputable that inland revenue increased. While, 
for example, the Inland Revenue Department of Hargeysa region collected about Sl.Sh. 6 
billion per year prior to 1997, this rose to Sl.Sh. 20 billion two years later (Interview 52). 
Table 8: List of Inland Revenue Department Sub-Offices  
 
Source: Interview 44. 
 
Laudable as these developments are, the potential for regime standardization remained 
limited, not least because the share of direct taxation stayed miniscule, contributing an 
insignificant 2.6 per cent of all taxes to the state coffers between 1997 and 2008 – an entry 
that was even outstripped by the 5.5 per cent of total revenue raised through fees and 
charges (Jama/Awad 2010:4). Income tax,617 for example, was hardly harnessed, and 
 
                                                     
614  See e.g. the Body of Laws on Direct Taxation 1996 (no. 89/96), and the Law on Customs Duties (no. 91/96). 
615  The most notable and prominent example thereof is the so-called aafada, a tax that served to create a 
disaster fund for the rehabilitation of Burco after the 1994-1996 war (Renders 2006:337). 
616  Similarly, the Government of Somaliland claims that “[w]ith a pinch of salt, the [Customs and Revenue] 
Department works today apparently better than the former Hargeisa branch of Somalia’s Revenue 
Department (MNPC 1999:10). 
617  The payroll tax conceded a tax free allowance of Sl.Sh. 6,000 per month (ca. USD 1), while payrolls 
between Sl.Sh. 6,000-9,000 were taxed at 3 per cent, those between Sl.Sh. 9,000-12,000 at 6 per cent, and 
 
Location of Sub-Office (Region and City) Date of Establishment 
Inland Revenue Office Hargeysa 1993 
Inland Revenue Office Berbera 1994 
Inland Revenue Office Borama 1995 
Inland Revenue Office Gabiley 1995 
Inland Revenue Office Burco 1997 
Inland Revenue Office Erigavo  1997 
Inland Revenue office Las Aanod 2008 
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(unconfirmed) data from the Inland Revenue Department reveals that one company alone 
(a prominent import-export enterprise) paid some 20.25 per cent of all income taxation, 
while most other companies contributed less than 0.9 per cent to the overall income tax 
take.618 Over time, the structure of Somaliland’s revenue remained largely unchanged, as 
evidenced by data presented in Table 9. 
Table 9: Sources of Revenue per Year (1997-2004) 
 
Source: Mohamed (undated). 
 
The meagre yield from inland revenue and its limited potential to contribute to regime 
standardization lay largely in the population’s opposition (Interview 24) and the state 
authorities’ restricted capacity to enforce taxation. This is confirmed by a government 
official who proposes that “taxpayers voluntarily pay only about 10 percent of the taxes 
they legally owe” (Mohamed undated:23) and a former Minister of Finance who observes 
that “nobody is paying taxes” and that “there is no tax enforcement capacity” (Interview 
12).619 This lack of enforcement capacity and consequently restricted potential of inland 
revenue to contribute to broad-based regime standardization partly lay in the inland 
 
                                                                                                                                     
those above Sl.Sh. 12,000 at 9 per cent. While the tax was theoretically slightly progressive, in practice this 
was irrelevant as a medium half-decent income ranged around Sl.Sh. 500,000 in the late-1990s. By similar 
means, the progressiveness of the profit tax was also an “optical illusion” (MNPC 1999:11).  
618  The country’s largest hotel, which also hosts numerous UN staff and offices, paid for its 59 staff a total of 
USD 720 per month in labour tax to the Somaliland state (at a labour tax rate of six per cent) (Interview 
93). Telesom, a telecommunication company that controls about 80 per cent of the telecommunication 
market (Interview 157), paid only some USD 50,000 per year in taxes (Interview 120). This has partly to 
do with the fact that the government has insufficient capacity and knowledge to tax the communication 
companies (Interview 157). 
619  See also Interview 52; Jama/Awad 2010:5. 
Sources Actual Revenue (in million Sl.Sh.) and Percentages of Total Revenue per Year 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Indirect 
taxes 
25,904 
(87.7%) 
34,345 
(83.6%) 
52,153 
(93.6%) 
59,951 
(88.4%) 
68,132 
(89.3%) 
98,558 
(94.3%) 
111,457 
(92.3%) 
133,491 
(91.1%) 
Direct 
taxes 
0,303 
(0.01%) 
0,401 
(0.01%) 
0,570 
(0.01%) 
1,292 
(0.02%) 
2,201 
(0.03%) 
2,165 
(0.02%) 
1,597 
(0.01%) 
3,512 
(0.02%) 
Properties 0,001 
(0%) 
0,004 
(0%) 
0,063 
(0%) 
1,109 
(0.02%) 
0,801 
(0.01%) 
0,518 
(0.01%) 
1,788 
(0.01%) 
1,609 
(0.01%) 
Fees and 
charges 
3,303 
(11.1%) 
6,333 
(15%) 
2,935 
(5.2%) 
5,443 
(8%) 
5,121 
(6.7%) 
5,967 
(5.7%) 
5,967 
(4.9%) 
7,863 
(5.3%) 
Total 29,511 
(100%) 
41,083 
(100%) 
55,721 
(100%) 
67,795 
(100%) 
76,255 
(100%) 
104,499 
(100%) 
120,809 
(100%) 
146,475 
(100%) 
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revenue department’s limited human resources. While the customs office could boast about 
235 staff by the mid to late 2000s (see above), the inland revenue office only had 60-65 
employees at its disposal – most of whom were subordinate staff (Interview 127), and the 
remainder were insufficiently trained and lacking relevant work experience (MNPC 
1999:10). 
The Taxes’ Meagre Contribution to Standardization 
The state’s limited ability to tax the population showed in the country’s considerable tax 
gap, i.e. the difference between the taxes actually raised and what could have been collected 
according to existing laws and statutes, which, at 75 per cent was highly significant 
(Jama/Awad 2010:2). This lack of enforcement capacity was present not only at the central, 
but also the district level, where “[t]here is significant scope for increased revenue collection 
and service delivery” (UN/WB 2006a:14). This tax gap can largely be traced to the little 
interest Somaliland governments showed in expanding the state’s inland revenue 
department due to its meagre profitability (Interview 52) and the belief that the population 
should pay as little tax as possible, as expressed by a former Minister of Finance (Interviews 
12, 145). Moreover, the competition of different ministries over who was entitled to collect 
what not only diminished overall tax collection (Interview 151), but also hindered 
institutional standardization.620   
That the Somaliland state authorities made only limited progress regarding the enforcement 
of domestic taxation can also be seen in the example of fees and levies. The road levy, for 
example, at Sl.Sh. 50,000 (ca. USD 8.3) per six months, was paid by less than 40 per cent of 
registered car owners in 2010 (Interview 152) and only just over 17 per cent paid their 
yearly car registration fee (Interview 127).621 Property tax collection also suffered from 
irregularities that hindered regime standardization. Having won the civil war against the 
Garhajis, Egal exempted the clan from paying property tax in Hargeysa in order to both 
assist their economic recovery and silence them politically. This exemption remained in 
place in subsequent years, largely because Egal’s successor, President Riyale, depended 
politically on their support. Although the latter no longer enjoyed this tax holiday by the 
 
                                                     
620  The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of 
Telecommunication, amongst others, were, according to a regulation of the 1960s that was re-enacted by 
the Somaliland government, delegated to collect taxes (APD 2002b:60).  
621  The car registration fee was Sl.Sh. 43,000 (ca. USD 7) for limousines, Sl.Sh. 156,000 (ca. USD 25) for 
landcruisers, and Sl.Sh. 167,000 (ca. USD 28) for trucks (Interview 52).  
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late 2000s, they allegedly paid only an estimated third of what residents residing in the city’s 
northern part paid in property tax (Interview 151). 
Rather than mobilising resources through popular inland revenue generation, “[t]he 
government survives on the business community” (Interview 106). Yet, Somaliland 
governments largely refrained from obliging the biggest enterprises to play by the state’s 
rules and pay taxes and rather depended on voluntary donations on the part of tycoons. In 
fact, the tax income from the major businesses amounted to less revenue than that 
collected from the country’s civil servants in form of labour tax (Interview 120). The 
tycoons not only evaded tax payment (MNPC 1999:11; Interviews 52, 100),622 but were so 
influential that they could lobby for changes in personnel in the inland revenue department, 
if one of its employees was too persistent in demanding revenue payments from the 
respective company (Interview 52). Although the money remittance company Dahabshiil, 
for example, donated some USD 700,000 to the general public during the course of 2010 
(Interview 120), such donations were believed to be equivalent to only about one per cent 
of the private sector’s profits (Interview 100).  
More importantly, however, the decision of how much entrepreneurs paid the state 
remained with the tycoons rather than the political leadership, thus leaving this relationship 
uninstitutionalized. As observed by a former Minister of Finance, “the system works for 
them and there is no tax enforcement capacity” (Interview 12). Consequently, it is the 
private companies such as Dahabshiil and Telesom who control the state rather than vice 
versa (Interviews 100, 156). Due to the importance of the business sector for the survival of 
the Somaliland state, Bradbury (2008:155) labels the relationship between the business 
community and the government of the mid-1990s as a “relationship of co-dependency.”  
7.2 Forging or Fragmenting the Nation? 
Analogous to the trajectory of institutional standardization, progress with regard to socio-
cognitive standardization was also ambiguous in the period between 1991 and 2011. On the 
one hand, the fact that a national currency was established in 1994, a new flag and national 
 
                                                     
622  “With a few exceptions: the dozen or so of really rich people with annual income probably in the hundred 
thousands of millions of Dollars just refuse to pay up and ignore the Inland Revenue” (MNPC 1999:11). 
While the state legally has the option to jail tax evaders, it refrains from strict enforcement – either 
because it lacks the enforcement capability, or because the big businessmen are extremely influential at the 
political level (MNPC 1999:11). 
7   THE STATE OF SOMALILAND 
 
239 
 
anthem introduced in 1996, a Somaliland school curriculum developed from 1997 onwards, 
and national and civil war monuments erected in 2001 (Höhne 2011:321), hint at an 
increased potential for deepening a common set of ‘rules of the mind’. Moreover, two 
decades after having declared independence, there barely existed a single newspaper edition 
that did not call for international recognition of Somaliland (Personal observation, Hargey-
sa, 2008, 2010, 2011; Interview 57), thus committing its readership to a shared value. Yet, 
the potential for socio-cognitive standardization inherent to these developments does not 
seem to have been fully harnessed, restricting the extent to which nation-building occurred. 
Did Currency Buy Nationalism? 
In face of the depleted treasury he inherited when he took power in 1993, and due to his 
endeavour to establish greater long-term control over the polity’s economy, President Egal 
introduced a new currency in November 1994 (ION 1995; cf. Symes 2005).623 Viewed 
through the regime standardization prism, the replacement of the Somali Shilling (So.Sh.) 
with the Somaliland Shilling (Sl.Sh.) and the installation of the latter as the single accepted 
legal tender within the borders of the country constituted a formidable state-making 
endeavour. First, the introduction of a new currency indicated an advancement of 
institutional standardization as it was to provide a common, nation-wide medium for 
engaging in economic transactions. Second, it also constituted a tool for fostering socio-
cognitive standardization as the use of the same legal tender is considered to serve as a 
constant reminder of an ‘imagined community’ and, thus, contribute to nation-building 
(Helleiner 1998; Rowlinson 1999:60; Young 2004).624 Yet, how far did the introduction of 
the Somaliland Shilling contribute to regime standardization?  
Although Egal announced on January 13th, 1995 that the Somali Shilling would cease to be 
legal tender by the end of that month (Symes 2005; MNPC 1999:7), it did not disappear 
from Somaliland’s markets, but continued to be preferred over the Somaliland Shilling in 
 
                                                     
623  The introduction of the new currency constituted a windfall to the Egal administration as it was 
exchanged at a greatly preferential rate for the Somali Shilling (So.Sh.). The government set the exchange 
rates at Sl.Sh. 50 to USD 1, and Sl.Sh. 1 to So.Sh. 100, earning itself the accusation of conducting ‘the 
greatest robbery in Africa’ (Bradbury 1997:24ff.; Interview 30). As the government sold the So.Sh. for 
USD, it was provided with hard currency to support its war-torn economy (cf. Symes 2005). The 
introduction of the Sl.Sh. was financed by prominent merchants (Bradbury 1997:27), who used the 
discarded So.Sh. for business in other parts of Somalia and Ethiopia. The losers of this change in currency 
were marginal businesses and small traders, and the major businesses in the east of the country (Interviews 
104, 149). The introduction of the Somaliland Shilling thus fuelled the civil war, whose outbreak coincided 
with the introduction of the new currency (Interview 36). See Chapter 5, and also fn. 466. 
624  Unwin/Hewitt 2001; Hymans 2004; Cooper 2009. 
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places like Burco, Erigavo and Las Anood. First, Egal’s opposition objected to the 
Somaliland Shilling, partly because it went in tandem with a financial strengthening of his 
government.625 Second, the dominant livestock economy was strongly linked with south-
central Somalia, which rendered the Somali Shilling much more valuable to the traders 
involved. The distribution of the Somaliland Shilling remained so confined that even 
salaries of civil servants stationed in Burco were sent either in Somali Shillings or US 
Dollars (Bradbury 1997:27). The lack of acceptance of the Somaliland Shilling in the east 
was partly mirrored in the country’s western part. In Awdal, the Ethiopian Birr and the 
Djiboutian Franc were frequently preferred as legal tender – partly because the Gadabursi 
and Issa clans were economically strongly intertwined with their Ethiopian and Djiboutian 
neighbours, for whom the acceptance of the currency of an unrecognized country was risky 
and burdensome (Interview 99).   
The subordinate role the Somaliland Shilling took in Somaliland’s currency landscape not 
only had to do with political and economic reasons, but also a shortage in supply of 
Somaliland Shilling denominations. After two rounds of notes had been printed in 1994 
and 1996 respectively, the amount of Somaliland Shillings was estimated at around 16 to 17 
billion (approximately USD 4.71 million),626 and their circulation was, not surprisingly, 
largely restricted to the Kalabeydh-Hargeysa-Berbera corridor (MNPC 1999:7). While the 
geographical distribution of the Somaliland Shilling increased over the years, businesses in 
Erigavo still only accepted Somali Shillings in the late 2000s, even though many of the 
denominations were known to be forgeries (Interview 25; Personal observation, Erigavo, 
09.04.2009). Simultaneously, the Erigavo branch of the Central Bank of Somaliland did not 
hold any Somaliland, but only Somali Shillings in its vaults (Interview 61).627  
After «Silanyo» took power in mid-2010 he had additional denominations printed and 
distributed to Burco and the country’s eastern region (NSP 2011). By means of exchanging 
Somali Shilling denominations worth USD 4.37 million with Somaliland Shilling notes, the 
government aimed to suppress the circulation of the Somali Shilling by mid-June 2011 
 
                                                     
625  See fn. 466.  
626  Calculated on the approximate average exchange rate of USD 1 to Sl.Sh. 3,500 (USAID 2003). 
627  Also in this case numerous factors led the local population to prefer the Somali Shilling over the 
Somaliland Shilling. One reason seems to lie in the fact that the vast majority of goods consumed in 
Erigavo arrived from the Puntland port of Bossasso – with khat being the only major exception 
(Interviews 25, 63) – largely due to the appaling infrastructure that ‘connects’ Erigavo with other urban 
centres in Somaliland (Interview 66) and the fact that custom duties are much lower in Bossasso than in 
Berbera (Interview 9).     
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(Bartamaha 2011).628 Although these measures significantly enhanced the long neglected 
potential of the national currency to contribute to socio-cognitive standardization, it 
remains questionable as to how far the Somaliland Shilling will ultimately be accepted and 
used by the country’s population. As a former Minister of Finance states, “nobody really 
believes in the Somaliland Shilling […]. Everybody – even the poorest person – has a US 
Dollar account” (Interview 99). That the Somaliland Shilling was only second to other 
currencies was mirrored by the fact that the total value of local currency in circulation was 
guesstimated to be about USD 35 million, while the value of foreign currency in circulation 
was roughly USD 100-150 million (UN/WB 2006a:9). The Somaliland Shilling’s potential 
to contribute to regime standardization does not, thus, seem to have been fully harvested. 
The Media and the ‘Imagined Community’629 
As established by Anderson (1983) and other scholars, the media can play a pivotal role in 
forging national identities, as the near simultaneity of engaging with the same news that is 
spread through a daily newspaper available throughout the country, for example, enhances 
the creation of an ‘imagined community’. During the course of Somaliland’s history, a 
complex media landscape developed that lends itself to closer investigation of its impact on 
nation-building. Shortly after the end of the civil war in 1991, Somaliland saw the 
mushrooming of independent A4 duplicated ‘newspapers’, such as Ileys (Light), Codka 
Hargeysa (The Voice of Hargeysa), Xorriyo (Independence/Freedom), and Jamhuuriya (The 
Republican). Largely created by influential SNM mujahedeen,630 these newspapers, which 
had a print run of a few dozen hand-printed leaflets, provided a platform to articulate the 
views that had inspired the SNM’s armed struggle (Höhne 2008a:96). However, as no 
 
                                                     
628  However, according to the governor of the Central Bank of Somaliland the rate at which the currency will 
be exchanged has yet to be determined (Bartamaha 2011). It should be noted that the Somali Shillings 
collected by the government were, allegedly, not resold as had been the case under Egal, but destroyed – 
largely due to the fact that the old Somali Shilling denominations used in Burco were no longer accepted 
beyond the city’s confines (Interview 101). 
629  This section draws on research conducted in the framework of a joint research project of the Stanhope 
Centre for Communications Policy Research and the Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy 
(University of Oxford), which I was involved in during the course of 2009. The research findings 
presented here accrue from my work as Senior Research Associate, in which capacity I conducted and 
coordinated the project’s research in Somaliland between January and May 2009.  
630  Among them were Faisal Ali Sheikh, Jamhuuriya’s managing editor and co-owner, who later joined 
Kulmiye’s executive committee; Mahmoud Abdi Shide, entrepreneur and SNM veteran, who enabled 
Jamhurriya to be the first paper to go to the printing press; Aukuse, founder and editor-in-chief of 
Sahansaho, who had been head of the clandestine SNM radio during the war (Stanhope 2010:53, 59, 102; 
see also Höhne 2008a:97).   
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printing press existed until 1993,631 and as the production of leaflets was hardly profitable, 
most of them quickly disappeared again – with the exception of Jamhuuriya, which 
developed into the only independent, proper, government-critical newspaper by 1995.632 
Constituting a thorn in the side of Somaliland’s political leadership, the early governments 
tried to restrict the impact of Jamhuuriya, which strongly represented the voice of the SNM, 
particularly its more hard-line elements. While under «Tuur» press freedom was seriously 
impeded by the fact that militias loyal to the government would kidnap journalists that 
produced government-critical articles or cartoons (Omar 2004, cf. Höhne 2008a:96), Egal 
used other tactics to contain the challenge posed by the paper: he established Maandeeq, a 
government-funded newspaper designed to outweigh the views expressed in Jamhuuriya. 
This way, Egal could not only counter the opinions spread by Jamhuuriya – in which he 
succeeded particularly because many of Maandeeq’s editors were SNM veterans, thus 
providing former SNM cadres with an alternative source of information – but was also able 
to better communicate the government’s policies to the population. Clearly, this increased 
the potential of establishing an ‘imagined community’.  
Throughout the 2000s, numerous more privately owned newspapers evolved (Interview 
53), such as Haatuf (2001),633 Ogaal (2005),634 Geeska Afrika (2006),635 Sahansaxo (2007),636 
Malmaha (2008),637 and Waheen (2008).638 Their impact on socio-cognitive standardization 
appears unclear. On the one hand, they seem to have contributed to regime standardization 
in that they promulgated, despite their political differences, very similar ‘rules of the mind’. 
This was evident not only in that they all called for an independent Somaliland and 
emphasized the need for international recognition (Personal observation, Hargeysa, 2008, 
 
                                                     
631  The national printing press was only established in 1995. 
632  Since 1997, Jamhuuriya has also produced a weekly English sister-publication, The Republican, a paper 
edition of which is also sold in London (Höhne 2008a:97).  
633  The media outlet produces the Somali Haatuf, the English Somaliland Times, and the Arabic Al Haatef al 
Arabi.  
634  Founded by Musa Jambir, who used to work for Haatuf, this newspaper has an enhanced coverage of 
Togdheer region, as its owner originates from Burco and it is funded by entrepreneurs from Togdheer. 
635  Established by Mohamed Hussein «Rambo», an SNM veteran who had worked with Jamhuuriya, and was 
supported by a businessman close to the political party of UCID.  
636  Owned by Abdullahi Ahmed Dahel, the former manager of SNM’s Radio Halgaan, and financially 
supported by at least two individuals close to the poltical party of Kulmiye.  
637  Owned by Abdirahman Adam Dhameye, a former NSS officer, this newspaper was largely financed by 
former President Riyale.  
638  Chaired and funded by Ahmed Hussein Essa, a Somali-American, who used to be an active member of 
the Kulmiye party, leaving upon having fallen out with the party’s chairman «Silanyo».  
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2010, 2011), but also in that they largely reflected the voice of the Isaaq in Somaliland. 
Thus, the media landscape itself was standardized insofar, as the media outlets were largely 
run by SNM veterans. Moreover, the ability of the newspapers to act as a catalyst for 
standardization was bolstered when new technologies allowed for an increase in numbers of 
copies, and when an incremental expansion of the country’s infrastructure facilitated the 
dispersion of the nearly exclusively Hargeysa-based media outlets. 
On the other hand, however, the potential of the print media to contribute to socio-
cognitive standardization was hampered by a number of factors. First, the number of 
newspapers distributed remained relatively low. By the late 2000s, Somaliland’s roughly ten 
media outlets distributed an estimated 7,000 newspaper copies throughout the country. 
While it is true that newspapers were generally shared among multiple readers (Stanhope 
2010:100f.), the fact that the majority of newspapers remained in the capital itself impeded 
broader socio-cognitive standardization. By way of example, Ogaal produced around 700 to 
800 copies per day, which were distributed in Hargeysa (400 copies), Wajale (70), Gabiley 
(100), Boroma (50), Buro (60-70), Erigavo (25-30) and Las Anood (50) (Interview 46).  
Second, given that the newspapers largely reflected the Isaaq viewpoint, they were not 
always well received among the non-Isaaq communities, thus limiting the impact the media 
could have on people’s mental models.639 While Höhne (2008a:91f.) claims that “the 
newspapers printed in the capital city Hargeysa clearly contribute to the establishment of a 
democratic political system”, the media landscape was so dominated by the Isaaq that he 
acknowledges that “the guerrilla legacy heavily biases the reporting on issues touching upon 
the position of Somaliland as an independent state”, thus excluding “the perspective of a 
significant minority that is critical about the secession of Somaliland” (see also Stanhope 
2010:41). Although the Isaaq dominance of the print media could enhance socio-cognitive 
standardization by means of superimposing a particular agenda, it is unclear to what extent 
this bias was helpful, rather than detrimental to, socio-cognitive standardization. As one 
respondent told the Somaliland Communication Flows Research Project:  
“Since there [i.e. in the east of Somaliland] are no newspapers and they don’t 
receive any newspapers or radio from the capital Hargeysa, we think that they 
are isolated from the other regions… they don’t know what is going on there 
 
                                                     
639  When undertaking a research trip to the eastern town of Erigavo, the Haatuuf emblems on the cars were 
removed under the presumption that these stickers could provoke unnecessary tensions among the 
eastern population (Personal observation, Hargeysa, 07.04.2009). 
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and since they don’t have any information they do not think that they are part 
of Somaliland.”640  
Similarly, another interviewee claimed that: 
“Some of the people who live in the capital, they may have a big portion of 
information from the government while the other regions do not…. So if they 
could get that information partially, or equally, they will share their sense of 
Somaliland togetherness.”641  
Radio also played an important role in Somaliland’s media landscape, not only due to the 
fact that Somali society is predominantly an oral one (Interview 21), but also due to its 
illiteracy rate of about 60 per cent (IREX 2009:355). During the SNM struggle, radio had 
been used to mobilize people, and, once the war was over, it had an important impact on 
Somaliland’s demobilization campaign (Stanhope 2010:18). Subsequent to the declaration 
of independence, the premises of Radio Hargeysa in the capital were rehabilitated, and the 
SNM’s Radio Halgaan renamed itself Radio Hargeysa. Yet, in contrast to the print media, 
hardly any diversification took place, and Radio Hargeysa remained the country’s only 
broadcasting station. While much of this monopoly was due to technical limitations 
throughout the 1990s, Somaliland’s governments were strongly opposed to other radio 
stations going on air. Thus, the radio landscape remained very limited – both with regard to 
the number of radio outlets as well as their impact – during Somaliland’s first two decades. 
The government prohibited the establishment of private radio stations by ministerial decree 
in 2002.642 Furthermore, the Ministry of Information demanded that all transmitting 
equipment that had entered the country be handed over to the central state authorities and 
banned any further importation of radio transmitting equipment (Stanhope 2010:18). 
When, in 2005, individuals close to the Kulmiye party established Radio Horyaal, 
broadcasting a one-hour programme on shortwave from Belgium, military authorities 
prohibited soldiers from listening, arresting those who did not comply. Yasin Jama Ali, a 
stringer for the radio station and editor of the Berbera News website643 was arrested on 
August 13th, 2009, and accused of spreading “scandals against the nation” (Stanhope 
2010:25). Together with the chief of the radio station’s website, Mohamed Said Abdullahi, 
 
                                                     
640  Interview 301966180309, Stanhope 2010. 
641  Interview 1400899260409, Stanhope 2010.  
642  An attitude that was structurally not that different from the Barre government, which had prohibited all 
privately owned newspapers (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988:85). 
643  See URL: http://berberanews.com/news.php. 
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who was charged in absentia, the two were found guilty of committing “a crime against the 
Somaliland nation” on August 23rd, 2009 (Stanhope 2010:24).644  
The fact that Radio Hargeysa remained the sole radio station in the country could have 
contributed to enhancing socio-cognitive standardization within Somaliland, had it not been 
for the fact that its broadcasting range was limited to about 25km. Furthermore, the 
standardization capacity of Radio Hargeysa would have probably been eclipsed by that 
provided by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Somali Service, which was the 
most frequently listened to radio station, followed by Voice of America (VOA). Moreover, 
due to the limited media coverage the eastern parts of the country experienced over the 
course of the first two decades, large parts of the population in Sool and Sanaag tuned into 
broadcasts from Puntland (Interview 21). Despite the fact that Radio Hargeysa’s reach 
remained limited and even though it was subject to government control, numerous 
respondents to the questionnaire of the Somaliland Communication Flows Research 
Project expressed their scepticism towards a diversification of the broadcasting landscape.  
“The country is still young. So more radios will only divide the minds and hurt 
the healing of wounds that have been inherited from civil wars, centuries of 
war. If there are more radios the country would be chaotic. They would be 
divided according to clans.”645 
“I support that there should be one single radio station in the country because 
radio is good for state control. If the radio comes to be controlled by 
individuals there may be contradictions… that can create a lack of stability and 
make harm to the nation.”646  
“You hardly see a radio which is operating impartially, but it is each and every 
radio station or newsletter… based on individual and clan interests, which is 
really contributing to the current problems in south Somalia. So really the 
Somalia media is in such a chaotic manner, no editing, no ethical journalists are 
working there and they are contributing to the problem.”647  
 
                                                     
644  It is interesting to point out the manner in which the arrested journalists were dealt with by the 
government. According to NUSOJ (undated:6) it was common procedure that, upon arresting a journalist, 
the government would approach the respective clan elders, asking them to sign for the release of their clan 
member. This “serves as a guarantee for the government that the journalist will not repeat what he or she 
did, an act that journalists are unhappy about, since it amounts to blackmail.” While muzzling the 
journalists potentially contributed to regime standardization, the fact that the government resorted to the 
clan’s ‘rules of the game’ to implement its will rather points towards regime de-standardization.  
645  Interview 302266180309; see also e.g. Interview 401066070309; Stanhope 2010.  
646  Interview 301266080309; see also e.g. Interview 1400899260409; Stanhope 2010.  
647  Interview 600766260309; Stanhope 2010. 
7   THE STATE OF SOMALILAND 
 
246 
 
These three interview extracts, which were recorded in response to the survey question of 
how much plurality should be allowed in Somaliland with regard to radio stations, illustrate 
the belief of some that the diversification of media, and the potential it carries for socio-
cognitive de-standardization, could pose a challenge to the young polity.648 
Education Contributing to Standardization? 
After the end of the civil war in the early 1990s, the educational sector in Somaliland 
developed considerably. While in 1991 there were no educational facilities in place, a 
nascent educational system started to evolve from 1992 onwards (Bekalo et al. 2003:465). 
With the support of central government, local communities, foreign donors and the 
diaspora the number of educational establishments increased to reach some 627 primary 
schools, 59 secondary schools649 and ten universities nearly two decades into the polity’s 
existence (UNESCO 2009:10; MNPC 2010; see Table 10). Accordingly, the school 
population rose from basically zero to some 170,930 primary and 20,460 secondary pupils 
in 2009 (MNPC 2010).650 This significant development suggests that the educational sector 
also had a large potential for socio-cognitive standardization – but in how far was it 
harnessed? 
Considering the geographical distribution of schools, the educational system’s potential for 
socio-cognitive standardization was seemingly harnessed. While some 28 per cent of 
primary schools were concentrated in the region that is home to the country’s capital, the 
same region was also home to about 39 per cent of Somaliland’s population.651 Comparing 
the percentage figures of primary schools with those of regional populations, it can be seen 
that educational facilities were actually quite evenly spread across the territory (see Table 
11). The reason why there was much less of an ‘urban’ or ‘Isaaq bias’ – as could be 
observed with regard to the security sector, for example – probably lies in the fact that there 
was little involvement on the part of the government in the sphere of education. As the re-
evolution of the educational system depended largely on local actors, their respective 
diaspora, and international agencies, a more equitable regional distribution was assured. 
 
                                                     
648  However, overall about 70 per cent of respondents favoured privatization of radio stations in Somaliland, 
30 per cent were opposed. See also Interview 21. 
649  About 55 per cent of all secondary schools are public (UNESCO 2009:10).  
650  These numbers outstrip the enrolment rates of Somalia in 1961/62, when there were only some 18,000 
students enrolled in Somali schools (Abdi 1998:333). 
651  See WHO/UNICEF working estimates for the regional distribution of Somaliland’s population. For 
similar, yet slightly older estimates, see see UK Border Agency (2012:19) and Ambroso (2002:9). 
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Table 10: Growth of Public and Private Education from 1997/98 to 2008/09 
 
Source: MNPC 2010. 
Table 11: Distribution of Primary Education by Region (2008/09) 
 
Source: MNPC 2010; for the estimates on the regional distribution of the Somaliland population, see 
WHO/UNICEF working estimates. 
However, despite this indication that the educational system developed its potential to 
foster socio-cognitive standardization, a number of items call this supposition into 
question. First, while the education sector in its entirety experienced a considerable boost, 
and while this boost showed an equitable regional distribution, enrolment rates remained 
relatively low. Whereas primary school enrolment was put at between 20 per cent (UN/WB 
2006a:3) and 40 per cent (EC undated:6) in the mid-2000s, only some 15.6 per cent of 
those went on to secondary school, leading to a secondary school gross enrolment rate of 
about 8.1 per cent in 2007/08 (UNESCO 2009:10). Thereby, enrolment in urban areas was 
considerably higher (27 per cent) than in rural areas (16 per cent), not to speak of those of 
nomadic pastoralist communities (1 per cent) (Bekalo et al. 2003:465, referring to UNICEF 
Region (reg. capital) 
No. of 
schools 
% of Total 
Student Enrolment Population 
distribution Male Female 
Awdal (Boroma) 84 13.40%   14,010  9,508  12.5% 
M. Jeex (Hargeysa) 177 28.23%   44,136  23,962  39.3% 
Sahil (Berbera) 41 6.54% 5,131  3,611  5.1% 
Togdheer (Burco) 130 20.73% 18,434  9,569  23.3% 
Sanaag (Erigavo) 101 16.11% 13,149  7,978  10.1% 
Sool (Las Anood) 94 14.99% 13,462  7,980  9.7% 
 
Total 627 100.00% 108,322  62,608  100.0% 
 
Year Primary Schools Secondary Schools Vocational Universities 
1997/98 165 3 2 1 
1998/99 144 5 3 2 
1999/00 174 13 4 2 
2000/01 294 15 4 2 
2001/02 307 16 4 2 
2002/03 353 20 4 2 
2003/04 385 29 4 2 
2004/05 412 35 2 3 
2005/06 516 43 2 5 
2006/07 n.a. 44 2 6 
2007/08 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2008/09 627 59 n.a. 10 
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1996).652 Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that Somaliland’s achievements in the 
educational sector are respectable.  
Secondly, the education sector’s ability to contribute to socio-cognitive standardization was 
restricted due to a lack of resources. Whereas, prior to the Somali civil war, education had 
largely been managed by the central government in Mogadishu and heavily subsidized by 
foreign aid, the limited resources the Somaliland state had at its disposal in the years 
subsequent to its declaration of independence resulted in deregulation, privatization and 
decentralization of all educational services (Bradbury 2008:163f.).653 For example, of the 
roughly 5,000 teachers in the country, only 2,300 (i.e. 46 per cent) were on the payroll of 
the central government by the late 2000s (UNCDF 2009:53).654 Furthermore, about half of 
the teachers employed were either not trained at all or undertrained (MNPC 1999; MEDPR 
1999/2000; cf. Bekalo et al. 2003:465). And, by leaving the task of reviving schools and 
employing teachers to a mixture of communities, international aid agencies, Islamic 
charities, diaspora organizations and Somali businesses,655 the state relinquished 
considerable control over the education system in general and school curricula more 
particularly with implications for the extent to which education contributes to socio-
cognitive standardization. 
The fact that different school curricula were implemented in Somaliland during the first 
two decades after independence indicates that chances of socio-cognitive standardization 
were derogated. While 88.1 per cent of secondary schools utilized the Somalia curriculum, 
6.8 per cent used the Saudi Arabian one, 1.7 per cent the Kenyan, and 3.4 per cent made 
use of other curricula (UNESCO 2009:21).656 “Most primary schools appear to be 
opportunistic in their use of available curriculum materials from outside the country, or to 
devise their own curriculum […]. Notably, curriculum materials from Gulf States and 
 
                                                     
652  According to UNESCO (2011:1), the average rate of primary and lower secondary school enrolment 
across sub-Saharan Africa stood at 77 and 43 per cent respectively.  
653  Comparing Somaliland’s education sector with the one that existed under Barre, an interesting picture 
emerges. While from 1975 to 1979 the total basic recurrent and development expenditure on education 
had culminated in 19 per cent of the national budget (Ahmed I. Samatar 1988), Somaliland spent only 
eight per cent on all social services together in the late-2000s. However, it should be noted that in 1984, 
Somalia’s spending on education had fallen to between 1.5 and 2 per cent of the national budget, or 0.6 
per cent of GDP, while some 36 per cent was spent on defense and security (Bekalo et al. 2003:463f., 
referring to Abdi 1998; Ahmed I. Samatar 1988).  
654  Of these, only about ten per cent received regular salaries from the Ministry of Education (Interview 41). 
655  Merchants supported the educational sector by sponsoring chairs, tables, and blackboards (Interview 41). 
656  More benevolently, other informants suggest that one and the same curriculum was applied to 100 per 
cent by public schools and to 70 per cent by private schools (Interview 43). 
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neighbouring Kenya are in use unmodified” (Bekalo et al. 2003:460). Moreover, 
Somaliland’s history books – if at all available, dedicate only one page to the history of the 
SNM, thus sweeping apart important aspects of the country’s history (Interview 151).  
The State of the Nation 
As the potential for socio-cognitive standardization was not fully harnessed, Somaliland 
nationalism remained vague and hardly manifested beyond the national holidays of May 18th 
and June 26th (Interview 151). The fact that Somaliland nationalism did not truly blossom 
for the most part of the polity’s first two decades was ascribed to the state’s inability to 
provide certain socio-economic services to the population (Interview 150).657 As expressed 
by another interviewee, “[f]or the past eight years, nothing has been invested in common 
institutions that allow you to have loyalty to the state” (Interview 116). Moreover, a national 
sense of identity remained underdeveloped, because this identity hinged more on the future 
hope of international recognition, rather than past achievements from which common 
‘rules of the mind’ could be derived (Interview 156).658  
Ultimately, however, the development of national sentiments remained impoverished due 
to the prevalence of clannism, which increased in importance over time (Interviews 150, 
142). While President Egal had put much effort into creating a national identity, clan 
identities gained increasing strength, particularly under the Riyale government and in the 
run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections (Interviews 106, 112).659 A sign and a 
consequence of this development was that political parties increasingly aligned and 
identified with particular clans during the course of the 2000s (Interview 150), fostering 
identification with the clan rather than non-kinship-based groups (Interview 156) – a 
development that clearly detracted from socio-cognitive standardization. Consequently, 
interviewees argued that “I don’t believe that there is Somaliland nationalism. There is 
Isaaqism” (Interview 19), and that Somaliland was “an Isaaq project dominated by the 
Isaaq” (Interviews 95, 142, 114).660 
 
                                                     
657  According to some, this shortcoming of the Somaliland government was diametrically opposed to Barre’s 
government, which had managed to replace the clan as the most important service provider, thus effecting 
the retreat of clan identities and the emergence of nationalism (Interviews 144, 156). 
658  This is reflected by the fact that the SNM’s struggle is allocated merely one page in the schools’ history 
books (Interview 151; see also Interview 27). 
659  See Chapter 6.  
660  This judgement is, however, challenged by others (Interview 94).  
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7.3 Interim Conclusion  
While south-central Somalia faced a general trajectory of regime de-standardization in the 
two post-1991 decades,661 the Republic of Somaliland made certain strides in the direction 
of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Despite some laudable progress, 
however, this chapter elucidated that state-making in Somaliland was not as comprehensive 
as is frequently claimed. Although levels of regime standardization increased overall 
between 1991 and 2011, it appears that progress indicative of state-building and nation-
building remained unclear. Thus, rather than being turned into an ‘effective state’ as, for 
example, Othieno (2008) has it, the young polity seems to have consolidated as a fragile 
state. This is largely due to the fact that a plurality of different sets of ‘rules of the game’ 
and ‘rules of the mind’ not only continued to prevail, but was consolidated in the state’s set-
up. Whereas the 1990s had largely witnessed processes by which Egal wrested authority 
over particular sets of rules from the traditional authorities, the 2000s were generally 
marked by developments that saw the clan regime reconquering their spheres of influence.  
Moreover, the chapter suggested that the standardization of authoritative sets of rules had 
largely been confined to the ‘heartland’ inhabited by the Isaaq clan, while it remained 
principally absent from the ‘hinterland’. In other words, the polity’s periphery was generally 
marked by processes of de-standardization, largely due to the state’s lack of enforcement 
capacity. This was shown most prominently with the formation of the Puntland State of 
Somalia in 1998, the announcement of the Makhir State of Somalia in 2007 and the 
proclamation of the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) State of Somalia in 2009, all of which 
attested to Somaliland’s feeble level of regime standardization in its periphery.662 While 
those alternative state-making projects can be interpreted as having been the result of the 
central state’s inability to broadcast and enforce a particular set of rules, they can also be 
read as having resulted from the central state’s commission to do exactly this. In fact, the 
secessionist projects within Somaliland coincided with the state’s increasing administrative 
 
                                                     
661  Whereas de facto regime de-standardization showed in fragmentation of the country into different polities, 
de jure de-standardization was, for example, propelled by the decision to officially return to a multi-lingual 
society. During the Mbaghati Peace and Reconciliation Conference in Kenya in 2003, a sizeable majority 
of Somali politicians voted in favour of having two Somali languages – Maay and Maxaatiri – in addition 
to Arabic (see the Transitional Federal Charter of 2003, Art. 7; see Mukhtar 2007:129). 
662  While the Makhir State of Somalia was a Warsangeli project (Interview 156), the SSC State of Somalia is 
driven and supported by the Dhulbahante clan.  
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penetration of the respective regions, causing resistance among the particular non-Isaaq 
communities involved (Höhne 2011).  
Yet, whether brought about by the state’s omission or commission to implement particular 
institutions and socio-cognitive systems, the formation of these alternative state-making 
projects attests to the underlying regime plurality and the insufficient level of regime 
standardization achieved in Somaliland during the first two decades of its existence. 
Assessing Somaliland’s state of affairs, prominent Somaliland politicians argue that the 
polity was in a “transition to nowhere” (Interview 36) and, with an eye to the continuously 
strong force of clannism, express their belief that “we will never form a state” (Interview 
12; see also Interviews 19, 94). Hence, the benevolent assessment that “[t]he integration of 
the clan in the government also created a necessary link between ‘old’ Somali governance 
and the desired ‘new’ democracy” (Richards 2009:201) needs to be questioned. Viewed 
through the prism of regime standardization, the institutionalization of an institutional and 
socio-cognitive plurality was beset with more drawbacks than benefits. 
252 
 
8  
Conclusion  
“We were lucky” was the response given independently by two former high-ranking and 
well-respected Somali politicians when asked why Somaliland’s state trajectory diverged so 
significantly from that of south-central Somalia (Interviews 12, 36). While one informant 
sees Somaliland’s ‘luck’ as largely deriving from having had a capable leader in President 
Egal, the other proposes that Somaliland’s fortune lay in its long-lasting neglect by the 
international community – a neglect that allowed the polity to develop according to its own 
pace and patterns. Although both propositions are coherent, this thesis suggests that the 
reason for the divergence of Somali state trajectories transcends the dichotomy of ‘luck’ and 
‘misfortune’. Having scrutinized prevailing theoretical approaches to state-building, state 
fragility and nationalism, developed an original analytical framework that puts an 
institutional prism at its centre, and challenged received wisdom regarding the making and 
breaking of Somalia and Somaliland, this research project aimed to contribute to a better 
understanding of the nature of state development within and outside of Somali boundaries.  
The central empirical puzzle this thesis has addressed is if, why and how Somaliland’s state 
trajectory diverged from previous Somali state-making endeavours undertaken between 
1960 and 1991. Moreover, the research project raised the question under what condition was 
war beneficial rather than detrimental to state-making, as an answer to this conundrum was 
hoped to render additional insights into processes of the making and breaking of states. In 
order to address these and a number of further theoretical and empirical issues, the thesis 
put forth an analytical prism that draws on well-established insights from the literature on 
state-building, nation-building and warfare. According to this analytical framework, 
processes of state-(un)making can valuably be understood in terms of institutional and 
socio-cognitive (de-)standardization. The thesis also suggested that central administration 
provides an important tool for advancing the standardization of an authoritative set of 
‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’.  
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With reference to the cases of Somalia and Somaliland the thesis showed that processes of 
state-(un)making do, indeed, correlate closely with alterations in levels of institutional and 
socio-cognitive standardization. This finding is relevant in numerous ways, not least 
because it stresses the close relationship between trajectories of states and nations. 
Moreover, the research presented here suggests that while war was surely no ‘angel of 
order’, in historical and macro-societal terms it can be much more than a mere ‘daemon of 
decay’ – under the condition that it contributes to regime standardization. Besides 
generating further insights regarding the role of institutions in development and the 
ambivalent effects (premature) democratization can have on nascent state-making projects, 
this thesis also contributed to the literature on Somalia and Somaliland by providing new 
empirical observations and alternative insights into their trajectories. Thus, it scrutinized the 
prevailing interpretation of Somaliland being an unmitigated success story of peaceful, 
bottom-up and democratic state-making. 
By means of reviewing some of the key findings, distilling a number of central implications, 
and identifying some of the study’s caveats and avenues for further research, the final 
chapter is divided into three sections. Section one revisits some of the research project’s 
most central theoretical and empirical findings. This is followed by highlighting a number 
of implications these insights have for our understanding of, and attitude towards, (violent) 
processes of state-making and related issues of development in section two. The chapter 
concludes by reconsidering the study’s main limitations, highlighting remaining questions, 
and suggesting potential avenues for future research.  
 
8.1 Central Findings 
State and Nation – A Pair of Twins 
One central contribution this thesis makes to existing scholarship on state-making lies in its 
elaboration of an analytical prism that theoretically re-establishes the intimate connection 
between state-building and nation-building. While a number of scholars have emphasized 
the common bonds between the state and the nation (Weber 1948:78; Gellner 1983:1; 
Hobsbawm 1990:9f.), and others have rightly argued that state-building cannot succeed in 
the absence of nation-building (Lemay-Hébert 2009), there is a dearth of theoretical 
frameworks that integrate both concepts to understand processes of state-making and state-
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breaking. Drawing on a number of established insights from the literature on state-building 
(e.g. Evans et al. 1985; Mann 1988; Tilly 1992) and nationalism (e.g. Anderson 1983; 
Breuilly 1993; Smith 1998), and deploying ideas of institutional theory (e.g. North 1993; 
Denzau/North 1994) in order to bridge the analytical gap between the two strands of 
scholarly work, this thesis has proposed that processes of state-making can valuably be 
understood in terms of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. 
Apart from laying the theoretical foundations this thesis provided empirical evidence in 
support of the argument that it is processes of ‘rule-standardization’ that constitute the 
central underlying current as well as common denominator of both state-building and 
nation-building. Whereas state-building can, ultimately, be described as a development 
during the course of which an overarching set of ‘rules of the game’ gains dominance 
within a given society, the standardization of a common set of ‘rules of the mind’ is a 
defining characteristic of nation-building. And although state-building and nation-building 
are (analytically) distinct processes the thesis showed that they are closely intertwined. Thus, 
it can be observed at different instances in Somali history that changes in the institutional 
set-up conditioned alterations in concomitant socio-cognitive systems and identity patterns 
– the dissipation of authoritative ‘rules of the game’ in the late 1960s, for example, entailed 
a fragmentation of common ‘rules of the mind’ into subsidiary socio-cognitive systems. 
Hence, this research project not only made the case for the need for ‘bringing the nation 
back in’, if we are to better understand the complexities of state trajectories, but also 
disclosed that, figuratively speaking, there are numerous roads that lead to Rome. Put 
another way, the regime standardization thesis drives home the point that there is no one-
size-fits-all solution to state-making, partly because the sets of authoritative rules that are 
standardized, as well as the means by which they are standardized, differ from case to case 
and diverge in face of dissimilar (institutional) pre-dispositions. While, for example, all 
Somali state-making projects have been marked by an overall increase in levels of regime 
standardization, Barre’s and Egal’s state-making endeavours diverged not least insofar as 
they tried to standardize different sets of rules by different means. And while linguistic 
standardization might have been a condition sine qua non for state-making in France, it has 
been conspicuously absent from state-making processes in Switzerland.  
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War – A Bloody Backer of State-Making  
Apart from providing an exceptional opportunity to investigate processes of state-making 
and state-breaking, the Somali case studies also lend themselves to important questions 
about the relationship between state trajectories and war. While Tilly’s (1992:67) dictum 
that “war makes states, and vice versa” has become a classic proposition to explain state-
making in historical Europe, its validity has been questioned for contemporary developing 
countries (e.g. Kaldor 1999; Herbst 2000; Leander 2004). Pigeon-holed and dismissed as 
constituting “development in reverse” (World Bank 2003; Collier 2004), war has been 
denied any productive role in shaping states and/or forging nations. Although it is 
undeniable that wars are nasty and brutish, and even though I do not advocate “Give War a 
Chance” (Luttwack 1999), this thesis has scrutinized the proposition that war is a “political 
retrovirus […] about nothing at all” (Enzensberger 1994, as in Cramer 2006:77). 
Following scholars such as Cramer (2006) and Taylor and Botea (2008), this research 
project aimed to disaggregate the ‘black box’ of war in order to corroborate the proposition 
that war has, at times, played an important role in state-making in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Deflem 1999; Ahmed/Green 1999; Niemann 2007). As stipulated by the analytical prism 
of regime standardization, I found that war can be constitutive of state-making under the 
condition that it – or, rather, certain of its elements – contributes to an increase in 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. By extension this proposition challenges 
received wisdom, such as the propositions that civil wars are, principally by definition, 
detrimental to state-making (Biró 2007), whereas only ‘old’ wars could possibly be 
constitutive of the state (Kaldor 1999). In line with Clapham’s (2001:8) assertion that wars 
are as likely to make as to break states, I have argued that the analytically feeble division of 
wars into binary categories such as ‘intra-state/inter-state’ and ‘old/new’, for example, 
should be replaced by a more thorough understanding of which elements could add in what 
ways to state-making and which could detract.  
Although this thesis contributed only modestly to this debate, it demonstrated that the 
relationship between violent conflict and state trajectories is more complex than 
dichotomous concepts want to make us believe. While the Ogadeen War of 1977/78 had 
ambiguous effects on Somalia’s regime ecology, it could be observed that the process of 
state-breaking it resulted in originated less in the war per se, but more in Barre’s subsequent 
policies. Conversely, primary research revealed that both the civil wars of Somalia and 
Somaliland carried elements that were constitutive of state-making. Although I argue that 
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violent conflict constitutes neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for state-making, 
evidence suggests that wars may catalyse processes of regime standardization, not least 
because wars and the concomitant formation of armies provide “the most common vehicle 
for cultural homogenization” (Conversi 2007:388, my italics) and subject the population to a 
“uniform impulse” (Simmel 1964:92; O’Leary 1998:66). 
From Kalashnikovs to Calculators – The Centrality of Administration  
Apart from emphasizing the role war has played in Somali state trajectories, this thesis also 
pointed towards the crucial role central administration plays in state-making endeavours. 
Thereby, this proposition stands in the tradition of those scholars who have highlighted 
that administration lies at the heart of both state-building (e.g. Tilly 1985:45; Herbst 
2000:124) and nation-building (e.g. Anderson 1983:53; Giddens 1985:116). While Röder 
(2007) has also cunningly argued for the centrality of administration in explaining state-
making, the thesis went beyond his proposition that “nation-states have mostly come from 
administrative upgrade of segment-states” (ibid.11).663 In light of the regime standardization 
thesis I make the argument that the reason why central administration matters for state-
making is to be found in it constituting a key tool for bringing about institutional and socio-
cognitive standardization. This theoretical proposition could be observed empirically in the 
Somali case studies, where the spread of particular rules hinged on the presence of an 
effective administration.  
The realization that central state administration has an overwhelming potential to broadcast 
and enact regime standardization has important implications for the way international 
actors think about and conduct administrative reforms in developing countries in general 
and fragile states more particularly. It emphasises that administration is not solely a 
technical, but in fact highly political issue that not only plays a central role in determining 
the ‘rules of the game’, but also has significant influence on the ‘rules of the mind’. It also 
cautions against policy prescriptions that envision a considerable downsizing of the 
administrative architecture for the sake of efficiency – as has frequently been demanded in 
the framework of the (post-)Washington Consensus (e.g. World Bank 1997; Edwards 1997) 
– as this is likely to restrict a government’s potential to spread common institutions and 
socio-cognitive systems. Given that the military apparatus is, generally, the second most 
 
                                                     
663  Röder (2007) understands ‘segment-states’ to be administrative jurisdictions of the overarching nation-
state, such as the union states of the former USSR.  
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significant tool to broadcast and (violently) enforce regime standardization, the diminution 
of administration not only carries the danger of contributing to regime de-standardization, 
but also of directly playing into the hands of heightened militarization.  
A New Narrative for Somalia and Somaliland  
Another intrinsic contribution of this research lies in the alternative narrative it provides for 
the state trajectories of Somalia and Somaliland. Countering, for example, the proposition 
that the disintegration of the Somali state started with the onset of dictatorial rule in 1969 
(e.g. Abdullahi 2007a:43), this thesis showed that far from state-breaking, Barre’s reign 
between 1969 and the mid-1970s was predominantly marked by processes indicative of 
state-making. Similarly, the thesis put forth a nuanced interpretation of the 1977/78 
Ogadeen War and its effects on the unmaking of the Somali state. While agreeing with the 
proposition that the Somali-Ethiopian war constituted the most visible turning point that 
separated the phase of state-making in the early and mid-1970s from the one of state-
breaking during the 1980s, I postulated that the unmaking of the Somali state hinged less 
on the war itself – as frequently suggested by the respective literature664 – than on the 
policies subsequently enacted by the national political leadership and international actors.665 
Moreover, I argued that the fragility of Somali state-making projects did not lie with the fact 
that the “cultural traditions are not compatible with the constructs of a modern state” 
(Mansur 1995:115), but that it rather stemmed from the regime plurality that rooted in their 
parallel existence.   
Much more distinct, however, this thesis added to the debate on Somaliland’s state 
trajectory by providing new empirical facts, an alternative interpretation of these, and, thus, 
a narrative that sets itself apart from most existing accounts. Based on extensive primary 
research the thesis scrutinized some of the most prominent ideas that surround 
Somaliland’s trajectory – namely that its state-making project has been a ‘success’ (Jhazbhay 
2007; Shinn 2002),666 which is ‘unique’ (Hoyle 2000:85; Kaplan 2008b:148)667 in that it has 
been characterized by ‘peaceful progression’ (Othieno 2008; Sufi 2003:285; Bradbury 
 
                                                     
664   See Tareke 2000:666; Cassanelli 1996; Hamrick 1993; Laitin 1982; cf. Besteman 1996a:589. 
665  On the detrimental effects of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on Somalia’s state-making 
project, see e.g. A.I. Samatar 1993. 
666  Eggers 2007; Othieno 2008; Bradbury 2008; Kaplan 2008b; Walls 2009a; Kibble/Walls 2010b; 
Harris/Foresti 2011. 
667  Jhazbhay 2009:50. For an application of this argument to all of Somalia, see e.g. Adam/Ford 1998:v. 
8   CONCLUSION 
 
258 
 
2003:455) based on ‘traditional reconciliation’ (Adam 1995; Terlinden/Debiel 2003; 
Othieno 2008), ‘home-grown democratic institutions’ (Azam 2011:157; ICG 2003:34),668 
and a ‘vibrant democracy’ (Forti 2011:5; Kaplan 2008b:148).669 While having refrained from 
wholly dismissing these accounts, this thesis countered that Somaliland’s state-making 
process has been much more ambiguous, with numerous parallels with other state-making 
endeavours within and outside of Somali boundaries, and showed significant traits of 
violent episodes, top-down policies, and shrewd power politics. Rather than celebrating 
Somaliland’s achievements, this research project scrutinized its progress, and indicated that 
even in the case of Somaliland, not all good things have gone together.670  
As well as providing some additional insights into the economic foundations and some of 
the most pertinent dynamics of elite bargaining in Somaliland, the thesis also called the 
assertion that it is the ‘traditional elders’ who are “responsible for the success of Somaliland 
today” (Leonard 2009:13; Flint 1994:36; Massey 1994:123)671 into question.672 While the 
celebration of the elders has fanned the flames of the proposition that Somaliland’s ‘best 
kept secret’ (Jhazbhay 2003) is, allegedly, to be found in the hybridity of its political orders 
(Böge et al. 2008; Moe 2009a; Renders 2010), my research leads me to conclude that, first, 
the role of the traditional authorities in state-making has been eclipsed by the political, 
economic and military elite, and, second, the involvement of the elders has been much 
more ambiguous for Somaliland’s trajectory than commonly acknowledged. Although 
refraining from overgeneralizing the role played by elders, this thesis suggested that they 
have tended to impede processes of regime standardization in Somali state trajectories. 
 
 
                                                     
668  WB/UNDP 2008:11; Ibrahim/Terlinden 2010. 
669  Bradbury 2008:1; ICG 2003:10; World Bank 2005:19; Eubank 2010. 
670  Here I borrow from Packenham’s (1973) observation that “American liberalism approached foreign aid 
policy with the belief that ‘all good things go together’” (Putzel 1997:941). 
671  See also Bongartz (1991:61) who goes so far as to suggest that Somalia be reconciled and governed by an 
inter-clan council of elders. 
672  Indirectly, I thus also challenge the underlying narratives of ‘colonial difference’ and ‘cultural difference’, 
reappraising them as insufficient to account for the differences in state-making that can be observed 
between Somaliland and south-central Somalia, even though cultural and historical divergences do clearly 
exist and have influenced the basis of the respective regime ecologies.  
8   CONCLUSION 
 
259 
 
8.2 Broader Implications 
How State-Making Counters Peace-Making  
Although this research only touched upon the controversy surrounding the 
interrelationship of state-making and peace-building in passing, the thesis speaks to this 
debate in a generic way. While some analysts have come to argue that the concepts of 
peace-building and state-building are “largely congruent” (e.g. Grävingholt et al. 2009), the 
work presented here supports the more critical position that the two are not only different, 
but can counteract each other (e.g. Call 2008a/b; Cliffe/Manning 2008; Call/Wyeth 2008). 
Consequently, I agree with scholars such as Menkhaus (2003:407f.), who argue that “state 
building and peace-building are two separate and, in some respect, mutually antagonistic 
enterprises in Somalia” (see also Tadesse 2004a:66; Menkhaus 2008c). The same 
proposition holds for Somaliland, where Egal’s state-making endeavour of the mid-1990s 
clearly challenged the newly won peace head-on and resulted in a number of civil wars.  
Even though the separateness of processes of state-making and peace-building is 
commonly recognised in the literature on Somaliland, some of its authors were seduced 
into neatly dividing the polity’s history into consecutive phases of peace-building, state-
building, and democratization (e.g. Ali/Walls 2008:18). While much could be said about 
such simplistic divisions, the operative point here is an analytical one: conceptualizations 
that understand peace-building and state-making as successive phases of a more or less 
linear trajectory of a society’s post-war development fail to acknowledge that these 
processes do not (necessarily) build on one another, but are rather involved in a 
concomitant competition with each other. Why and how is state-making not at peace with 
peace-building when viewed through the analytical lens of regime standardization? 
In the framework of the regime thesis, state-making is understood as a process during the 
course of which particular (sets of) ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ are 
standardized among the members of a territorially delineated population, i.e. a process that 
creates institutional and socio-cognitive conformity. Given that changes in a society’s set of 
rules go hand-in-hand with shifts in power, state-making processes are inherently crisis-
prone and likely to see antagonistic actors turn violent in order to assert themselves and 
their particular rules. While the concept of assertion also plays a part in peace-building, the 
latter process is equally characterized by compromise and mutual acceptance. Viewed 
through the regime standardization prism, peace-building is ultimately about the termina-
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tion of violent processes that are designed to create institutional and socio-cognitive 
homogeneity, and predominantly geared towards accepting the simultaneity of plural ‘rules 
of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. While political organizations and alliances can manage 
conflicts generated by state-making processes, peace-building and state-building are difficult 
to reconcile.  
Why Democratization Carries Dangers 
More explicitly, this thesis raised questions about the effect of policies of democratization 
and decentralization on processes of state-making. Having observed how the Somali state 
of the 1960s slid into an “artificial democracy” (Adam 1999:262; Mansur 1995:114; 
Abdullahi 2007a:43) and how Somaliland came to epitomise a clanocracy rather than 
democracy in the eyes of some analysts (Interviews 153, 112), the question arises as to how 
far democratic forms of governance have helped or hindered the respective state-making 
projects. Whereas democracy has been identified as a crucial part of development because it 
provides “the freedom to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value” (Sen 1999:14), 
empirical evidence also suggests that democratization is prone to polarizing political 
identities, resulting in social, political and economic instability or even breakdown 
(Mamdani 2001:23; Chang 2002:76; van de Walle 1999:22f.).673 How do the findings 
presented in this thesis speak to the broader debate on democratization? 
As shown in Chapter 5, the democratic transition in Somaliland has been much less 
characterized by the ‘grassroots’ and ‘bottom-up’ development than is frequently claimed. 
In line with Sibanda’s (2000) proposition that “new democracies continue to represent the 
interests of the elite”, it can be observed that the polity’s democratization has generally 
been marked by top-down processes designed to maintain the power of the ruling elite, 
rather than to create a political level playing field. Moreover, I suggested that democratiza-
tion occurred prematurely in Somaliland, as, in the absence of consolidated sub-national 
political identities, it evidently promoted a relapse into clannism, which fostered regime de-
standardization and state fragmentation.674 The formation of the Makhir State of Somalia in 
2007 and the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) State in the late 2000s support the cogency not 
 
                                                     
673  While scholars such as Rai (1996) point out that democratic institutions (in old as well as new 
democracies) tend to marginalize subordinate groups, other researchers show that new democracies 
exhibit significantly higher rates of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001; Bates 2008:11).   
674  The relapse of Somaliland’s political elite into clannism parallels well with the parliamentary era of the 
1960s, when “civilian elites manipulated clanism to win elections” (H.H. Adam 1995:205).  
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only of this argument, but also of comparative accounts on democratization,675 which 
suggest that transitions into democratic forms of governance frequently result in political 
instability and the mobilization of ‘illiberal’ political forces (Zakaria 1997). 
Although elections contain the potential for strengthening state-making, not least because a 
voter’s experience of joining all other elective citizens in voting for new political 
representatives is likely to enhance the creation of an ‘imagined community’, electoral 
processes can also have the opposite effect – namely in contexts in which political identities 
remain principally congruent with ethnic or clan identities. Under these auguries it is 
commendable that Somaliland could advance its state-making project not because of but 
despite the fact that it embarked on a process of democratization – which was, however, 
rather shallow. While more research is needed to better understand under what conditions 
certain policies, events or actions exert either positive or negative influences on the 
standardization of particular ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’, the regime 
standardization thesis clearly supports past propositions that caution against precipitously 
introducing liberal democracies in fragile states.  
What Advocates of HPOs Should Reconsider  
The case of Somaliland has been instrumental in giving rise to and fuelling concepts of 
‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006), the ‘negotiated state’ (Menkhaus 2006/07), and ‘hybrid 
political orders’ (HPOs) (Böge et al. 2008). In trying to provide an alternative to Weberian 
conceptualizations of the state these frameworks principally suggest that Somaliland’s 
alleged state-making ‘success’ lies in the simultaneity and interaction of different sets of 
institutions, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ ones. The analytical prism of regime standardization 
calls these concepts into question, not least because they remain inconclusive regarding the 
question under what conditions and what kind of HPOs are supportive of rather than 
inimical to state-making. Rather than advocating treating HPOs as political orders in their 
own right (Kraushaar/Lambach 2009), the regime prism suggests that the hybridity of 
political orders – or, in the terminology of the regime prism, the plurality of institutions and 
socio-cognitive systems – is inimical to state-making. The underlying rationale is that regime 
plurality impedes the standardization of authoritative sets of ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules 
of the mind’, thus restricting state-making at its very roots.   
 
                                                     
675  E.g. Mansfield/Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000.  
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In the Somali context, Elmi (1992:61f.) remarks similarly critically that “[t]he strong 
advocation […] that the resolution of the present crisis and conflict in Somalia lies in clan 
and clan-chiefs rather than the political movements and leaders is a greatly misconceived 
notion of the realities in Somalia” (see also Interview 12). As demonstrated in this thesis, it 
has rather been the case that in both Somalia and Somaliland it was ‘shrewd politicians’ 
rather than ‘benevolent elders’ who advanced the respective state-making projects, and that 
the latter generally achieved greater progress in situations in which the traditional 
authorities and the clan regimes they presided over were side-lined. It is not without reason 
that the democratic leadership of the 1960s as well as the dictatorial government of the 
1970s as well as the Somaliland administration of the 1990s all tried to limit the powers of 
the traditional authorities and relegate them from the political arena.  
Although having acknowledged that fragile states are inherently ‘hybrid’ as regards their 
political order, I have argued that this hybridity should not be taken as an ideal or 
benchmark for state-making. While a plurality of different rules can be desirable or even 
necessary to keep states functional in the long-term – partly because it may contribute to a 
state’s resilience in that it provides alternative institutional frameworks that offer “the 
possibility of switching strategically from one institutional universe to another” (CSRC 
2005:8; North 2005:42) – this thesis has carved out the argument that such plurality is more 
likely to be inimical in the early stages of the development of (fragile) states. Thus, in a 
manner analogous to the dictum of Rodrik (2008) on economic development, I propose 
that ‘what is required to sustain states should not be confused with what is required to 
initiate them.’  
 
8.3 Caveats, Remaining Questions and Avenues for Future 
Research 
Caveats 
A number of caveats that are inherent to this study should be mentioned briefly. One 
obvious limitation of the research presented here lies in its application of the case study 
approach in general and the restriction of this project to the Somali case in particular. 
Although Landman (2008:28) considers a single-country study “comparative if it uses 
concepts that are applicable to other countries, and/or seeks to make larger inferences that 
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stretch beyond the original country used in the study” – conditions this research project 
was keen to fulfil – and even though I could overcome some of the single case study 
limitations by dividing the Somali case into ‘subunits’ in order to undertake comparative 
studies over time and space so as to make “many observations from few” (King et al. 
1994:217ff.; Lijphart 1971), this project could not escape the general caveats of a single case 
study approach. Thus, the study remains limited in reaching generalizable conclusions (see 
Tellis 1997), and its analytical prism needs to be applied to other empirical cases in order to 
test its validity and usefulness. 
One caveat that is more specific to the analytical framework presented here lies in the fact 
that its utility hinges on in-depth knowledge of the respective case, as the lens of regime 
standardization hardly lends itself to a large-N comparative study, not least because the 
standardization of rules can be achieved by rather different means. The execution of large-
N studies with the aid of the regime prism is further impeded by the fact that the theoretical 
framework of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization is geared towards 
understanding processes rather than identifying and operationalizing clearly defined 
variables. And given that the processes under investigation are, in the context of state-
(un)making, generally drawn-out ones, the study at hand also faces another limitation: the 
periods of state-making and state-breaking investigated here may well be too short to 
authoritatively determine the trajectories of states, which unfold over decades and centuries.    
Remaining Questions  
While this research project has shed light on a number of questions, it has left some 
unanswered and raised many more. One set of questions that remains for future research is 
how far the anti-Barre war in south-central Somalia in the late 1980s – and its subsequent 
continuation during the 1990s and even 2000s – effected institutional and socio-cognitive 
standardization, and why the levels of regime standardization in south-central Somalia were 
seemingly less pronounced than in the territory that came to be Somaliland. Although a 
number of potential reasons can be hinted at in this regard – amongst others the fact that 
southern rebel movements had a high leverage, that settlement and production patterns 
differed from those in northern Somalia, and that many more actors fought over higher-
priced stakes – additional work is required to address this more contemporary comparative 
question, which is beyond the scope of the research presented here.  
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Similarly, the puzzle of why the SNM but not the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) 
effected a de facto secession from Somalia and why the attempt to build a Rahanweyn State 
of Somalia did not show more progress remains unaccounted for by this thesis. 
Constituting the militant movement of the agricultural Sab communities in southern 
Somalia, the RRA fought for the interests of the Sab clans of the Digil, Rahanweyn and 
other minority groups, all of whom had been politically neglected for decades (Castagno 
1964:532; Cassanelli 1996:17). Given that these groups had apparently been much less 
incorporated into the Somali state and, thus, much less standardized than the Isaaq of 
north-western Somalia, for example,676 this question is particularly pertinent when viewed 
through the analytical prism of regime standardization. In institutional and socio-cognitive 
terms, the Sab had probably about the most uniform and most delineated set of rules that 
should have facilitated the formation of alternative statehood. However, this did not 
happen – why?  
Future Research Avenues  
One possible way to expand on the research presented here lies in either addressing the 
aforementioned ‘remaining questions’ or investigating the previously delineated ‘broader 
implications’ in greater detail. The former avenue could valuably be pursued in the 
framework of an in-depth study of regime trajectories in post-Barre south-central Somalia, 
as this would provide comparative empirical material that could contribute to a better 
understanding of why the state trajectories of north-west and south-central Somalia 
diverged so significantly. The latter route could, for example, give rise to a holistic 
investigation of the relationship between peace-building and state-making. In particular, 
additional research could focus on the effects historical and contemporary peace processes 
have exercised on respective projects of state-making. Hypothesizing that internationally 
negotiated (liberal) peace processes enhance rather than reduce regime plurality and, thus, 
 
                                                     
676  See e.g. the fact that only 12 per cent of the male population of the Bas-Jubba region participated in the 
courses offered by Barre’s literacy campaign of the mid-1970s, and that the Sab communities not only 
differed in cultural aspects from the pastoral Somali nomads, but also spoke a dialect (Af maay maay) 
different from the official Somali tongue (Compagnon 1995:370). “The decision in 1972 to adopt a Latin 
orthography for Somali and to make Somali (that is, the language of the central and northern regions, 
known as Af-maxaad) the official language of government and education further isolated Af-maay 
speakers from the political mainstream” (Cassanelli 1996:17). Moreover, the Digil and Mirifle party 
HDMS of the 1960s, had been judged the “only party completely established on a tribal basis” (Ware 
1965:176). 
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handicap the stabilization and consolidation of post-war states, such research would be 
well-placed to shed additional light on the peace-building versus state-making conundrum.  
Moreover, this research could be taken forward by extending the regime standardization 
prism to other cases in order to test its usefulness to better understand state-making 
trajectories. One obvious possible case study is Iraqi Kurdistan, which shares numerous 
features with the Somaliland case study presented here. As an alternative to extending the 
research to other cases, one could also think about shifting the analytical focus under 
investigation. In this sense, it could be worth addressing the question of how far, not war, 
but the presence or absence of industrialization has played a key role for the process of 
regime standardization in past and present state-making projects. This potential research 
stream could be guided by the hypothesis that the formation of a productive sector in 
Europe allowed political identities to form around interest groups, such as labour unions, 
rather than along ethnic or clan lines, thus facilitating the creation of overarching ‘rules of 
the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’ that could act in a unifying rather than dividing way.677 
Rather than arguing that the existence of a civil society is a precondition for democracy 
(Toernquiest 1999:135), it could be proposed that it is rather the existence of political as 
opposed to clan identities that is a precondition for democratic development. 
A final agenda item for future research to be sketched out here lies in refining the analytical 
framework of regime standardization. Guided by the overarching questions of how to 
assess degrees of standardization, future research could investigate what levels of 
institutional and socio-cognitive conformity need to be reached to make state-making a 
sustainable process. Apart from exploring the role national actors play in bringing about 
regime standardization, this research stream would also invite a closer analysis of the impact 
international actors and their past and present policies have had on supporting or impeding 
the standardization of common ‘rules of the game’ and ‘rules of the mind’. Having 
acknowledged that state-making can valuably be understood as a process during the course 
of which a particular set of institutions and socio-cognitive systems is standardized across a 
geographically delineated population, the question arises concerning the conditions under 
which and how, the so-called ‘international community’ can effectively support processes of 
state-making in the 21st century.  
 
                                                     
677  See e.g. Diamond et al. (1995:43) according to whom the presence and even generation of cross-cutting 
cleavages is one of the means by which democracies “manage, soften, complicate, and contain conflict.”  
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Appendix
Chart 1: Clan Genealogy 
 
 
Author’s illustration, following Lewis 1961 and Hagi/Hagi 1998. Note: This chart of Somali clan genealogy is 
simplified and cannot portray the much more complex and disputed nature of ‘true’ Somali kinship genealogy.  
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Map 1: The Reserved Areas and the Ogadeen 
 
 
Author’s map. Sources: Delineation of Ethiopian administrative zones taken from URL: http://reliefweb.int/-
map/ethiopia/administrative-regions-and-zones-ethiopia; accessed 10 July 2012; and Northern Frontier District 
taken from URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7168551.stm; accessed 10 July 2012. 
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Map 2: Colonial Partition and Ethnic Distribution of the Somali People 
 
 
 
Author’s map. Sources: Delineation of international boundaries taken from URL: 
http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=287; accessed 9 September 2012; Approximate 
distribution of ethnic Somali taken from URL: http://michaelmaren.com/1993/01/170/; 
accessed 9 September 2012.   
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Map 3: Political Map Somalia  
 
Source: Balthasar/Grzybowski 2012. Courtesy of the Small Arms Survey. Cartography by Jillian Luff, 
MAPgrafix, with significant input by the author. 
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Map 4: Map of Somaliland 
 
Source: Balthasar/Grzybowski 2012. Courtesy of the Small Arms Survey. Cartography by Jillian Luff, 
MAPgrafix, with significant input by the author. 
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Map 5: Map of Customs and Inland Revenue Offices in Somaliland 
 
Source: Base map: Survey Action Centre 2003; modifications by the author. 
